




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





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THE PANMURE PAPERS

THE KAMMOK PAPERS





Alexander, P. Sc.

The Right Hon^{ble} Fox Maule Ramsay, K.C.B.
XIth Earl of Dalhousie and 2nd Lord Panmure,
Lord Lieutenant of Forfarshire.

THE PANMURE PAPERS

BEING A SELECTION FROM THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF FOX MAULE,
SECOND BARON PANMURE, AFTER-
WARDS ELEVENTH EARL OF
DALHOUSIE, K.T., G.C.B.

EDITED BY
SIR GEORGE ^{BRISTANE} DOUGLAS, BART., M.A.

AND

SIR GEORGE DALHOUSIE RAMSAY
C.B.; LATE OF THE WAR OFFICE

WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER BY
THE LATE REV. PRINCIPAL RAINY, D.D.

VOLUME I

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON: MCMVIII

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HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON: MCMVIII

PREFACE

‘HISTORY,’ says Lord Acton,¹ ‘is better written from letters than from histories.’ In *The Panmure Papers* the historical student will find given to the world, for the first time, the correspondence of a Sovereign with her War Minister during the course of a great modern war. Out of nearly two hundred letters of Queen Victoria which the Editors have been graciously permitted by His Majesty the King to print, less than a dozen have been already published in *The Letters of Queen Victoria, 1837-1861*, edited by Mr. A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher.² The remainder are so far unpublished, and are, we venture to say, of the utmost interest in illustrating, not only Her Majesty’s profound sympathy with her Army in its seasons of suffering and of triumph, but her close attention to the minutiae of the War Department and the details of its administration. Second only to these in interest are the letters of his Royal Highness the Prince Consort, revealing as they do the breadth of intellectual view and the high sense of duty of one whose services to the nation were too early lost and too late appreciated. Lord Palmerston’s letters may be said to illustrate the principle that, to the successful carrying on of a great war, the personal interest of the Prime Minister in the affairs of the War Department is essential. Of Lord Panmure’s own letters it is enough here to say that, in addition to the new light thrown by

¹ *Historical Essays*, p. 506.

² Murray, 1907.

them upon the Crimean War, and especially upon the period following the close of Kinglake's authoritative work—as, for instance, by the plans for the continuation of the war in the summer of 1856—they will be found to touch on many questions not uninteresting to the military student at a time of development and remodelling in the Army. The papers here published have been selected from a vast mass of material, much of which has necessarily been sacrificed to the considerations of continuity of narrative and of events which have retained their interest for the general public.

The Editors desire to express to the representatives of the writers of the letters their thanks for permission to print the same.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE ancient family of Maule is one which from the historian's point of view has enjoyed exceptional advantages; for, as far back as the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries, two accomplished members of that family devoted themselves to the compilation and illustration of the history of their house. Mr. Harry Maule of Kellie, a younger son of George, second Earl of Panmure, and his son, James Maule, combined ardour in research with a remarkable erudition, and with a degree of critical discrimination, which in their day were rare, and it is mainly owing to their labours that the archives of Panmure can be characterised as among the 'fullest and most considerable in Scotland.'¹ In indicating as briefly as possible the outline of the family history, we shall be guided by the documents collected as above.

The family of Maule, then, is stated to be of French origin, the first member of whom record survives being Ansold, Lord of Maule, near St. Germain; who, in the year 1015, made a donation to the Priory of St. Martin des Champs at Paris.

Second in succession from the above was another Ansold, whose great wealth obtained for him from the ecclesiastical historian, Ordericus Vitalis, the designation of 'the rich Parisian.'

In 1076, his son and heir, Peter, Lord of Maule, grants the two churches of the village of Maule to the monks of

¹ *Registrum de Panmure*, Editor's Preface, p. lxxx.

St. Evroult in Normandy. In 1098 Peter with his sons defended his castle of Maule against an assault by William Rufus. In 1106 he died, and in 1398, by the marriage of the heiress of Robert, its last lord, the French house of Maule became merged in that of Morainvilliers.

Meantime, the founder of the English branch of the family was a son of Peter, Lord of Maule, named above, who, having accompanied William the Conqueror to England, received from him the lordship of Hatton de Cleveland in Yorkshire, together with much other land in the conquered country.

In the reign of Henry I., Robert and Stephen de Maule make a grant of the church of Hatun of Cleveland, with its pertinents, to the Abbey of St. Hilda at Whitby.

During the struggle between the adherents of King Stephen and those of the Empress Matilda, Scotland continued to attract many settlers from the south, and it is believed to have been at this period that the above-named Robert de Maule migrated to the Court of King David I., from whom he received a grant of lands in Lothian. Robert Maule's second son, by name Roger, continued the family in the male line.

About the year 1224, Roger's grandson, Sir Peter Maule, married Christina de Valoniis, of Panmure, the heiress of another Norman family, whose grandfather, Philip de Valoniis, had been High Chamberlain of Scotland, and had received from William the Lion a grant of the manors of Panmure and Benvie. And from this time on, says the family historian, 'the succession is abundantly clear, and every link is established by the family papers.' Accepting this assurance, we refrain from tracing categorically the successors of Sir Peter Maule and his wife, as they appear during the centuries immediately following, figuring as granters of tacks and charters, and in other legal instruments.

In the earlier part of the fifteenth century, Sir Thomas Maule, claiming through the De Barclay family, established his right as heir to the lordship of Brechin.

In 1547 Robert Maule, having opposed the match between Edward of England and Mary of Scotland, was made prisoner by the English whilst defending his house of Panmure, and underwent a term of confinement in the Tower. Of him and of his eldest son, Thomas, born in 1521, of their characters and adventures both in warfare and the hunting-field, the family MS. furnishes accounts which are highly picturesque and interesting.

In the seventeenth century, Patrick Maule was a Gentleman of the Bedchamber to King James I. and his successor. In 1646, in consideration of long and faithful service to these sovereigns, his son, a second Patrick, was created a peer by the title of Earl of Panmure, Lord Brechin and Navar.

Lord Panmure shared the King's captivity at Holmby and Carisbrook, and, dying in 1661, was succeeded by his son George, who had fought for Charles II. at Dunbar and Inverkeithing, and who now carried out his father's intention of rebuilding the house of Panmure—a work which was supplemented by his eldest son and immediate successor.

True to the Stuart traditions of his family, James, the fourth earl, who had succeeded his elder brother, opposed the settlement of the Crown on William and Mary, and having declined to take the oath of allegiance on their accession, never again appeared in the Scottish Parliament.

In the Jacobite rising of 1715 he himself proclaimed King James VIII. at the market-cross of Brechin, fighting for him at Sheriffmuir, and being taken prisoner. Having been rescued by his brother, Harry Maule of Kellie, of whom mention has already been made, he entertained the Chevalier at Brechin Castle. But his

adherence to the Stuarts cost him dear ; for, being attainted of high treason, his honours and estates were forfeited to the Crown, and he himself was driven into exile. To him succeeded his brother Harry, who, though as stout a Jacobite as himself, nevertheless contrived to obtain a lease of the forfeited estates of Panmure and Brechin from the purchasers.

Harry Maule had improved a period spent in exile by prosecuting his studies in the Law of Nations and the Canon Law of the Church, in both of which he was deeply versed, and had likewise conducted an extensive correspondence with the leading Jacobites. His elder son, James, sometimes styled Lord Maule, had inherited his studious tastes, and assisted him in collecting and arranging the documents illustrative of the family history. But, James having predeceased him, he was succeeded by his younger son, William, who restored the honours and estates of the family.

Having entered the Army, and served at the battles of Dettingen and Fontenoy, William Maule became a General Officer, represented Forfarshire in Parliament, and in 1743 was created a Peer of Ireland by the title of Earl of Panmure of Forth. In 1764 he bought back the forfeited estates in Forfarshire for a nominal price, a feeling of honour and of consideration restraining others from bidding against him. He died unmarried in 1782, when his title became extinct.

The succession was then continued by the family of Jean, his sister, the eldest daughter of Harry Maule of Kellie, who had married George, Lord Ramsay, eldest son of William, fifth Earl of Dalhousie.

Thus, on the death of the Earl of Panmure, in 1782, the Panmure estates were inherited by his nephew, George, eighth Earl of Dalhousie, the second son of the above marriage ; and on the death of the eighth earl, in 1787,

they were vested, in terms of a deed of entail,¹ in his second son, the Honourable William Ramsay, who there-upon assumed the name and arms of Maule of Panmure.

A lad of fifteen when he inherited the Panmure estates, William Maule in due course became a cornet in the 11th Dragoons, but left that regiment to raise an Independent Company, which, however, was soon disbanded. From 1796 to 1831 he represented the county of Forfar in Parliament, and in the latter year was created a Peer of the United Kingdom, by the title of Baron Panmure of Brechin and Navar. In 1794 he married Patricia Heron Gordon, daughter of Gilbert Gordon of Halleaths, in Dumfriesshire, by whom he had a family of seven daughters and three sons.

The eldest son, who, on the death of his father in 1852, became the second Baron Panmure, and is the subject of this memoir, was born April 22, 1801, and was christened Fox as a compliment to Charles James Fox, the Man of the People, for whom his father, the first Liberal of his family, and an approver of the principles of the French Revolution, cherished an enthusiastic admiration. This incident led to the following interchange of letters.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE CHARLES JAMES FOX
TO WILLIAM MAULE, ESQUIRE

ST. ANNE'S HILL, *Wednesday, September 16, 1801.*

SIR,—I learn from a friend in Scotland that you have done me the great honour of naming your eldest son after me. Such a circumstance, from a person of your distinction, to whom I had not the happiness of being personally known, can only be owing to your approbation of my general conduct; and in this view allow me to return you my warmest thanks for this very honourable testimony.

¹ Which provided that these and the Dalhousie estates should not be held by the same person.

The esteem which I feel for the character you so universally bear makes me justly set the highest value on it.—I am, with great regard, sir, your most obedient servant,
C. J. Fox.

To the above Mr. Maule replied as follows :—

BRECHIN CASTLE, *October 11, 1801.*

SIR,—I had the honour to receive your letter. Had I been personally known to you, I would not have named my son after you without having previously solicited your consent. Respect for your public and private virtues, and the high estimation in which I have always held the exertions you have made in the cause of humanity and in defence of public liberty, contrasted with the conduct of your opponents, were certainly my motives, and I am much gratified to find that my having done so meets with your approbation.—I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,

WILLIAM MAULE.

Fox Maule was educated, first at a private school at Clapham, and afterwards at Charterhouse, where he had George Grote, Connop Thirlwall, and Henry Havelock as schoolfellows—all of them destined to distinction in after life. Throughout life he remained warmly attached to his old public school, of which in due course he came to be appointed a Governor, being the first Nonconformist Governor the school had had since the days of Oliver Cromwell.

The happiness of his school-life was, however, by no means unalloyed, and it is regrettable to have to acknowledge that his troubles were due to a difference of opinion with his father. The painful episode may be told as briefly as possible ; to omit it entirely would be unjust to the son.

As a public man, then, William Maule was by no means

lacking in gifts and qualities. Indeed he was, in his own day, a very powerful and conspicuous personality. To the tenants of his large estates he was a liberal landlord, and throughout Forfarshire generally he enjoyed great personal popularity. But his strong character was undisciplined, and his temper overbearing, and, when crossed, ungovernable. In the tradition of the county where most of his long life was passed, he now survives as the last of an old school of country gentlemen who were notorious mainly for their hard living. A contemporary has described him, not ill-naturedly, as follows :—

‘ His ample fortune, his profuse hospitality, his capacity beyond others to endure convivial excesses with impunity, above all, his joyous, cordial, affable manners, which diffused cheerfulness wherever he went—these were points on which he stood elevated and alone, without rival or competition, in these northern regions. If his conduct was not in all respects equable and exemplary, it might fairly enough be questioned, what models were there for his guidance, or to what canons could he have referred? Our doctrines of morals, politics, and religion had become very confused and problematical in those days.’¹

It is, of course, true that the moral tone of the Regency period was, to say the least of it, not a high one ; nor must we forget that it was the misfortune of the first Baron Panmure that, having long survived such of his con-

¹ *Memoirs of a Literary Veteran*, by R. P. Gillies, vol. i. p. 72.

A few further particulars of the earlier life of the first Baron Panmure may be gathered from *Archibald Constable and his Literary Correspondents, a Memorial*, 1873, vol. i.

A single anecdote may serve to illustrate the peculiarly saturnine quality of his humour. After recovering from a very severe illness, he gave a dinner to his tenantry in celebration of the event. Rising to his feet at the close of the feast, he made the following speech : ‘ Gentlemen, I shall propose but a single toast—the disappointed one.’ He referred, of course, to his eldest son, their relations being no secret. But a worthy farmer who was present put a different construction on his words. ‘ Fegs !’ exclaimed he, ‘ I’ve heerd mony a queer toast proposed in my time, but this is the first time I have been called to drink the health o’ the deil.’ With which words he took down a bumper.

temporaries as Fox and Sheridan, his conduct should be judged by the more rigid standard of a later day. In the vices of drunkenness and a ruinous extravagance he at least did not participate ; none the less it would be idle to pretend that his domestic character was such as commands admiration. The glimpses of his old age at Brechin Castle afforded by the private letters of his second son—when, in enfeebled health, but still surrounded by a little court of parasites and sycophants, he continued to make head against the world—are grim and repellent in an unusual degree. But these belong, of course, to a much later period than we have yet reached. Suffice it here to say that between William Maule and his wife an estrangement arose, the circumstances which led to it being as follows : Whilst Mr. Maule was in London, attending to his duties as a member of Parliament, Mrs. Maule, who was a very beautiful woman and had been brought up in strict Presbyterian principles, remained in Scotland, devoted to the care of her youthful family. There reports of her husband's life in town were brought to her, which led her to leave his house and take up her abode with relations of her own in Ireland. The incident was in every way regrettable, but perhaps the chief sufferer from it was the eldest son of the marriage. Highly incensed at this unforeseen desertion, Mr. Maule visited his eldest son at school and put the following alternatives before him : If he would consent to take his father's side and to cease from communication with his mother, he should be allowed in the meantime every advantage befitting his position and would eventually be given a seat in Parliament ; but if, on the other hand, he continued to see his mother, all he should receive from his father would be a commission in the Army with an allowance of £100 a year. It was a cruel choice to force upon a boy of fifteen or sixteen years. But with a spirit which would have been admirable in any

one, Fox replied that he did not see that his mother had been to blame, and announced his intention of standing by her. The father's nature is revealed in the relentlessness with which he carried out his threat. During the five-and-thirty years of life which yet remained to him, he never once saw his eldest son again—and this in despite of dutiful efforts made by the latter, at a later date, to bring about a reconciliation. And, as regards money matters, it is enough to state that—the decision in an action against his father which he had carried in the Scotch Courts having been reversed in the House of Lords—until he was fifty-one years of age, when his father died, Fox Maule continued to subsist as best he could upon a yearly income of £1000, raised, together with a sum of £10,000 paid down, on a post-obit from the Jews.

After leaving Charterhouse, young Maule, in his altered circumstances, pursued his studies in the University of Edinburgh until 1819, when he received an ensign's commission in the 79th Highlanders. At that date his uncle, George, ninth Earl of Dalhousie, a general officer who had served with distinction in the Peninsular War, had recently been appointed Governor-General of Canada. He attached his nephew to his staff as aide-de-camp, and in Canada Fox remained during his uncle's tenure of office. But though affairs in that colony were then ripening for the rebellion of a few years later, the military outlook generally was not at that time stimulating, and after twelve years' service in the Army he retired with the rank of captain. In later years, when holding the offices of Secretary-at-War and Secretary of State for War, he was often heard to declare that his practical experience of soldiering was of the greatest advantage to him in the performance of his official duties. Meantime, having in 1831 married Montagu, eldest daughter of the first Lord Abercromby, and granddaughter of the famous Sir Ralph of that name, who was

killed at the battle of Alexandria, he took up his abode at Dalguise in Perthshire, and looked forward to leading the life of a country gentleman—a life, by the way, which his inherited love of sport rendered peculiarly attractive to him. With this project, however, circumstances were destined to interfere as follows.

Whilst at Dalguise he had formed a close friendship with Lord Glenorchy, eldest son of the fourth Earl and first Marquis of Breadalbane. Glenorchy was at that time the accredited Whig candidate for the parliamentary representation of Perthshire, and into his friend's electioneering campaign Maule, who was by conviction a strong Liberal, soon entered heart and soul. So it happened that when, in 1834, Lord Glenorchy, on the death of his father, succeeded to the peerage, his energetic lieutenant was selected to take his place as candidate, and, the General Election coming early next year, Fox Maule was duly elected member for the county, defeating the sitting member, General Sir George Murray, a nominee of the Mansfield family.

In parliamentary history the early months of 1835 are memorable on account of Sir Robert Peel's short-lived Ministry, and the gallant efforts made by their leader in the face of overwhelming difficulties. Maule's maiden speech was spoken in the debate on the Address, when, in supporting the amendment moved by Lord Morpeth, he defended, 'with warmth and eloquence' says the *Times*, the changes introduced by the Reform Act into the electoral system of Scotland. And here it may be observed that, though making no pretension to the higher gifts or achievements of the orator, throughout his parliamentary career Maule spoke at all times readily and to the point, whilst exhibiting a full and business-like knowledge of the details of his subject.

In the following March he spoke in support of the

motion of Mr. Poulter,¹ for leave to bring in a bill for 'protecting the voter in the free exercise of his franchise.' Early in April the Peel Ministry fell, and on the consequent formation of Lord Melbourne's second Administration, Fox Maule was appointed to the office of Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department. His parliamentary experience was at the time very brief, but obviously he had already succeeded in impressing his colleagues favourably. His new appointment brought him into close association with Lord John Russell, then Home Secretary and leader of his party in the Commons, between whom and himself a friendship was begun which lasted until Maule's death. With Lord John, too, during the coming years, he carried on a constant correspondence, of which, however, only Russell's letters have been preserved among the Panmure Papers. These deal, as was to be expected, with very multifarious subjects, including the enrolment of special constables, the improvement of Newgate and erection of other prisons, the mitigation of Criminal Laws, the Poor-Law Bill, the Scottish University Commissioners, the Scottish Church Commission, and Crown Teinds. And in reference to the subjects last named, it appears that Lord John was already beginning to turn his subordinate's local knowledge to account, for, in a letter dated September 6, 1836, he exhorts him to inform himself as much as possible 'of all matters referring to the Government of Scotland.' Lord Melbourne also turned to him for information upon Scottish affairs; and indeed, though the office of Secretary for Scotland was not created until a much later date, it is no exaggeration to say that at this time Maule was performing many of its functions. At the same time, in his new capacity, there frequently devolved on him the duty of defending the conduct of Ministers, a task of which he acquitted himself consistently with credit. In 1835, whilst

¹ Liberal member for Shaftesbury.

moving for leave to bring in a bill for modifying the Game Laws of Scotland, he had taken occasion to declare that he 'would always advocate the interests of the poorer classes and do his best to redress their grievances,' and it can scarcely be considered fanciful to reflect that the lessons of oppression had not been thrown away upon himself.

At the General Election which followed the death of King William IV. in 1837, Mr. Maule lost his seat in Perthshire, being defeated by Lord Stormont; but next year he was chosen as member for the Elgin Burghs, a constituency which he continued to represent until 1841. On his re-election to Parliament, he had resumed his former position in the Home Department under his former chief. But on August 18, 1839, Russell writes to him as follows:—

'I wish to tell you most confidentially that it is most likely I shall exchange offices with Normanby.¹ I wish much to know whether, in that case, you would prefer to remain in the Home Office or to go to the Colonial.² Of course I should like to have you with me, but, looking to your acquaintance with Home Office business, and standing in the House of Commons, it would be a serious injury to my successor to carry you away with me. However, tell me what you feel about it.'

Chiefly from unwillingness to sever his connection with Scottish business, and, as his draft reply puts it, 'the more immediate knowledge of what was doing in that respect,' he decided to remain at the Home Office; and accordingly, so long as Lord Normanby held the office of Home Secretary—that is, from 1839 to 1841—he continued in

¹ Constantine Henry Phipps, second Earl and first Marquess of Normanby, 1797-1863.

² Referring to this exchange, Lord John writes characteristically, August 26, 1839: 'Looking to our difficulties in Canada, and the obligation under which I lie of bringing forward a measure next Session, I believe the change will be useful in the end to the country.'

his post, having the advantage of such advice and assistance as Lord John Russell could find time to give him.

Comprising, as it did, a portion of the Chartist Agitation, this period was one of great importance and great stress in home affairs.

The autumn of 1838 will be remembered as the time when the Chartist Movement began to excite apprehension in the country. In the December following, it was found advisable to issue a proclamation forbidding torch-light processions, and throughout the year 1839 the correspondence of the Home Department is much occupied with Chartism. Thus, in April, a letter is addressed by the Home Secretary to the Lords-Lieutenant of Monmouthshire and six other English counties, enjoining watchfulness against unauthorised drilling, suspicious meetings, or illicit traffic in arms. Then additional military force is ordered to suspected districts, the services of country gentlemen and farmers who have formed themselves into an association for the preservation of peace are accepted, and these are furnished with pistols and cutlasses; arms are likewise sent out for pensioners and special constables, and seizure of ammunition and the payment of costs incurred in prosecuting Chartists are authorised. Later on, there are issued instructions to troops on the march in the event of their coming in contact with armed bodies, whilst the conduct of magistrates who have been active in suppressing disorder receives commendation. Notwithstanding preventive measures, however, a letter addressed by Lord Melbourne to Fox Maule on November 5 of that year announces 'a serious outbreak in Monmouthshire and several lives lost.' This refers, of course, to the attempt made on the previous night, under the leadership of Frost, an ex-justice of the peace, to deforce the gaol of Newport and effect the release of Henry Vincent and other Chartists.

To the debate of January 28, 1840,¹ Maule contributed a speech on Chartism, which is an able and telling piece of special pleading, and from which a few extracts may serve the purpose of giving an idea of the speaker's style and manner in Parliament. After explaining the appointment to the Commission of the Peace of Frost, and of a Mr. Muntz, of Birmingham, who had been accused of being implicated with the Chartists, he proceeds to the following review of the conduct of his party in regard to Chartism :—

‘I have endeavoured to trace, as far as I can, the origin of Chartism. It had its public birth in the summer of 1837, at a meeting of the Working Men's Association, held at the Crown and Anchor Tavern in the Strand, at which resolutions were passed in favour of Universal Suffrage. Some parts of the Charter were then adopted. On the 11th of August 1838, it was adopted by the Political Union of Birmingham, and six weeks afterwards several speeches were made, in which expressions were used, and opinions savouring of disaffection avowed, and dangerous doctrines promulgated. On looking back, I find that there was no alarm existing in the country with reference to Chartism till the beginning of November 1838, and the Government have been accused of neglecting the information which was then, and which has been since afforded to it, and, by its inertness and inactivity, encouraging the growth of that of which I, in common with every member of the House, and in common with the bulk of the people, deplore the existence.

‘In the month of November 1838 the first intimation was given to the Home Office of the disturbances and seditious meetings in the northern districts. In November 1838 a variety of correspondence took place between the Magistrates and the Home Office, in answer to the communications which were then made, informing the Magis-

¹ On Sir John Yarde Buller's motion for a vote of want of confidence in the Government. The motion was defeated by the narrow majority of twenty-one votes.

trates how to act, and calling upon them to act with promptitude. On no one occasion since that time can the Magistrates complain of having failed to receive from the noble Lord, at present Secretary of State for the Home Department, or from the noble Lord now Secretary of State for the Colonies, the most direct aid, either by way of advice or of armed assistance, in any way that the Magistrates may choose to ask.'

He then goes on to assert that much of the so-called Chartist agitation is, in reality, anti-Poor-Law agitation,¹ and to charge the Opposition with responsibility for the latter. Next he enumerates the preventive measures which we have already summarised, and claims that, if he can 'demonstrate to the House and to the country that, without making any parade of coming down to ask for any extraordinary powers beyond the law, without spreading alarm in other districts, without resorting to any extraordinary course of severity, the disturbers of the public peace have not only been summoned to the bar of justice, but have been fairly tried and punished'—if he can do this, then he will go far towards relieving the Government from the charge of any dereliction of its public duty, or of having given the slightest encouragement to outrage by its inertness and inactivity. After which, having proved these points, he proceeds to carry the war into the enemy's country. It will be remembered that the disorders which had marked the distressful years of 1816 and 1817 had been met by very stern repressive measures—which measures were, of course, capable of being turned to account for the purposes of the present argument.

'The Government of 1817,' he continued, 'came down to the House for extraordinary powers. They came down

¹ Directed against the new Poor Law adopted in July 1834, which, though very beneficial in its results, was very unpopular in the country at the time, having been denounced by Cobbett as the 'Poor Man Robbery Bill.'

to Parliament for the Six Acts. The 19th Chapter of the 57th George III., under the pretence of being an Act for the more effectual prevention of seditious meetings, was in effect an Act passed for the purpose of suppressing public discussion altogether. Not content with these powers, they applied for the most extraordinary powers which that House could give to any Government—they applied for and obtained a suspension of the *Habeas Corpus*. God forbid we should ever live in times when a necessity for such a step should exist! As far as I can form an opinion of the circumstances which gave rise to that course, I must say that I look upon it as a most unnecessary and extraordinary stretch of the powers of the Government. They nevertheless rather defeated than advanced their own object; for they alarmed the country in a very great degree—they shook the confidence of the public—and they, moreover, held up to the country the most undesirable spectacle of bringing numbers of State prisoners to trial, against whom, either from the weakness of the charges, or from some other cause, no convictions were obtained.'

A comparison of the severity of 1817 with the self-restraint and economy of repressive means shown by the Government of 1839 then furnishes the orator with an effective contrast in favour of his party.

'Now, when I contrast these proceedings of 1817 with what has recently occurred under circumstances very similar—when I look at the weakness of that Administration, as evidenced in the fact of so many cases which had been brought to trial having been dismissed in that abrupt manner¹—a dismissal which must very materially have affected public opinion at the time—when I advert to the number of convictions which have been obtained from juries in cases arising out of the recent disturbances

¹ He had previously stated that, of twenty-four persons against whom the Government solicitor had been instructed to institute proceedings at York in August 1817, ten were pronounced not guilty, against eleven others no bills were found, and one was liberated on bail.

—232 convictions out of 290 committals—I cannot help being confirmed in my opinion that that Government best does its duty to the State which stands on the authority of the law as it exists, so long as it will suffice, and does not come down to Parliament for extraordinary power until the last resource has failed. Above all, it is most essential that Government should not bring men to trial for political offences without, at least, some satisfactory ground for concluding that conviction will follow, and that the prisoners will not be dismissed in triumph from the bar.'

Then, after a spirited denunciation of the employment of spies and paid fomenters of disorder, he declares that the present Government have no charge brought against them of this nature.

'I have a right to go back to Tory times,' he adds, 'and it is only in the Tory times of 1817, 1818, and 1819, that I can find the Government coming down to the House to ask for extraordinary powers, and employing spies, whilst they also moved for secret and *ex parte* committees, in which the cause of the people was left entirely undefended. Such is the parallel between the Government of 1817, 1818, and 1819, and that of 1839.'

Excepting the masterpieces of a Burke or a Macaulay, the interest of even the most successful efforts in parliamentary oratory is generally remarkably short-lived. But the above summary may doubtless serve the purpose of showing that Maule had already at this date attained to the mastery of a vigorous, well-informed, and closely reasoned style of speaking, which explains his value to his party in debate, and the confidence reposed in him by them. As long before this as 1837 he had already taken upon himself to disclaim in Parliament, on behalf of the Scottish nation, all sympathy with the People's Charter, and to declare that his countrymen were 'true friends of peace and order.'

But though the Chartist movement was absorbing the lion's share of attention during these years, it must not be concluded that domestic legislation was on that account brought to a standstill. This was by no means the case. The establishment of the Committee of Council on Education marked an important epoch in the history of public instruction in this country, the Custody of Infants Act redressed an injustice of long standing, and the severity of the Criminal Laws was mitigated by a sweeping reduction in the number of capital offences. Inquiries into the condition of the poor were also being carried on, and, in 1839-40 he passed through the House of Commons the English Police Act, brought forward 'in order to induce counties to look after their own interests in the restriction of crime, instead of doing that which it was the universal practice in those days to do—making the British Army the police of the country.'¹ In short, Fox Maule had ample opportunity of forwarding legislation of that useful and enlightened, or beneficent and humanitarian, type which most appealed to him.

The repercussion of Foreign Affairs was also making itself felt in his department. The seizure of Syria by Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, had led to an intervention on behalf of the Porte, in which England had taken part. Syria was restored to the Turkish Empire by a Convention signed in London in July 1840, Mohammed Ali being at the same time confirmed in his government of Egypt. But France, which had taken no part in the intervention of the Allied Powers, became thereupon so angrily suspicious of the designs of England upon Egypt that for a time war seemed imminent. An Association of persons calling themselves The Friends of Peace was consequently formed in the country, to protest against the war—which it did not always wisely. The following characteristic and level-

¹ The description is his own.

headed letters, addressed by Lord Palmerston to Fox Maule, respectively on October 27th and 31st of this year, serve to throw light on the situation. In the first he writes :—

LORD PALMERSTON TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

Foreign affairs look better. The retirement of Thiers¹ makes Peace certain ; but, in fact, there never has been for a moment any real danger of war, unless from the incautious manifestations of some of our friends of their anxious desire to cling to Peace at all conditions. The French armaments have been chiefly a system of Bully ; for I cannot learn that when complete they will carry the French Army beyond its full Peace establishment.

In the second :—

I received by the post this morning, a cargo of these Handbills.² Would it be possible to get any of our friends at Manchester to attend this meeting and oppose the Resolutions which may be proposed ?

The line of argument to be taken would be, that we are all favourable to the Preservation of Peace, not only at the present crisis, but at all times ; and that such a general declaration of opinion, being of the nature of a Truism, is useless unless it is to have a practical bearing upon the existing state of things. But what is that existing state of things, and how is it likely to bring on war ?

The Four Powers are engaged in assisting the Sultan to recover one of his own Provinces, namely Syria, to which he has an indisputable right ; and the recovery of which is necessary, to enable him to remain independent, and to keep Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles in his own independent custody, without being under the Rod and Rule of any Foreign Power ; but the Four Powers, in so doing, are not going to attack France, nor to injure any French interest which the French Government have hitherto avowed. How, then, is the execution

¹ Lately Prime Minister of France. Guizot was now Foreign Minister and favourable to peace.

² Calling a meeting of the Friends of Peace.

of this Treaty to lead to war? Why, only in the event that France, in opposition to the principles she has laid down, and in disregard of the declaration she has made, should, without any provocation or just cause, attack the Four Powers, and make an aggressive war against them. But how will such resolutions as those which are to be proposed prevent France from so doing, and thus preserve Peace? If the danger of war arose from an intention on the part of England to invade or attack France, then, indeed, such resolutions as these might be useful as a check upon the Government of England; but, seeing that the danger of war, if any such danger still really exists, consists in a supposed intention of France to attack England, such resolutions as these could only render war more likely, by encouraging the Government of France to make war in consequence of a belief that the People of England would not defend themselves, but would submit to any terms which France might chance to impose as the Conditions of Peace.

Therefore, if the Proposers of this meeting really wish for Peace, the best way to preserve it would be either to have no meeting at all, or, if they will have a meeting, to resolve at such meeting that they hope the British Government will never draw the Country without provocation into a war with any Foreign Power, but that, if any Foreign Power should without provocation make war upon England, the English Nation will know how to repel aggression and defend itself.

The Syrian crisis was tided over.

Early in 1840 Maule was appointed Vice-President of the Board of Trade, an appointment which, owing to the fall of the Melbourne Ministry in the following summer, he held for only about four months.

At the General Election of 1841 he was returned to Parliament for the city of Perth, which seat he held until his succession to the peerage in 1852. The Peel Administration lasted till 1846, and though throughout

this period he spoke frequently on such subjects as the treatment of Chartist prisoners, the law in regard to chimney-sweepers, juvenile offenders, and capital punishment, the part which he took in general politics as a member of the Opposition was naturally less active than before. Two most important subjects were, however, engrossing his attention, and his views in regard to them serve to illustrate his progress in the direction of a more pronounced and independent Liberalism. The subjects were the Corn Laws and the Church of Scotland.

In 1841 Lord John Russell had already announced a concession to the views of the Free Traders in the shape of a fixed duty on wheat, and proportionally diminished rates on other cereals—a measure which is described by the Honourable Charles Gore, sometime Private Secretary to Lord John, in a letter to Maule, as being ‘an instalment merely, but still a necessary one, to give the farmers a warning, and to allow them to make other arrangements for the cultivation of their lands.’ But upon this point Maule’s views had been progressing more rapidly than Russell’s. The following letters are interesting as illustrating their divergence, and containing an eloquent appeal from the lieutenant to his nominal leader:—

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

CHESHAM PLACE, *December 20, 1842.*

MY DEAR MAULE,—I had here yesterday Palmerston, C. Wood, Baring, Duncannon, and Lord Minto. In this little anti-Cabinet it was agreed, on my proposition, that it would be advisable to propose an amendment, on the first day of the Session, praising the principles of the tariff of last Session, agreeing in the character of our acts given by the Crown at the prorogation, and declaring that we shall be ready to extend the same principles to articles on which there are still duties, either prohibiting, or so

variable that they discourage trade, and injure the community.

This is all in the supposition of no move being made generally in the Corn Laws by Peel. It is a step that would force him to declare his intentions.

All this being premised, I wish, and those here wished, you to move the amendment. During your short official career at the Board of Trade, you made an admirable speech on the subject in Scotland. Of course you might be as general as you pleased. I take for granted you would not pledge yourself to total and immediate repeal. And I trust you are still for a moderate fixed duty. 8s. might be too much in present circumstances. 5s. or 6s. I should think a fair compromise.

I have had some conversation with Lord Cottenham on the County Courts Bill, and I think either you or I should bring such a bill into the House of Commons.

You will dine with me, I hope, on the 1st of February, when I shall ask a few of the old stagers. . . .—Yours very truly,
J. RUSSELL.

THE HON. FOX MAULE TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL

December 25, 1842.

MY DEAR LORD JOHN,—This being Xmas day, I shall begin my answer to your letter, which I received only yesterday, by wishing you and yours many happy returns of the season, and assuring you of the great pleasure it gave Mrs. Maule and myself to see Lady John's confinement so prosperously got over.

Your proposal that I should move an amendment such as you sketch is extremely gratifying to me, as a mark of the friendship and confidence of those with whom it was my happiness to be associated in office; but, while I heartily concur in the tactics of such a step, I fear there are reasons which will be conclusive with you that I am not the proper person to take the lead in it. Perhaps while you and your former colleagues were adjudging me this honourable post, they did not recollect my course

in Villiers'¹ motion for the total and immediate repeal of the Corn Laws during last Session. I was then of opinion that these laws must ultimately be repealed, but I felt myself justified in declining to vote, as I was unwilling to rank myself in a division against those with whom I had acted in office. Since the prorogation of Parliament I have been anxiously watching the progress of this question, and have done my best to weigh the consequences of contending with the stream which is fast bearing the Corn Laws to an end, and the result of my observations is the conviction that those who struggle will struggle in vain; and, moreover, that the longer this question is agitated, the worse it will be for the landed proprietors in the country.

When you proposed a fixed duty of 8s. the country was prepared to compromise. It was not our fault that this was thrown overboard, and the only principle on which a duty on corn, if raised at all, should be raised, rejected. But so it has happened. Things are now more altered in a short space of time than one could have conceived, and what was considered fair in 1841 would be looked upon as oppressive in 1843, and it is my firm conviction that the circumstances and safety of the country demand—and I use this strong term advisedly—a repeal of the laws on corn. It is impossible to see the starving thousands in this country, whose miserable pittance is counted by $\frac{1}{5}$ ths of a penny, and not feel that every penny by which the price of meal is kept up by a corn law is cruel and abhorrent to all reason. The farmers in this country are beginning to find out that, as far as they are concerned, Corn Laws matter not.

The farm-servants are joining in the cry now almost universal for their repeal, and a short essay of Mr. Hope, an East Lothian farmer, which you will get with two others on the same subject at Ridgway's, will show you how ably these men can treat upon this question.

That the Corn Laws are doomed I think no one can

¹ The Hon. Charles Pelham Villiers, brother of the fourth Lord Clarendon. After a five nights' debate, the motion had been defeated by a large majority.

deny. Look at your own constituents and see how they are moving. Need I say how earnestly I could wish to see you lead them on in this great move, and make your name, already honoured as the mover of the Reform Bill, imperishable as the repealer of the Corn Laws. You will, I think, excuse me for dwelling so tiresomely on this subject, but I assure you I have not extended my views upon it rashly, nor without weighing well my own interest and that of others connected with land in this country.

I have accepted an invitation to join the Glasgow banquet in favour of Free Trade principles, where I imagine my opinions on corn will be called forth; and if, as I fear it may happen, they are too strong for you, then, as I said at the beginning of my letter, this is conclusive against my moving the amendment. This letter has grown too long, but I must add only one more sentence to say that I trust you will study in your amendment to rally as many Liberals round you as you possibly can.

I will be very glad to aid you in County Courts, and, as I believe I have all the records of our former bill, I may be of service to you.

I will certainly join you on the 1st, if you will have me still as an old stager?

To this Russell somewhat drily replies:—

December 29, 1842.

MY DEAR MAULE,—I am very sorry to hear of your adhesion to the extreme views of the Anti-Corn-Law League,¹ but I quite agree that, in such circumstances, you would not be the best person to move the amendment.

Pray dine with me on the 1st, and if you and Cobden form a Cabinet, I will give you all the support I can.

Pray let me know, if you hear, whether Graham is still in treaty with the rebels of your Church. Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Impartial readers will probably agree that Lord John's

¹ Founded in 1839.

posthumous reputation would have stood higher had he taken Maule's advice. In the sequel the proposed amendment was dropped. The events of 1846 brought Russell's views once more into line with those of Maule.

Simultaneously with the agitation for repeal of the Corn Laws, there was being carried on what has been described as the Ten Years' Conflict in the Church of Scotland—a controversy into which Maule eagerly threw himself, and in which he at once became a leader. The part played by him in this capacity is dealt with in detail, in the Supplementary Chapter, by one well qualified to speak upon the subject, so that it is here unnecessary to do more than generally indicate Maule's course of action.

A member of the Church of Scotland, as Under-Secretary for State he had taken an important share in dispensing the patronage of that Church—a task which he had performed with conscientious care. When difficulties arose over the questions of the independence of the Church Courts and the right of patrons to appoint parish ministers without the concurrence of the congregation, he identified himself with the Evangelical and reforming party, whose spokesman and champion in Parliament he at once became, and which he continued to support by every means in his power through the crisis of the Disruption of 1843, and indeed to the end of his life.¹

It was perhaps a matter of course that those opposed to him should question the purity of his motives in adopting this line—the strictures of these critics being pithily summed up in the words of a Forfarshire farmer, who, when characterising the public men of the day, was overheard to remark, 'There's my Lord Panmure: he

¹ At his death he bequeathed £20,000 to the funds of the Free Church of Scotland.

disna care muckle aboot the Kirk; but it's a graand *poleetical engine!*' But against this view of the case we have the opinion not only of the late Principal Rainy, which might perhaps be open to suspicion of unconscious partisanship, but of Charles Gore, who at this time knew Maule as well as any man did, and who, in the extremely frank and often critical letters addressed by him to his friend, gives to that friend full credit for sincerity and singleness of mind in the course which religious conviction had led him to pursue.

His activity in Scottish affairs, combined with his advanced Liberalism, had by this time made the name of Fox Maule a name to conjure with in Scotland—at all times a forcing-house of Liberal ideas,—one typical result of his popularity with the rising generation of Scotsmen being that, in 1842, he was elected to the Lord Rectorship of the University of Glasgow, and was re-elected in the following year.

To return now to the Corn Laws, it was to these that was due the Ministerial Crisis of December 1845. The last two or three years had witnessed a remarkable development in the views upon this subject held by the respective party leaders, and, after the outbreak of the potato disease in Ireland, Peel had suggested, as a remedial measure, the opening of British ports to foreign corn. His Cabinet, however, declined to support him in this proposal. It was followed by an announcement on the part of Lord John Russell of his conversion to the doctrines of the Anti-Corn-Law League. On this, Peel, in his turn, improved upon his rival's policy by deciding to recommend repeal. Failing, however, for the second time to carry the Ministers with him, on December 5th he gave in his resignation. The Queen then summoned Lord John, who endeavoured to form a Ministry.

THE HON. CHARLES GORE TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

LONDON, *December 18, 1845.*

MY DEAR MAULE,—I have only time to say that Lord John Russell will be glad to see you as soon as you can come to London. He has, as the papers will have told you, undertaken the Government, but is fixing in his mind its component parts, and I am for the moment his Private Secretary.—Ever yours,

CHARLES GORE.

Russell's party was not at this time strong in the country, nor did he command a majority in the House of Commons; moreover, Peel had declined to bind himself by a promise of support on the Corn Law question. Still, as is shown by the following letter, it was less these things than the differences of his own followers which led Russell to despair of forming a Cabinet.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

CHESHAM PLACE, *December 20, 1845.*

DEAR FOX MAULE,—We are not in office, Lord Grey having declined to act with Palmerston as Foreign Minister. This is sad, but it saves us from a dreadful position.—Ever yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Peel's resignation consequently was not accepted.

In the earlier part of the following year the Corn Laws were repealed, Peel fell, and Russell returned to power.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

July 2, 1846.

MY DEAR FOX MAULE,—I have the Queen's permission to propose to you to accept the office of Secretary-at-War. I cannot offer with it the Cabinet, which is already more than usually full.—Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Maule accepted this offer, and was thus embarked upon that work of Army Administration with which his name is most closely associated. Some three years later he was advanced to a seat in the Cabinet.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

48 EATON SQUARE, *November 27, 1849.*

MY DEAR MAULE,—The proposal that you should enter the Cabinet was received with great applause, and I hope to meet you there to-morrow at half-past two.—Yours truly,
J. RUSSELL.

This post he held till 1852, introducing many Army reforms, as chief among which he kept consistently in view the bettering of the conditions of the private soldier's life. Thus, already in December 1846, his brother, Colonel the Honourable Lauderdale Maule of the 79th Highlanders, is able to write to him: 'I see you have conferred a boon as to rations and marching-money on soldiers, and have also increased our wretched pittance of fuel; for these you have already our thanks.' In the year following he brought forward a measure for revision of the Pension Warrant, with a view to increasing the soldier's pension from a minimum of sixpence per day to eightpence—a proposal in regard to which the Queen graciously wrote, that it gave her 'real pleasure' to approve it. In the same year he regulated the management of military canteens, reducing the sale of spirits there, and proving, in a memorandum on the subject which he drew up, that he appreciated the idiosyncrasies of the private soldier and had his moral welfare at heart. The system of reliefs to regiments on foreign stations he likewise improved, keeping in view at once the interest of the soldiers themselves and those of the home government and the colonies. He also took the

first practical steps towards the disuse of flogging in the Army, and introduced a bill which limited enlistment to a term of ten years. In regard to the latter, it is interesting to recall that the Duke of Wellington at first opposed it. And it was not until it had been proved to his Grace that his own reinforcements during the Peninsular War had been recruited under Windham's Short Service Act,¹ that his opposition was withdrawn. In addition to the above, a Warrant of Maule's remodelled the Mutiny Act and the powers of Courts-Martial, and he was also the first to establish educational tests for the admission of officers to the Army.

He likewise already foreshadowed and advocated the consolidation of the Army Offices, and other departmental reforms which were, at a later date, adopted ; but in bringing these forward he was fatally hampered by the influence of the Duke of Wellington, whose opposition to all military innovations is well known. These matters are referred to as follows in a Confidential Memorandum dated January 1850 :—

‘Whatever the Ordnance Office may have been,’ he writes, ‘it is now notoriously a clog upon the Military Service. Its departments are *cumbrous*, its business is transacted in a complicated manner, its accounts are kept in an inferior way to those of other departments, and the impediments which obstruct one at almost every turn in transacting the commonest business with the Ordnance are proverbial in all departments that have to do with them. Reform is necessary and *will* come, in spite of all opposition or delay, whether arising from consideration for the feelings of old and distinguished officers, or an indisposition to touch the question. . . . I believe much economy would result from an entire combination of the Civil branches of the Army and Ordnance ; but the Military Command of that branch of the Service, and the

¹ This Act, passed in 1807, continued in force till the end of the war.

actual direction of all warlike services and operations should be left to Military Authority. . . .’

And again, ‘What the House of Commons wants, and is resolved to have, is some one member of the Government, who shall be responsible to them for all military matters upon which public money is expended, or in the administration of which the public is concerned. Let the *appointments, promotions*, exchanges from corps to corps, be considered functions of the prerogative, and be left, if it is thought more expedient, to be settled as at present; but the movement of the troops, their armament and equipment, their clothing, their medical attendance, their lodging, and their food, are questions which the House of Commons will make their own, and which they are entitled to call on a Minister on his responsibility to explain.

‘My opinion is, so long as so large a portion of our annual expenditure is required for the Army and Ordnance, you must have a distinct and separate Minister who shall make it his business to look into all military matters; who shall be able, not only to check expense, but to issue the orders of the Government to the Commander-in-Chief’s Department from time to time; who shall direct the clothing, arming, lodging, medical attendance, and recruiting of the Army, making it his duty to issue orders on all these points and to see that they are efficiently and economically conducted. Let the patronage of the Army be left to the Commander-in-Chief, and its strategy to its own officers, but let all other matters rest with a responsible Minister of the Crown. I foresee great difficulty in carrying out these views so long as the Duke of Wellington or Lord Anglesea live, as I should be sorry to do anything to disturb the setting sun of either gallant soldier, and I think that the House of Commons would not press changes likely to denude either, especially the Duke, of any of the dignity of his present position; but the change must come sooner or later, as it is founded on reason and constitutional principles.’

Probably these are not by any means the only instances

which might be cited of the public service having been made to suffer out of consideration for a deserving individual. The subjoined letter, written when Fox Maule went out of office, shows that at least the Duke was not insensible to the consideration which had been shown him.

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

LONDON, *February 25, 1851, 4 P.M.*

MY DEAR SIR,—I am much concerned to learn from you that our official intercourse is finished. I assure you that I have derived the greatest satisfaction from the reflection that the efforts of both to render it useful to the public, as it was agreeably despatched, have been successful.—Believe me,

WELLINGTON.

In the species of national panic which followed in this country the usurpation of the supreme power in France by Louis Napoleon, the question of National Defence assumed paramount importance. The Government, therefore, resolved to bring in a Bill intended to reconstitute the Militia, which had become practically extinct. Distrust of France had brought the matter to a head, but already for some time previously it had been engaging the attention of Maule and other members of the Ministry. Indeed, so long before as December 1847, Lord Palmerston had written as follows, in reference to a draft Bill on the subject.

LORD PALMERSTON TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

December 18, 1847.

MY DEAR FOX MAULE,—If you will send me a copy of the proposed Militia Bill that was prepared by the late Government, I will have it printed at the printing-press in my office with as many copies as you may like. I think

the Cabinet cannot properly consider what is to be done without having that plan before them.

My own view of the matter is simply this. The danger to be provided for is, that if war were to break out between England and France, *quod Deus avertat*, we should not be able, by any Naval means, *to be sure* of preventing the landing of 30,000 French Troops on the Southern coast of England within a fortnight after the rupture should have taken place; and what we want, therefore, is a very large Force, which, being partly dormant, but nevertheless to a certain degree trained, in time of Peace, might suddenly, and at ten days' notice, start up at the approach of war, like the men of Roderick Dhu, and become an army capable of mixing in Quarters, in March, in Camp and in the Field, with the Regular Army. Such a Force must be very large in nominal establishment, because, from the nature of things, you must allow a large percentage deduction for men who will not be forthcoming on the day when they are to be embodied. Such a Force must be organised and trained like Regular Regiments, so that, when wanted, it may fall in with Regular Regiments without confusion and disorder. Such a Force must consist of men chiefly taken from the same classes in society of which Regular Regiments are composed, in order that it may be, in the habits and constitutions of the men who compose it, fit to endure the hardships and exposure to which, if it had to act, it would necessarily be liable. It should, in short, be in all respects as like Regular Troops as the nature of things will admit; and especially it ought, from the first day when it assembles for service, to be liable to be marched to any part of the United Kingdom where its service might be required.

Now, in my opinion, no volunteers or local force would at all answer these conditions. It would cost you nearly as much as a better description of force, and when the day of invasion came it would be totally useless. Moreover, the great value of such an army of reserve would be that the French, knowing that we had it, and were therefore prepared with an adequate force to meet and repel

invasion, would probably never attempt invasion; but you may rely upon it that they would hold in no respect a force tied down to counties, or composed of attornies, shop-keepers, gentlemen's servants, and the like.

The Volunteers of 1803 had a great effect from their immense numbers, added to Regulars and Militia, and from the manifestation which they displayed of the universal spirit of the nation; but 20 or 50,000 Volunteers, as a reserve for 15 or 20,000 Regulars, would be derided by Troops accustomed to the Kabyles and the Arabs of the Desert.—Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

The letter is not without special interest at the present time. And, as Palmerston had had suggestions to make for the draft Bill of 1847, so, when in February 1852 a Militia Bill was introduced into Parliament, he was its principal critic, being by this time out of office. The outstanding feature of the Bill was that it proposed to substitute a local Militia for the regular force then in existence.¹ But it failed to stand against Lord Palmerston's attack, and with it fell Lord John Russell's Government.

Ere this, however, Fox Maule had ceased to be Secretary-at-War, the circumstances of his doing so being as follows. The East India Company's Charter being about to expire, a readjustment of relations with our Eastern dependencies became imminent. Lord Broughton,² President of the Board of Control, had announced

¹ In a sketch of the history of the Militia, the late Sir Spencer Walpole wrote: 'By a series of Acts passed between 1808 and 1812, the regular Militia was supplemented by what was called the local Militia. This force, like the regular Militia, was raised by ballot. But, unlike the regular Militia, it could only be called out for the suppression of riots, or in case of invasion, the appearance of an enemy on the coasts, or of rebellion. It could not, even in the greatest crisis, be moved out of Great Britain.' The principles of the Bill proposed by Lord J. Russell's Government were as follows:—(1) Compulsory service for three years in the locality, (2) Twenty-one days' training during each year, (3) No substitutes, (4) The Militia to serve out of the county only in case of invasion or of war.

² The Right Honourable Sir John Cam Hobhouse, afterwards Lord Broughton, the companion of Byron, had been President of the Board of Control from 1835 to 1841, and again from 1846.

his retirement, and Sir James Graham had been thought of as his successor. But the capacity shown by Maule at the War Office, coupled perhaps with his near relationship to the Governor-General, recommended him for the appointment. The following comments taken from the *Times* of January 31, 1852, serve to illustrate the estimation in which the new President's abilities were held. '*Solve senescentem,*' remarks the leader-writer, referring to Lord Broughton, 'he has left some heavy work to his successor in the construction of the new Bill for the government of India. That work devolves upon a man whose long habits of business, strong sense, and genial temper particularly qualify him for it. . . . The Indian Charter being about to lapse, something was necessary to be done, and Lord John has given the work to the best man for the purpose he could find in the existing Cabinet.'

At the end of two or three weeks, however, the fall of the Russell Ministry cut short his term of office at the Indian Board.

Two months later, by the death of his father, on April 13, 1852, he succeeded to the title of Baron Panmure. On the 8th of the month, his old leader had addressed him in the following terms:—

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO THE HON. FOX MAULE

PEMBROKE LODGE, *April 8, 1852.*

MY DEAR MAULE,—I feel very much the loss of your assistance in the House of Commons. From the days of the Home Office to the last days of our official connection, I have received from you the most friendly and the most useful aid in carrying on the business of the country.

When good sense and habits of business are so much wanted, we can ill spare you. But I hope before the new Parliament meets we shall be working together again.—
Yours truly,

J. RUSSELL.

Lord Panmure, as he must for the future be called, was now again out of office. But the care of the vast and long-neglected estates which he had just inherited supplied him with ample occupation. In spite of contrary orders issued by his father, the brothers Maule had clung loyally and affectionately together. In their private correspondence they alluded to themselves as a Triumvirate whose interests were identical; nor can we justly blame the two who had retained some portion of their father's favour for keeping back from him the nature of their relations with the son who had incurred his displeasure. In referring to the family estates, the second brother, Lauderdale Maule, had written, in 1845, to Fox: 'So you have been at Panmure. Alas, poor demesne! The great body of the estate is, of course, as good, perhaps better than ever it was. But the house, the bare parks and thinned-out woods are melancholy examples of irreparable wrong. I never shall forget my first impressions on viewing Panmure on my return home in 1834.'

But, if there was much lee-way to be made up in getting the estates into order, the fine natural energies of their new owner especially qualified him for the task. During the three years which intervened between his leaving the India Board and his being called to the War Office at the crisis of the Crimean campaign, this was his principal occupation. It is true that he did not relax his interest in national affairs, but he refrained from adding to the amount of business already on his hands. Thus, when, in October 1852, on the retirement of Mr. Carr Glyn, he received from the Directors of the London and North-Western Railway Company a unanimous invitation to undertake the Chairmanship of the Board, he declined it on the ground of pressure of private affairs. And it may here be mentioned that, having long taken an active part in the business of the Company, on becoming a Cabinet Minister he

had resigned his Directorship, together with all other directorships of public companies. This act entailed a considerable loss of income, but he considered it due to the position to which he had been called.

Despite the ability shown by Disraeli as leader of his party in the Commons, it soon became evident that the Derby Administration was not destined to a long existence. In anticipation of the event, Lord John Russell writes to Lord Panmure :—

THE GART, CALLANDER, *October 10, 1852.*

MY DEAR MAULE,—As Newcastle and Cobden and Duffy are all agreed that I am not to be at the head of the next Government, I suppose it is to be so. I shall look with some curiosity to see how it is composed.

Arrive qui pourra, I cannot but be grateful to you for your constant friendship and fidelity to the old colours. . . .
—I remain, yours truly, J. RUSSELL.

It was in December that the crisis came. The necessity of providing for members of both the Whig and Peelite parties in the new Coalition Ministry left Panmure for the time without a seat in the Cabinet.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO LORD PANMURE

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 29, 1852.*

MY DEAR MAULE,—The arrangement of offices under the Junction Company has been very difficult, and many good friends of the High Contracting Parties have been left behind. I should have liked, for instance, to have had your assistance in the Cabinet. But it was not for me to prescribe. I have proposed, however, that your brother Lauderdale should be Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, and I should be very glad to know, before Friday, whether he will accept it. . . .

Give our best regards to Lady Panmure, and believe me, yours faithfully, J. RUSSELL.

THE SAME TO THE SAME

December 30, 1852.

MY DEAR MAULE,—I am glad to find you approve of my conduct. It has not been without great hesitation I took the course I did. The Whig party must feel great confidence in their own strength and popularity to submit to their present inferiority.

The Greys, Lord and G.,¹ declined office.

I wrote to you yesterday to propose the office of Surveyor of the Ordnance for your brother, Colonel Maule. But his seat is in no danger, and he may have the office, reserving the writ for the 10th February.

I do not think of remaining in this office² after that day. But I propose to lead the House of Commons during the Session.—Yours truly, J. RUSSELL.

Under the circumstances detailed above, Lord Panmure no doubt found it easy enough to console himself for a spell of enforced leisure from politics. Lord Palmerston had surprised the country by accepting the office of Home Secretary in the new Government. The subjoined letter is his reply to an offer of assistance in regard to those Scottish matters to which Lord Panmure had given so much attention.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

January 16, 1853.

I am much obliged to you for the letter which I received from you some little time ago, and which I ought to have answered sooner. Having spent many years in looking after our interests abroad, I am glad to be charged with the care of some of our interests at home. A man

¹ Lord Grey and Sir George Grey, who had served respectively as Colonial Secretary and Home Secretary in the Russell Administration.

² The Foreign Office.

ought not to live abroad too long, either in body or in mind. It gives me pleasure to be connected by departmental duty with Scotland, where I passed much time in early life both profitably and agreeably, and I shall be glad from time to time to avail myself of the assistance which you offer.

Our Militia arrangements have certainly as yet answered even beyond expectation. It remains to be seen, as you say, whether the future trainings will be as fully attended as they ought to be. I incline to think that they will, and, if so, we shall have a large body of active young men sufficiently instructed in military movements to render them a most valuable reserve for the Regular Army if we are destined ever to be at war again.

I trust, however, that at all events we may remain at peace for one or two years to come, and, if we make the most of that interval by providing means of defence, the temptation to attack us may be considerably diminished.

As to our new Government, it seems to be generally approved of; no one Party was strong enough to make an administration singly. The inconvenience of a Junction of Parties is that many good men necessarily remain out of the combined arrangement.

One source of strength for the new Government will be that, if it was overthrown, there is nothing at present to succeed it but the Government which has recently been proved too weak to stand.

The aspiration expressed towards the close of the above letter, that 'at all events we may remain at peace for one or two years to come,' will scarcely strike the reader as immoderate. He who uttered it had had the amplest opportunity of obtaining insight into European politics. And yet, long ere the period specified was past, the country was in the midst of such a war as she had not known for close on forty years. As to the glib remark about 'making the most of the interval,' if that may be extended, as surely it may, to embrace the general state

of preparedness for war, it was destined very soon to be exposed to the most bitterly ironical comment.

In so far as they affected Lord Panmure, the result of these coming events was that the services of the man who had been crowded out of the Aberdeen Ministry were eagerly requisitioned when the hour of need arrived. Hitherto we have seen him in the character of a level-headed and hard-working administrator, a consistent advocate of enlightened reform, giving special attention, on the one hand to Scottish business, and, on the other, to the interests of the humbler classes in the Army and the State. He was now to be called to play a far more strenuous part, upon a more conspicuous stage. The time has, therefore, arrived when the present brief sketch of his career may fitly give place to his own letters and those of his correspondents—at which, in a word, he and they may speak for themselves. It must first be mentioned, however, that in this year, 1853, his services received two gracious marks of recognition, by his being created a Knight of the Thistle, and appointed Keeper of the Privy Seal of Scotland.

On November 11th of the same year he sustained the loss of his wife, Lady Panmure.

CHAPTER II

FEBRUARY 1855

EARLY in February 1855, following the fall of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry, Lord Panmure succeeded the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State for War. Previous to this the offices of Secretary for War and Secretary-at-War had been distinct, the functions of the latter, who, by the way, did not rank as one of the principal Secretaries of State, being mainly financial, so that no expenditure from Army funds was held legal without his authority.¹ In

¹ The functions of the two Secretaries have been defined more particularly as follows: 'The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was responsible for the amount of force to be maintained. . . . He also allotted garrisons to colonial possessions. In time of war he was responsible for the selection of officers to command in chief, and to a considerable extent for the selection of officers to important commands under them. He had entire control over operations bearing on the war. The Secretary-at-War was a Minister of the Crown, holding a seat in Parliament, and sometimes in the Cabinet. His sanction and authority were required for everything relating to the finance of the Army, and to those matters which brought soldiers into contact with the inhabitants of the country, such as quartering, billeting, and marching of troops. He brought in the annual Mutiny Act in the House of Commons, and to that extent had a certain amount of control over the discipline of the Army. He controlled financially the pay and finances of the Staff, the infantry and the cavalry. He fixed the rates of pay, food, and clothing to be given to the Army (exclusive of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers). He issued pay and allowances at home, dealt with questions relating to recruiting, savings banks, issues of routes, and the grants of passages, and had the executive control over schools, chaplains, and military prisons. He dealt with all questions of half-pay, pensions to officers and their families, the payment of pensions to soldiers, and the control of the enrolled pensioners. He had no control over the Artillery and Engineers, nor over the material of the Army. The Secretary-at-War held direct communication with the Crown; but should any regulation introduced by him be objected to by the Commander-in-Chief, he had to communicate his views, together with the objections of the Commander-in-Chief, to the First Lord of the Treasury, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or to all of them, for them to obtain the Sovereign's pleasure thereon.'—Sir Robert Biddulph's *Lord Cardwell at the War Office*, pp. 3 *et seq.*

the person of Lord Panmure the two offices were, however, for the first time combined, great benefit to the national Army system being looked for from the change.¹ And it may be worth while here to recall to the reader that the War Department and Colonial Office, which had heretofore been associated, had been separated in the preceding June.

The circumstances in which Lord Panmure succeeded to office were certainly among the most trying which a Minister of the Crown had ever been called to face, for the troubles arising out of the Crimean War were just then at their worst. Those troubles are too well known to require here more than the briefest recapitulation. Upon the cyclone of November 14, 1854, with its disastrous wreckage of British supply-ships and ruin of British camps, there had followed a period of three months of true 'Crimean winter'—that is, of severe frosts and bitter winds, and of snow-storms alternating with drenching rains. On the unprotected heights fronting Sebastopol, the British Army lay exposed to the full brunt of the weather, whilst at the same time enduring the utmost privation in respect of food, fuel, clothing, and shelter. For these latter misfortunes the breakdown of the transport system must be held mainly accountable; whilst this in its turn is attributable alike to the condition of the road communicating between Balaclava and the camp, and to the culpable neglect of the Treasury to supply the forage so necessary to the support of overworked draft-horses. Add to these hardships the fact that the soldiers were meantime undergoing the crushing fatigue of passing often as many as five out of six nights in the trying duty of the

¹ 'The lamentable results which have attended our present expedition, as far as the waste of human life has been concerned, are solely to be attributed to the want of proper control by a single Minister of every department of the Army. The confusion, delays, and disappointments may be traced to this source to a very considerable extent. . . .' See *infra*, Lord Panmure's *Observations on the Prince Consort's Memorandum*.

trenches, with the consequent neglect of sanitary and scavenger work, and there will remain small room for wonder that the Army fell a prey in an unprecedented degree to scurvy, cholera, frost-bites and other maladies. With this outbreak of disease the existing hospital resources were wholly powerless to cope. But, in proof of this particular, the figures cited by Kinglake are more eloquent than any general statement. These inform us that, on February 28, 1855, out of an army whose mean strength is computed at 30,919, no less than 13,608 men were in hospital; whilst in the four months terminating at that date, no fewer than 8898 men had died there.¹ It is indeed a lamentable record of suffering and mismanagement. But no plea of brevity must be allowed to divorce from that record of suffering a parallel record of the noble fortitude with which that suffering was endured.

‘Without extraneous aid,’ says the historian of the war, ‘men found strength, it would seem, in their own heroic qualities, found strength in that soldierly pride which forbids outward signs disclosing self-pity or despair.’ And again, ‘All their hardships—too often fatal—our officers and men endured with a heroism, as the Sebastopol Committee declared, “unsurpassed in the annals of war”; and, in truth, the contented devotion of the men under these cruel trials was such as to appear almost preternatural in the eyes of one who measures self-sacrifice by a merely civilian standard.’

But, though the soldiers endured all things without murmuring, the British public was rightly and naturally moved by the reports of their sufferings which were brought home. And it so happened that to these reports a new development of journalistic enterprise had at that time contributed a peculiar force and vividness.²

¹ *History of the Invasion of the Crimea*, vol. vi. p. 202.

² Sir William Howard Russell, the *Times* correspondent with the British

The result was a storm of public indignation, accompanied, as is always the case, by the desire of imputing blame. Righteous enough in its origin, this manifestation of public feeling could scarcely be characterised as judicial; indeed, it soon showed signs of degenerating into mere clamour for a victim. At whose door the blame of the Army's misfortunes really lay, history has not yet finally decided. We ourselves have inclined to attribute a principal share of it to neglect on the part of the Treasury to send out adequate supplies of forage. Mr. Kinglake, writing with characteristic dispassion, would carry the blame back to that original vicious strategy of the Allied Armies which had culminated in the tardy resolve to winter on the heights before Sebastopol. But the British public of the time was inclined to fasten it upon Generals Estcourt and Airey, Lord Raglan's Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, and, perhaps in a somewhat lesser degree, on the Commanding Officer himself.

Though indiscriminating, the public emotion was much too strong to be disregarded. Constituting himself the mouthpiece of the country at large, Mr. Roebuck therefore brought before the House of Commons a motion for a Select Committee to inquire into the condition of the Army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose business it had

Army in the Crimea, whose death is announced whilst these papers are being prepared for publication, is described by the writers of obituary notices as the Father of War Correspondence. His communicativeness, as some of these pages will show, was at the time severely criticised. The truth is that the new branch of journalism had not yet found its proper working conditions. For, on the one hand, the war-correspondent was looked at askance by military officers—more especially by those of the older school, of whom Sir George Brown may be taken as a type; whilst, on the other hand, he on his part would sometimes fail to recognise the limits prescribed by expediency to his functions. It is perhaps needless to add that all this is now changed for the better: that the status of the war-correspondent receives official recognition, and that the correspondent on his part conforms to the opinion of authority as to the information which he imparts.

been to minister to its wants. Though strenuously resisted by Lord Palmerston and Mr. Gladstone, this motion was carried by a majority of no less than 157, and thus was sealed the fate of the Aberdeen Ministry. After others had essayed the task in vain, Lord Palmerston then took Lord Aberdeen's place at the helm of State and set to work to form a Government.¹

These, then, were the circumstances in which Lord Panmure was summoned to the administration of the War Department. The moment was one, as has been shown, of great national stress; the position to which he was called was one of supreme difficulty. His health, too, was by this time impaired, so that, in the event of his accepting office, he would have to face the prospect of being hampered in the execution of arduous duties by the inroads of a peculiarly painful and irksome malady. And no doubt he took full account of all these things. But he belonged essentially to that fortunately large class of Britons who are never prone to draw back from taking their share in the day's work, and who derive the pride and satisfaction of their lives from the contemplation of work well done. To these the voice of duty does not often speak in vain. Panmure recognised that his experience, first as an officer in the Army, and secondly as an administrator of Army affairs, gave him special advantages for dealing with the present national crisis. And accordingly, without hesitation, he placed his services at his country's disposal. The courage which he showed in doing so has not yet perhaps received the full appreciation which is due to it. And it

¹ The principal places in his Cabinet were filled as follows:—First Lord of the Treasury, Viscount Palmerston; Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth; President of the Council, Earl Granville; Privy Seal, Duke of Argyle; Foreign Secretary, Earl of Clarendon; Colonial Secretary, Right Honourable Sidney Herbert; Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure; Chancellor of the Exchequer, Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone; First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham; Minister of Public Works, Sir William Molesworth; President of the Board of Control, Sir Charles Wood; Irish Secretary, Mr. Horsman.

may here be said that it is doubtful indeed if any man better qualified to fill the difficult post of War Minister could have been found at that moment in the country. For, without claiming for Panmure any very exceptional gifts or talents, it may be argued that his strength of character, energy, workmanlike spirit, breadth of view, and sound common-sense were qualities of perhaps greater value at the moment than, say, the enthusiasm, charm, and lofty-mindedness of such a statesman as Sidney Herbert. Morally speaking, too, he had a pair of good broad shoulders on which to lay burdens; whilst a certain salutary toughness of hide—a very serviceable attribute—guarded him from excessive sensitiveness to criticism.

Once in office, he was not long—as the papers immediately following will show—in plunging into the midst of his duties. In a couple of sentences, dated February 1855, he notes the strong points and the defects of the Army system then in force, viz.: 'The regimental system is as nearly perfect as it can be. The system by which an army should be provisioned, moved, brought to act in the field and the trenches, taught to attack or defend, is non-existent.' And again, 'We have no means of making General Officers or of forming an efficient Staff.' And, this done, he proceeds forthwith to devise 'measures to be taken to establish a better order of things in the Crimea,' special attention being devoted to land-transport, scavenging, sanitation, commissariat, and the medical department. He also creates the appointment of Chief of the Staff,¹ which has continued in use since then. At the same time he declared war on the 'old-fashioned departmentalism' which at that time still pervaded the whole administration of military affairs. In addition to the above, matters dealt with in the correspondence of his early days in office included the problem of providing an army for the ensuing

¹ See the Instructions to General Simpson dated February 19th.

campaign, the passing of a Limited Enlistment Bill, and questions relating to clothing of troops and cavalry reorganisation. Furthermore, it can scarcely fail to be noticed that the effect of the letters addressed by Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan is greatly to soften the view of the relations between the correspondents which was presented by Mr. Kinglake.

OBSERVATIONS BY LORD PANMURE ON MILITARY
ORGANISATION¹

February 1855.

I have carefully perused His R.H.'s memorandum, and would humbly offer the following observations upon the subject to which it refers.

The causes which have led to the maintenance in this country of so small an army are manifold. First, ever since the Commons of England have made their voice heard in its Government, they have evinced a deep jealousy of a standing army, which looks to the Sovereign, as its head, for all promotion, discipline and orders, though paid by annual vote of Parliament.

Secondly, the people of this country have always been in the habit of looking to their insular position as a reason why they should depend more on a navy than an army for their protection, and have looked to the former only as necessary to afford protection to our colonies, and to maintain order and respect for the law at home.

They have never looked on the Army as a force which was to be kept available for foreign aggression.

Thirdly, every Ministry for the last forty years has striven, one after another, who shall gain most popularity by reducing our Army to the lowest possible amount with which the colonial reliefs could be carried on without subjecting our soldiers to absolute exile from their native country.

The first of these causes, whatever grounds may have formerly existed for it, can no longer be regarded as

¹ Suggested by a memorandum of Prince Albert's.

reasonable—for all experience has proved that the Sovereign of this country has neither the desire nor the power to use the Army save against the enemies of the country. The chimerical dread therefore of a 'standing army' is absurd, and in the altered circumstances of the times I am of opinion that this country will not maintain its place among the intelligent nations of the world unless she exhibits her disposition to show a respectable front, even in time of peace, as regards her Army.

Secondly, I trust our present experience will prove to our countrymen that our Army must be something more than a mere colonial guard or home police; that it must be the means of maintaining our name abroad, and causing it to be respected in peace as well as admired and dreaded in war. We know that British troops can fight better than any others, can endure longer, and obey with more alacrity and less of question. These are qualities which will always give them a vast superiority, if we are only *on a par* with other nations in our *training, military habits, drill, and tactics*. This can only be accomplished by courage and resolution on the part of all future Cabinets to prefer the honour of their Sovereign and country to all considerations of personal ambition, and to demand boldly from Parliament means sufficient to maintain, as economically as is consistent with perfect efficiency, an Army and Navy such as England ought to possess.

I firmly believe that, if Parliament is boldly asked to provide the means, though there may be always an opposition, the true spirit of patriotism will prevail, and the great political parties will soon come to an understanding that it is not on the question of the Military Establishments of the country that their party warfare is to be carried on.

If we should happily arrive at this state of things, then comes the consideration of the numbers and organisation of our Army in all its branches.

The lamentable results which have attended our present expedition, as far as the waste of human life has been concerned, are solely to be attributed to the want of proper control by a single Minister of every department of

the Army. The confusion, delays, and disappointments may be traced to this source to a very considerable extent, and as the nation is now alive to this fact, it is quite possible that it may rush into some extreme course which may entirely overthrow the present system, which by prudence and a little foresight might have been preserved in all its better parts.

I concur in H.R.H.'s remarks that our Army is 'a mere aggregate of battalions'—each of these perfect in itself and admirably formed, governed, and drilled, but only pieces in the entire structure of an army, as the wheels, etc., are in the mechanism of a clock.

The regimental system is as nearly perfect as it can be. The system by which an army should be provisioned, moved, brought to act in the field and in the trenches, taught to attack or defend, is non-existent.

All that was done in the Peninsula by the Duke of Wellington was frittered away and lost by a false economy forced upon successive Governments, and which [we] never have had the courage to resist.

We have no means of making General Officers or of forming an efficient Staff, as it has been the practice, even with our limited capacity, to keep the same officers constantly in employment, till they have either become worn out, or so wedded to old ways as to be useless when called to the field.

Had the report of the Commission of 1837 been followed out, this would not have occurred. It will not, I trust, occur in future.

It is owing to our regimental system and the intrinsic worth of our officers that we have succeeded in the little wars in which we have been engaged from time to time. For great operations we are inadequate, as the result has proved.

I concur in H.R.H.'s views that what we require is—

1. A Staff of competent General Officers.
2. A Staff Corps to train subordinate officers to the duties of the field.

3. Masses of troops to be provisioned, moved, and accustomed to life of a camp, by which a combination of all arms may be secured.
4. A proper system for the conveyance of material and baggage.
5. The means of easy and immediate transport for sick and wounded.
6. Well-arranged means of communication between our Army abroad and the authorities at home.
7. An efficient Commissariat, which shall have a certain number of its officers employed in India with the large bodies of troops there, and where alone they can learn the science of collecting supplies of all sorts.
8. A well-appointed corps of Artillery.
9. A siege-train suited to an army of 30,000 men, and which can be increased as occasion may require.
10. A good corps of Engineers.

In addition to the above, we should know at all times what means of transport we can command on any emergency either by means of the Royal or Mercantile Navy of the country. This may be all accomplished efficiently in time of peace at no great expense, certainly at none which a nation such as ours should grudge.

I now come to our force in time of peace. This should never be under 100,000 bayonets, of which 25,000 will probably be in India, 12,000 should be in Gibraltar and the Mediterranean. This would dispose of 37,000 out of 100,000, leaving 63,000 for home service and the colonies. Canada should not require more than 1000 in addition to the Canadian Rifles; the West Indies say 2000, in addition to the Black Corps; Nova Scotia, 1000; Australia, New Zealand, and Van Dieman's Land, 2000; and for the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon, 4000, with a full corps of

1500 for the Mauritius. This would reduce the home force to 51,500. Of these, three divisions of 10,000 each should be formed to be placed in permanent cantonments and occasionally encamped in such localities in England, Scotland, and Ireland as afford sufficient space for training and exercise, and easy access by railway.

To each division there should be attached a proper proportion of Cavalry and Artillery, a Medical Staff and Commissariat Department, and a Pontoon Brigade, and every man should be trained to work with the spade and practised in throwing up works. The officers would learn thoroughly all their duties and become practical professional men. These corps would occupy 30,000 men and leave 21,500 for duty throughout the country and for reliefs abroad. Of course the different regiments comprising the corps would be changed from time to time, and permission might be given to officers from other regiments to join the divisions temporarily for instruction.

I think that H.R.H. lays a good foundation for such a system as this in his Memorandum.

The divisions at Gibraltar and Malta would be smaller, say 6000 at Gibraltar and 5000 at Malta, giving 1000 to Corfu.

At Gibraltar much might be learned, and to our shame be it said that for many years there has never been one single instance, I am informed, of the garrison having been brigaded, and why? Because we have had incompetent officers placed in that most important command.

It is satisfactory to find that H.R.H. is so keenly alive to what is required for the organisation and efficiency of our Army, and with such materials as we have, though we can never compete in numbers with the Continental Powers, still we may easily beat them in alertness. We may make as good generals, I think better, out of the gentlemen of which our corps of officers are composed, and have what we never yet have seen in the British Army, an efficient Field Staff, who, both in the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Departments, shall not have to

learn their A B C when a full knowledge of their profession is demanded of them.

All that I have pointed out may be achieved under even the present system of command, but I would be wanting in candour did I not state my opinion, that I believe it can only be done by vesting in a Minister of the Crown the sole control of and responsibility for the co-operation of all the branches of the Military Service.

(Signed) PANMURE.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *February 7, 1855.*

If I did not mention to you this morning that I had offered to Lord Canning to take him into the Cabinet, it was that it went out of my head while talking of other matters. I had mentioned it to the other House of Lords members of the Cabinet, who had expressed no objections. I have not made any such proposal to Cardwell, but told Gladstone, who wished me to do so, that we had not room for him. Canning I do not consider as a Peelite, for he would have felt himself at liberty (at least as I understood him) to have joined the Government when the Peelites had declined to do so. I have altered your Statement of the Composition of the Cabinet. Granville is a Whig if ever there was one, and if you do not reckon Molesworth as one it must be because you think him something more: you omitted Cranworth, who is clearly a Whig, and with these corrections your list shows nine of one kind to five of the other—very nearly two to one, even if you count Canning as a Peelite, which I do not, and which I should think he would hardly do himself. Surely if we are to be a Coalition Government, which it has been felt to be so important that we should be, the foregoing proportions cannot be deemed to give an unfair preponderance to those who have joined us.

Composition of
the Cabinet.

As to Canning, my belief is that you will find him very useful in the House of Lords.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 9, 1855.*

Warning of a
supposed in-
tended attack
by the
Russians.

I have been so entirely occupied since my appointment to office that I have had no time to acquaint myself sufficiently with the details of former correspondence, so as to enable me to write you officially by this mail. I seize, however, these few minutes which remain to me to inform you of that which may reach you previously by telegraph, that the Government have information on which they think they can implicitly rely that the Czar has sent Prince [Nicholas or Michael¹] to the Crimea for the purpose of making a continued attack from without and within on the Allied Army. The signal for this is to be the first occasion of a snow-storm setting in from the direction in which the Russian Army will advance from without, and blowing consequently in the faces of the allies; in fact, they intend to use a snow-storm to answer the purpose of the mist at Inkerman. I hope it is unnecessary for me to impress on you every vigilance on the part of your outposts, and should the weather prove coarse, the most frequent inter-communication between your main bodies and their advanced pickets.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *February 9, 1855.*

Offering to
communicate
his impressions
of things at the
seat of the war.

I know how fully your time must at this moment be occupied, but I shall venture to write to you, as I am exceedingly anxious to see you. I have the vanity to suppose that there are many little matters in which I might be of use to you, as having come so recently from the seat of war and seen all that our poor fellows there have to go through, and so much that ought to be differently arranged and managed from what it is at present.

Your appointment has given me great satisfaction, but your task is not a light one. It must be the duty of all to assist as far as possible in carrying out your arduous undertaking, and, believe me, if in anything I can be of

¹ See Raglan's letter of February 24th.

use, my services are at all times at your command. If you would let me know where and at what time I may call on you, I will come to see you, or if you prefer it, I shall be happy to receive you here; but your time is precious, and you had therefore better let me call on you.

The following Memorandum, of which the original is in Lord Palmerston's handwriting, incorporates the decision of the Cabinet held on the 12th February as to measures to be taken for improving the Military Administration at home and in the Crimea.

MEMORANDUM OF MEASURES TAKEN TO ESTABLISH A BETTER
ORDER OF THINGS IN THE CRIMEA

- (1) A Land-Transport Corps has been formed under the orders of Colonel M'Murdo: the duties of this Corps will be to undertake the whole of the transport for the Army, and will be carried out on a much greater scale than the Royal Waggon train was under the Duke of Wellington. Agents will be sent to all parts of Asia Minor to purchase animals of burden.
- (2) Instructions have been sent to Lord Raglan to procure immediately from Constantinople a Corps of Scavengers to remove all the filth which exists in the camp.
- (3) Sanitary Commissions are to be sent out to suggest to Lord Raglan the measures necessary for keeping the camp in a good state, and their attention will also be directed to the sanitary conditions of our hospitals.
- (4) A Commission, of which Sir J. M'Neill is to be the head, is to be sent out to inquire into the working of the Commissariat in all its branches of supply and issue, and every other detail.
- (5) Civil medical men are to be sent out to the East, and a hospital at Smyrna is to be formed entirely under their direction.

- (6) Major-General Simpson is to proceed to the Crimea as Chief of the Staff. His duty will be to convey Lord Raglan's orders to the Staff, and through them to the Army, and see their orders quickly and implicitly obeyed; to inquire into the manner in which the Staff Officers perform their duties, and to report fully thereon to Lord Raglan and otherwise to the Secretary of State.

He will recommend to Lord Raglan any change which the result of his inspection may prove to be necessary.

- (7) A Sea-Transport Board is to be formed at the Admiralty, which will, so far as regards Military Transport, communicate duly with the War Office.

Reform of Civil Departments.

FROM PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

February 10, 1855.

No power to
purchase (much
needed)
vegetables.

A fact which has been brought to my knowledge yesterday ought to be known to you, and therefore I write a line notwithstanding my reluctance to trouble you, when such a heavy press of business must already be on your hands. It is admitted by all medical men that the greatest danger to our Army arises from scorbutic diseases and a corrupt state of blood, caused chiefly by the use of salt provisions. Vegetables are of the utmost importance to the poor men. It so happens that one of the Crimean Relief Societies sent out a whole shipful of vegetables. On its arrival at Constantinople, the man in charge of it reported himself to the Commissary (I believe Smith, reported to be our best), who was delighted to hear of the arrival of provisions; when he saw the list, however, and found they were vegetables, he declined purchasing 'as the Commissariat had *no power* to purchase vegetables'!! You will know that such is the ordinary rule, but surely in these moments they ought to have full powers to exercise their own discretion.

My authority is Lord Blantyre, on the Committee of the Fund, whom I saw yesterday, and who could tell you many strange stories connected with the state of our Army in the East.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

February 11, 1855.

The narrative with which your Royal Highness has favoured me is of a piece with the old-fashioned departmentalism throughout the whole administration of military affairs, which must be entirely overset. . . . I am quite certain that every officer has received ample discretionary powers, and, if they are either too timid or too slow to act upon them, they must at once be removed.

Old-fashioned departmentalism to be overset.

We expect the messenger at midnight, and I have just received from the Secretary of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company a notice that they have been informed of the arrival to-day of the first detachment of the 10th Hussars.

I trust that your Royal Highness will acquaint the Queen with this fact. I will not lose a moment in transmitting to Her Majesty all the information contained in the bag which reaches me.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 12, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and hastens to forward for your Majesty's perusal the despatches which arrived from Lord Raglan shortly before midnight last night.

No improvement in health of the Army.

Your Majesty will observe, probably with as much surprise as Lord Panmure, that Lord Raglan takes no notice whatever of the Duke of Newcastle's despatch of the 6th January, although in his private letter received by last messenger he acknowledged its receipt and complained generally of its contents. This omission seems to be so unaccountable that Lord Panmure still hopes that in some

confusion it may have got into another bag, and that it will come to his hand this morning.

Lord Panmure has ventured to transmit to your Majesty copies of Lord Raglan's letters, as the originals are difficult to read.

Lord Panmure cannot congratulate your Majesty on any marked improvement in the physical condition of the Army. By the Morning State of 28th January, there appears to have been on that day present and fit for duty—Artillery, 2562 rank and file; Cavalry and Infantry, 14,511 + 4075 batmen; making 18,586 rank and file fit for duty. There were also 2251 on command.¹ Colonel M'Murdo leaves England to-night to organise at Balaclava the land transport of the Army.

Lord Panmure abstains from sending to your Majesty, from day to day as they sit, the resolutions of the Cabinet upon military affairs solely because he presumes that all the resolutions of the Cabinet are communicated to your Majesty by Viscount Palmerston.

Lord Panmure will forward to your Majesty this evening a copy of the despatch that he writes to Lord Raglan by the mail.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 12, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty and begs to forward to your Majesty a further communication which arrived through the Post Office this morning from Lord Raglan.

Lord Panmure likewise transmits the Morning State of the 26th and 28th January, together with an extract of a private letter which has been sent to him, and which gives a more cheerful view of the state of the Army.

Lord Panmure begs to acquaint your Majesty that the Cabinet have resolved to recall Sir John Burgoyne,² whose presence is no longer necessary with the Army since General

¹ *i.e.* on detachment.

² Chief Engineer with the British Army in the Crimea. Born in 1782, he had been present at most of the great battles in the Peninsula.

Jones' arrival. It has also been thought expedient that Sir George Brown should be officially recognised as second in command.

In the absence of any reply on the part of Lord Raglan to the despatch of the 6th January, but in consequence of the deep conviction which rests upon his mind of the inefficiency of both Major-General Airey and Major-General Estcourt for the important duties imposed upon them, Lord Panmure has suggested to his colleagues, who have concurred in his views, that Major-General Simpson should proceed at once to the Crimea as Chief of the Staff, and in that capacity make a searching inquiry into the fitness of every officer for his duties, and report his opinion and recommendations to Lord Raglan.

Simpson to inquire into fitness of officers at seat of war.

Lord Panmure transmits to your Majesty a copy of the despatch which he has sent to-night to Lord Raglan.

Lord Panmure has received a box from your Majesty containing a letter to Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, and your Majesty's commands that it should be forwarded by to-night's mail, which have been obeyed.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL LORD WILLIAM PAULET¹

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 12, 1855.*

I think you will like to have a few lines from me, on assuming the direction of the War Department, to assure you of the deep anxiety with which I look to every officer in command to meet the exigencies of the times and carry on with vigour the war in which we are engaged. On no one can devolve more important duties than yourself, and I am sure that I may rely on your zeal and ability in discharging them. You are charged with making the arrangements for the accommodation of the sick and wounded. In so doing you must not be afraid of taking upon yourself considerable responsibility, and whenever you see it to be beneficial to depart from ordinary and established rules to improvements, or meet cases of emergency, pray do so and rely on me for support. Above all, you will, I trust, co-

Exhortation as to management of hospital department.

¹ In command at Scutari.

operate heartily with Admiral Grey, who is a friend of mine, and will, I am sure, by his quickness and talent be of great service to you in your arduous duties. Remember that the eyes of all England are on Scutari, and a victory over disease and death is as great as over a living foe.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN¹

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 12, 1855.*

Regretting
necessity of
forwarding an
unpalatable
despatch.

I am sorry to be obliged to send you a despatch to-day embodying my view of the grievances in your camp, their cause and the remedy, or rather my strong advice that you should try and get a more energetic and efficient officer than Airey seems to be. The public are roused, and the House of Commons has already sacrificed two victims to their disappointment in the persons of Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Newcastle. I have most reluctantly come here—not that I expect to do any better than my predecessor, but because I wish to protect, as far as possible, the interests of the Army, and to stand between you and those who are so angry at all that has happened. I know well the chivalrous feeling that will induce you to protect your subordinates, but I hope that you will not push this too far, because it is impossible for you or any man to see all that is going on with one pair of eyes, and you have not been informed of the state of your different Divisions by those whose business it was to be continually on the outlook and to tell you. I can never excuse General Airey for not looking to his communication with Balaclava. With plenty of stone, he might have laid a thick bottoming first, and a causeway on the top of this; but no pains seems to have been taken to do anything, nor do I believe, from all I hear, that either he or his people have even been at Balaclava at all until we had the storm burst on us here.

¹ The first letter written by Lord Panmure after receiving the Seals. Its effect is greatly to soften the effect of the despatch which it accompanied—a stern indictment, the tone of which, as will be remembered, was severely censured by Kinglake in his *History*. See *Correspondence relating to the Military Expedition to the East*, pp. 370, 371. Printed for the use of the Cabinet; also Appendix to vol. ii. of this work.

We are in a curious position. Parliament is adjourned till Friday. Mr. Roebuck's Motion for a Committee is carried, and almost all the new Government were members of the old. The House of Commons will name that Committee, unless some change is made, or some step undertaken by Government which would be painful to you. I think it impossible to submit to carry on the Government unless the House of Commons put down Mr. Roebuck's Committee. This they will not do unless we move on our part. Some think a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the whole management of the Army. This I wish to avoid for your sake, as you have done great and gallant deeds, and I should be sorry to be compelled to put such a slight upon you. But your Staff must be changed at the least; that will satisfy the public, and that radically, and I would strongly advise both Airey and Estcourt to go either to Divisions or come home; for be assured that, if they do not, they will be swept away by Ellenborough, who will succeed me as War Minister should Lord Derby come in. If I had Markham¹ at home, so high is my opinion of him as a soldier that I would have sent him at once to your aid; as it is, I have ordered him from India, and on his arrival you must use him as your Quartermaster-General, who-ever you employ in the meantime.

Critical position
of the Govern-
ment.

You have done us great service, nobody could have done better in keeping up friendly relations with our allies, and the quiet way in which you have effected your relief in the trenches, though not to the extent you could desire, is most gratifying to the Government and myself. I hope you may gradually effect more. I don't wish to place my views too much or too conspicuously before you, but it occurs to me that we ought to know your opinions upon every point of strategical detail without loss of time.

Raglan's
merits
commended.

Interrogated as
to his plans.

1. Your opinion upon the expediency of an assault.
2. Your arrangements should it succeed.

¹ General Markham had made a great military reputation in India, where he had commanded the 32nd Regiment.

3. Your calculations of what might happen on its failure.
4. If it should be necessary to withdraw, have you in consultation with General Canrobert thought or forecast any plan for so doing?

All these are matters of deep interest to me and all of us here, and we shall look for your views with what you may call too great impatience.

General
Simpson sent
out to act as
Chief of Staff.

Since I wrote the above I have returned from the Cabinet, and we have resolved on two things which it is of importance for you to know. The first is to issue a Commission of Second in Command of the Army to Brown,¹ and the next is to send out to you General Simpson to act as Chief of the Staff, as referred to in my public despatch. He will inquire into and report upon the efficiency of your Staff Officers, especially those in the inferior grades, but General Airey and Estcourt will not escape from his review.

You must support him, or be assured that we shall have greater difficulties arise. Do for pity's sake get something done for the road, as it will be absolutely necessary, as well as the train road now making.

I have not time for more but will write fully as I can every mail.

QUEEN VICTORIA TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *February 13, 1855.*

The Queen has to thank Lord Panmure for two letters, one received yesterday, and the other this morning.

Meagreness of
Raglan's letters.

She has been as much surprised as Lord Panmure can have been to find that Lord Raglan made no answer to the Duke of Newcastle's despatch of the 6th ult.; his letters are as usual not very full of information, and the Morning State shows an unfavourable condition of the Army.

¹ General Sir George Brown. He had distinguished himself in the Peninsular War as an officer of the famous Light Division, and had been placed in command of the Light Division in the Crimea.

It is to be hoped that Colonel M'Murdo will succeed with the organisation of the Land Transport, which the Queen apprehends, however, will be more easily prepared at Constantinople than at Balaclava itself.

Organisation
of Land
Transport.

The Queen approves of the recall of Sir John Burgoyne, which may be effected without wounding his feelings, as he is in fact wanted at his post at home.

Recall of
Burgoyne, and
appointment of
Sir G. Brown
and General
Simpson.

She likewise approves the appointment of Sir George Brown as Second in Command, and the appointment of General Simpson as Chief of the Staff; he is a very experienced officer, and it is to be hoped not yet too old for the duties. His task will not be an enviable one, particularly that of inquiring into and reporting on the efficiency of the officers now composing the Staff of Lord Raglan.

The Queen was much pleased with the despatch which Lord Panmure has addressed to Lord Raglan—painful as it must be to have to write or to receive it; the truth of everything stated therein is undeniable, and the directions given, if attended to, can only produce an improvement.¹

Panmure's
despatch to
Raglan.

The Queen keeps both the letters from Lord Raglan and the despatch, presuming that they were copied for her.

She understands that Mr. Frederic Peel is to be Lord Panmure's Parliamentary Under-Secretary; whom will he propose as his Military Under-Secretary? This will be an appointment of much importance.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 13, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty and begs to assure your Majesty of the great encouragement which he receives from your Majesty's approbation of his proceedings.

All copied papers are intended for your Majesty's retention, and whenever time will permit Lord Panmure

¹ Compare Kinglake's comment on this despatch, vol. vi. pp. 331 *et seq.*

will have Lord Raglan's despatches copied for your Majesty's use.

Lord Panmure feels that he has erred in not acquainting your Majesty with Mr. Peel's appointment,¹ but he understood that Lord Palmerston had undertaken to do so. The selection of a Military Under-Secretary is a matter of more importance, as it is permanent, and no step shall be taken in that direction without your Majesty's full cognisance.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

February 13, 1855.

The Queen was very much pleased to hear that a portion of the 10th Hussars have already arrived at Suez. It will be of the greatest importance that this fine regiment should not be sent to the Crimea before the spring, where in the present inclement season, and under present bad arrangements, it would be sure to be destroyed without any likelihood of being able to render any service.

It strikes me that it would be much the best plan to reorganise our Cavalry at once in Turkey in order to have it ready in the spring. The Duke of Cambridge tells me that, after so long a voyage as some 1000 miles, the horses will at least require six weeks' rest, standing, and that those which went out last year, amongst which the fine Artillery horses, having to march soon after their arrival, got fever in their feet and were rendered useless.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

February 13, 1855.

I received your Royal Highness' suggestions as to the mode of disposing of the 10th Hussars, while Lord Hardinge was with me, and we both concur in the force of your Royal Highness' remarks. The same applies to the remount of our Cavalry in Turkey, and instructions on this point will be sent to Lord Raglan.

¹ As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.

10th Hussars
not to be sent
to Crimea till
spring.

Cavalry to be
reorganised in
Turkey against
spring.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

February 13, 1855.

It is clear that, quite independently of the medical ^{Improvement of war hospitals.} treatment of the sick and wounded, there is an urgent necessity for improved sanitary arrangements in our hospitals at Constantinople, Scutari, and elsewhere. Proper ventilation has been neglected, and various other sanitary arrangements have been either not thought of, or not carried into effect.

There are two very able and active men who have been connected with the Board of Health and whom I have much employed about sanitary matters—Dr. Sutherland and Dr. Grainger. I wish very much that you would send them out at once to Constantinople, and one afterwards to Scutari and Balaclava and the Camp, not to interfere at all with the medical treatment of the sick and wounded, but with full powers to carry into immediate effect such sanitary improvements and arrangements in regard to the hospital buildings and to the Camp as their experience may suggest. I am convinced that this will save a great many lives, and restore to the service a great many men who would otherwise be permanently disabled.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, February 13, 1855.

I forgot to say that the Queen asked me in a note ^{Inquiry as to next campaign.} yesterday what steps are taking with a view to the next campaign, and you may as well give her an outline of your arrangements.

Would it not be well to send out with General Simpson the living Despatch who is to come back again?

Colonel Malcolm, son of Sir John Malcolm who was in Persia, wishes for employment. I believe him to be an intelligent man. He was with his father in Persia, and went with Sir Henry Pottinger to China when I sent Pottinger to arrange matters with the Chinese. He did very well there.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 15, 1855.*

Affairs at home
and at the seat
of war.

I commence my private letter to you before the mail comes in, as I fear that we shall have hurry and confusion to-morrow, with the mail arriving in the morning, departing in the evening, and Parliament reassembling in the interval. I suspect that heavy fire will be opened in both Houses, but we will do our best to allay angry feeling and conduct affairs coolly. I send you, under the same cover with this, a paper of Lord Hardinge's, confidentially printed for the Cabinet, which it will be useful for you to see. It will show you the resources to which you have to look in spring, and I hope inspire confidence in your mind as to any scheme of operations which you may be forming. I have every reason to believe that your supplies of hay are now arriving regularly, and I shall send your Artillery horses as soon as I can get conveyance for them. I am very anxious to have your batteries completed, and that important arm fit to move for any purpose.

In regard to your Cavalry remounts, I make that the subject, or rather one of the subjects, of my public despatch. I hope you are in some better order at Balaclava, and that you are by degrees getting that confusion brought into order. As soon as this is done, and your stores cleared out, let me suggest to you to have no depôts of any size—not more than a fortnight's consumption at that place, but to draw by regular steam communication every three days for supplies from the Bosphorus, where your great magazines of everything should be. I cannot see any difficulty in arriving at this arrangement.

As to supplying
and clothing the
Army now on
active service.

I am contemplating the issue of an order to organise at Scutari a corps of shoemakers, who could be supplied with leather and materials and make and mend shoes and boots for your people. There is, of course, some necessity for our looking to the spring clothing immediately. I have a strong notion that the men ought not to leave off their woollen shirts even in the hot weather and when not

on duty, that a pair of coarse canvas trousers, and a smock frock shirt [that] would go on even over their uniform jacket, would be a good fatigue dress. Let me hear from you on this point at your earliest convenience. We mean to send out a Commission to inquire into our Commissariat and the whole question of delivery and consignment of stores, also a sanitary Commission to aid you in clearing your camp, for if that be not efficiently done you will all die of fever.

The Czar seems to be making frightful efforts, but I firmly believe that they will prove abortive, and my great ambition is to see you either give him battle in the field or force him out of the Crimea. Don't look for peace or turn your eyes to Vienna.¹ If we can make a *bonâ fide* honest peace it will be done, but this is for our diplomatists; our generals must fight as if no negotiations existed. Your operations must be so conducted as to leave not the slightest ground for suspicion that we pursue a Fabian policy till peace comes to our rescue. It is not so, and it must not appear to be so. The villainous *Times* has outdone itself in an article to-day on the 63rd Regiment. By the bye, when you send a regiment away in such circumstances as this has been sent, do not send it to Malta or Gibraltar, or any place where it can cast a damp on the spirits of your reserves, but send it home at once to have its ranks recruited. I shall keep this open till to-morrow, and finish it when I come from the House of Lords in case I have anything to add.

The mail is in and we have no answer to No. 202!² I expect to be called over the coals for it, but I must promise it on Monday when I hope and trust it will arrive. I am going to bring in a Bill to enable us to enlist men for two or three years between 24 and 32 years of age, which will, I hope, help us.

¹ Shortly before the fall of the Aberdeen Ministry, the acceptance by Russia of the four points held by the Allies to be the necessary basis of a treaty of peace called for negotiations to define the practical application of these points. A Conference at Vienna for that purpose was the result.

² The Duke of Newcastle's despatch of January 6th.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 15, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and transmits for your Majesty's approval and signature the increase to the Establishment of the Ordnance Corps.

Contemplated
Commissions at
the seat of war.

Lord Panmure begs to acquaint your Majesty that Major-General Simpson leaves England on Monday evening, and that it is in contemplation to send out a Commission to inquire into the condition and state of the Army.¹

It is likewise intended to despatch a Sanitary Commission² to follow up the instructions to Lord Raglan on the subject of the purification of the Camp.

Lord Panmure begs to acquaint your Majesty that the messenger is expected at 8 A.M. to-morrow, and he will endeavour to have the contents of the despatches in your Majesty's hands as soon as possible.

Mischievous
article in the
Times.

Lord Panmure is deeply concerned to observe the mischievous article in the *Times* of this morning, contrasting the condition of the officers and men of the Army. With such infamous articles as these it is not surprising to see recruiting fall off, and zeal, and even loyalty itself paralysed.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, February 15, 1855.

Deplorable
state of war
hospitals.
Despatch of
medical men to
remedy defects.

It is essential that I should be able to state to-morrow in the House of Commons that the two able civilian medical men whom I mentioned to you¹ are going out to Constantinople and to the Crimea to establish sanitary regulations in our hospital departments. The condition of our hospitals is deplorable and disgraceful. Hundreds of men are dying there from mere neglect and bad arrangements, and it must be our first and immediate object to set these things to rights. Not only are our hospitals in

¹ The Commission consisted of Sir J. M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch.

² Sir Henry Rawlinson's Commission.

³ See Palmerston's first letter of date February 13th.

this state, but the ships in which our sick and wounded are brought from place to place are worse than the hospitals, and the poor wretches who are crowded into them are left in a state of filth and misery which baffles description. The two men I mentioned to you will set all this right if they have full powers, and we must overrule all objections on the part of the Military Departments to accomplish these objects. The state of the Camp also requires immediate attention with reference to its sanitary condition, for depend upon it that, unless some active measures are taken, there will break out, as soon as the spring sun begins to shine, a pestilence worse than any disease which has hitherto afflicted our troops.

February 15, 1855.

That Dr. Sutherland of the Board of Health,

Mr. Simon, Health Officer of the City of London, Memorandum on the despatch of Medical Commissioners to the seat of war, and their powers.
 Dr. Gavin, for three years Government Commissioner to West Indies in prevention and cure of the Cholera, be appointed—Dr. Sutherland to be the chief.

One thus may be at Scutari,

One at Balaclava,

One either stationary or employed on inspections.

That in case of their finding certain structural works to be necessary, such as jetties to embark and disembark the sick and wounded, shafts for ventilation, and many other important things well known to the practitioners in Sanitary Science, they have full power to avail themselves of the aid and services of Mr. Barron and his body of five-and-twenty workmen *already engaged* by the Government, and sent out under the recommendation of Mr. Peto.¹

Mr. Barron is receiving a salary of five hundred pounds for one year; and is, as Mr. Peto stated to-day, an intelligent, experienced builder, full of knowledge and skill, and zealous to be useful in the highest degree.

He and his men would, of course, move as required from Scutari to Balaclava and back again.

¹ One of the contractors for the Balaclava railway.

These gentlemen should have power to order better sanitary arrangements for the hospital-ships taking sick and wounded to Balaclava.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *February 16, 1855.*

Will you have the goodness to let me have in the course of the day, and before the House meets, a short statement of the various measures taken or about to be taken to establish a better system of order in our arrangements at Constantinople, Scutari, and the Crimea.

I send you a memorandum which Shaftesbury gave me last night. I believe the three medical men he mentions would be the best for the purpose. But they ought to have power to make arrangements for sanitary purposes in the transport-ships for sick and wounded.

Deplorable
condition of the
sick on board
transport-ships.

I was told by a person who came from the East that the condition in which the sick are put on board at Balaclava and landed at Scutari is too disgusting to be described, and too filthy for human beings.

Is not Seaton too old for active duty even in Ireland, and would not De Lacy Evans be a better man? His being an Irishman, moreover, would be a recommendation, considering how scantily Ireland is represented in our Government.

I suppose I may say, if asked in the House, that Dr. Smith of the Medical Board here at home is to retire, and that some changes are about to be made in the Heads of the Medical Department in the Levant.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February 16, 1855.*

The Queen has been much interested with Lord Hardinge's Memorandum giving account of all that has been done up to the present time with reference to the Army.

If recruiting is to be improved it will be necessary to lose no time with the introduction of a Bill enabling short enlistments, for one, two, or three years, for men between 25 and 30 years of age.

Urges introduction of a Bill for short enlistments.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 16, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to forward for your Majesty's information the despatches from Lord Raglan which have been brought by the messenger. The official reply to No. 202 of the 6th January is still not forthcoming, and Lord Panmure is sorry to observe that the return of casualties referred to in Lord Raglan's official despatch has been omitted to be sent.

Lord Panmure humbly requests that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to return by the messenger the Morning State which accompanies this note.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February 16, 1855.*

The Queen returns the Morning State of the Army in the Crimea, and must express astonishment at the meagre and unsatisfactory reports from Lord Raglan, which contain next to nothing, and certainly nothing for the guidance of the Home Government. How different are General Rose's¹ despatches reporting on the State of the French Army! Should not the 63rd Regiment be brought home to be reorganised? It has got 33 officers present to 62 men, including batmen!

Meagreness of Raglan's despatches.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 19, 1855.*

I have scarcely any time to write you, nor indeed much to say. General Simpson goes to-day and will

¹ Hew Rose, afterwards Lord Strathnairn, British Commissioner with the French Army.

Roebuck's
Committee and
how its opera-
tions are to be
limited.

reach you soon after this. You will, I trust, appreciate the spirit in which I have sent him. Such a course is the only possible mode left to me of acting, unless I had at once written to you to remove Airey and Estcourt. This I was unwilling to do on your account, but I must do something to satisfy the House of Commons, and if you can, as I hope you will, give way to the current of public opinion in some degree, I look forward to better times ere long. Roebuck's Committee will sit—no power can stay it. I will prevent its dealing with the Army and its discipline, or I shall resign my office. However, I do not expect I shall be driven to this, though God knows that it would be an escape from one of the greatest toils I ever undertook.

I have got you a very good man to command our Turkish Contingent—General Vivian. He is in the E. I. Company's service. The officers will be mostly, if not all, from the E.I.C. service.

Mind that both the Sardinian Contingent and the 10th Hussars at Cairo await your orders. Arrangements will be made to send the ships for them to Genoa to wait till you send for them. Send an officer whenever you require them. I hope by the aid of my sanitary gentlemen your camp may be cleansed and good suggestions made for getting rid of offal and ordure.

I fancy the weather has detained our messenger. It is bitter cold, and the river is full of ice before my windows and fast above bridges.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G. C., *February* 19, 1855.

As to a Jewish
spy.

The writer of the enclosed is, I understand, a respectable man. A few days ago he informed me that he had fallen in with one Kransz, a Jew, who seemed able and willing to do us some service. I asked for further information and got the letter I now send.

He is the sort of a man that has been long *wanted*

in the Crimea, and if he has a mind to get himself hung by the Russians, *why shouldn't he?*

Would you like to send him out if he can furnish any testimonials of respectability? I have no recollection of his bringing me a letter from the Duke of Cambridge, but he may have done so.

Ellenborough¹ told me this evening that the best man *longo intervallo* for the command of our Turkish Army is Sir Hugh Wheeler, of the Bengal Army. He spoke of him in the very highest terms.

Command of
Turkish
Contingent.

I asked him if he knew Vivian, but he had never heard his name. I have had a note from him since, to say that a Colonel Vivian belonged to the Madras Army and can therefore have no military experience, as the Madras Army has had nothing to do for many years. This may be worth inquiring about. Ellenborough is good reference for Indian officers.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 19, 1855.*

SIR,—Her Majesty having been graciously pleased to appoint you to be Chief of the Staff of the Army in the Crimea, and as your position is novel in the British Army, I think it necessary to state to you in distinct terms the nature of the duties which you will have to perform.

Instructions to
General
Simpson on his
appointment as
Chief of the
Staff.

1. On arriving at the headquarters of the Army, you will report yourself to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, to whom a copy of these Instructions will be forwarded by the next mail.

2. As Chief of the Staff you will receive from the Field-Marshal, and promulgate in his name, all orders to the Army.

3. You will convey the Field-Marshal's special instructions to the Departments of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, and it will be your business not only to convey to these officers the orders referred to,

¹ Lord Ellenborough, formerly Governor-General of India.

but to see that those orders are speedily and implicitly carried into effect.

4. It will be your duty to look into the composition of the General Staff of the Army, and report your opinion and any changes which it may occur to you to think necessary to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan. This Report you will make in duplicate, and instructions will be given to the Field-Marshal to forward one of them for the information of the Secretary of State for War.

5. All Reports from the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General's Departments will, as a general rule, pass through your hands.

6. All appointments and removal of officers from the General Staff of the Army will rest with the officer in Supreme Command, but you will not fail if you find any officer in your opinion unfit, on trial, for the duties intrusted to him, to report the same without fear or affection to the Commander-in-Chief.

7. From the above instructions you will perceive that great responsibility attaches itself to your situation, which, however, I feel quite confident of your ability to undertake.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 20, 1855.

Still no reply
from Raglan to
Newcastle's
despatch of
Jan. 6th.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and transmits herewith, in original, all the despatches which the messenger who arrived last night about midnight has brought from Lord Raglan. Your Majesty will observe that no reply has come to the Duke of Newcastle's despatch of the 6th Jan., nor is any allusion made to it further than the complaint made by Lord Raglan in his private letter.

Lord Panmure cannot understand how the Commissary has allowed his stock of hay and straw to run so low as Lord Raglan represents, but he has every reason to feel confident that, from the arrangements now made from hence, regular supplies of hay will flow into Balaclava.

Your Majesty will perceive that these despatches are of more than ordinary interest, especially that marked No. 1, which communicates the plan of attack on Sebastopol. Unanimity of opinion and concert of action between the Commanders of the Allied Armies is gratifying, and gives strong assurance of a successful issue, though Lord Panmure does not anticipate that any assault will have taken place as yet, but most probably a very few days will elapse before it is made.

Referring to
plan of attack
on Sebastopol.

Lord Panmure humbly requests that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to return the despatches by the messenger when read, as there is to be a Cabinet at two precisely, at which Lord Panmure will be expected to submit them to his colleagues.

Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit a letter addressed to your Majesty which came in this bag.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February 20, 1855.*

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letters and the interesting despatches, which she asks him to let her have again after the Cabinet.

She feels very anxious at the accounts of the prospects of an assault.

Prospects of an
assault.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 23, 1855.*

The messenger brought us your answer to the Duke of Newcastle's despatch, but I cannot comment on it officially by this mail. We are in another ministerial crisis on the subject of Roebuck's Committee. The House of Commons and the country are resolved on inquiry; no Government can resist it, and it has been ascertained that Lord Derby would yield to it were he to come in. It is useless therefore to resist the storm; we must try and guide it, if, as I presume will be the

The storm
must be faced.

case, three such defalcations as Graham, Gladstone, and Sidney Herbert can be made up.¹

Comments on
plan of attack
on Sebastopol.

We were all much pleased with your secret despatch, in which you send us home the plan of attack on Sebastopol, and it appears to be feasible so far as you know the difficulties with which you will have to contend. But my notion is that you will find barrier on barrier prepared to resist you within, and mines ready for you in all directions. If it should come to an assault, God send you well through it. In publishing your despatch to-day, I have put in your paragraph about the hay as just to yourself, and I have caused a most searching inquiry to be made into the cause of delay. I hope you will give all facilities for our inquiry into the Commissariat Stores by Sir John M'Neill and Tulloch; it will enable us to do much to improve.

I must now go to the House of Lords, and if I can get back to add any more, I will.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G. C., *February 23, 1855.*

Turkish
Contingent.

The ratifications of the Turkish Convention go to-day. I wrote by the last mail urging Stratford to use his utmost exertions to have the Contingent got together and ready for the officers.

What shall I tell him about their arrival?

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

February 23, 1855.

Amongst all the difficulties of the moment, which, however great they may be, I trust we shall successfully

¹ On becoming Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston had endeavoured to persuade the House not to insist on the appointment of the Committee recommended in Mr. Roebuck's motion. When it became plain that Parliament was inexorable, Sir James Graham, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sidney Herbert declined to continue in office. Sir Charles Wood then became First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord John Russell Secretary of the Colonies, and Sir George Cornewall Lewis Chancellor of the Exchequer.

pull through, the consideration how we are to provide an army for the next campaign is the one which gives me most anxiety.

How to provide an army for next campaign.

We shall have nothing except the ten Battalions preparing in the Mediterranean, the Drafts organising at Malta, and the remnant of Lord Raglan's present force.

The first will not be completed and fit for service for some time; the second cannot be ready much before the summer, and will then be very young and quite inexperienced; the last will be found, after all, what we shall have chiefly to depend upon.

Our chief endeavour therefore must be to save as many men of that Army as possible, putting them in a condition to be able to meet further hardships and fatigues.

They have between 17,000 and 18,000 sick at this moment, and from all I can hear, recoveries are very rare and slow in the crowded hospitals, nor will the new hospital at Smyrna do more than relieve Scutari and Kulali of their increasing numbers. When men are considered convalescent and sent back to the Crimea, they are so little able, with their shattered constitutions, to stand the fatigues and privations of the siege, that in a very few days they have to be sent back to hospital, and thereby not only add considerably to Lord Raglan's present difficulties, but also diminish our prospect of seeing them again in the ranks as efficient men, as relapses are generally more fatal than the original disease.

In my opinion, therefore, we ought not to delay a moment in selecting a distinct place for convalescent depôts,¹ removed from the immediate contact of the hospitals and sick, in a different locality and climate, and leaving the men free from all hard duty and exposure, but keeping them under military organisation and strict discipline. I should say that Corfu or the Ionian Islands generally would be the best place for this. The convalescents might there be organised in Provisional Battalions, similarly to the Drafts at Malta, and, as at the

Suggests 'convalescent depôts.'

¹ It was as a result of experience gained in the Crimean campaign that our later system of *hospital-ships* was introduced.

latter place the principal object is to form recruits into efficient soldiers, here it should be, to devise every possible means of restoring the convalescents to health and strength.

In the weakened state of many of the regiments before Sebastopol, there seems to be an overplus of officers, and as many as are required might easily be detached for this service. There is a good General there who might be assisted by two Brigadiers, and any want of barrack room might be supplied by sending for huts, perhaps from Trieste, where they could be quickly and cheaply procured.

I send you this suggestion as it has occurred to me, without any further comment.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 23, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and regrets very much to have to acquaint your Majesty that, after conferring with his colleagues on the subject of sending Major-General Grey¹ to the headquarters of the Army, he feels himself constrained to yield to their opinion that such a step would not in the present temper of the country be expedient.

Referring to a
delicate matter.

Lord Panmure would not on that account shrink from any responsibility when he thought that the interests of your Majesty's service were involved, but in the present case the question turns upon the extent to which His Royal Highness the Prince's name might be associated with General Grey's mission.

Lord Panmure represented to his colleagues that he had suggested General Grey's name to your Majesty, and that laying aside all considerations of private convenience, both your Majesty and His Royal Highness cheerfully placed the General at the disposal of the Government.

¹ It had been proposed to send General Grey, Prince Albert's Private Secretary, to the seat of war to institute a general inquiry.

Lord Panmure's colleagues were deeply sensible of your Majesty's readiness, as well as that of His Royal Highness, to sacrifice on this as on other occasions personal considerations to the public good, but they feared to raise again those most unjust and false prejudices which have been entertained against His Royal Highness, and thereby to cause pain to your Majesty in your most tender feelings.

Under these circumstances Lord Panmure, most humbly thanking your Majesty for your gracious reception of his proposal, requests to withdraw it from your Majesty's further attention.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *February 24, 1855.*

The mail of the 9th arrived yesterday and brought me the announcement of your appointment to be War Minister, and your private letter of that date. The renewal of our official intercourse is very agreeable to me, and I shall be happy to correspond with you without reserve, and in terms of the utmost confidence. You will have learnt by my despatch to Lord Clarendon, of the 17th, that I received on the 15th his telegraphic despatch of the 9th, apprising me of the Govt. having acquired information, on which they can rely, of the intention of the Russians to make a combined attack on the Allied Army from within and without Sebastopol, and that they are in possession of submarine explosive machines, and that I communicated the message to General Canrobert and Sir Edmund Lyons.

Position of
affairs in
Crimea.

The Princes¹ are certainly here, and it is said that one of them was at Eupatoria, and we had on Tuesday an awful snow-storm, but the attack has not yet been made.²

I send you copies of two further letters from Colonel

¹ Grand-Dukes Nicholas and Michael, whose return to the Crimea was correctly interpreted as portending an increase of warlike activity.

² See Lord Panmure's letter of date February 9.

Simmons,¹ containing a good deal of interesting matter. I have every reason to hope that the repulse of the Russians from Eupatoria² is calculated to make a very favourable impression, and to inflict considerable discredit on the enemy.

Importance
of retaining
Turkish troops
at Eupatoria.

I consider the presence of a Turkish force little short of 30,000 men at Eupatoria in the highest degree important, but General Canrobert is anxious to have a great portion of it here. I shall endeavour to prevent this, and as Sir Edmund Lyons alone has the means of moving these Turkish troops by sea, and he agrees in my opinion, I hope we shall succeed in keeping Omar Pasha where he is. I am afraid that the French sustained a more considerable loss in the affair of this morning than they are prepared to avow.³ This I say quite confidentially.

I enclose a report from Mr. Cattley⁴ of the amount of the Russian Army according to the latest advices. I am inclined to think that the 8th Division has arrived.

I enclose the last Morning State.

The deaths at Scutari are numerous, but the returns do not show, in the present state, the period during which they occurred. Our communications with the Bosphorus are uncertain.

There is certainly an improvement in the sick, and if the weather becomes moderate, I expect further amendment.

Return of
General Niel
to the seat of
war.

General Niel,⁵ the officer of Engineers lately sent from Paris, who had left this after a short visit, met an order at Constantinople for him to return here, and he arrived at General Canrobert's yesterday morning.

¹ Afterwards Sir Lintorn Simmons ; with the Turkish Army in Asia Minor.

² February 17. They made no further attempt on that place.

³ The French night attack on the Selinghinsk Redoubt. Bazancourt estimates the killed at 94, the wounded at about 150. *Cinq mois au camp devant Sébastopol.*

⁴ Head of Intelligence Department.

⁵ The French Emperor's confidential agent at the seat of war.

It had been urged on Raglan, by the Queen, Prince, and Lord Panmure, to adopt, after the manner of foreign nations, a Chancellerie Militaire, or secretarial department, for the despatch of correspondence. But, averse to all innovations, he declined to do this.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 26, 1855.*

I have not much to form the subject of either a public or private letter, but I am unwilling to let the mail go empty-handed in either respect.

The accounts which are prevalent here of your operations do not convey to us the idea that you will be in the position to assault the town for a month to come. I hope you will not attempt it unless pretty certain of success, as even a very partial failure will open the flood-gates of wrath upon every one. I am not alarmed at this. My own impression is that you will have to fight a battle before you have a chance of the town, and I would not very much wonder if it became the prize of the Allied Armies without an assault at all, by the defeat of the enemy in the field.

Writer's
impression as
to how the
town will fall.

I cannot see that the fleet can aid you in any assault on Sebastopol unless you can previously get possession of the forts on the north side, though barrier and booms are so set as to be almost impassable to our screws.

It seems to be pretty clear that we shall do something with the Sea of Azof as soon as the ice breaks up, and we shall require a land force to co-operate in the reduction of Kertch and the forts guarding its entrance. You had better consider this event, and arrange in your own mind in what manner you will meet it, in case the co-operating force is to be detached from your Army. Had this been done last year, what a host of supplies would have been cut off from the Russian Army!

As to opera-
tions in the Sea
of Azof.

The new Limited Enlistment Bill will receive the Royal assent to-morrow, and I hope under it to get you some stout and able-bodied men; they tell me, but I can only receive it as a report, that I may get 1500 or 2000 men for the Guards from the Irish Constabulary force. If this be so, your brigade of Guards will rise Phoenix-like from its ashes. I expect, however, great things from the measure.

I hear Lord Cardigan talks of leaving about the middle of March. I am very busy with the Bath and the medals, both of which I find had made no progress. The new Order of Merit will take time, I fear.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

February 26, 1855.

Second Lieut.-
Colonel to
Crimean
regiments.

The Queen received a few days ago a box from the Horse Guards, with a document for her signature, appointing, to each of the Crimean regiments, a second Lieut.-Colonel, instead of a third Major now on their establishment. Before doing so, she would wish to know what position he is intended to hold? If it is for the command of the depôt at Malta, it appears to her that, as these depôts are to be collected into provisional Battalions corresponding with the Divisions in the Crimea, it will scarcely be necessary to have an officer of that rank for each separate depôt, but rather an encumbrance.

The Queen would also draw attention to the fact, that the list of Lieut.-Colonels who obtain their Colonelcy under the new warrant after three years' service, which we have every reason to fear will already get very heavy, will thereby be still further increased. This must contribute to the prospect of our General Officers after the conclusion of Peace being eventually still older than they are at present.

I have sent a copy of this letter to Lord Hardinge.

PS.—The Queen has not yet received Lord Raglan's despatch which you had printed.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

February 26, 1855.

I had the honour to receive your Royal Highness' note, conveying to me Her Majesty's views on the subject of the appointment of a second Lieut.-Colonel to each of the regiments in the Crimea. I fully understood that Lord Hardinge had explained his views to Her Majesty

in submitting to Her Majesty the document which was to enable him to carry them into effect.

The present establishment is one Lieut.-Colonel and three Majors for 16 Companies of 2000 men. This gives the chance of regimental promotion to the rank of Lieut.-Colonel in no greater proportion in these regiments than it was before this increase, which certainly appears to be a ground of great complaint to the line, when they contrast their position with that of the Guards, in which so many additional Lieut.-Colonels are immediately created, and for this reason I agreed with Lord Hardinge that an alteration was proper.

Answers objections to appointment of a second Lieutenant-Colonel to each of the regiments in Crimea.

The 2nd Lieut.-Colonel is to be stationed at home, to command the Dépôt to be formed in this country, and be ready to assume the command of the regiment should any casualty occur to the senior officer. I admit that such an arrangement will increase the number of General Officers, but as those who receive extra pay are limited by the Royal Warrant, they will not entail any greater expense upon the country.

I think that your Royal Highness will see the justice of the case for the line at all events. I shall trust to your Royal Highness to convey my views most humbly to Her Majesty.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

February 27, 1855.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter. Lord Hardinge has also since explained the object of the appointment of 2nd Lieut.-Colonels to the regiments in the Crimea. He reckons upon their being employed in the Crimea itself. The regimental service does not seem to require them either there or at home, where there will remain only two companies eventually; it appears, however, that, for the due proportion of Ranks, and as a boon to the officers of the fighting regiments, the Army looks to it.

Proposal as to second Lieut.-Colonels agreed to after explanation.

The Queen has consequently signed the submission.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

February 27, 1855.

Insufficiency of
Raglan's
despatch.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to your Majesty a copy of the only despatch which has arrived from Lord Raglan by this mail. There is no 'private' letter, nor is the usual Morning State up to the latest date forwarded in any shape, at which neglect Lord Panmure feels some surprise.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, February 27, 1855.

General Vivian
to command
Turkish
Contingent.

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday evening, and approves that General Vivian should be appointed to command the Turkish Force which is about to be organised, and to be attached to the Army in the Crimea. The Queen would wish Lord Panmure to bring him and present him to her on Thursday. She will let Lord Panmure know the hour to-morrow.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.**BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, February 27, 1855.*

Lord Raglan's
visit to General
Monet after the
attack on the
Selinghinsk
Redoubt.

In my private letter of the 24th I mentioned to you *confidentially* that I was afraid that the French sustained in the attack of that morning a more considerable loss than they were prepared to avow. The account I gave you in my official despatch of that day was precisely what Major Claremont had communicated to me by General Canrobert's desire.

After the post was gone, I saw the General, who assured me that he had received no further report, and I rode on to see General Monet, whom I found suffering under five wounds. One finger and one thumb had been amputated. The remaining thumb had been struck by a ball, but the surgeon hoped to save it, and the poor

General had two balls in his arms. It appears that the Russians allowed the Zouaves to come close to them and then fired a volley at them, and it was at this one discharge that the poor General was struck in five places. The Colonel who commands the Regiment of Zouaves engaged on the occasion, Colonel Cler, who is very well known to and esteemed by our officers, was sitting with him when I was admitted. They both spoke of the great loss the regiment had sustained, but they made no allusion to any other troops, nor did they mention having inflicted any injury upon the Russian work which it was the object of their mission to destroy. The general belief is, however, that they did it no harm whatever, and that they were not supported by some other battalions whose assistance they were entitled to reckon upon.

The expression of the French officers, I hear, is *C'est un coup manqué*, and General Rose and Major Claremont have both assured me that the French headquarters were much dispirited as the real facts transpired. General Osten-Sacken¹ sent in last night a letter addressed to General Canrobert, and urgently proposing an armistice for one hour to-day to bury the dead killed on the 24th. The officer who brought it to me from General Canrobert took it away with him, promising to send me a copy. If I get it in time, I will enclose it with this. It contains some flattering expressions towards our Allies, which may mean nothing but still are curious, and I observe that the French attach no little value to them.² Firing is to cease for one hour to-day.

Russians propose a truce to bury the dead.

I received this morning the letter of which the accompanying is a copy, from General Canrobert, and I will send my answer for your information on Saturday. I cannot prepare it with any satisfaction to myself without

¹ Governor of Sebastopol.

² 'Je m'empresse de vous prévenir que vos braves soldats morts qui sont restés entre nos mains dans la nuit du 23 ont été inhumés avec tous les honneurs dus à leur intrépidité exemplaire.' To this compliment Canrobert made the following allusion in his order of the day: 'Le général en chef remercie, au nom de l'Empereur et de la France, les braves qui viennent de soutenir l'honneur de notre drapeau avec une si haute valeur, que nos ennemis eux-mêmes lui rendent hommage.'

having previously ascertained what I can really do, and I have set on foot the most diligent inquiries. You will observe that my colleague requires a good deal of assistance from us, both in the way of material and of transport, and at the same time presses for the immediate conveyance by us of ammunition.

Everything that the British Army can effect shall be done. I doubt, however, that the French are as ready as they profess to be.

I enclose the Morning State of yesterday.

P.S.—I have waited to the last moment, but the copy of Osten-Sacken's letter has not been received. The officer sent to General Canrobert for it is this instant returned without it, the General having sent it to General Bosquet. I asked for it many hours ago.

GENERAL CANROBERT TO LORD RAGLAN

AU QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DEVANT SEBASTOPOL,
26 *Février* 1855.

Relating to the construction by the enemy of the 'White Works,' and accepting offer of the loan of artillery.

MY LORD,—Je m'empresse de remercier Votre Seigneurie de l'offre qu'elle m'a fait transmettre ce matin par M. le Colonel Dairer, de mettre à ma disposition les 19 pièces de 32 qui sont encore à Balaklava. J'accepte cette offre avec d'autant plus de reconnaissance qu'une partie de ces pièces m'est dès à présent indispensable, par suite de l'obligation où je suis d'établir une seconde batterie dans la parallèle avancée d'Inkermann, pour contrebattre l'ouvrage que l'ennemi construit à 950 mètres de cette parallèle, sur la berge droite du ravin du carénage. Je me résigne à faire ce nouvel effort en priant Votre Seigneurie d'aider, autant qu'il lui sera possible, au transport des canons, tant au moyen du chemin de fer de Balaklava que de ses chevaux d'attelage.

Mais la crainte de voir augmenter les complications apportées déjà à notre projet d'attaque sur la tour Malakoff par l'ouvrage avancée des Russes me fait désirer vivement de sortir de cette période de travaux préparatoires,

que chaque jour de retard nous oblige à développer d'avantage.

Le Général commandant mon artillerie me fait espérer que dans huit jours il sera en mesure d'ouvrir le feu de toutes ses batteries, et je viens vous prier, my lord, de vouloir bien examiner si toutes les batteries que l'artillerie anglaise doit servir seront dans les mêmes conditions.

Je sais, d'après les renseignements que vous avez autorisé le Colonel Dairer à me communiquer, que les canons sont moyennement approvisionnés à 110 coups, soit dans les batteries mêmes, soit aux parcs, et qu'il suffira d'apporter de Balaklava neuf à dix mille boulets, pour compléter cet approvisionnement au nombre jugé nécessaire de 500 coups au moins par pièce. Je pense, votre chemin de fer aidant, pouvoir contribuer à ce transport de manière à ce qu'il soit terminé à la fin de cette semaine. Quant aux bombes, dont il paraît vous manquer environ 3500 pour atteindre le chiffre de 300 coups par mortier, je ne puis pas vous offrir un concours aussi efficace, puisque l'on ne peut pas les transporter à bras. Il serait bien désirable que Votre Seigneurie pût affecter à ce travail, d'ici à la fin de la semaine, une bonne partie de ses chevaux de trait. Je ne vous parle pas des poudres, qui seront sans doute réunies sans difficulté.

Arrangements
regarding
artillery in
anticipation of
an assault.

Là un mot, je voudrais pouvoir espérer que les deux armées seront en mesure, dès les premiers jours de Mars, de protéger par leur Artillerie les travaux d'attaque qu'il nous faut encore faire pour aborder la place.

Je viens vous prier d'ailleurs, my lord, de donner des ordres pour que la nouvelle batterie de 8 pièces, établie dans la deuxième parallèle de votre attaque de droite, soit armée sans délai, afin d'empêcher, ce que je crains chaque jour de voir se réaliser, que l'ennemi ne vienne surprendre la construction d'un ouvrage avancé sur la Mamelon au sud de la tour Malakoff.

Je prie Votre Seigneurie d'agréer l'expression de mon respectueux dévouement.—Le Général en Chef de l'armée française.

(Signé) GÉNÉRAL CANROBERT.

LORD RAGLAN TO GENERAL CANROBERT

DEVANT SEBASTOPOL, 28 *Février* 1855.

Places Bala-
clava railway,
but not draft-
horses, at
service of
French.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL EN CHEF,—J'ai reçu la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, le 26 de ce mois, par laquelle elle m'informe qu'elle accepte les 19 canons de 32 que j'avais mis à sa disposition.

Le chemin de fer de Balaklava pourra être utilisé pour le transport de ces canons sur tous le parcours en service ; mais je crains qu'il ne soit pas possible de faire concourir à ce transport les chevaux de trait de l'artillerie anglaise, en raison de l'emploi qui doit en être fait, pour transporter les bombes de 13 pouces, destinées à compléter l'approvisionnement à 500 bombes par mortier, et les canons qui doivent être placés dans la nouvelle batterie établie dans la deuxième parallèle de notre attaque de droite. Tous les efforts possibles vont être faits pour l'armement de cette batterie sans le plus bref délai.

L'approvisionnement des canons existant actuellement, soit dans les batteries mêmes, soit aux parcs, est inférieur au chiffre indiqué dans votre lettre précitée ; il n'y a encore que de 300 à 400 coups par pièce.

Les poudres pourront être en effet réunies sans difficulté.

L'officier supérieur commandant l'artillerie anglaise espère qu'avec l'assistance que vous voulez bien nous offrir, et toute l'activité qui pourra être déployée de notre côté, les batteries anglaises seront à même d'ouvrir leur feu dans une dizaine de jours. Avant l'expiration de ce délai, j'aurai l'honneur de m'entretenir avec Votre Excellence à ce sujet.—Agréez, Monsieur le Général en Chef, l'assurance de ma haute considération et de mon affectueux dévouement.

(Signé) RAGLAN.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *February* 28, 1855.

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's box which she received last night. She thinks his plan with respect

to the medals to be given to the Army a very good one,¹ and by this means she trusts that her noble, brave, and unequalled soldiers (whom she is so proud to call her own) will be able to receive them soon. When does Lord Panmure think a sufficient number can be ready?

Approves
Panmure's
proposal as
to medals.

The Queen said to her wounded Guards when she saw them, she hoped that they would soon have their medals, which they had earned so well; it will therefore be additionally gratifying to her if her promise to them can soon be redeemed.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

February 28, 1855.

I have called a Cabinet for to-morrow that we may consider what answer should be given to the letter of the Emperor of the French as to his intention of going to the Crimea, that of course we must try to dissuade him from. But we must consider what should be said as to his plan of operations, his proposed distribution of Forces, and the means of transport which he asks us to furnish.

Consideration
of the Em-
peror's plan for
forthcoming
campaign.

His plan of operations has been suggested by many persons; its expediency will probably depend upon the comparative amount of the allied and the Russian forces that would come into conflict in the interior of the Crimea.

The Queen and the Prince urged objections to letting the Sardinian 15,000 go with the French, as they consider that force as being part of our contingent, being paid out of money advanced by us. Still they might reckon as our contribution to the inland operation, and it might be better to contribute them than to lead away into the interior the whole or a part of our Army.

As to the means of transport, Charles Wood must tell us whether he can supply the ships required for that purpose.

¹ A plan for distributing them more speedily.

CHAPTER III

MARCH 1855

THROUGHOUT the month of March the besieging army in the Crimea was, by Lord Raglan's own admission, itself subjected to what amounted to a state of siege. So far as supplies were concerned, its communications, indeed, remained open; but for the army itself, from its bleak station before Sebastopol, there was no means of retreat. And of course it is one thing to know that no thought of retreat was entertained, and quite another to know that no such thought *could* have been entertained.

Throughout the month the health of the troops continued to improve.

Sorties and their repulse were the principal military incidents of a period which was less remarkable for events directly connected with the campaign than for external occurrences which exercised, or promised to exercise, an influence on the war.

On March 2nd died the Czar Nicholas I., the prime author of all its woes, his death being so unexpected as to be with difficulty believed. It has been directly ascribed to the effect, on his tumultuous and already disordered nature, of the defeat inflicted on his troops by the Turks at Eupatoria on the 17th of February.

On February 26th, another Imperial disturber of the peace of nations had imparted to the British Prime Minister the latest chimera of his teeming brain. Though

he was not an expert in war, it took the form of a plan of campaign designed to subserve his personal glory.

Briefly, Napoleon's idea was to proceed in person to the seat of war, and, having secured the investment of Sebastopol, to organise and lead an army in the field which should sweep the Russians from the Crimea. Promising himself, so to speak, to be 'in at the death,' he looked to his own personal share in the enterprise to dazzle his impressionable subjects and so strengthen his hold on an insecure throne. Meantime, with characteristic selfishness, he had instructed his confidential agent, General Niel, to curb French ardour at the seat of war. Of the distaste with which most well-wishers of the Allied Armies regarded the prospect of his presence in the Crimea, these letters afford ample testimony.

On March 15th the Vienna Conference re-assembled, the new Czar's Minister, Count Nesselrode, having announced that Alexander II. would join in it 'in a sincere spirit of concord,' notwithstanding that his predecessor had declared that he would submit to no limitation of his power in the Black Sea. Lord John Russell represented Great Britain at the Conference, on which, a week after its inauguration, good hopes of peace were based at home.

Meantime, the statecraft of Count Cavour had induced the King of Sardinia to declare war on Russia; whence Lord Panmure's letters of this period are concerned with the Sardinian Contingent, no less than with such topics as the progress of the Balaclava railway, the bringing of troops from India through Egypt, the debate in the House of Lords on Lord Lucan's case (March 19th). His letter to Lord Raglan, dated March 16th, is of special value, as helping to set the relations of the War Minister with the General in a truer and less harsh light than before.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *March 1, 1855.*

Referring to my letter of the 27th February, I am now enabled to send you a copy of General Osten-Sacken's letter of the 26th February to General Canrobert and myself, and of our collective answer.

As to Russian
proposal for an
hour's cessation
of hostilities.

It is difficult to understand the meaning of General Osten-Sacken's proposition for a suspension of hostilities under the pretext of burying the dead. You will observe by our answer that there were no dead to bury, either of French or Russians. There was a great deal of bowing, I understand, and some display of friendly feelings by the Russians, but what called it forth I cannot say.

You will see that the Governor of Sebastopol speaks of the exemplary intrepidity of our Allies.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have learned that the enemy have moved forward a work¹ in advance of that which they maintained against the French on the morning of the 24th, and it may have been a device to have a better look at the ground they have since taken up that they proposed a cessation of hostilities for an hour on the 27th, under another pretext.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 2, 1855.*

The French
Emperor most
likely to go to
the Crimea, and
his reasons for
doing so.

I have your bag of the 17th, and it is more cheerful than for some time past, and the state exhibits an improvement in your sick list. The previous mail brought neither private letter nor state, which was vexatious, inasmuch as the Queen desires to see immediately every one that arrives, which was my reason for ordering them in triplicate. We have every reason to believe that the Emperor will positively go to the Crimea. He distrusts his Generals: he feels a conviction that things have either been concealed from or misrepresented to him, and he has resolved to see,

¹ See *infra*, Raglan's letter of March 3rd.

hear, and act for himself. This will change the face of affairs with you, and for my own part I believe you will find in him a more sincerely disposed co-operator than you have found in his Generals. He will produce a plan of operations ; but I hope that, before you are placed in a position to decide on any particular course, I shall be able to send you a confidential despatch containing the instructions of the Government.

I have seen General de la Marmora, who is to command the Sardinian Contingent. He is a fine, soldierlike man, with whom you will have pleasure in acting. I have informed him of what has passed between us on the subject of the conveyance of his troops, and he seems to be pretty well satisfied, though I fear that, like most other people, he will expect more than can be done for him. I have been busy in arranging for your sick, and I hope soon to have two convalescent depôts opened—one at Corfu and the other at Gozo, where the men, as they become fit for duty, may be gradually trained on by degrees, as their strength permits, to their former habits. I am also arranging for a speedy transit of such of your sick as can bear it direct to England, so that I hope to relieve your hospital at Scutari so far as to leave room for the sudden influx which an action or an assault might occasion.

General La
Marmora ;
hospital
arrangements ;
water-supply.

I am glad to see that your railway is getting on. It will be a vast assistance and relieve the men in many respects. What appears to me to be your main necessity is *rest*. I hope you are turning your attention to supplies of water for the camp, as we are informed here that, as spring advances, this necessity of life becomes scanty. As the weather becomes warmer and the troops less harassed with work, bathing parties might be sent down to the sea, as a means of keeping up cleanliness and a source of amusement to the men. I am afraid Filder¹ is very inefficient, for while you are crying out for hay and reporting its deficiency, not one word reaches us from him of any prospective want of this article, or indeed of anything else. Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch will, I

Inefficiency of
Filder.

¹ British Commissary-General in the Crimea.

hope, put some life into him. I hear privately from the railway contractors that they are afraid that you will lay an embargo on the vessels. Pray do not do this unless you are driven to it by the greatest emergency.

Results to be expected from new Enlistment Act.

I have passed a new Limited Enlistment Act, and hope under it to send you some hundreds of strong, able-bodied men, instead of the boys of whom you not unreasonably complain. I presented General Vivian to the Queen yesterday. I suppose you know that he is a son of the late Lord Vivian.

The post waits, so I must conclude.

Death of the Czar Nicholas I.

P.S.—We have this moment learnt by telegraph the death of the Emperor of Russia. This will paralyse all the efforts of his people, and make some change of mighty magnitude in the complexion of affairs. I do not, however, feel justified in pointing to any relaxation of vigour in the conduct of the war.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

Confidential.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *March 3, 1855.*

In your private letter of the 12th February you express a desire to be informed without loss of time of

1. My opinion upon the expediency of an assault.
2. The arrangements which would be necessary should it succeed.
3. My calculation of what might happen on its failure; and
4. If it should be necessary to withdraw, whether I have, in consultation with General Canrobert, thought of any plan for so doing.

Replying to Lord Panmure's inquiries as to measures preliminary to an assault.

The possibility of success in an assault is not yet ripe for discussion. Actual operations against the place are at a stand. Very powerful batteries, consisting of not less than 300 guns, are, however, in a forward state of construction and equipment for opening on the enemy's lines,

with ammunition for four or five days' and nights' firing, and it is hoped that the effect may be such as to justify an assault, either general for the reduction of the South Side, or partial so as to obtain influential lodgments on the works. This operation, however, will, I fear, be disturbed by the advanced post taken up by the Russians on the night of the 22nd February, and from which the French were repulsed during the following night, and by a work further in advance which the enemy are busily engaged in establishing opposite the batteries of our Allies.¹ It may be necessary to dislodge the Russians from these points by more cautious means before an assault can be made on Sebastopol.

As regards No. 2, success in such an assault, or a succession of assaults, is not to be attained without considerable loss, but still to guard the left side of the harbour as a defensive measure would require fewer men than are now occupied with the siege. The first step would be to destroy the men-of-war in the harbour, if not effected by the enemy themselves, to dismantle our batteries, fill in the trenches, and arrange our battering trains for future operations or embarkation. When these services should have been accomplished, more offensive operations might be undertaken, but it would be premature to operate upon them at present.

3. With respect to this point, the assault would probably be made on these points:—

Steps to be taken in case of an assault succeeding.

Probable points of assault.

1. On the town by the Bastion du Mât.
2. On the Redan and Barracks batteries.
3. On the side of the Malakoff Tower.

If the first and third, or either one of them succeeded, the advantage might be maintained, and would facilitate the progress of further proceedings against what remained of the enemy. In case of absolute failure, the troops would have to resume their positions, and it is to be hoped with sufficient power to retain the batteries and trenches and await further means.

¹ The Selinghinsk and Volhynia Redoubts.

Impossibility
of retreat.

4. No thought of withdrawing has as yet been entertained. If the inquiry is intended to be confined to withdrawal from the trenches, the process would be to remove all the guns and ammunition and to retire to the best defensive positions very near to where the trenches are at present, in order to prevent an advance of heavy guns that would bring the camp under fire. If a total withdrawal of the armies from the country is meant by the question, the operation is impossible; we have no retreat, and I have never thought it advisable to introduce into conversation with General Canrobert the possibility of such a state of things. Neither Government has at hand shipping to convey away the British and French Army and the Turks, nor could such an embarkation be effected with a powerful enemy close at hand.

Road from
Kadikoi to the
'Col.'

The railway is progressing rapidly, and every assistance I could give Mr. Beatty¹ has been afforded him. He has not yet made his survey beyond the 'Col,' as the top of the hill is termed by the French. He will do so to-morrow. The French have continued our road from Kadikoi to the point above named nearly. It is practicable, but it is very rough and painful to the tread of the horses.

There has always been an officer of the Quartermaster-General's department at Balaclava. For a very considerable time there have been two, and these are not to be surpassed in efficiency by any officers in the Army. Their names are Major Mackenzie and Captain Ross.

Lieut.-Colonel Hardinge, late Aide-de-Camp to General Pennefather, is the Commandant, and capitally does he do his duty.

The Naval arrangements are under Admiral Boxer.

I send you a copy of the answer I gave to General Canrobert's letter of the 26th, which I sent you on the 29th, and I hope, if we can get the Croatians to work, that we shall be ready to open at the time mentioned. The Croatians are strong enough to carry shot and shell; but they are new to us and our system of work, and require

Croatian
labourers,

¹ The railway engineer.

to be humoured and protected from the cupidity and roguery of their chiefs, and I will take care that they are well treated.

General Jones is preparing a report upon the trenches with a plan, which I hope to have ready to send you by Monday. It will be an interesting document.

I have informed Sir John Burgoyne of the instructions I have received to send him home, but I hope you will not disapprove of my having requested him to remain a little while.¹ His assistance at this particular crisis may be of great value to me, and in the meanwhile General Jones, who is an excellent officer, is making himself thoroughly acquainted with the ground and his various duties. I at once put him in orders when he arrived as Commanding Royal Engineer.

Recall of
Burgoyne.

As the season of the fogs in the Black Sea is approaching, we must take care to keep an abundance of supplies here. I must, however, say that I have always been desirous of keeping the tiny harbour of Balaclava clear. Now, alas, what with transports, railway ships, and private supply vessels, it is far fuller than is desirable. But Sir Edmund Lyons has his attention fixed upon it.

Colonel M'Murdo² has been here and has just started on his return to Constantinople. I am much pleased with him.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *March 5, 1855.*

The Queen is very anxious to bring before Lord Panmure the subjects which she mentioned to him the other night, viz. that of hospitals for our sick and wounded soldiers. This is *absolutely* necessary, and *now* is the moment to have them built, for no doubt there would be no difficulty in obtaining the money requisite for this

Hospitals for
sick and
wounded
soldiers.

¹ At Lord Raglan's instance, Burgoyne remained in the Crimea until the third week in March.

² Colonel M'Murdo had come to the Crimea to superintend the Land-Transport Corps.

purpose, from the strong feeling now existing in the public mind for improvements of all kinds connected with the Army and the well-being and comfort of the soldiers.

Nothing can exceed the attention paid to these poor men in the Barracks at Chatham (or, rather more, Fort Pitt and Brompton), and they are in *that* respect very comfortable; but the buildings are bad—the wards more like prisons than hospitals, with the windows so high that no one can look out of them, and the generality of the wards are small rooms, with hardly space for you to walk between the beds; there is *no* dining-room or hall, so that the poor men must have their dinners in the *same room* in which they *sleep*, and in which some may be dying, and at any rate many suffering, while others are eating their meals.

The proposition of having hulks prepared for their reception will do very well at first, but it would not, the Queen thinks, do for any length of time. A hulk is a very gloomy place, and these poor men require their spirits to be cheered as much as their physical sufferings to be attended to.

The Queen's
solicitude for
her soldiers.

The Queen is particularly anxious on this subject, which is—she may truly say—*constantly* in her thoughts, as is everything connected with her beloved troops, who have fought so bravely and borne so heroically all their sufferings and privations.

The Queen hopes before long to visit also the hospitals at Portsmouth, and to see in what state they are.

When will the medals be ready for distribution?

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

March 5, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and in acknowledging Your Majesty's note of this morning, he feels assured that Your Majesty's troops will fully appreciate the solicitude for the due care of the sick and wounded which Your Majesty has so constantly evinced.

Lord Panmure concurs in the views which have been so well stated by Your Majesty as to the necessity of one or more general hospital for the Army, and will desire an immediate survey to be made for a proper site or sites, which shall combine all considerations for the health of the patients and the facility of access to invalids.

As to proposed general hospitals for the Army.

Lord Panmure has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty, in reference to the Crimean medal, that he expects to be able to submit the proof impression to Your Majesty by the 14th inst., and after that no delay shall be allowed to occur in getting them struck off.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 5, 1855.*

Something has come over the messenger, as we have no tidings of him from Marseilles. The tidings of the Emperor's death has surprised us all, and must be a heavy blow and great discouragement to the Russian Army. You must not build upon it, however, as a means of shortening the War. On the contrary, we must carry on our operations with vigour, and leave nothing undone to capture Sebastopol. In confidence I may tell you that I think the Emperor's intention of going to the Crimea is somewhat relaxed, but you must not appear to the French to know of anything touching this project.

Caution against building hopes upon the death of the Czar.

I send you officially a copy of the convention with Turkey, but I fear it will be some time ere the force will be available in the field. I hope your rails are finished by this time, or in a fair way of being so.

Lord Lucan made a demonstration (not in force) in the Lords on Friday. I have sent him a copy of your despatch of the 16th Dec.¹ for his consolation. He has

¹ In which Lord Raglan had maintained that Lord Lucan had 'misconceived the written instruction that was sent him prior to the Charge of the Light Brigade, and 'that there was nothing in that instruction which called on him to attack at all hazards.' See the despatch in *Correspondence relative to the Military Expedition to the East*. Privately printed.

asked for a Court-Martial, which has been properly refused.

The Queen, having seen the wounded of the Guards, went to Chatham to see those of the line, and the poor fellows are much cheered by it.

Pray send me home as soon as you can a nominal list of all men out with you who will have the medal, and mention also those entitled to clasps. I expect to have the medals ready by April.

Reorganisation
of light cavalry
regiments.

Lord Vivian is to raise the question as to the mode of reorganising the Light Cavalry Regiments. He proposes to send out new regiments instead of sending out men to the old. I believe both Lucan and Cardigan are of a different opinion from Vivian.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

March 7, 1855.

A 'change of
dynasty' urged.

Pray do not forget to send Dr. Smith¹ the most approved model of a letter of resignation. As a change of dynasty has begun abroad, we ought to follow suit at home, though it has not been foretold by my correspondent, Dr. Granville.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

March 8, 1855.

The Queen
pleased at Omar
Pasha's success.

The Queen was very much interested with these despatches, and pleased with the decided success of Omar Pasha.² She wishes also, of these despatches and letters, only such portions copied for her use as are not to be printed and published. She hopes, at the same time, that the despatches detailing the messages before Eupatoria will be published to the world, as well as the account of clothing, material, etc., etc., distributed to the troops by Lord Raglan, which he reports in the previous mail. This will restore confidence in the Army administration.

Account of
clothing, etc.,
distributed to
troops to be
published.

¹ Head of the Army Medical Board.

² At Eupatoria, February 17th.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 9, 1855.*

I have received your letters within twenty-four hours of each other, and with very little time left to answer them.

You will see that I have published all those which give an account of the Eupatoria affair, and likewise the returns of articles furnished to the troops.

In reference to Eupatoria, I must remark that I entirely concur in your views with regard to the position of Omar Pasha's army. I am astonished at General Canrobert's desire to move it.

As to position
of Omar Pasha's
army.

Can anything be more clear as to the Russian opinion of its position than the early attempt which has been made to force that position and dislodge its occupants, and in the face of this it seems to me to be little short of playing the enemy's game to abandon it? You must be resolute in resisting General C., and as you have the only means of transport in your hands, you can carry your point.

The Crescent has shone brightly in this affair, and it will tell well morally on the Turkish Army by implanting in the minds of the allied troops a greater respect for their prowess. It will dishearten the enemy, for, if he can't beat the Turks, *a fortiori* he must quail before England and France.

We must keep our eyes before us in regard to the requirements of our troops. I hope you have turned your attention to a supply of water and arranged how you can command it as summer advances.

Enjoins atten-
tion to require-
ments of our
troops.

I have noticed in my public despatch Colin Campbell's conduct.¹ I am proud of my countryman. If the French had only moved, we should have had a haul, and turned the tide of popular clamour.

You will see that Lord Lucan has arrived and commenced the war in the House of Lords. I wished to keep the peace, but he gave me no power to do so. You will

Conduct of
Lord Lucan.

¹ In relation to a preconcerted combined movement with the French, at which the latter failed to put in an appearance.

scarcely believe that he called on me at a quarter to four, and said he came to present himself and answer any questions. This was said too significantly to escape my perception of what he meant, and I abstained from asking him one single question. He left me at a quarter to five. I was in the House of Lords and found Lord Lucan on his legs reading to the House his letter to you. My surprise was great, and I consulted my colleagues, when we determined to send him a copy of your despatch to the Duke of Newcastle, as it was clear he was ignorant of it. This occurred on Friday. By Monday he had the despatch. Meanwhile he had demanded and been refused a Court-Martial.

The reading his own letter rather gave a turn to the case favourable to him, and, had he been a wise man, he would have reposed on his grievances, and no great harm would have resulted to you or the Government. His temper did not permit him to do this, so on Tuesday he read to the House your despatch, and I had it laid, together with his letter, before both Houses. The effect has been completely to floor Lucan in public opinion, and even the *Times* confesses that your victory over him is complete. The second demand for a Court-Martial is not yet answered, but I shall give my voice against it.

Supposing it granted, where would it be held? Not here. In the Crimea? It would be a scandal to the Army, and must be avoided if possible. He is to talk again to-day, but I believe not of himself. We have so far succeeded in preventing him and Cardigan from coming into collision.

I wish you would send me immediately a nominal list of all those whom you would recommend for the Bath on the scheme proposed by you to the Duke of Newcastle, making actual presence in the field and good and gallant conduct therein the basis of your recommendation. Lucan will be a difficulty, I fear.

We cannot carry the C.B. below officers commanding corps, consequently none but mounted officers of the Guards can be included, and not more Staff than absolutely

necessary. I ask for this list as I must gazette it to bring the whole within the Statutes of the Order.

Your letters will mention the officers as having distinguished themselves in the field, and that you recommend them for H.M.'s favourable consideration in any reward which may be given for such services. As to distinctions to be awarded to officers.

There is an ugly report come here of General Forey having been detected in treasonable communication with the enemy. I presume it is false, as you say nothing of it in your private letter, and it is said to have occurred on the 23rd of February.

I must close now as the post waits.

I reopen my letter to add that Lord Clarendon made some impression on the Emperor the other day when he saw him at Boulogne, and it is not so clear that he will go to the Crimea, though we have no reason to suppose that he has entirely abandoned his intention. As to the French Emperor's going to the Crimea.

General de la Marmora is gone, and we have arranged to send for his corps by the 7th of April, and hope he will be with you by the 21st or 22nd with the greater portion of his contingent.

We are also to carry 10,000 *élite* troops for the French from Marseilles. I hear that the ice has carried away the barrier at Kertch. Could not you and Lyons make a *coup* there, and so get possession of the Sea of Azof?

I throw it out as a hint for your own consideration.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *March 10, 1855.*

I enclose the report of General Jones on the trenches, and the plan of the siege-works to which I adverted in my letters of the 3rd and 10th instant. You will find them very interesting. I received Lord John Russell's telegraphic despatch of the 2nd instant from Bosnia on the evening of the 6th instant, before the conference¹

¹ A Council of Generals adjourned from the 4th March.

alluded to in my secret despatch of this date had broken up. You may imagine the sensation the perusal of it occasioned.

I sent Lord Burghersh in with a flag of truce on the following day, for the purpose of conveying a letter and some clothes to an English prisoner. He casually remarked to an officer who spoke French that the news of the Emperor's death had been received. The officer said that the report was without foundation, and nothing more passed.

How the
Russians took
the news of the
Czar's death.

Deserters say that the two Grand Dukes have gone away, and that Prince Mentschikoff has received a contusion. They had not heard of the death of the Emperor, when they, the deserters, left the town, and I conclude the secret has been kept as long as possible.

This is the birthday of the Grand Duc Héréditaire, now, in the common course of succession, the Emperor; but there are no manifestations of the day in Sebastopol. Mr. Cattley, however, says that birthdays are not much kept in Russia. The fête of the Patron Saint is what is most celebrated.

I enclose Mr. Cattley's report in continuation of that in which he mentioned the arrival of two Polish officers as Deputies. It contains a good deal of important information, and shows that the enemy's force, either here or in the neighbourhood, and that expected, are very great.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

March 10, 1855.

Proposal to at-
tach a military
officer to
Embassy at
Constantinople.

Stratford proposes, and Palmerston and I concur, if you see no objection, that a military officer should be attached to the Embassy at Constantinople. He would look after all the requisitions both of Lord Raglan and General Vivian, and would become the organ of communication between the Embassy and the Teraskierat upon all military matters, and Lord S. thinks that his own efficiency would thus be much increased.

The rank of such an officer should be at least that of a

Colonel, and he should be a man of good temper and firm purpose, the first being required for his Chief, and the second for the Turks. Do you approve, and have you got such a man?¹

Let me suggest to you that Major-General Vivian should have the local rank of Lieutenant-General.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

March 16, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that despatches of a highly interesting character have arrived from Lord Raglan, copies of which are forwarded for Your Majesty's use.

Improvement in
Lord Raglan's
despatches.

Lord Raglan seems to be much hurt by the plain expressions in Lord Panmure's despatch of the 12th February, and writes somewhat strongly in reply.

Your Majesty will observe that there is an intermediate mail missing, which will not arrive till to-morrow morning. The communication until that time will be incomplete. Lord Panmure will lose no time in sending Your Majesty copies of the other despatches when they arrive.

Your Majesty will no doubt observe that the tone of Lord Raglan's private letter is perfectly friendly, and that the letter contains far more real intelligence than any which have yet been received, which it has been Lord Panmure's duty to submit for Your Majesty's perusal.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

Private and Confidential.

23 BELGRAVE SQUARE, *March 16, 1855.*

I have this moment received your despatches by the messenger who left the camp on the 3rd; the preceding one, having gone astray from some accident, will not be here till to-morrow. I will attempt, therefore, no public

As to Lord
Raglan's
despatches.

¹ Note by Lord Panmure, 'Answered in the affirmative.'

reply to your despatches of the 2nd, at all events till Monday. You may well believe how harassing to me, and how utterly foreign to my feelings, such a correspondence is, but I cannot conceal from you that, had the Government had from yourself one such despatch bag as that which you have now sent me, they would have had more heart, as well as better ground, for maintaining the position of yourself and officers. You know the public of this country as well as I do. They look always for more than can be accomplished, but they are generous in the end, and when reasons are given, or appeals made to them, they are indulgent. Let me point out to you wherein I conceive the whole difficulties of your case to lie. You must have long perceived that, not only were you surrounded by a vigilant and inquisitive and not very friendly press, but a vast number of your own officers have been in the habit of openly criticising all that occurs in your camp in letters to their friends, which we hear daily quoted and hear daily read in Parliament. Your actions, nay your motives, have been attacked in the public prints, and your policy has been to despise those attacks, instead of giving to those who would have been too ready to use them in your defence the means of exhibiting their falsity or their perversion of facts. I must say for the Duke of Newcastle that he was left by your own unhappy reserve, or by your contempt of those whom you considered your slanderers, without a word to say against the well-concocted and highly-spiced accusations which were levelled at you. If he denied them, it was on no responsible authority; if he was silent, he increased the reproaches of both parties in the controversy.

I had no desire to embark in this complicated and most unpleasant controversy to which I foresaw that the despatch of the 6th January¹ must lead. I was induced to succeed Newcastle in hope of being able to do some good. Not I alone but every member of the Government was assailed with loud complaints against you and your Staff. The stormy public feeling was in its fury, and my

¹ See this despatch in the Appendix to the letters of March 1855.

difficulty was to guide it—to control it was beyond my power. I searched the records of the office for explanations to enable me to meet the attacks for the absence of a road between your camp and Balaclava, and I could find none. I tried if I could discover in your despatches any mention of your visits to camp, which were denied, though you may not know it, from very many quarters of it. I could find no mention of them. One such report as you have sent me from Dr. Hall¹ would have allayed anxiety as to the sick, but it was not to be found. In justice to myself in undertaking my duties, nay in justice to you, I resolved to embody the state of my feelings in a public despatch, and painful as was the process, it was done without any personal feeling against you, in order to elicit from you those explanations without which I could not carry on my duties. I was quite aware that your indignation might be aroused, and I was prepared to receive in the replies to my two despatches strong expressions of that indignation. I quarrel not with them, and will endeavour in my despatch on Monday to meet you calmly and to convince you that, whatever faults may be laid to the charge of your administration, your character, honour, and fidelity to your Queen and Country are as pure and unsullied as the driven snow. I have known you too long and too well to feel shaken in my fullest confidence in any one of these requisites for a soldier.

The writer
justifies his own
conduct.

I have learnt with some surprise that you were not fully advised as to the Sardinian Contingent. I have desired a copy of the convention under which it is raised and taken into our pay to be sent to you by this mail, and a full explanation of the whole conditions of the force, its organisation, means of movement and supply, about which neither you nor Mr. Filder need be under any alarm. It is reported to consist of the flower of the Sardinian Army, and will, I hope, prove a great addition to your force.

The Sardinian
Contingent.

It will be necessary, however, for Mr. Filder to look well abroad for his supplies, as there will be another army

¹ Inspector-General of Hospitals in the Crimea.

of 15,000 men foraging in the same districts with him. I am sorry to inform you that matters yesterday appear to have taken a very unpleasant turn before *the Committee*. Lord Lucan has given such evidence before it as you might expect to proceed from an ill-tempered and a disappointed man.

The Committee
of Inquiry.

I mean to apply to the Committee for an authenticated copy of all the evidence to send to you, that, in those instances at least which affect yourself and the Army, you may be able, if you think proper, to give through me such answers as you deem right.

On Monday I am to have a field-day with Lord Lucan on the refusal of a Court-Martial. He has not the slightest case. The Duke of Cambridge and Cardigan will, I believe, and sincerely hope, absent themselves from the debate.

I am sorry to trouble you with so long a letter, but I must still thank you for your long and interesting private letter of the 3rd, which I cannot notice further by this mail.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *March 17, 1855.*

I received on the morning of the 14th your private letter of the 2nd, in the postscript of which you announce the receipt of the news by telegraph of the death of the Emperor Nicholas. I am anxious to learn the impression this important event has created in England. For this we must have patience.

The weather is very cold to-day, as it was yesterday evening, but the troops continue to improve in health, and the sun of the last few days has been very beneficial to them.

Statements of
a Russian
deserter.

A deserter is just come in who is now under examination. There is not time for Mr. Cattley to prepare his report for to-day's mail, but he has sent me word that the man reports that he is one of 8000 who entered the Crimea two months ago: that of these 8000, 2800 died

on the road, the greater portion being frozen to death, 1700 were sent back to re-form, and the remainder only reached Sebastopol. The man represents that there is much dissatisfaction in the camp, the soldiers are badly fed, and the old ones complain that those who are sent to them as reinforcements are mere boys and not equal to the duty assigned to them. There would seem also to be a good deal of discussion amongst them as to the consequences to follow Nicholas' death, and the question is agitated whether Constantine will succeed to the Kingdom of Poland.

The cavalry, he says, is again moving to the southward, that is, to this vicinity. If this be true, it will only add to their difficulties, for there can be no forage for them.

I conclude that the death of the Emperor of Russia will have put an end to the contemplated visit of the Emperor of the French to the Crimea. His presence here would be a great *gêne*, though personally I should have no difficulty in communicating with him. I feel about him much as you do. I am vexed not to have any more detailed information about the Sardinian Contingent. You evidently think I have received it. I conclude the Duke of Newcastle, in the hurry of the moment, forgot to announce the arrangements determined upon to me. We are quite satisfied with Mr. Beattie, who will send away his railway ships as soon as he has cleared them. They are chartered for three months.

Raglan's view of the contemplated visit of Napoleon III. to the seat of war.

You are quite right. What our troops want and have long required is rest. Bulgaria weakened them very much, and there, mind you, they did nothing. Those in advance, I brought down to Varna without their knapsacks, which I carried for them, knowing that they were not strong enough to bear them on their backs, and they marched as lightly as they could when they landed here; whilst the French, who suffered to the extent of many thousands on the expedition to the Dobrudja, were made to carry five or six days' provisions from Old Fort Bay to Balaclava. One of the reasons given me at Alma for their not

British troops require rest.

advancing further was that they were obliged to leave their knapsacks near the river, where I saw many of them, and had to go back for them.

We have made every necessary inquiry about water, and the engineer's report was drawn when I got your letter. I believe the supply will be sufficient. The sea is too distant from our present operations to be made use of for bathing, and, moreover, the weather too uncertain.

Is it true that Walewski¹ says that the French have lost 52,000 men in the campaign in the Crimea?

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *March 17, 1855.*

Fuller despatches from Lord Raglan.

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter and the very interesting despatches which he sent her from Lord Raglan. They are much fuller than any yet received, and full of interest.

The report of the improvement in the men's health and comforts is very satisfactory. The Queen thinks that it would be a good thing if the enclosure from Dr. Hall were published; it would be satisfactory to the public, and would tend to dispel a great many false and exaggerated reports.

It is natural that Lord Raglan should be pained and hurt at all that has been said and written. . . .

The impossibility which Lord Raglan states of retreating by embarkation,² though the Queen will not for a moment believe in the possibility of such an eventuality, is nevertheless very uncomfortable.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *March 18, 1855.*

The Queen has to acknowledge the receipt of Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday, enclosing the contents of

¹ Count Walewski, French Ambassador in London.

² See his letter of March 3rd.

the missing mail. She feels sure that Lord Panmure's remonstrances¹ will have done good, as she is glad to perceive Lord Raglan shows no symptoms of throwing up his command.

It becomes more and more probable, however, that Sebastopol will not be taken unless it be invested, and that this will not be possible unless the enemy be beaten in the field, and we become possessed of the roads leading to both sides of the town. To concentrate the English force will be an indispensable preliminary to such success—the affair of the 24th² having shown again that the French Line don't possess that moral superiority over the Russians which our troops have established for themselves. What is the amount of Reserves already arrived at Malta? Where has Lord Panmure found the new vein³ for the Foreign Legion?

The Queen encloses a despatch from Colonel Williams,⁴ not knowing whether he has seen it, and asks him to send it back to the Foreign Office when he has done with it. She is anxious to know what can be done to relieve the Kars army, and make it fit to take the field.

Probable necessity of investing Sebastopol.

As to relief of Kars.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 19, 1855.*

I have to acknowledge your letter of the 3rd inst. enclosing Mr. Cattley's report, and also your letter of the 1st inst. with two enclosures on the truce granted for an hour to General Osten-Sacken. I fear that General Canrobert has been overreached by his clever enemy, and that he will yet have occasion to rue the hour so foolishly acceded.

As to the truce of one hour's duration.

¹ In particular his despatch of February 12th.

² The unsuccessful night attack upon the Selinghinsk Redoubt.

³ Source of supply.

⁴ British officer in command at Kars.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

*Private.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 19, 1855.*

On a repulse
sustained by
the French.

I have to acknowledge your private letter of the 27th February and to revert more fully than I could do on Friday to that of the 3rd inst. I am afraid that our Allies have had what is vulgarly called a 'licking.'¹ The Zouaves appear to have behaved well, but not to have been properly supported by their reserves of Marine Infantry. I suspect, from this proof of capacity on the part of the Russians, that more frequent change of garrison occurs than we suppose, for it does not look like the act of men worn down by fatigue and privation so suddenly to throw up new works and so resolutely to defend them. I trust your 32-pounders will effect what the French attempted and failed in. I am very sorry for General Monet, for by all accounts he is a fine fellow. Rose gives a good account of the coolness of the Zouaves. I suspect with you that the armistice was a sly *ruse de guerre*. I have no doubt of your doing everything to encourage as well as accommodate our ally, though I must say that he has not been over-considerate in that respect towards you.

Let me now advert to yours of the 3rd inst., and thank you for your detailed answer to my four points, which is as full as I could expect and extremely interesting. Powerful batteries of 300 guns must have a tremendous effect whenever their fire opens, especially if that fire be continuous and concentrated for four or five days. We wait patiently for the result, feeling secure that every day's delay will add to your ability to give effect to the result of your iron storm. Whenever the place is assaulted, I fear we must look for harassing scenes, but you will, of course, have provided as far as you can for your wounded.

I was quite prepared for your reply to my fourth question. '*Vestigia nulla retrorsum*,' a worthy motto for a British Army, but a questionable position for any army

¹ In the night attack on the Selinghinsk Redoubt, February 24th.

'*Vestigia nulla retrorsum*.'

to be put in. I feel no uneasiness at it, as I do not believe that we *can* fail eventually in our object.

I received last night from Lord John Russell a copy of a despatch which has been sent you from Vienna. I do not believe that the Emperor is so hot on a Crimean expedition as he was, but I will not say that he has abandoned it. If he does come, it will not be to lead an assault on Sebastopol, but to organise and lead an army in the field, which shall drive the Russians from the Crimea and enable the Allies to cut off all supplies from either side of Sebastopol. In this scheme of operations the Sardinian Contingent will be of good service.

Ere this you will no doubt have conferred with Sir E. Lyons¹ on the possession of the Sea of Azof. I do not see what can be done to Kertch unless we send a land expedition to co-operate with the Navy, but such a move would be of very great importance, and if we once had the command of the Sea of Azof we should cripple the enemy terribly.

I am glad to hear such good accounts of the railway, and hope soon to hear that it has enabled you to take up sufficient material for your batteries. You say nothing of forage, and I sincerely trust it has arrived. Pray make no hesitation of reporting every omission of attention to supplies of any kind from this country. I know that you have always had the Q.M.G.'s office at Balaclava itself, but what I pointed at was a station or stations at intervals on the road to look to it, but that is past now, and I hope we shall hear nothing more of it.

Supply and
sanitation of the
Army in the
field.

You seem to give a hopeful account of the Croatians, and I trust that you will find a large number of them to aid our sanitary people in their arduous duties. I entirely approve of your doing what you think right with Sir John Burgoyne. My impression was that with Jones you would not require him.

You alarm me by mentioning 'the season of fogs.' I hope those wily Russians will try no surprises, and I fear such another will harass our men by keeping them always on the alert.

¹ Commanding the British Fleet in the Black Sea.

I am glad you like Col. M'Murdo, and I think you will like Napier as well.

Lord Cardigan
and the Duke
of Cambridge.

Lord Lucan discusses his case to-night in the Lords. The Duke of Cambridge and Lord Cardigan have, with great good taste I think, resolved to be absent, leaving it to me to deal with the matter.

I may tell you in confidence that you will not see the Duke in the Crimea again, as I have advised him not to return. What effect this may have on you I know not, but I trust it may not disarrange any of your plans. I shall likewise endeavour to persuade Cardigan that his health is insufficiently reinstated, for his temperament is not such as to make him looked up to as a C.O. should be. All this, however, I communicate in the strictest confidence.

The *triple* states came all right.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *March 20, 1855.*

Your letter of the 5th reached me last night.

We have heard nothing from the Continent since Lord John Russell's telegraphic message of the 2nd from Berlin, announcing the Emperor's death, reached me this day fortnight.

Louis
Napoleon's
proposed visit
to the Crimea.

I earnestly hope that the Emperor Louis Napoleon will not come here. It would be a false move under any circumstances. I am certain that his proper place is Paris.

I have received your official communication of the Convention with Turkey.¹ I have to write to you officially upon it, and hoped to have been able to do so to-day, but I am obliged to defer my observations until the next mail.

I have obtained Omar Pasha's opinion.

Advantage of
not changing
cavalry regi-
ments.

The advantage of not changing the regiments of cavalry is this, that you have the officers and twelve hundred men who have some experience of war and of the way of taking care of horses out of a barrack yard. If you

¹ With regard to raising the Turkish Contingent.

replace them by new regiments, the whole will be as green as grass, and the condition of neither horses nor men will be as good as we may expect it to be with the older soldiers. An Englishman does not accustom himself to discomfort in a minute.

It was a very gracious act on the part of the Queen to visit the wounded at Chatham.

I send you Mr. Cattley's budget, which is rather fuller than usual.

The revolt at Nicholaieff is, I fear, too good to be true.

The death of Prince Mentschikoff¹ was considered by Admiral Bruat to be so positive yesterday that he sent off a vessel with the news to Constantinople. I have it not from any source I can consider authentic.

The recent reports received by Mr. Cattley would lead to the supposition that reinforcements are marching this way. He appears to be under the impression that there is discontent in the Russian camp.

The medal lists for Alma and Inkerman have been sent in. Those for Balaclava will be forwarded without delay.

Since writing the above, another deserter has come in. He also asserts the death of Mentschikoff, and he states, moreoever, that Admiral Istomine² was killed yesterday.

Death of Admiral Istomine.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G. C., *March 20, 1855.*

You do not tell me what instructions you wish sent to Bruce³ with respect to procuring what may be necessary for the 12th Lancers when they arrive, and any more things for the 10th Hussars that may be required, and how he is to be reimbursed. Would you like me to send you Bruce's letter officially?

¹ Mentschikoff was withdrawn from the command of the Russian forces in the Crimea after the failure of his attempt on Eupatoria.

² A gallant defender of Sebastopol, killed in the Mamelon, March 19th.

³ See two following letters.

Refers to letter
of the Consul-
General in
Egypt dealing
with destitution
of the 10th
Hussars.

I cannot help thinking that the Commander-in-Chief here or in India is much more to blame than the Dandies —the incomplete state of the regiment for service, and its destitution of all necessities, must or ought to have been perfectly well known, and the want of due provision is *too bad* in my humble, civilian judgment.

Polish
prisoners.

I have communicated with Prince Czartorinski about the Polish prisoners. He wishes very much that those here should be incorporated in the French Foreign Legion, and that those at Constantinople, together with any deserters, should be allowed to join the Cosaques. I will arrange with the Admiralty about the former batch, and I shall be much obliged if by the next mail you will give the necessary orders respecting the latter. Count Zamoyski¹ is the person at Constantinople charged with the organisation of the Cosaques, and our officer might communicate with him. Prince C. reminds me of what I know to be a fact, viz. that the D. of N.² said he would give 5000 carbines to this corps, and some other equipments.

THE SAME TO THE SAME

F. O., *March 23, 1855.*

The Earl of Clarendon presents his compliments to Lord Panmure, and has the honour to forward to him the accompanying copy of a letter from Mr. Frederick Bruce, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, with reference to the means of transport, etc., required by the 10th Hussars.

MR FREDK. BRUCE TO LORD CLARENDON

CAIRO, *March 7, 1855.*

Referring to the
journey of the
10th Hussars
from Cairo to
the seat of war.

Since I wrote the despatch which goes by this mail, Major Mitford has arrived from Malta to make arrangements for the march of the regiment from Cairo, and its embarkation. I have not yet seen him, but I am told that no time is yet fixed for the latter operation. I hope,

¹ General commanding Polish Legion.

² Duke of Newcastle.

therefore, that the horses will be in good condition before the order arrives for them to march.

I have done all in my power, and offered to take upon myself any pecuniary responsibility, in order to induce the Colonel to have the regiment properly equipped *before it embarks*. For instance, I found that the men have no sufficient blankets, as it seems the bedding was sold before they left Bombay, and they are indebted to the charity of the ladies of that place for a very insufficient covering they have brought with them. Now, not to speak of the Crimea, the march from Cairo to Alexandria cannot be undertaken without great risk to the health of the men if insufficiently protected at night. I have therefore bought up, out of my own funds, about 500 of the country blankets, which are more durable and fitted for service than the English ones, and I will increase the number should the Colonel wish it. He is quite aware of the necessity of these things, but there seems no power vested in any one, sufficient to meet contingencies. Everything must in the first instance be referred home.

Another point I have urged on him most strongly is the propriety of buying here baggage animals, should the regiment be ordered direct to the theatre of war, and should there be room enough to put them, with the regiments, on board the transports. At this moment they have no means of carrying with them even what is required for the shelter of the men, and to enable them to prepare their food. I can quite understand that those who are in charge of the Commissariat department in the Crimea may be expected to find food, and the means of conveying it to the camp; but it does seem strange and unreasonable to expect that any department should be expected to furnish means of transport for the tents and camp-kettles of a regiment, which are as necessary to it as its arms. Hardy little horses are to be bought very cheap here, and I dare say one might pick up mules. There would also be no difficulty in providing a sufficient quantity of barley and straw, and putting it on board the transports, for the consumption of the animals in the Crimea for some

The Consul recommends the acquisition of baggage animals by the regiment.

time. Chopped straw is the food always given to horses here.

Improvidence
of said regi-
ment.

Certainly the 10th is a splendid regiment in point both of men and of horses, and after the expense that has been incurred in bringing it from India, it would be lamentable to see it reduced to a state of inefficiency from the want of a timely expenditure of £600 or £800 more. But from the officers downwards, I, as a civilian, am struck with their utter helplessness, and with the difficulty of inducing them to take any precautions against the inevitable hardships and privations of a campaign. Actually the first detachment came away without camp-kettles, and though, by taking out those supplied to the transports for their use during the voyage, they have remedied it partially, still I believe their number is incomplete. It seems difficult to impress on them sufficiently that, as far as possible, when they embark at Alexandria they ought to be provided with everything necessary for their efficiency, and to enable them to move, and ought not to trust to what they may find on disembarking. That seems to me the principle on which a Colonel proceeding to join an army in the field ought to act, and to relieve him from the pecuniary responsibility which seems to paralyse the energies of these old routine officers, I have offered to provide the funds on a single statement from him of what he requires. I feel sure no greater service could be rendered to the army of the East than to diminish the drain on the means of transport to be found on the spot.

Evils of rein-
forcing the
Army by regi-
ments and not
by divisions,
and how this
evil may be
remedied.

I am induced to offer these observations because the 12th Lancers is on its way here, and in all probability will arrive, like the 10th, incomplete in several of these points. I should like to have authority to supply what is required, for what I have seen of the regiments leads me to the conclusion that it is only by supplying the regiments on embarkation with the means of locomotion, etc., that the evils and confusion can be avoided which are the necessary consequence of reinforcing the army by *individual regiments*, and *not by Divisions*, as is the habit of the French and other Continental nations.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *March 22, 1855.*

The other day when the Queen spoke to Lord Panmure on the subject of the distribution of the medals for the Crimean campaign amongst the officers and men who are in this country, no decision was come to as to how this should be done. The Queen has since thought that the value of this medal would be greatly enhanced if *she* were *personally* to deliver it to the officers and to a certain number of men (selected for that purpose). The valour displayed by our troops, as well as the sufferings they have endured, have *never* been surpassed, perhaps hardly equalled, and as the Queen has been a witness of what they have gone through, having visited them in their hospitals, she would like to be able personally to give them the reward they have earned so well, and will value so much. It will likewise have a very beneficial effect, the Queen doubts not, on the recruiting. The manner in which it should be done, and the details connected with the execution of this intention of hers, the Queen will settle with Lord Panmure when she sees him in town.

The Queen desires to present medals to her troops personally.

Will the medals now be soon ready?

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *March 23, 1855.*

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letter received this morning with the despatches. The Queen is glad to see that the weather and the health of the troops are so much better. Another mail has come in—she sees by to-day's papers.

The Queen rejoices over improved health of her troops.

What is the amount of troops in depôt already at Malta?

We should wish to see Lord Panmure at Buckingham Palace at 3 to-morrow.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *March 23, 1855.*

Opinion as to
necessity of
investing
Sebastopol.

I have not much news to give you from this, except that we are all beginning to believe that Sebastopol, instead of being weaker and more likely to fall, is getting stronger and more impregnable. Things seem to have taken a turn with the Army, and I hope, when the railway is completed and your ranks recruited, that something effectual may be accomplished either against the citadel or in the field. My own idea is that you will have yet to invest the place, and when you have got the whole of the French reinforcements, your own, and the Sardinians, that you will find yourself enabled to do so, and to make a combination with Omar Pasha which will prevent the enemy from throwing any more supplies or reinforcements into the fortress.

We have had our field-day with Lord Lucan, and he has done no harm, though he certainly dealt unscrupulously with your name and those of your Staff. I hope, however, you will not think it worth while to notice his attack, which made no impression, although, if you do, I am quite ready to be the channel through which you may appeal to the public.

You will have abundance of amateurs ere long in your camp, as I hear of many who are going to the Crimea, and among others you will, in all probability, receive a visit from the Duke of Newcastle. Our accounts from Vienna are in favour of peace, and that opinion seems to hold among the Greek houses in the city, as they are fast selling all Russian produce of which they are the holders. This only makes one anxious to see a blow inflicted on the enemy. I expect to hear to-morrow morning of the effect of the Emperor's death on the enemy, as I see you sent in Lord Burghersh to communicate it.

You astonish me by your account of Canrobert's 'sick.' How snug they keep all these things in France!

Roebuck's Committee is doing no harm so far as the

Desire to see a
blow inflicted
before peace
is made.

energies of the Army are concerned—indeed a reaction is commencing here, and it only requires an ‘affair’ to complete it. Your races and dog hunts don’t show a ‘broken spirit!’

I have written to you about ‘water.’ It is the only thing that I am uneasy about, and I wish you would tell me what you think of your supply.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *March 24, 1855.*

The attack of the Russians upon our trenches and those of the left of the French Right on the night of Thursday and morning of Friday was very serious.¹ I do not know how it originated with the French, and I have received no authentic account of what happened to them; but my impression is that they were driven from their advanced position, though they afterwards recovered it. The rifle-pits were empty yesterday, and this morning they are reported to be reoccupied by the enemy.

Great night
of attack by the
Russians.

The French loss was very serious. They admit three hundred. I should fear it was more. The Russians succeeded in getting on to our advanced position, and into several of our batteries, but they were quickly driven out again, and they have done them no injury. Our numbers were small, but they were not wanting in determination of spirit, and though some of the working-parties and Generals had to go back in the first instance, they speedily re-formed and ejected their assailants without delay. Major Gordon of the Engineers, a most valuable officer, is wounded in two places in the arm, but I found him yesterday cheerful and pretty well, and he reckons upon a speedy recovery. He was leading the troops forward when he was struck. Tylden of the Engineers distin-

¹ The sortie of March 22nd, undertaken to check French ‘approaches’ threatening the Kamtschatka Lunette. At the same time four sorties were directed against the English troops established on the Woronzoff Ridge. All these sorties were repulsed. Kinglake estimates the French loss at 600 killed and wounded, ours at 70, the enemy’s at 1300.

Insufficiency of
British troops.

guished himself very much also as Commander. Captain Brown¹ of the 7th, and Captain Vicars of the 97th, who both, I lament to say, fell, did likewise. I am quite convinced that our right and left attacks require more troops for their adequate defence than I can furnish; but I do not see how I can give more, without throwing upon our men more fatigue than I can possibly call upon them to undergo. We must do the best we can.

You will see from my next despatches that, in the question of Eupatoria, Omar Pasha sided with General Canrobert rather than with me; but the place is not to be abandoned. On the contrary, there will be from 12 to 15,000 men there.

I can see no reason why Lord Lucan's application for a Court-Martial should not be resisted. He has no ground to insist upon it.

I will write to you upon the Bath as soon as I can, and state my views to you. My own conviction is that the Government at home can do such things better than I can.

General Forey is perfectly innocent of any treasonable correspondence with the enemy to the best of my belief. I understood that he was not pleased with the advent of General Pélistier, and had a mind to return to France, but he was persuaded to retain the command of his Division. How or why this vile report was spread I cannot imagine.

I am told it was stated in our camps by a Frenchman that he was to be shot.

I have seen him since the report was afloat. He, of course, did not allude to it. He was in good spirits. I have just received a letter from Lord J. Russell of the 12th.

ADMIRAL HOUSTON STEWART TO LORD PANMURE

Private and Confidential.

H.M.S. 'HANNIBAL,'
OFF SEBASTOPOL, *March 24, 1855.*

I think it possible that you may expect to hear from me now and then whilst I remain in these latitudes, and

¹ Captain Cavendish Brown.

at all events I feel confident that you will accept my cordial congratulations on your being again at work, and my warmest wishes for perfect success and credit in the all-important office you are placed in.

I was very glad to get up to the scene of action at this end of the Russian Empire, although I much fear there is little for the large ships to attempt—the enemy having from the first month decidedly declined and avoided risking any struggle on the ocean, and the sinking of two separate lines of ships, and placing two separate barriers (one a boom and the other a cable) across the harbour of Sebastopol, has made it undeniably *impracticable* for our ships to force their way in; nor indeed do I see what they could do, even were they able to overcome these obstructions, for, in addition to all the former strong fortresses and batteries, the Russians have thrown up earthworks, on which heavy ordnance are placed, in every possible position, most of which are situated so far in the rear and at such a height that a ship would be quite unable to reply to them. Sir E. Lyons's heart has been set upon getting his small vessels into, and occupying, the Sea of Azof, so as to cut off the supplies which are poured into the Crimea from that side. But to do this, and to ensure the *safe return* of the vessels of light draught of water, it seems indispensable to take and occupy Kertch, and when I say *occupy* Kertch, I mean only for a time sufficient to enable us to open and clear the passage, which (the works of Kertch being destroyed) we could afterwards keep open by our shipping. Indeed, Sir E. Lyons only asks to have the troops for twelve or fifteen days, by the end of which time they would be returned to the camp before Sebastopol. With this object in view, the Admirals have applied to the Generals to place at their disposal for a limited space of time ten or twelve thousand troops—with which I think the successful blockade of the whole Sea of Azof might certainly be effected; but without which it would, I fear, be neither safe nor satisfactory to attempt it. Admiral Bruat quite concurs with Sir E. Lyons as to the desirableness of the operation, but General Canrobert

Impossibility of entering Sebastopol harbour.

As to occupation of Kertch.

will not hear of giving a single regiment, and unless he agrees, Lord Raglan cannot possibly do it with his force, so very inferior in numbers to that of Canrobert.

Night sortie of
March 22nd.

Sir E. Lyons and I rode up yesterday to Lord Raglan's quarters. There had been a sharp affair the night before. About five thousand of the enemy attacked the whole of the advanced works of the Allies. The wind blew so strong from the southward that the *supports* did not hear a shot. The working-parties in front were nearly surprised, and several taken, including the Engineer officer (Montagu). They fell back upon their arms which were piled, and so soon as they got them and formed, they charged and drove the enemy out at the point of the bayonet with considerable loss. One officer assured me that they could count forty-nine dead bodies from one point and twenty-eight from another. Our loss I believe to amount to about sixty,¹ killed, wounded, and missing, amongst the latter Colonel Kelly, 34th Regiment, and of the former Captain Cavendish Brown of the 7th Fusiliers, whose body was perforated with no less than five balls. The French loss is more considerable, but not in proportion to the numbers engaged. They state it to be about two hundred and fifty *hors de combat*. Here *again* our superiority to the Russian soldiers, when brought man to man, has been signally evinced. The prisoners say that two thousand attacked the English trenches, and they were repulsed by four hundred! Will you consider me 'indiscreet' if I tell *you* that, having now seen General Canrobert three times, and heard him speak on our position and prospects *twice*, I have conceived a very poor idea of his talents, and am of opinion that, whatever he may have been as a General of Division, he is now *over-weighted* and *crushed* by the responsibility of having the Command-in-Chief. His extreme *caution* suggests *timidity* to one's mind, and either he mistrusts himself or his troops. Whichever it may be, the consequences are likely to prove very embarrassing and mischievous, for I should apprehend the want of confidence becoming mutual.

¹ Hamley fixes our loss at seventy.

The French soldier is not the soldier of the Republic or of the former Empire, and the troops of the Line at present here have lowered themselves in the estimation of the Zouaves, and, sooner or later, must do so in that of their Allies, which will be very lamentable and detrimental to the expedition. I declare to you that I never saw a man more decidedly *cast down* than Canrobert was yesterday. He happened to call on Lord Raglan whilst we were there. Only himself, Lord Raglan, Sir E. Lyons, and I were present. The dread of an attack seems to haunt him, and *defence* of our present position to be allowed to supersede all operations of *offence* or advance. They say the Emperor is coming here; if he does (which I *very much* doubt), I do not believe Canrobert's tenure of the chief command would be worth many days' purchase. With respect to Sebastopol being taken by bombardment and assault, I am by no means sanguine. The north side would remain potent and commanding, even were the south side in possession of the Allies. But the Russians have become so bold in their operations against the besiegers, and especially so upon the French attack, that it is now far more difficult and doubtful, and I can scarcely wonder if the troops, seeing the *incessant* increase and multiplication of the enemy's defences, should begin to *doubt* the issue of bombardment and assault. Many people of excellent judgment are disposed to think that the Allies should take the field so soon as artillery horses and commissariat animals are in sufficient numbers to enable them to move, and that, with eighty thousand French and twenty thousand English united, and forty-five thousand Turks under Omar at Eupatoria, the Crimea might be traversed, the enemy licked to a *certainly* if he stood, and Sebastopol taken with ease afterwards. But I fear such a measure will never be consented to by Canrobert, and that he is not the man to execute it. All this increases painfully the difficulties of Lord Raglan's position, and the disproportion in numbers is so great as to make his influence and opinion to weigh less with the French than they ought to do.

Canrobert's
despondency.

Difficulties of
Lord Raglan's
position.

I saw General Simpson yesterday also, and I like the

cut of his jib *much*—fine old soldierly appearance, who gives you the idea of mild yet firm decision and good sense. I believe he will tell you that things are not nearly so bad as he expected. But indeed the improvement of the last six weeks in the health of man and beast is wonderful.

We have got a noble squadron here—six English screws and the *Rodney*. The French have three screws and four sailing-ships of the line, and I am confident that, if any possibility occurs for employing them, our present Chief, Sir E. Lyons, will not miss it.

J. C. Dalrymple Hay (Dunraggit) is captain of this ship; I dare say you recollect him, a fine boy, playing with Michael and Willy, and Mr. Makellar superintending their studies and their piscatory pursuits at Penninghame in the days of yore. . . .

And now, my dear old friend, fare thee well. If my yarn has bothered you, or if you think I ought not to write you on *military* matters, but stick to the tar-bucket, you have only to give me a hint and I shall observe it.

Rear-Admiral Istomine, second in command of ships at Sebastopol, but charged with command of the Mamelon Battery on shore, was killed by a shell a few days ago—a good officer, and well known to Sir. E. Lyons and others when at Athens.

PS.—I open my letter to say that the *Himalaya* has arrived—all the horses in great good health and condition except four, of which one died and three were shot on the passage. Three hundred and forty-eight horses and two hundred and thirty-five artillerymen will be landed all right.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G. C., *March* 26, 1855.

Employment
of Sardinian
Contingent.

I send you two letters from Hudson. One may serve as a reminder with respect to sending horses, etc., through France by the railway, but the other is very important, viz. where and how we are to employ the

Sardinian Contingent. The idea of landing the troops at Eupatoria is utter nonsense. That place is already so full of human beings that a pestilence is to be feared. It is desirable that the whole force there should be under one command, and we could not put La Marmora under Omar Pasha. The sooner it is made clear that the Sardinians don't belong to the French, and are not to be ordered about by them, the better. You will see by the enclosed extract from a letter of the Emperor's to Walewski that, although he wished to have the Sardinians at Constantinople, as part of an army of reserve which would be a constant menace to the Russians (and the plan is not a bad one), yet, that if all our ships cannot remain there in waiting upon them, he would prefer their going to the Crimea.

Now, that will simplify matters for us, as we can do what is most convenient for ourselves in compliance with the Imperial wishes, and if we convey the Sardinians direct to Balaclava, and place La Marmora in connection with Raglan, their position and their quarters will at once be settled. But it is of great importance that, on landing, they should be well received and cared for, and you will probably think it right to give Raglan notice of the probable time of their arrival, and very special instructions as to their treatment.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

BELGRAVE SQUARE, *March 26, 1855.*

I have sent you a long 'secret and confidential' despatch, embodying my views and fears of the tendency of the counsels of our beloved Allies. I have my suspicions of them, and I only hope you will not be induced to give way to them one inch more than you consider right. It is all very well to talk of the necessity of keeping a 'good understanding' with the French, but I have no notion of doing so to our own risk, and the good-nature with which you have already borne the rough work seems only

Warning
against counsels
of our Allies.

to make them more presuming. I admire Burgoyne's honest report, and smile at Canrobert's *prudent* refusal to adopt his views. If *you* had been there, I feel as sure as I write it that no general of yours would have allowed the Russians to have erected the advance work, and, had they done so, they would have considered themselves under a cloud till it was swept away.

The Turks at
the seat of war.

I earnestly hope you will carry your point as to Omar Pasha's army. I entirely concur with you that it is in its proper position. It could do no good before Sebastopol, and, moreover, I believe it will be your best policy to keep the Turkish Army as far as you can from the Allied. By the way, the Queen is very anxious to know what has become of the Turks sent to you some time since. Let me have some state of them from the Adjutant-General's department, or from whoever is accountable for them. Since they were driven from the forts on the 25th October,¹ I have scarcely ever seen their names mentioned.

Send me home your list for the Bath as soon as you can. You will, of course, include Lucan, Airey, Estcourt, but no one not actually engaged and who [did not] distinguish himself. You know, I presume, that an order of merit is under preparation which will pervade all ranks.

The Queen
much occupied
with military
matters.

The Queen is to present the Crimean medal publicly to detachments of officers and men from every corps in the Crimea. You never saw anybody so entirely taken up with military affairs as she is. You need not mention this fact, but I thought you would be gratified by hearing it.

I have no news for you.

FROM ADMIRAL HOUSTON STEWART

Private and Confidential.

'HANNIBAL,' OFF SEBASTOPOL,
March 26th, 1855.

I cannot tell you how much your kind letter of the 12th inst. gratified me. I received it on my return with

¹ Just before the battle of Balaclava.

Sir E. Lyons last evening from a visit to Lord Raglan. I had written to you the day before, and I shall most assuredly follow out your desire that I should write you from time to time as plainly and unreservedly as our long-established and most cordial friendship justifies.

Most truly do I sympathise in the feelings you express as to what would have been the honest pride and pleasure of those loved ones who are 'gone before,' could they have witnessed our present relative trusted positions in the service of our country, and especially so in this her hour of need. But you, my old friend, have an incomparably heavier weight on your shoulders than I have. My duties, as second in command under such a Chief as Lyons, are light and easy, for I have but to do my best to give effect to, and support, his clear and energetic and truly patriotic views and measures. It is not easy to imagine any man more active, zealous, and devoted than he is, with a clear judgment and incomparable memory, and the bodily activity of twenty-five, with a promptness of decision that is invaluable, and totally free from that bugbear to all weak minds, the dread of responsibility.

Character of
Sir E. Lyons.

You will be glad to hear that his value seems to be fully felt and appreciated by Lord Raglan, with whom he is on the most frank and confidential terms, and apparently consulted on *military* matters, as if he were an accomplished General as well as Admiral. And, truth to say, Lord Raglan, according to my poor apprehension, has much need of a clear-headed, stout, and *cheerful* adviser and friend, for some of those under his command take a doleful and desponding view of matters as they now are, and are likely to be. Sir E. Lyons, and Lord Raglan also, have admitted me to their confidence. And I trust I shall never communicate anything *even to you* which could possibly be considered as inconsistent with that confidence; but I think I only do what is right in stating to you *my own* impressions and thoughts upon what I see, and what everybody here may see. I touched upon the subject of our Allies in my last letter. They are, I fear, nearly at a standstill, and every day appears to add to the boldness of the

Activity of the
Russians.

Slackness of
the Allies.

Russians and to diminish the self-confidence of the French General, and (I doubt) the confidence of the French troops in their Generals, and especially so in Canrobert and Bosquet—the latter of whom stood high until the 24th ult., when he failed to retain possession of the ‘Mamelon,’ where the enemy have now a very formidable work. It is easy to imagine that the constant view of the strengthening of the enemy’s works, their unceasing and most skilful operations for defence, added to their incessant sorties upon the Allies, and upon the French in particular, whilst *almost nothing* is undertaken on the part of our Allies, and little beyond the transport of guns, mortars, and ammunition even by ourselves, must tend to sap their enthusiasm and belief in ultimate success, whilst it cannot but turn their thoughts upon the augmented risks and dangers which must attend the assault, come when it may. To maintain our present position seems the full extent of Canrobert’s designs. But even *that* he does not accomplish, if, as is the case just now, the enemy succeed in establishing formidable works in *advance* of their former ones, and nearer to the French lines. But what is to be done? Lord Raglan is, comparatively speaking, powerless as the head of so small a numerical force, and if the French General won’t move, or won’t agree to measures proposed by both Sir E. Lyons and Admiral Bruat, and fully approved of by Lord Raglan—viz. to allow 10,000 or 12,000 men to be embarked and landed to take Kertch, destroy the fortifications, and so open the passage into the Sea of Azof, as I formerly stated to you—we shall be looked upon as being asleep. The difficulty of moving into the field (and it is a serious one), is the preservation of the guns, stores, and lines of the Allies. It appears to me that such a Guard might be formed of the Turkish and Egyptian forces, and that, if the French and English did take the field, the garrison of Sebastopol would probably be drawn upon as largely as possible in order to meet them, and so the safety of our lines, etc., might be the more confidently intrusted to the Turks, who, under Omar himself, are trustworthy behind defences.

From all this you will gather that *I* humbly consider 'A fix.' *matters in a fix*, and from which I do not believe Canrobert has the genius, nor, without his concurrence, Lord Raglan the *power*, to extricate them. *Re-embarkation is simply impracticable*; to wait for reinforcements beyond a certain point, fraught with increased obstacles and the loss of much valuable time, which the Russians will not fail to profit largely and most ably by; and, without the co-operation of a small land force, I fear the ships cannot effect any diversion or enterprise of consequence. And, taking all these things into account, you cannot be surprised if I for one do venture to hope that the Emperor *will* come, and come quickly, in person to the Crimea. The game is all important to *him*, and his presence *must lead* to active and decisive measures. But unless L. Napoleon does come, or unless positive intimation be sent to Canrobert to act, and especially to give the necessary means to enable the ships to get possession of the Sea of Azof without further delay, I warn you, so far as the poor judgment of a *functionary* can entitle him to *warn a statesman*, that you must not expect anything *immediate* in the way of military success. I like *very much* what I saw at a first and brief interview which Sir E. L[Lyons] and I had with General Simpson, and I mean to have another chat with him as soon as I can. I think *he* will be useful to Lord Raglan, who really seems to have very little beyond himself to trust to. Sir J. Burgoyne you will see. He will not give you a very encouraging prospect, I fear, nor a very flattering estimate of what the French have done and are likely to do. But I understand from Sir E. Lyons that he was decidedly in favour of a move into the field, a battle royal, and then Sebastopol, as a certain result of the *as certain victory* of the Allies. I have taken a leisure moment to scribble this long yarn, which you may not thank me for inflicting upon you. . . .

Sir J. Burgoyne's views.

James Drummond is here in the *Tribune*, an excellent fellow, and we often talked of *the glorious game* during the frosty weather.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

March 27, 1855.

Suggests reinforcement of the Guards.

I write to you to-day on the subject of the Brigade of Guards out in the East. It is now so much reduced in numbers that it will be able to render hardly any service to the Army, and yet, as the Guards are present by name, their reputation is at stake. I find that about 1000 men fit for duty could be furnished by the Brigade at home; 200 from the Grenadiers, and 300 from each of the other regiments. Now, as time is advancing, and the Guards have not yet sent any drafts to Malta, would it not be advisable to send out the larger reinforcement at once to the Crimea, and to give orders for the sick and convalescents to be sent home, who are said to recover badly and frequently to die from relapses? They would be valuable to assist in bringing on the recruits.

Suggests increasing number of men at Malta.

I am afraid that Malta is not rendered as useful as it ought to be, if such an amount of Staff and sergeants is swallowed up for no more than 120 men from each regiment. The original idea was to have 200 there of each, so that Lord Raglan might draw upon them. If left at 120, one draft will exhaust the whole and leave a valuable Staff doing nothing, whilst we have not Staff enough at home to bring on the recruits.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.**BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, March 27, 1855.*

I mentioned in my private letter of Saturday that I had just heard from Lord John Russell. I wrote to him yesterday, and Sir Edmund Lyons undertook to forward my letter to Varna this morning.

I am strongly impressed with the notion that the Emperor of the French will not come here, and my wishes are in unison with that impression. He would be mistaken if he supposed he could at once on arrival achieve a great success.

The failure of the French to keep the Russians off the ground they endeavoured to drive them from on the 24th February¹ has checked their disposition to lay violent hands upon the enemy's ambuscades, and the Russians still occupy some of those in the immediate front of their advanced parallel, contiguous to our extreme right; and the French are content to proceed towards the Mamelon by sap. General Rose is somewhat uneasy upon this point, and will, I believe, write confidentially to Lord Clarendon. I earnestly recommend that the subject should be considered confidential in the strictest sense of the word. Our Allies are extremely sensitive.

Moral condition
of the French
Army.

I send you Mr. Cattley's report of the day.

The arrival of the Grand Duke Michael requires confirmation, as does the death of Mentschikoff.

The march of a body of troops in the direction of Kutschuk (?) does not seem unlikely. If true, it indicates that the Russians have acquired intimation of the importance the Allies attach to the possession of the Sea of Azof. This is unfortunate. I am confident that the intelligence did not reach them through the English.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

March 28, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to enclose the despatches which arrived from Lord Raglan this morning, from the 13th to 17th inst.

Your Majesty cannot fail to remark the full details with which we are now furnished, not only of the operations of Your Majesty's troops, but likewise in regard to the health and condition of the Army.

News from the
seat of war.

There appears to be no foundation for the announcement in the *Times* yesterday of the attack upon our lines by the Russians.

In comparing the Morning State of the 12th inst. with

¹ Selinghinsk Redoubt.

that of the 16th, there appear to be an increase of 2094 Cavalry and Infantry under arms, and of Artillery 337.

Lord Panmure forwards for the perusal of Your Majesty a private letter from Sir John M'Neill, in which he gives very gratifying accounts of the energy and services of Colonel Tulloch.

The Sanitary Commission has been busy at Scutari and Balaclava, and is doing much good service. These missions have been of the most important service to Your Majesty's troops, and, from all I can see, have been welcomed as they deserved.

General Simpson had arrived, and had been well received by Lord Raglan. The General merely reports his arrival, and promises to write more fully by next mail; he had been detained at Malta, waiting for passage.

Lord Panmure forwards for Your Majesty copies of the former tracing received by the last messenger in General Jones' report, and likewise of that which has been sent now, showing the new works thrown up to unite the English and French lines. The only one of these documents which Lord Panmure will trouble Your Majesty to return is Sir John M'Neill's letter.

Lord Panmure must apologise for troubling Your Majesty with so many documents, but his only excuse is his conviction of the deep interest taken by Your Majesty in all that concerns the honour and well-being of your Army.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *March 29, 1855.*

The writer volunteers his services in connection with the German Legion.

I have been thinking of all sorts of persons who could speak German, and who could be of use to you in the formation of your new German Legion, but I confess to you I can hit upon nobody that would suit, with the exception possibly of Colonel Sir Gaspard Le Marchant, our present Colonial Governor in Nova Scotia, I think, who used to be some years ago a most excellent officer and active-minded man. I have been told that he would wish to return to the service, but this I cannot answer for.

It has, however, occurred to me that *I* might *myself* be of some use to you in this matter. I am extremely anxious to have some military occupation, even if only of a temporary kind, until it is quite clear whether or not I should go back to the Crimea. You know that I speak German and write German as well as I do English. I am thoroughly conversant with the German habits, character, and military service, I delight in soldiering, and am well up in our own military details. Rather than not be of some use in this time of war and anxiety, I would willingly assist in the organisation of the present Legion, if you think my doing so would be of any use, and I really flatter myself that it might, and that the very fact of my being in some way associated with it might assist it abroad in obtaining good and useful recruits. I would undertake to drill and organise such a force with some little assistance. There is only one observation I would wish to make. If I am ultimately to go back to the Crimea, I should wish to return to my own Division of British troops, which you will not think unnatural. I take for granted, however, that the Foreign Legion will not go out as a body, but will be partitioned off to the various Divisions of our Army, and act with English troops, and not *per se*. In the latter case there can be no difficulty in my organising and drilling the force preparatory to its departure for the seat of war, and I should not be called upon to proceed out at their head as a separate body. At all events I hope you will kindly think the matter over, and have some little conversation with me about it before you write a final decision.

As to organisation of German Legion.

One more observation I would wish to make in reference to this force. You said the other day that at present you would only take INFANTRY. Now our great want at present lies in CAVALRY for our next campaign. Nothing equals the German Light Cavalry, and it takes a long time to make a Cavalry soldier. Why not at once form a good strong regiment of German Light Cavalry? They would be found most valuable.

Recommends formation of a regiment of German Light Cavalry.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

March 30, 1855.

Doubts as to
staunchness of
the French.

I have to thank you for your two letters of the 13th and 17th, the latter of which leaves no doubt that the report in the *Times* of a general attack, on the morning of the 17th, on the lines was without foundation. I am getting more anxious about the conduct of the French than ever. Their backward conduct with you, and a certain wavering in Council at home, induce the belief that their desire for peace may be more potent than their sense of honour. Alas! if it should be so. I have said all on this subject in my secret despatch that need be said, and I only hope that I may be disappointed. Lucan made his onslaught in the House of Lords last night, but with no effect; and now I trust we shall hear nothing more of this matter. Both Houses adjourn to-day till the 16th of April, and I hope when we meet again to have something to tell them of your feats of arms. In the meantime we shall have a little rest from our daily interrogation.

I am glad to see by yours of the 13th that the Sea of Azof is attracting the Admiral's attention.

Expectation of
seeing the
Conference
broken up.

The Emperor of Russia's death has ceased almost to be talked of, and it is pretty clear that it will for a time make no change in Russian policy. I do not believe that they will ever consent to the Third Point, viz. a reduction of their fleet in the Black Sea, and therefore we are every day expecting to see the Conference broken up. Drouyn de Lhuys,¹ however, is here, *en route* for Vienna, to see what he can cobble up. The Emperor and Empress are coming here in a fortnight, and are to be right royally received. His position will be somewhat different from what it was when he last had his foot on these shores.

As to improved
reports of the
troops.

Your improved reports of the troops are doing great good, and I hope all the precautions which are being taken will insure you from any serious visitation from sickness. Your summer clothing, viz. a light coat and pair of trousers

¹ French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

per man, will be at Constantinople in the first instalment of 5000 suits ere you receive this. You must send for it as you require it.

The limekilns will do great service, and your opinion as to water is satisfactory. What a horrible mortality your deserter describes among the corps of 8000 to which he belonged.¹

I am by no means sure that you will not see the Emperor. He will be a great *gêne* in some respects, and in others he may stick a spear into Canrobert when it is much wanted. The Sardinian Contingent will have been fully detailed to you ere this. You must protect De la Marmora, and not let the French dispose of him. The Sardinians are sensitive lest they should be considered as *mercenaries*, and you will perceive the necessity of recognising them as the army of an allied State, though they must act under your orders and be at your disposal. The Emperor has a design to lay his hands on them, but this must not be allowed. I never heard the admission of Walewski of so great a loss on the part of the French as 52,000. I have sent you a copy of the evidence before the Committee. I shall attend to any remarks you may have to make on it.

Position of the
Sardinian
Contingent.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

[Written in reply to a Report by General Simpson to Lord Panmure.]

Private.

March 30, 1855.

I have your official report of your arrival, and I look for something more by next mail. I have sent Lord Raglan by this mail a copy of the evidence before the House of Commons Committee, which you can aid in dissecting, and if there is anything you can furnish me with facts to refute, I will do it.

I find my work harder than I like.

I hope you will keep your health and remember Gardiner's rules even in your very hut.

¹ See report of a Russian deserter, *supra*, pp. 106-7.

Feeling in
England
against Raglan
and his
personal Staff.

Costume of
officers in the
Crimea.

The feeling against Raglan is subsiding, but his personal Staff appear to have given dreadful offence to some of their brother-officers out there, and they are most evilly, it may be most foully, reported of.

I wish to direct your attention to one point which is reported to me, viz. the licence adopted by Reg^{tal}. Officers as to *costume*. Depend on it that this betokens a loose discipline, and the sooner you strike at it the better. Give any relaxation you please, but let it be *given* by superior authority in an official way, and don't let young gents. or old gents. be the judges of their own dress. I am sure Brown¹ will concur with me in this.

Pray have a quick eye to your forage. Animals will crowd in on you very soon, and you must spur up Filder to be getting his supplies.

DR. WALLER LEWIS² TO LORD PALMERSTON

March 30, 1855.

Understanding that the Medical department of the Army is to be entirely remodelled, may I be excused suggesting to your lordship one or two alterations that I believe to be improvements urgently called for?

Recommendations as to
hygiene of the
Army.

I am of opinion that, in the reconstitution of the department in question, provision should be made for an acting Sanitary Staff being attached to the Army, and that the Army Medical Board should comprise one member whose attention should be mainly directed to the general hygiene of the troops.

He should have the management of all matters bearing on the *prevention* of disease, as the site of barracks and hospitals, the structural arrangements of these buildings and of guard-houses, the selection and preparation of ground for encampments, the recommending suitable food and drink for the soldier, and advising as to the best and readiest modes of cooking, the clothing best adapted for

¹ General Sir George Brown, commanding the Light Division.

² An authority on sanitary matters who had been much employed by the Government.

different climates, etc., etc. Results have shown that if this system had been adopted with our troops in the East, and if an officer specially acquainted with these subjects had been attached to head-quarters at home, much sickness and death would have been saved, and an enormous amount of distress, not to speak of expense, might have been avoided.

The latest official statistical returns of the sickness, invaliding, and mortality in the Army, published in 1853, afford decisive evidence of the amount of *preventible* diseases and mortality: and I am informed that within the last five years the most satisfactory results have followed the adoption of judicious sanitary arrangements among the children in the Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea.

Amount of
preventible
diseases.

The superior condition of the French troops in reference to health and disease is mainly owing, it is believed, to the existence of such an arrangement as I have indicated.

The details of the organisation of the Medical Military Staff are not, I believe, thoroughly known in this country.

I am about to visit Paris in a few days to complete my investigations for the Home Department. If your Lordship and the Minister of War think it desirable, I shall feel much honoured by being authorised to make inquiries into the way in which this important portion of the subject of the health of the Army is managed in France, and will report thereon on my return to London.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *March 31, 1855.*

. . . I think our friends are a little uneasy, and over-anxious for the arrival of some of the Turkish Army from Eupatoria, but they continue to have full confidence in their English Allies.

CHAPTER IV

APRIL 1855

AT the seat of war the outstanding event of the month of April was the great bombardment—the ‘iron storm’ directed upon the enemy’s defences from every gun and mortar in our possession, in the hope of making the fortress untenable. Begun on April 9th, in the midst of wind, rain, and mist, it was maintained night and day for ten days; and then, in more desultory fashion, for eight days longer. Notwithstanding which, it completely failed of its object, producing but little effect upon the Russian earth-works.

In the meantime, signs are not wanting that the mutual relations of the French and British were by no means free from friction. Niel’s allegations in a letter addressed to his master on March 13th, our complaint that the French wish to obtain control of the Sardinian Contingent, and the case of the *soi-disant* ‘Colonel’ Ochota, disposed of by Lord Raglan on April 27th, furnish illustrations of how this state of feeling was kept up. Lord Panmure’s justification of Raglan, dated April 8th, would serve of itself as an answer to the charge of unfairness brought against the writer by Kinglake.

Both at home and in the Chersonese, the infatuation of the Emperor Napoleon continued anxiously to exercise the minds of statesmen and generals. The Emperor’s plan was to go to the Crimea at the end of the month. *En attendant*,

he paid a brief but brilliant visit to the Court of St. James, during which he was present at Councils held at Windsor and at Buckingham Palace. A plan for investing Sebastopol was there made to take the place of his more showy military projects; and, indeed, so successful were diplomacy and statecraft, that by the end of the month it comes to be understood that his contemplated visit to the seat of war has been abandoned. A relief to all, the announcement can have been to none more welcome than to his own generals.

On the 16th of the month, Lord Panmure is able to allude to the daily increasing vigour of our troops at the seat of war. Reinforcements also are arriving there, though as yet scarcely in the numbers desired. Omar Pasha, with 20,000 Turks and Egyptians, is now before Sebastopol. At home the Duke of Cambridge energetically urges the need of recruiting. Lord Raglan, who had spent the best of his days in office-work, is seen assiduously pursuing the old life under new conditions. But perhaps the most reassuring item in the month's correspondence is the testimony of General Simpson—a witness whose special business is to criticise, and who by his own showing has had prejudice to overcome—to the merits of the much-maligned Staff Officers of our army in the field.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *April 1, 1855.*

The Queen returns all these despatches and letters in order that they may be copied. The reports of the deserters, the Queen thinks encouraging.

As soon as Sir J. Burgoyne arrives the Queen wishes to be informed. The Queen has never heard from Lord Palmerston respecting the monument for her poor soldiers at Scutari; has anything been agreed upon? The Queen

Inquiry as to monument to British soldiers at Scutari.

has again been asked about it; they say that it ought to be begun soon, as in Turkey everything is so soon destroyed and desecrated.

How are the medals getting on?

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 2, 1855.*

The mail arrived to-day with dates from you up to the 20th.

The contents of the despatches are on the whole very satisfactory. I received also from you, yesterday, a telegraphic despatch of the 29th, requesting me to send you out a fourth battering-train and a further supply of 32-lb. shot. I am happy to be able to inform you that I have every prospect of despatching these armaments and ammunition by the steamer *Alps* on Saturday next.

Armaments and reinforcements about to be despatched.

The *Alma* will sail on the same day, with a thousand Guards and some other drafts. This will warm your Guardsmen's hearts, and make their brigade look decent again. The *Great Britain* will also sail in a few days with 1500 for Malta, which will make your *reserve* there upwards of 4000 men.

A few hours before your message I received your telegraph, announcing, in somewhat confused language, the affair of the French on the 22nd and 23rd.¹ We do not yet make out whether we had any hand in it or not, and as people get very anxious when these reports come, I think it had better be an understanding between us that whenever anything occurs you should send me a telegraph at once. The poor doctor of the 9th² seems to have met a very unexpected fate. No blame could be attached to the French sentry. You will perceive that this is written by my Secretary; the fact is, I am sorry to say, I am suffering from an attack of gout.

¹ See Note to Lord Raglan's letter of March 24th.

² Accidentally shot by a French sentry.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 3, 1855.*

My next despatch of this day will afford you all the information I have to convey to you.

I never could bring myself to believe that the Emperor of the French would come here; and, so far as I have been able to ascertain, he has never announced his intention of visiting the Crimea to General Canrobert, though it is spoken of in most of the private letters from Paris. The General thinks it would be a very false move.

A very large army would be required to operate in the field, and to complete the investment of Sebastopol on the north side. Omar Pasha's Army, if assisted by a couple of French Divisions, could undertake the latter duty, should we have an Army in the field to make head against the Russian Army outside the place, and another to continue the siege on the south side; but all this would require immense preparations, vast supplies and abundance of means of transport; and His Imperial Majesty of France would have longer to wait than might be agreeable, or safe, as regards the state of affairs in his Empire, where in my humble opinion he had better remain.

Raglan's view
of the French
Emperor's plan
of campaign.

The Sea of Azof is constantly in the mind of Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat, and they are most anxious to engage in the operation, but they will require the assistance of some troops, and I, as I have before said, and Sir Edmund has repeated to Sir Charles Wood, I believe, have none to give them.

The Sea of
Azof.

What a body of French troops is collecting at Constantinople for, I cannot divine.

In the meanwhile I do not hear that any of the Mediterranean battalions are coming to this Army. I thought I was to have The Buffs when it should leave the Piræus, but I now hear that the regiment has returned to Malta. The French are expecting horses in abundance. We shall be late in receiving our remounts if they are sent

Reinforcements
and remounts
required.

in sailing-vessels. Many months ago I entreated they might be forwarded in steamers.

I had got thus far when I received a letter, of which the enclosed is an extract, from Sir Henry Ward,¹ expressing his anxiety to get rid of two of the battalions which are at Corfu.² This being the case, although I have no authority to do so, I propose to request Major-General Macintosh, with the consent of the Lord High Commissioner, to send them up here; and if to these The Buffs could be added, it would be a great advantage.

I trust this proceeding on my part will be approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I will request Sir Edmund Lyons to find the means of bringing these troops up.

I have no materials for a military despatch to-day.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *April 5, 1855.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter and the despatches from Lord Raglan. She is proud at the record of unalterable and brilliant gallantry on the part of her noble troops,³ though she grieves at the loss of officers and men it has occasioned. She wishes Lord Panmure to express these feelings in her name to Lord Raglan. The Russians have received another lesson, and their loss seems to have been severe.

We hope Lord Panmure is better?

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

BELGRAVE SQUARE, *April 6, 1855.*

As this is Good Friday, and I am desirous to restrict the work of the office as much as possible, I send you nothing more than is absolutely necessary. The only

¹ Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands.

² Owing to difficulty of accommodating them in the island.

³ In repulsing the night sorties of the enemy against our siege-works, March 22nd.

public despatch with which I shall trouble you is upon the subject of the Sardinian Contingent: there seems to be a great desire on the part of the Emperor of the French to lay his fingers upon, and to be the directing spirit of, this little army. It must be your special care to prevent this, and to give you the full means of doing so, I have desired it to proceed at once to place itself under your orders and to form part of your force before Sebastopol. This will have the effect likewise of meeting the want of men which you complain of in your position.

Desire of the French Emperor to obtain control of the Sardinian Contingent.

The enemy seems to have taken no advantage by his night movements of late, though we grieve to see promising young officers picked off in these small but harassing affairs. I am sorry to tell you that I am still far from well, and my holidays have hitherto been spent either entirely in my bed, or, when not there, in a room adjoining my bedroom. I shall write you more fully in every way by Monday's post.

LORD RAGLAN TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 7, 1855.*

I enclose Mr. Cattley's report of this day. The information it contains would lead to the supposition that Balaclava is to be attacked, if not to-night, at least on some very early day or night; but there is certainly nothing visible to confirm this intelligence, and Sir Colin Campbell, who is now in this house, is under no apprehension.

Prospect of an attack on Balaclava.

It is, however, natural that the enemy should make some effort to disturb us whilst our attention is directed to the attack of Sebastopol.

If the effort be a serious one, the arrival of some of the troops of Omar Pasha's Army at Kamiesh and Kazatch will have been most opportune.

Events from day to day.

Sir Edmund Lyons fulfilled his promise of transporting 5000 men to perfection. His ships left the fleet on Wednesday evening, embarked the troops next morning,

and brought them to Kazatch in the afternoon in time to disembark most, if not all of them. The French, whose ships had gone away before ours, had kept a greater distance from Eupatoria, and thus were jockeyed.

The Admiral has despatched the *Sidon* and the *Leopard* to bring up the two regiments from Corfu, and I hope Admiral Stopford will be able to find conveyance for The Buffs from Malta. Some additional troops here just now would afford us much relief. The deepening the trenches and thickening the parapets being works of the first necessity, and the Divisions engaged in the siege being unable to furnish additional working-parties, I caused three hundred of the 71st to be brought from Sir Colin's position yesterday on baggage animals, and sent them back by railway. This produced a fatal and very serious accident, which has given me very great pain. Mr. Beattie assured me that there was no danger whatever, and that he had selected experienced and steady hands to take charge of the brakes, and he would accompany them himself, not from any fear of an accident, but to ascertain how so many men could be well conveyed. He did go with them, but from some cause or other the last set of carriages, upon one of which he was, upset, and I grieve to say a corporal was killed, a private had his leg smashed, poor fellow, and ten or eleven others were more or less hurt, none I hope seriously. But the accident is unfortunate and much to be lamented, and will, I fear, stop the free use of the railway to the extent contemplated, unless Mr. Beattie can place the brakes under better control.

I shall probably get the official report to-night.

Canrobert's prolonged visit has left me no time to say more. The weather is very fine.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD CLARENDON

April 8, 1855.

I would have answered yesterday your note forwarding to me copies of the letters of Generals Canrobert and Niel to the Emperor of the French, but I had worn

A railway
accident.

myself out in despatching the mail for the Crimea. I will not conceal from you that I have read these despatches with very serious regret, as they tend in my opinion to convey to His Imperial Majesty a wrong impression of Lord Raglan's earnest desire to co-operate in every way, and to give every assistance in his power to our Allies. When two great nations are acting together in operations so extensive as those which the Allied Armies are now carrying on, it is not to be expected that everything will run exactly and precisely in the groove which we wish it, but you must be perfectly aware that one of the great qualifications for his position recognised in Lord Raglan was his amenity of disposition and his talent for conciliating those with whom duty would bring him in contact. Since you sent me these despatches, I have searched the records of Lord Raglan's correspondence with my Department, and I cannot discover a single instance in which he has expressed a doubt on his part of the good faith of the French Generals, nor can I trace the slightest indisposition to share his own resources with his allies. Any *contresens* that may have occurred when their operations were combined has been mentioned by him as a matter of fact, but never commented upon in the spirit exhibited in the letters of Generals Canrobert and Niel. These officers should consider, when they blame Lord Raglan for not keeping pace with them in their preparations for opening the whole of the concentrated fire of the Allied Armies before Sebastopol, the inferiority of the English Army in point of numbers, and the state to which they have been reduced by the original disproportionate work of the siege. I could point out many instances in which Lord Raglan might have remonstrated upon apparent want of support from the French Government. Had they consented to advance at Alma, the Russian Artillery might have become the spoil of the Allies. Had Lord Raglan declined to place his Light Cavalry on the heights in advance with General Bosquet's Division, many valuable animals might have been saved to his army, and his Division of Cavalry maintained in better condition. In

Defence of
Lord Raglan.

Raglan's
relations with
the French
vindicated.

the combined night movement on the Tchernaya, Sir Colin Campbell, in spite of the weather, was at his post at the hour fixed by General Canrobert, not so the French Contingent; but Lord Raglan merely mentioned this as a fact, sought out excuses to justify their inaction, and breathed not a word of complaint of any kind against his allies.

I will not refer to any more cases, as these will suffice to show you the tone and temper of Lord Raglan's mind, and I most earnestly hope that you will take such steps as shall appear to you best qualified to disabuse the mind of His Imperial Majesty of any impression adverse, either to the honest intentions of Lord Raglan, or the good faith of Her Majesty's Government.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

April 9, 1855.

Remark on
Russian
soldiers.

I write you one line though unable to hold the pen myself from gout. I hear from Corfu that they have too many troops there, so it would be charity on your part to relieve them of a regiment. You seem to have had a sharpish affair on the night of the 22nd. These Russians, though not fit to cope with us physically, are very clever fellows, and need uncommon sharp looking after. I fancy they cause our Allies no small quantity of anxiety. The Emperor is to be here on Monday, and we shall then know positively whether he intends to go to the Crimea.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 10, 1855.*

Opening of
the April
bombardment.

We commenced our fire under somewhat untoward circumstances yesterday morning.

The weather changed on Monday. We had torrents of rain that night, and yesterday we had a heavy storm of wind and rain, accompanied by a mist, which made it impossible to observe the effect of the fire, or to dis-

tinguish anything at a distance. I have rarely seen a worse day.

However, the French and ourselves succeeded in keeping up a more powerful fire than that of the enemy,¹ and they are doing the same to-day, although for several hours the haze was very thick.

It is now clearing rapidly and the sun is showing itself. I have not heard from Sir Edmund Lyons since yesterday morning, when he was getting under way, but whether he and his fleet took up their intended position in the course of the day, nobody can say. The ships were seen outside this morning, but the view was then very imperfect.

Omar Pasha arrived on Sunday, and I saw him that night at General Canrobert's. He has with him, including the Egyptian Division, nearly twenty thousand men. The weather detained His Highness at Kamiesh yesterday, but I expect him here directly, and General Canrobert is waiting his arrival. He will then let me know how he proposes to dispose of his troops.

The Artillery and Engineer officers recommend that the fire should be continued.² I say this with reference to their proposed meeting on Tuesday as mentioned in my secret despatch of Saturday.

TO LORD RAGLAN

April 13, 1855.

I am still unable to use my hands, though I am beginning to shake off the attack of which I have been a victim. The oppressive work of the Department, which well or ill must be kept under, is a great obstacle I find to convalescence.

Your last mail brought us little fresh intelligence, though it assured us of the personal safety of Colonel Kelly³ and Captain Montagu, which is some comfort.

¹ 'They were slack in replying; the guns in the redoubted Mamelon fired slowly, so did those of the Malakoff.'—Hamley, p. 210. The reason of this was shortness of powder. The bombardment lasted ten days.

² See letter of 14th April.

³ Of the 34th Regiment; afterwards Sir Richard Kelly. He had been captured by the Russians in the great night attack of March 22nd.

Attempts have been made to poison the French Emperor's mind against the British.

The Emperor of the French will be here on Monday, and I hope I shall be well enough to hold personal communication with him. I do not wish to disturb you by raising any vague suspicions in your mind as to the communications made from the French camp directly to the Emperor. It is quite evident from his tone to Lord Cowley that attempts have been made to poison his mind both against you and the Government. He imagines that we are unwilling to give him a full and unreserved support, and that you do not exchange with his Generals the information which you receive of the enemy's conditions and intentions. As an instance of this, the Emperor asserts that there is a certain Colonel Ochota, a Polish deserter, now or lately at Constantinople, who states that he gave you information about the Russians which you did not in any way communicate to General Canrobert. When this statement was made to me, I gave it at once flat contradiction, but I determined at the same time no longer to keep you in ignorance of the poison which is instilled into the Emperor's mind.

French complaint respecting information furnished by a Polish deserter.

Who is this Colonel Ochota, and what can you tell me about him?

I see the Russians have already got hold of our views with regard to the Sea of Azof; there is foul play somewhere. Time perhaps will lead to the discovery of it.

I have written you to-day an official letter about the Committee, and I earnestly hope that you will poke up Mr. Filder to enlarge his supply operations.

You can appoint as many Deputy-Adjutants, Commissary-Generals, out of his staff of clerks as you think he requires, but take care the work is done. We are daily looking for the opening of your fire on Sebastopol. I pity the poor devils there when the iron storm commences.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 13, 1855.*

Prisoners and deserters.

I had given the full disposal of the Polish prisoners and deserters to Count Zamoysky before I received your

note of the 26th March, with the understanding that the deserters will thereby relinquish all further claim upon the British Government. Prisoners are got rid of when the war ceases; but deserters stick like leeches to the party they have gone over to, and are by no means easy to shake off or satisfy.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 14, 1855. Night.*

My secret despatch will tell you all I have to say.

The conference lasted an unusual time.

The officers of Artillery and Engineers differed a good deal in opinion, but it has been resolved to continue the siege, diminishing our fire in order that the ammunition may last longer. It was the best arrangement we could make, and I had no little difficulty, with Sir Edmund Lyons' able assistance, in getting our friends to concur in the course determined upon.

Result of conference of Artillery and Engineer officers.

The letter of which I enclose a copy, from the Hospodar of Moldavia, has been transmitted to me by Lord Stratford, who has, I conclude, sent it to Lord Clarendon. If its contents are true, it is evident that Russia will strip other parts of her dominions to supply troops for the Crimea.

Special efforts made by Russia to raise troops.

I am sorry to say that there was a fatal case of cholera in Brown's Division yesterday. Another man has been attacked by the disease, but is doing well.

General Bizot, who was Chief Engineer before General Niel's arrival, was desperately wounded two days ago. He is doing well.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

April 15, 1855.

I should like to see your proposed scheme of arrangements for the Military Department before it is discussed in

Lord Panmure's
scheme of
arrangements
for the military
department.

the Cabinet. The matter is one of great importance and will require mature consideration; and we must not let Lord Grey,¹ nor anybody else, force us to premature statements in Parliament before our plans are fully and satisfactorily arranged.

I should like to see the instructions to Raglan about an attack on Kertch, and generally I should wish to see instructions for operations of that kind before they are sent out.

Removal of
Airey, Estcourt,
and Filder to
be considered.

We must at the next Cabinet seriously consider the question as to removing Airey,² Estcourt,³ and Filder.⁴

My conviction is that they are all three unfit for their respective situations. We are in all probability on the eve of a most important campaign.

It is impossible that in the course of it many things should not go wrong. If this happens with these three men still holding their present situations, all the world will throw the blame, and justly, upon the Government. If we remove these men and put others in their places we shall at least have done our best, and shall have nothing to reproach ourselves with.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *April* 16, 1855.

Many calls on
writer's time.

I had the pleasure of receiving your private note three days ago, and beg to thank you very much for it. I fear you expect to receive more frequent communications from me than I shall be able to make; for I assure you, my Lord, that, what with the innumerable references made to me, the greatly increased writing, and the constant outdoor duties that demand my attention, very little time is left for correspondence, even although I am up *at it* at five o'clock every morning.

An operation is now in full progress, which also much

¹ A leader of the Peace party.

³ Adjutant-General.

² Quartermaster-General.

⁴ Commissary-General.

engages us all. We began, conjointly with our Allies, last Monday at daylight, now exactly one week ago, to fire from every gun and mortar on the enemy's batteries, with the view of smashing them, and then to make the town untenable. The fire has been maintained on both sides, night and day, ever since it opened, and after a careful inspection which I made yesterday afternoon, I do not think we have made much impression, while we have had 8 or 10 guns disabled, and lost some valuable officers and men. The Russian earthworks, *à la Ferguson*,¹ are too tough for us, and their supply of guns and materials of all sorts so endless that my belief is that this fire may continue for these six months, were it possible, and that we should have the worst of it. Our Artillery-men are nearly exhausted, so are our *guns*. The Russians have fresh men, and guns too, day after day. One thing is clear, *we* cannot keep up this fire longer than one or two more days, and whether our Commanders will assault the place, I know it. If we *do not*, we may as well raise the siege; if we *do*, and succeed, we cannot hold it, so long as the Russians hold the opposite side.

The result of my observations since coming here is that we are in a *regular fix*! It is impossible, my Lord, 'A regular fix,' that any military man of experience could have recommended the descent of this Army in the Crimea, and *whoever* has ordered this expedition has much to answer for. As matters now stand, the French have a large and well-appointed army, but they have not shown themselves equal to cope with the Russians, and both sides know it. *Our* Force of Infantry is now, in round numbers, 16,000, of which 3000 are at Balaclava. The 13,000 up here in the front are very different from the splendid men who came out. But few *of them* remain; and at this time they have not above one night in three for rest. It often happens that men are two nights running in the trenches. This cannot be avoided. It is painful for me to compare the French and English alongside of each other in this

¹ An authority on earthwork defences, whose ideas were adopted by Todleben.

Condition of
the French
favourably
contrasted
with our own.

camp. The 'equipage' of our Allies is *marvellous*. I see continual strings of well-appointed carts and waggons, with *five pair* of horses in each, all under their officers and regular discipline, conveying stores, provisions, etc. The appliances for the sick and wounded, and the care bestowed on them, cannot be surpassed. Everything an army ought to possess is in full working order with the French—even the daily baking of their bread—all under military control and discipline.

Our Land-
Transport
Corps.

We have no establishments at all. It is true that this 'Land-Transport Corps,' which every praise and encouragement are given to, will in time amount to something; but I doubt its ever working, owing to the drivers and the people employed—as they appear of the worst race of men, and of all nations. On moving, I anticipate only confusion and disorder of all sorts amongst such a set of men. M'Murdo is doing his best, and every one is anxious to aid him to the utmost.

I am happy to say that Omar Pasha with some 15,000 well-looking Turkish troops came here from Eupatoria two days ago, and are encamped on the Balaclava side, which much tends to the safety of that place, so liable to attack.

Raglan's
great corre-
spondence.

Lord Raglan is in perfect health and spirits, and how he gets through all that he does is wonderful. I consider him the worst used man I ever heard of! His correspondence is far beyond what any man can get through, and he likes to do it himself. It is grievous to see, in the midst of the very serious operations at present demanding constant attention, a huge bag of letters, *twice* a-week per mail, laid on his table, demanding the utmost care in their perusal, quite sufficient to occupy *entirely* the mind of any man who has nothing else to think of!

Simpson's
opinion of the
Staff.

The Staff here at headquarters have, I am convinced, been very much vilified. They are a very good set of fellows—civil and obliging to every one who comes. I am speaking of the *personal* Staff, who have no responsibilities further than being generally useful. Nor have I any fault to find with Airey and Estcourt. I think the

line that ought to exist, distinguishing their respective departments, was not so distinct as it ought to have been ; and as both come to me now, I am trying to make it so, and to keep the two branches from clashing. As far as I can judge, the Officers of the Staff of the Divisions are excellent, some of them first-rate.

In an army like this, one soon finds out men's capabilities. There are three men who are very prominent as really good soldiers—Major Wetherall here at headquarters as Assistant Quartermaster-General ; Major Halliwell, Ditto with 4th Division ; and Lt.-Col. Pakenham,¹ Assistant Quartermaster-General at headquarters. Among many clever officers these men are prominent. I see no Staff Officer objectionable in my opinion. You will think my views very different from those printed in our newspapers ; but I judge from my own observation, and I hope with impartiality. Soon after my arrival I gave out an Order, with Lord Raglan's concurrence, on the dress and appearance of the officers, and they all appear in uniform now, and with their swords. The Press has done them all much mischief by encouraging them to throw off their stocks, to wear beards, and various other absurdities, which of course infected the soldiers, who went the length of throwing away their shakos. The sheepskins, buffalo robes, fur caps, long boots, red comforters, in which all hands, both officers and men, appeared, tended to licence in dress and appearance, but the Order I gave out on the 26th of March has done good. The state of our camps is another subject for misrepresentation at home. I know them all pretty well now, and more cleanly encampments I never saw. I consider them quite healthy and wholesome in all respects.

Licence in
dress.

Cleanliness of
encampments.

I write a rambling letter, my Lord, and it is with much hesitation I venture to offer you my *opinions* on any subjects, but I cannot resist the desire to respond to the kindness of your note to me by sending you these remarks such as they are.

¹ Afterwards Lord Longford and Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the War Office, in which capacity he was less successful than as a soldier.

TO LORD RAGLAN

*April 16, 1855.*Divided
counsels.

I hope this is the last day on which I shall employ a Secretary to write for me, as my hand is fast regaining its strength. I have seen Sir John Burgoyne this morning, and had a long conversation with him upon the state of things before Sebastopol. I learn from him, with great concern, though not with much surprise, the divided counsels which prevail between you and the French, and I cannot perceive any hope of much improvement so long as the present state of divided command continues to exist. From what Sir John tells me, it is difficult to perceive what is to be gained after our fire is opened, so I begin to be of opinion that the best course to pursue will be to abandon all attempt to take Sebastopol by assault, and at once to take the field and drive the Russians from the Crimea. There is to be a general discussion at Windsor on Wednesday morning as to the future conduct of the campaign. I will communicate to you by Friday's mail the result of that discussion, but I think you may be quite sure now of the Emperor's advent to the Crimea. He professes that it is his desire to place the fullest confidence in you, and to consult you as to all his plans.

I fear he will have great difficulty in restoring the morale of his troops, which, from all Burgoyne tells me, is greatly shaken, not only in the eyes of the English soldiers, but in the estimation of the French officers themselves.

This is altogether a very painful state of things, and gives me serious anxiety as to the result of our present operations.

If any attempt is made on Wednesday to wrest from you the control of the Sardinian Army, I shall resist it to the utmost of my power, but I don't expect that the Emperor will persevere now that he sees our faces so much set against him in the matter.

While we are deploring so much the depreciated morale of the French Army, it gives me much pleasure to hear of

the daily increasing vigour of your own, and when a reinforcement arrives and your hospitals send you back your convalescents, by the aid of the Sardinians you will muster a most respectable force for anything that may be before you.

Depreciated morale of the French Army and improved vigour of our own.

I have written you officially about Colonel Cadogan, who has been attached to General Marmora,¹ and who will communicate with you in all matters concerning that army. General M. will send you an officer of similar rank to represent him at your headquarters.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 17, 1855.*

I enclose Mr. Cattley's last report. It indicates that every effort is making to reinforce the Russian Army.

Efforts being made to reinforce Russian Army.

No deserter has come in for the last fortnight until just now, when one made his appearance from the town. Mr. Cattley will not be able to complete his examination to-day; but he judges, from the questions he has put to him, that he has no very important information to give except as regards the garrison in the town, which he estimates at nearly 40,000 men, a number Mr. Cattley considers not exaggerated.

Information from a deserter.

The conferences we have lately had occupy much time, and are in general very tedious. Fortunately nobody gets out of humour. I believe there never was such a siege as this before. The resources of the Russians are endless.

General Bizot, who I told you on Saturday was severely wounded, died on Tuesday morning. I had been told on the previous day by General Niel that he was considered out of danger. He is a great loss to the French Engineers, in which he was regarded as a man of great worth as well as ability. I attended his funeral yesterday with my Aides-de-Camp, and most of the officers of Engineers of Her Majesty's Service who were

Death and burial of General Bizot.

¹ Colonel the Honourable G. Cadogan had been appointed British Commissioner with the Sardinian Contingent.

not on duty were also present. General Niel, General Pélissier, and General Canrobert made orations on the occasion. Niel spoke by far the best.

Brown has two more cases of cholera in the Light Division. They were doing well yesterday.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *April 1855.*

Agreement
between French
and English
arrived at at
War Council
at Buckingham
Palace.

The Queen wishes to know whether any instructions to Lord Raglan have been forwarded on the Agreement come to with the Emperor of the French, and which was signed by Lord Panmure and Marshal Vaillant ;¹ if so, she would wish to see them. Whenever any instructions of any importance are sent to Lord Raglan, the Queen would wish to see them, if possible *before* they are sent. At times she knows this may be difficult, as the mail frequently arrives the same day that the despatches have been sent out.

We hope Lord Panmure is feeling better.

TO LORD RAGLAN

23 BELGRAVE SQUARE, *April 20, 1855.*

I am still too lame to hold my pen, which I regret the more as the subjects upon which I must write you are of deep and serious interest. Let me say in the first place that I have embodied in a public despatch my approval of your having sent for the three Infantry regiments from the Mediterranean, and I wish you distinctly to understand that you have my full authority to avail yourself of the services of any or all of the troops in the Mediterranean with the exception of Militia regiments. All that I ask is that you give me timely notice of the troops which you remove, that I may take steps for replacing them by others from this country.

Raglan has
complete
control of the
British troops
in the Mediter-
ranean, except-
ing Militia.

From all I hear I am afraid that the 10th Hussars will

¹ An agreement made in furtherance of Napoleon's plan of campaign.

not reach you in a very efficient condition, and I have strong reason to believe that their commanding officer is very inefficient. I hope that the 12th Lancers will be in better order than the 10th.

The visit of the Emperor has gone off with the greatest éclat. We had a meeting with him at Windsor on Wednesday,¹ at which were present the Emperor, Prince Albert, Lords Clarendon, Palmerston, Hardinge, Cowley and myself, Sir John Burgoyne, Marshal Vaillant, and Count Walewski. We discussed at great length the state of affairs in the Crimea, and everybody seemed to arrive at one opinion as to the inexpediency of the Emperor's going there. I cannot say, however, that he was shaken in his purpose, even by so marked an expression of our opinions. He has a strong idea that the present divided command of the Allied Army is leading to no good results, and he thinks that, if he were there, he could control for unity of action, without actually taking command of the Allied Armies.

The French Emperor attends a Council at Windsor.

We came to a pretty clear conclusion that, whatever might be the result of the bombardment, Sebastopol could not be ours until completely worsted.

To effect this purpose, the Emperor proposed a movement to the East with a considerable force as far as Aloushta, from which place he seems to know of a pass through the mountain defiles by which he could reach Simpheropol, from which having driven the Russians, he would descend upon Sebastopol. This appears to be a wild and impracticable scheme, and one which would so divide his army as to lead to its inevitable ruin. It is strange, however, with how much pertinacity he clings to the idea.

We have endeavoured to meet his views to some extent, without committing ourselves in any way to his plan. I may not be able to embody the views of the Government in a despatch by this mail, as the Prince has in his possession some documents upon which it must be founded, but our prospective arrangements are as

¹ April 18th.

Prospective
arrangements
made at the
Council.

follows :—First, that four distinct armies should be formed, each to act a part of its own. We estimate the Allied force to consist of the following numbers :—

French at Sebastopol, . . .	80,000
„ at Constantinople, . . .	23,000
„ Reinforcements, . . .	10,000
Turks,	60,000
English,	25,000
Piedmontese,	15,000

Of these we propose to make four armies, one of 30,000 Turks and Egyptians to occupy Eupatoria, under Omar Pasha ; a second to consist of 30,000 French and 30,000 Turks, under General Canrobert, which should maintain the trenches and carry on the operations of the siege ; a third consisting of 25,000 English, 15,000 Sardinians, and 10 or 20,000 French, under your command, which should move forward across the Tchernaya, and, first of all, take and occupy the high ground above Inkerman, including Mackenzie's Farm. The fourth army would consist entirely of French, and be available for any diversion which might be found practicable and be made in combination with the forward movement of the Army under your command.

I feel quite certain that, upon an examination of the Emperor's scheme upon the spot for passing the defile which I have before alluded to, and so coming upon Simpheropol, it will be found to be perfectly visionary.

The fourth army, or army of diversion as he likes to have it called, will therefore in all probability act upon your right, and aid in a great movement to the front, until you shall have arrived at a point where all communication between Sebastopol and the interior of the Crimea shall be effectually cut off.

Before you effect this, I have no doubt that the enemy will give battle, but the result must be in our favour, in which case we may anticipate the speedy surrender of the garrison of Sebastopol. This is a general outline of what appeared to us to be a practical plan of operation for the

summer months, as we should have no great difficulty in bringing up our supplies to the Army, even though our Transport Corps was not so fully organised and equipped as we could wish. The Sardinians have received orders to go straight to the Crimea, and you will assume direction of their position as a matter of course, but it is understood that they are not to be employed in the trenches.

Outline of a plan of operations for the summer months.

These private communications, of course, you will keep to yourself until I am able to confirm them by a secret and confidential despatch, containing formal directions similar to those which will be communicated to the Allies.

I think I have now tested your patience sufficiently.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 21, 1855.*

I send you Mr. Cattley's report of this day. It contains nothing very material, but I make no doubt that the Russians are taking advantage of the fine weather to bring troops from the northward.

I think Omar Pasha was pleased to have some French and English Cavalry confided to him, but nothing serious was apprehended. The Turkish troops looked well.

Our success of the night before last¹ will, I doubt not, produce a good effect both on the enemy and our Allies, but it was dearly bought by the sacrifice of the life of Colonel Egerton,² who was one of the best officers in the Army and looked up to by all. I cannot say how deeply I regret him. . . .

The fight for the lodgments, sometimes called 'rifles-pits,' in front of 'Gordon's Attack.'

Colonel Simmons has just come in to inform me, by desire of Omar Pasha, that he has received information from Eupatoria to the effect that all the Russian Infantry have left that part of the country and are on march this

Advance of Russians from neighbourhood of Eupatoria.

¹ The fight for the lodgments covering 'The Quarries.' One lodgment was captured and occupied by the English, the other was filled in and razed by them.

² Colonel Egerton, of the 77th Regiment, had greatly distinguished himself at Inkerman, where, with 259 of his men, he had, in Kinglake's words, turned back the whole tide of a battle.

way; and that the enemy have burnt the villages within three or four marches of Eupatoria. It would have been better to have left Omar where he was.

FROM ADMIRAL HOUSTON STEWART

Confidential.

'HANNIBAL,' OFF SEBASTOPOL, *April 21, 1855.*

You wished to hear from me now and then. I have little news to give you, and that little is not very cheering as to our future prospects here. Every day convinces me more strongly that the present French General-in-Chief is *over-weighted*, and unfit for the command of such an army, that he is afraid of responsibility, that he has not confidence in himself nor in his troops, and that he is looking far too anxiously towards Vienna in the hope that peace may free him from his difficulties; and whilst he affects to dread the bloodshed which might be consequent upon more decisive movements, he is *daily* and *nightly* having numbers killed and wounded, as must be reasonably expected, from the very close proximity of his advanced works to those of the Russians. But this diurnal drain tends to dishearten his soldiers, and I fear *they* will come to lose confidence in their General!

There does not appear to be any Second General Officer whose energy and influence at all compensates for the over-caution and want of enterprise of the Chief. This, my old friend, is my opinion—partly conceived at our first interview, and strongly confirmed on seeing and hearing more of this *Mountebank*; for his declamation, gesticulations, grimaces, and costume force one to fancy him *acting*. Is it not heartrending to find our own gallant Marshal and his brave little Army trammelled and hampered, if not *controlled*, by such a colleague?

The Admirals are quite *d'accord*, but they can do nothing without the co-operation and concurrence of the Generals.

The Russians are *indefatigable*, and work night and day, having their inexhaustible arsenal at command. We

opened fire on the 9th inst. and are still *by way* of keeping up a very, *very limited* amount of fire, at which I think the enemy cannot but smile in confident self-complacency. At gunnery and engineering I fancy they are *fully our equals*. At *fighting* they know, and *our fellows feel conscious*, we can beat them 3 to 1. To the field then we should betake ourselves, since the assault seems unlikely to come off. It is difficult to *advise* an assault, when one is not to participate in its perils; but although I am only a *Yeomanry Officer*, I feel confident that, had Lord Raglan commanded *in Chief*, matters would have been in a less doubtful state than they are now. Everybody seems now to be asking 'what next?' To wait for reinforcements will advantage the enemy fully as much as ourselves. And they have long been busily occupied in fortifying the elevations and passes *outside*—so that our advance into the country will now have to be *fought for*. But surely something like annoyance and diversion may be effected, and for many days have Sir E. Lyons and Admiral Bruat been *urging* and *begging* to have 10 or 12,000 embarked in the ships—landed in Kaffa and Theodosia, and Kertch and its Straits taken possession of, and our light vessels sent into the Sea of Azof, from whence the Russians bring much of their supply to the Crimea.

Impatience for action.

This would be a certain success. And never could a success be more valuable than it would be now to the Allies here. This should have been accomplished ere now. Most precious time is elapsing, and the enemy are profiting by it to obstruct the passages, etc.; but hitherto Canrobert has peremptorily refused to *spare a man*, alleging that '*ici nous avons une grosse affaire*,' and apparently dreaming of nothing but being *attacked* and *overpowered!!!* Whereas, were a flying force landed to occupy Kertch, they might *very soon* return, as *we*¹ could keep the Straits open, if once fairly effected, and they must detach troops to defend, besides the Turkish force in Eupatoria—whereabouts, and towards Perekop, further little *sprees* might be effected by soldiers and sailors combined. But here we

Canrobert
blamed for excessive caution.

¹ *i.e.* The Fleet.

are, a superb squadron of six English screws and four French screws, absolutely doing no more than if steam had never been applied to navigation. There are sailing liners enough fully to secure the stores and shipping against any attack by *ships* from Sebastopol, and the screws might proceed *hic et ubique* (as your classical gents. say) and keep the enemy anxious and on the *qui vive* on several points at once.

By the intercepted correspondence of Ibrahim Pasha with Mehemet Ali, he complained that, although he had 60,000 men, he could not keep the coast against the English with 2 or 3000, as they were able to move them along the coast and disembark anywhere and everywhere. I dare say you will think me *somewhat* presumptuous in giving you so decided an opinion in *military* matters, and be inclined to remind me of the propriety of sticking, like the cobbler, to my own particular calling; but I am writing to the intimate friend—not to *the Minister*—just now, and therefore, though little worth, you may still like to know the sort of opinion I have formed of affairs here. An order from Paris to Canrobert to afford 12,000 troops for a short period to Admirals Lyons and Bruat would effect more in favour of the negotiations at Vienna than anything likely to be done *immediately* before Sebastopol.

The night before last a small but smart and satisfactory affair took place. A pit in which riflemen were placed annoyed *our* front. Previously it had been only the French front, and I believe we had expressed some surprise that they were not *retained* when assaulted, which they had several times been by our Allies. It was, therefore, well to show a good example of practice as well as precept. The 77th Regiment had a detachment in the works, and at 9 P.M. they took the pit at the point of the bayonet, without firing a shot. About 1 A.M. the Russians advanced in force to recover possession, but were repulsed most satisfactorily by the few men of the 77th and 33rd Regiments. Poor Colonel Egerton of the 77th was killed, and is greatly lamented as one of our very best officers. Captain Lempriere of the same regiment was also killed in taking

Capture of
lodgment
confronting
'Gordon's
Attack.'

the pit, and Colonel Egerton carried him in his arms. They say the 77th was most seriously affected on seeing the bodies of their Colonel and Captain, both of whom they liked and esteemed much. Two Engineer officers, Owen and Baynes, were also very severely wounded. Our troops are in excellent spirits, and health and strength coming fast, and I was delighted to see the battalion of the Royals and the 48th arrive from Corfu in *Sidon* and *Leopard* yesterday and the day before. I hope The Buffs from Malta will be here forthwith. A reinforcement of *Red Coats*, however small, is of unspeakable value morally as well as physically. The 10th Hussars have landed in very effective order, I hear, and the 12th will be here in a few days. But of all this you will have accounts and returns far more accurate than mine, so I crave pardon. I was up at head-quarters yesterday with Sir E. Lyons. I saw Lord Raglan for a good long while. He is well in health and wonderful in spirits and equanimity, considering the very difficult and perplexing part he has to play. And his difficulties are *not lessened* by his Second in Command, who, notwithstanding all his well-proved courage and gallantry, is nevertheless *most desponding*, and has been avowedly so for a length of time. He came up with me in the *Spiteful* from Malta, very much to his credit, when other men might and would have gone home. Still I cannot state too strongly to you that *he*, too, looks eagerly to Vienna, and would have the Government made to think and believe that matters are in a very critical and even hazardous state here, an opinion which, if justified at all, can only be so by the incapacity, inactivity, and timidity of the Generals commanding. Lord Raglan seems disposed to hold very different language, and is *justified* in doing so, for we have here, according to their own account, more than 80,000 French troops, fully 20,000 English, and 21,000 Turks and Egyptians with Omar Pasha at their head. There are already landed in the Bosphorus 17,000 French, and many more on their way from Marseilles, besides the 15,000 Sardinians. By the way, nobody seems to know whether the Sardinians come here or stay

Losses sustained therein.

Lord Raglan hopeful.

there. They *ought* to be under Lord Raglan, as we furnish the loan to pay them. It would give *him* more weight in conference.

What is this army forming in the Bosphorus for? To act on the Danube? or the Crimea? If so, why not come on at once and enable us to bestir ourselves *one way* or *the other*—either by assaulting, or marching into the field and moving where we please in the Crimea, and thereafter *investing* Sebastopol. When once well invested, its fall would be speedy and inevitable; but with one side entirely open and free, it is a misnomer to call our present proceedings a *Siege*. . . . Two or three of our steamers approach every night, at uncertain hours, and deliver three broadsides of shot and shells and out again. The enemy's reply is *prompt* and *liberal*, but hitherto without any serious damage.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G.C., *April 22, 1855.*

The campaign
about to
recommence
in earnest
after a lull.

I send you a letter from Gordon, and have always forgotten to ask you what Dickson¹ reported and what can be done for Swiss recruiting. The Conferences² may now be considered at an end, and as the campaign must commence in right earnest we shall want every man we can get.

Is Stütterheim³ still here, or has he started on his mission?

I have had a most satisfactory letter from Hudson⁴ saying that the troops were all ready to embark and in a state of the highest enthusiasm.

TO LORD RAGLAN

April 23, 1855.

I have written you a long, confidential despatch to-day, for which my private letter of last mail will in a great

¹ Commanding the Swiss Legion.

² The Vienna Conference, in which, after the death of Nicholas I., the new Czar, Alexander II., had undertaken to join 'in a sincere spirit of concord,' but which broke up without practical result.

³ Baron Stütterheim, commanding the German Legion.

⁴ Minister at Turin.

degree have prepared you. The Conferences mentioned in my despatch took place, the first at Windsor on Wednesday last,¹ and the second at Buckingham Palace on Friday afternoon. At the first there were present the Emperor and the others whom I mentioned to you in my last letter. Though the discussion was on the whole satisfactory, the conclusions were indefinite and vague, and it became necessary to have some better defined heads of agreement prepared and fixed upon before the Emperor's departure. For this purpose the second Council was held at Buckingham Palace on Friday, at which the Emperor, the Queen, the Prince, Marshal Vaillant, Lords Palmerston, Clarendon and myself assembled. The heads of agreement were discussed one by one and separately concurred in by the Conference, and the whole was signed by myself and Marshal Vaillant respectively. I think that the most agreeable portion of the work has been assigned to you, as I trust you will muster, by the time it is put into operation, at least 25,000 bayonets of the British force, 15,000 Sardinians, and 5000 French, to which I hope we may be able to add also 10,000 Turks. This, with Cavalry and Artillery, will give you an army upon which you may rely with, I think, perfect confidence.

You will perceive that I have in my confidential despatch referred to the Commissariat and the Staff. Believe me that in doing so I have nothing in view but your own reputation, and the safety and success of the Army. Everybody here condemns Filder, and looks upon Airey and Estcourt as the sources of the winter suffering of the Army. If anything happens to you in the field which can by any possibility be traced to the door of any of these officials, we shall have such a storm of indignation as will most certainly lead to the ruin of their professional prospects. I wish you seriously to consider, before you take the field, whether your present is the best arrangement you can make. I am very much inclined to think that Tulloch would make a first-rate Field Commissary, and accordingly I have given you authority so to employ him,

Account of
Conferences at
Windsor and
Buckingham
Palace.

References to
Commissariat
and Staff.

¹ April 18th.

if you see fit. By the arrangements of the memorandum, if you can carry them into effect, I see no reason why you may not sweep the Russians back upon Simpheropol, and have possession of both the north and south side of the harbour in a very short time. As soon as your submarine cable is workable, you must keep us informed by messages which I can send to the papers of the course of events.

You see I am still unable to use my hand, but am approaching to convalescence.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 24, 1855.*

I received early yesterday your letters of the 9th, but those of the 6th have only this instant reached me, and I have barely time to acknowledge the receipt of them, having been warned by the Admiral that the French packet would not wait for my despatches if they did not arrive at the time fixed. I am very sorry to hear that you have been suffering so severely from gout.

I will take an early opportunity of sending an officer to Constantinople to communicate with General de la Marmora. Before the mail arrived I had a message from Sir Edmund Lyons regarding the Sardinian Contingent, and I requested him to have them brought up to Balaclava without landing in the Bosphorus.

You will see by my secret despatch what is likely to be attempted.¹ We must prevail upon General Canrobert to take the Mamelon. Otherwise we cannot move forward with any prospect of success or safety. I did not like the omission of the name in the paper containing the opinion of the Artillery and Engineer officers.

Canrobert is now sorry that he evinced so much anxiety to open the fire.

¹ See printed *Correspondence*, v. 716. The artillery fire, which had become slack, was to be resumed on the 26th inst., and continued for two days and a half, after which advances should be made against Sebastopol in a manner afterwards to be decided on.

Sardinian
Contingent.

Coming events.

You will have seen that my charity is unbounded, for I have relieved the Lord High Commissioner not only of one regiment, I have taken from him two, and both the Royals and 48th have joined the Divisions to which I have attached them, the 4th and 2nd. Their arrival is most seasonable, for it has been found necessary to increase the Right Guard of the trenches by 600 men.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *April 24, 1855.*

The Queen has received with much concern Lord Panmure's note informing her of his return of indisposition, and hopes he will take good care of himself, and not stir out upon any account, till he is quite recovered. His health is of too much importance to run any risks.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *April 25, 1855.*

I do not like troubling you at present with a visit, as I know you are not well, but let me entreat of you to do something about the recruiting for the Army. My regiment alone wants upwards of 300 men, and we cannot get recruits at all. I find that your new Bill for short enlistment, and at an advanced age, has not yet come into operation. Why should this be further delayed? Surely we could get men under this Act, but if not, has the time not arrived further to increase the Cavalry? I hear that many of the lately discharged Militiamen are only waiting in the expectation that the Cavalry will be raised, and that then they will enlist. Certainly this is an argument for doing so, but the fact is that MEN is what we now want most, and that they must be paid for, or else we shall not get them, and that longer delay, now that the war is likely to last, is fatal, for we have not got a sufficient reserve for our wants. How about the Foreign Legion? I hope you have not given up all idea of it, for we want men, and they must be got somewhere if the war is to last. Forgive me

Urges measures
to increase
recruiting.

for naming these matters, but as it comes under my own observation in my regiment of Guards that men are not to be got, I think it right that I should name it to you.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 27, 1855.*

I have received your letter of the 18th and am sorry to hear that you are still suffering, though in a less degree, from gout.

I am very much surprised at what you tell me of the suspicions of the Emperor, that I withhold from General Canrobert reports which reach me of the movements of the Russians.

In general I should say that the French consider themselves better informed than we are ; but it is our constant habit to send over to the gentleman who is at the head of their Bureau des Renseignements Militaires, one M. Lausky, for examination by him, any deserters who can give any important intelligence. The Colonel Ochota you mention is not a Colonel, but a Cadet of about nineteen years of age. He came over on the 27th March, and had very little to tell, and I never heard his name till very recently, when Zamoyiski, who has engaged him for the Turkish Congress, sent him up here with a letter for me. I, however, did not see him, being much engaged at the time.

I send you Mr. Cattley's report upon him. You will see that he had free intercourse with M. Lausky, who probably got out of him all he had to communicate.

Pour se faire valoir, I suppose, he gave out at Constantinople that he had furnished me important information which I had kept to myself.

TO LORD RAGLAN

April 27, 1855.

I shall not write you any public despatch by to-day's mail, as I hope to be able to do so with more command of my time on Monday.

Baseless
suspicion of
the French
Emperor.

Your last letters, of the 14th, do not give a very encouraging account of the bombardment, the result of which has not yet been attended with any very visible effects.

In your secret despatch you point at a movement upon Simpheropol from Eupatoria as a base.

As to a contemplated movement on Simpheropol.

I hope that the nature of the country will be well considered, especially the supply of water as regards the troops. I have my doubts as to the prudence of intrusting such an important move to Omar Pasha, and I think you had better pause before you send any portion of the Sardinian Army away from under your own eye. But with regard to all this I must write you officially by Monday's post.

Your telegraphic message which arrived this morning is utterly unintelligible at the Foreign Office. From its length we deem it to be of importance, but we must wait in patience for a solution of it from yourself. I will send you out next week a proper cipher to be used in our communications with each other, meanwhile I believe General Rose is fully acquainted with the Book cipher of the Foreign Office, and could assist you in transmitting a message if you have anything important to send.

I am happy to tell you that there is every reason to believe that the Emperor has for the present given up his intention of going to the Crimea. It renders it all the more incumbent upon his Generals to carry out the resolutions at which he arrived when he was in London.

I will not trouble you any more at present.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

April 27 [1855].

I have sent to inquire about the cipher.¹ There may be some difficulty about it, but I will overcome the office rule, if possible.

¹ Up to this time the War Office had had no cipher of its own, being thus obliged to get all despatches in cipher sent and received through the Foreign Office. From the above date the War Office assumed one.

Loss at sea of
the stores of the
Sardinian
Army.

All the medicines and a great deal of the provisions of the Sardinian Army went down in the *Cræsus*, and the Sardinian Government beg that we will order rations for the troops on their arriving, and that the sick may be temporarily removed into our hospital, as they have no means of establishing a hospital at Constantinople.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

CRIMEA, *April 27, 1855.*

Your letter of the 9th has duly reached me.

Prospects of
storming
unfavourable.

I can announce no change in our circumstances since I wrote to your Lordship on the 17th inst. The cannonade continued eighteen days, more or less, day and night, but seems to have ceased yesterday afternoon on both sides, as there are very few guns this morning at very long intervals. The Russians have all along had the best of it, and their works seem very little damaged. Every day the place becomes stronger by new works or batteries. I do not think the Commanders will be justified in attempting to storm it. Many advantages have been gained by the enemy *over the French*, who have tamely submitted to be beaten, and my opinion is that the French cannot stand against the Russians. The great difficulties now to be overcome in the long siege are the *retaking* of points of ground which the Russians have *driven the French from*, and have made batteries on them, which must be taken before we can advance, and the French *cannot or dare not* try it! But we have not the force for our enterprise, we are hemmed in and besieged all round; our men are overworked and get but little rest, and our gunners, ammunition, and guns are nearly worn out likewise, and nothing has ensued from this bombardment but a confession of our weakness. For all this, I blame our Allies!

Asserts failure
of the April
bombardment.

... Now, my Lord, as to my own position and duties, I have but little to say, but I am satisfied that I am all right. There is not a Staff Officer in the Army with whom I

have not had intercourse, in order to see and judge what sort of men they are. Those with whom I have had to do are of the Adjutant-General's, Quartermaster-General's, and Brigade-Major's Departments. There is not one of these incompetent; on the contrary, they are nearly all of them men of good attainments, and good officers. I am confident in the correctness of my opinion, and it is but just to these officers that I should declare it, for I came amongst them with considerable prejudice against them. They seem to vie with each other in showing their merit and anxiety for the good of the Service, and I must say I never served with an Army where a higher feeling and sense of duty exists than I remark in the General and Staff Officers of this Army. It pervades all ranks, except amongst the low and grovelling correspondents to the *Times*, of whom there are always some in every army.

Testifies to
competence of
Staff Officers.

I have not so much to do with the Medical Department, but it has been hastily composed. The regular doctors seem excellent, attentive men, but I doubt the general run of the assistant surgeons who have been suddenly called into the Service. They are all overworked, however, and do not complain.

The Commissariat I do not pretend to speak of. But Sir John M'Neill is busy with it, and a better man could not have been sent out. He is the great exception from the general class of Engineers or Commissioners sent out here, whose great aim seems to be to give trouble *pour se faire valoir*.

Opinion on
Medical
Department;
Commissariat.

I do not recollect any other details with which to trouble you, my Lord; I write just as matters occur to me, and appear to me. As I formerly mentioned, I hardly like to write matters of opinion in this unreserved manner, but you may perhaps be able to gather more from me in this way than from stiff official correspondence. I look on everything with a favourable eye *except* the Grand Object, the Siege.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *April 28, 1855.*Arrival of Lord
Stratford.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that Lord Stratford arrived here the day before yesterday. He came to Balaclava with his family. They remain there; but I have been able to accommodate him in Sir John Burgoyne's room.

General Canrobert reviewed the 1st Corps of the French Army yesterday, and this afforded Lord Stratford and his party the opportunity of seeing 18,000 or 20,000 of the troops of our Ally in one spot. His Lordship thinks of visiting Eupatoria, and of being back at Constantinople on Wednesday evening.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

*Private.**April 28, 1855.*

I have no materials for a public despatch, but I have written you a long secret one explanatory of the state of things for which the telegraphic despatch of the 26th will have prepared you.

Cholera.

The submarine telegraph is not yet in working order, but I hope in a few days to be able to rely upon it on all important occasions. I am greatly concerned to have to tell you that there is another case of cholera in the Light Division and one in the 4th. I do not know how they are likely to terminate. We also lost two men in the sanatorium yesterday of the same disease. I was also through that establishment the day before with Lord and Lady Stratford, and the visit was extremely satisfactory. All were doing well almost without exception, and the wounded were cheerful and very comfortable. Dr. Hall went down to Balaclava this morning and is not yet returned. I will send you his report on Tuesday.

Visit to the
sick.

Cholera has also appeared in the French Army.

I am surprised at it showing itself at the sanatorium, the elevation of which overlooking the sea is quite beauti-

ful. I enclose Mr. Cattley's report of to-day. You will see that large reinforcements have actually arrived, or are near at hand.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G.C., April 29, 1855.

I send you a note from Palmerston with which I entirely concur, and I hope you will send stringent instructions to Raglan and Filder to feed the Sardinians. I think your instructions only went to feeding them on their arrival, but it should be a permanent arrangement, otherwise we must give them ships for fetching their provisions, and their contractors, as Palmerston says, will be bidding against ours in the same market.

As to
feeding the
Sardinians.

If you agree, you will perhaps think it right to tell Mr. Filder to consult, not only the immediate wants, but the habits of the Sardinians, who may require to be fed somewhat differently from our men, and that may prove a facility rather than otherwise in catering for them.

Indian corn, beans, and vegetables will probably be required. I know they have a horror of our salt provisions. The Sardinian Government, as is natural, are very uneasy upon the subject, and Azeglio¹ presses me about it, as the case has become more urgent since the loss of all their stores in the *Cræsus*.

I am sure that Raglan need not be requested to behave courteously to La Marmora. Our Buckingham Palace agreement has come to grief. The Emperor doesn't go to the Crimea. Omar Pasha won't let his Army remain at Sebastopol, and Canrobert insists upon having the Army of reserve from Constantinople. We shall probably, therefore, not be able to keep our word to the Sardinians that they should be employed in field operations. They will have to stick at Balaclava, which they particularly objected to, and we should endeavour to make their *residence* in that delectable spot as comfortable as circumstances will admit.

¹ Sardinian Minister in London.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD CLARENDON

HOUSE OF COMMONS, *April 30, 1855.*

Recommends
instructions to
Raglan to in-
vest Sebastopol.

Operations
therewith
connected.

It seems to me that, on sending to Raglan a copy of this letter to Canrobert, we should say that he should enter into cordial concert and dispassionate consultation with Canrobert on the subject of this plan, and that our wish is that whatever may seem on full consideration to be best should be undertaken. That we are of opinion with the Emperor that Sebastopol cannot be taken until it is fully invested; and that it cannot be fully invested unless the Russian covering army is driven away from its present position, from which it communicates with the town. That for this purpose it seems advisable to divide the aggregate forces into three armies, as proposed by the Emperor, of which one should maintain the siege, while another moves forward to complete the investment, the third making a diversion, which would be a feint to draw off the Russians from their position near the town, or a real attack on their rear, according to circumstances, and especially according to the relative forces of the army making the diversion and the Russian force by which it might be opposed. The main question on which the Generals would have to deliberate would be the direction in which, and the point from which, this diversion should be made.

The Emperor strongly recommends the Aloushta as the starting-point, and Simpheropol¹ or Bakshiserai² as the object.

Alternative
plans.

Another opinion is that Eupatoria would be the best basis of operations for the Army of Diversion, and that from thence it should march to Simpheropol, or take in the rear the Russian force to the north of Sebastopol, and that, advancing along the line of the coast, it should keep up its communications with a squadron of the Allies which

¹ The nominal capital of the Crimea.

² A considerable town, lying midway between Sebastopol and Simpheropol, on the road to Perekop.

should accompany its march. To this plan the Emperor states objections. These objections will, of course, be well weighed by the Generals. A third plan is that this third Army of operations should not be embarked and transported anywhere by sea, but should march away from the present centre of operations at Kamiesh and Balaclava, and get to Bakshiserai by a road leading to the eastward of Mackenzie's Farm. H.M.'s Government must leave it to the Generals on the spot to determine which of these three plans affords the best prospects of success and is the most easily executed, taking into consideration the means which may exist of transporting by sea the force necessary to be so conveyed if either of the first two plans were to be adopted, and the means which either of the three would afford the Army of Diversion of making a safe retreat in the event of its being obliged to retire before a numerically superior force. Whichever plan, however, is adopted, it ought to be put into execution as soon as the whole of the reinforcements arrive and the troops intended for the two Armies of operation are ready to take the field.

Such an instruction might be shown to the Emperor.

CHAPTER V

MAY 1855

THE most notable military events of the month of May were the two expeditions to Kertch, on the straits leading to the Sea of Azof—a most important depôt of supplies for the Russian Army. The first expeditionary force had set sail on the 3rd of the month. But, in deference to the wishes of his Imperial master, transmitted with unfortunate celerity by the newly-established telegraph, General Canrobert promptly recalled the French portion of it, thus compelling the return of the whole.

Lord Panmure's indignation on hearing of this is forcibly expressed in his letter of May 7th to Lord Raglan. 'Well may the Army and Fleet be disgusted,' he writes. 'I only wonder Bruat obeyed so degrading an order. I will never believe that the Emperor's instructions were such so as to leave General Canrobert no discretion.' These words expressed the feeling, not only of the British Army in the field, but of the country at large. With our present knowledge of the restrictions by which Canrobert's freedom of action was hampered, they seem undoubtedly a little hard. But Panmure's letter of May 21st, following on the French Commander's resignation, does full justice to his qualities as a soldier. The defect of 'moral courage in counsel,' there ascribed to him, was one from which his successor was, at any rate, conspicuously free. After an interval of three weeks, a second expedition victoriously accomplished what the first had not been permitted to

attempt—its success, which went far to restore British spirits and confidence at home and at the seat of war, being referred to with unfeigned delight by the Queen in her letter of May 28th.

A substantial success to the allied arms was, indeed, sorely wanted at the time. For the practical breakdown of the Vienna Negotiations, over the clause limiting the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, had shown that peace must be sought through war; whilst Canrobert's unwillingness to follow up the April bombardment by assault, coupled with his withdrawal of the Kertch expedition, had done much to foster the discontent already existing. It is true that Raglan speaks of the French Commander and himself as 'on the best of terms.' But Raglan's amiability was exceptional, and the letters of this month are not wanting in indications, not only of impatience for decisive action, but of distrust of Canrobert and Niel. Of this latter feeling, it is shown in Clarendon's letter of May 15th, that Napoleon himself was aware.

The state of feeling prevalent in the country was taken advantage of by enemies of the war, or friends of peace at any price, represented by Lords Ellenborough and Grey and Mr. Disraeli, to bring forward, in both Houses of Parliament, motions hostile to the Government. The results were identical—the motion in each case being negatived by a large majority, and the position of the Government strengthened.

Besides the above matters, Lord Panmure was occupied during this month with the Consolidation of the Military Departments. Unity of control, and greater speed in the transaction of business were the advantages aimed at in this change. The grounds on which it was opposed will be found stated in Lord Raglan's letter of May 21st. The changes introduced by it have been thus recorded:¹ 'In

¹ By Sir Robert Biddulph, *Lord Cardwell at the War Office*, pp. 9, 10.

May 1855, the Letters Patent for the Board of Ordnance were revoked, and its duties were vested thenceforth in the Secretary of State for War; at the same time, by Her Majesty's command, the Secretary of State transferred the command and discipline of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers to the Commander-in-Chief, who was thus charged with the administration of all the combatant branches of the Army.

'The clothing of the Infantry and Cavalry was now undertaken directly by the War Department, which also absorbed the Army Medical Department. At the same time a definite distribution was made of the duties of the several classes of clerks, and they were rendered available for any branch of the War Department.

'The Consolidated Department thus included the duties of the Secretary of State, the Militia business of the Home Office,¹ the War Office (Secretary-at-War), the Ordnance Office, the Commissariat and Medical Departments, the duties of the Board of General Officers relating to clothing, also the examination of cash and store accounts, and of the payments made for non-effective services.

'The Commander-in-Chief's office alone maintained its separate existence; the military command and discipline of the Army, as likewise the appointments to and promotions in the same, being vested in the General Commanding-in-Chief, subject to the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the exercise of the Royal Prerogative, and subject to any powers formerly exercised by the Secretary-at-War. Although under the supreme control of the Secretary of State, it was a perfectly distinct department, communicating by letter with the War Department.

'The Clerk of the Ordnance was continued as the

¹ Taken over in the previous March.

executive Officer of the Secretary of State, directing all the business of the Supply Departments, viz. :—Inspector-General of Fortifications, Director-General of Artillery, Naval Director-General of Artillery, Director-General of Stores, Director-General of Contracts, Director-General of Army Clothing, the Accountant-General charged with the financial duties and with the control and audit of all expenditure on account of supply services and works.'

By the 21st of the month, about half of the Sardinian Contingent had arrived in the Crimea. It had been arranged that this force should consist of 15,000 men, 2000 horses, 36 guns, and 250 waggons.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *May 1, 1855.*

. . . I can hardly agree in your definition (divided counsels) of the state of things between the French and English.

General Canrobert and myself are on the best terms, and he has to-day yielded to my earnest recommendation that the Kertch enterprise should go forward.

As you state your intention of communicating to me on Friday the result of the discussion which was to take place at Windsor on Wednesday the 18th April,¹ I will merely say now that, if the attempt to take Sebastopol by assault be abandoned, not only the trenches mustn't be evacuated, but they must be preserved for the sake of the material, and to prevent an inroad on our position here and in front of Balaclava. In short, the 40,000 men composing the garrison must be closely shut in, so that the communications from the French and English posts (Kamiesh and Balaclava) may be liable to no interruption, and those dépôts secured from assault.

Good understanding with Canrobert. Expedition to Kertch decided on.

Trenches cannot be abandoned, even in event of a change in plan of campaign.

¹ At which, as has been seen, the Emperor Napoleon was present and expounded his own plan of campaign.

The offensive movement should in my opinion be from Eupatoria, where it should, in my view of the matter, be undertaken by Omar Pasha, aided by French troops. The British Army is too small to be divided. It should act in one body.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 1, 1855.

A substitute
for Filder.

I have found you a first-rate man for the Head of the Commissaries in the Crimea instead of Filder—Mr. Watkins, now Manager of the Manchester and Sheffield Railway, strongly recommended by Paxton and Robert Stevenson as one of the cleverest men going, and peculiarly fit for the duty in question. . . . M'Neill, having an important office in Scotland, ought not to be kept too long in the Crimea, and we cannot consign our troops to the tender mercies of Filder. If, in addition to this arrangement, you would appoint Markham to be Quartermaster-General instead of Airey, and if you would send out from hence an active intelligent man to be Adjutant-General instead of Estcourt, we should be able to make a good defence in Parliament against the attacks which are coming upon us for want of energy and resolution in regard to our military arrangements; but I, for one, cannot undertake to stand up in my place in Parliament and defend an inactivity which would leave our Army to be, in the ensuing campaign, the victim of that knot of incapables, who, in the last eight months, have been the direct cause of the disability and death of thousands of our brave men.

Indictment of
the 'knot of
incapables.'

It is not enough for us to reorganise Departments at home, we must absolutely place fitter men in important situations abroad. I will myself write to Raglan and explain to him the inevitable necessity of such improved arrangements.

Markham may not perhaps reach the Army for a month or six weeks to come, but as he seems to be the best man, that delay will not be of material consequence.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *May 4, 1855.*

The Queen returns this Draft which she approves, and of which she would wish to have a copy. The news conveyed by telegraph from Lord Raglan, the Queen is delighted to hear of.¹ She trusts that the secret will be well kept.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD RAGLAN

May 4, 1855.

I have just received your telegraph of yesterday. It gives me the greatest satisfaction, and I am sure we owe it to you and Lyons, that our expedition against Kertch has sailed. You will reap the fruits of this right early, and, moreover, you will, I am sure, succeed in gaining a *success*, which is becoming every day more and more necessary.

Your success in the rifle-pits will have a good effect morally on your own people and the enemy, though we all regret the loss of so fine a fellow as Egerton. What a tragical end my poor Sanitary Commissioner has met with.²

I send you by to-day's mail a letter, or rather copy of a letter, addressed to Canrobert by the Emperor. He entirely gives up his visit, and proposes the plan of campaign which he would have followed. I am not sure how far you will adopt any of the plans, but I consider that all the French Generals will now have no excuse for not taking the field and completing the investment of the place.

The Emperor abandons his plan of going to the Crimea.

The scheme by the Aloushta I hold to be visionary, but I shall have full confidence in your decision.

The shells and powder will be embarked in ten days, and, I hope, in fast ships.

I am getting well again, and if we could only get some warm weather we might be all the better for it.

¹ That the expedition against Kertch had been decided on.

² A member of this Commission had been accidentally killed.

I have got your 'bâton.' It is much too handsome to send to your hut, so I shall consign it till I hear from you to Lady Raglan's safe keeping.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *May 5, 1855.*

The first
(abortive)
expedition to
Kertch.

I am afraid that the result of the Kertch expedition will annoy the Government. I did all I could to prevent it, as I had previously done to persuade the General-in-Chief to undertake it. He never, however, liked the enterprise, and he availed himself of the inopportune arrival of the Emperor's telegraphic message to call Admiral Bruat and the French troops back. I wish there were grounds for the hope that the combined fleets would arrive at their destination before the order for the return of the ships to Kamiesh shall reach them. I have sent for the 31st from Corfu, and I am inclined to request Sir Robert Gardiner to let me have a regiment from Gibraltar; but I do not yet know that a steamer is available for its conveyance. Perhaps the *Alasca* may be disposable. What I have seen of the 10th Hussars and Colonel Parlbv I like, and it appears a most efficient regiment. Two squadrons were employed on the occasion of Omar Pasha's reconnaissance, with some of the heavy Cavalry, and with a troop of Horse Artillery, and Colonel Parlbv seemed to have his wits about him and to be equal to the direction of a body of troops. The horses of the 10th excited the admiration of Omar Pasha. The men are very fine. . . .

The 10th
Hussars.

From something that dropped from General Niel this morning, I think he must have heard a report that the Sardinians are not coming. Admiral Grey and Major Wetherall are keeping a sharp look-out for them at Constantinople.

I hope there are no more cholera cases. There is a good deal at Constantinople.

Lord Stratford took leave of us the night before last.

TO LORD RAGLAN

May 7, 1855.

I have just received your bag, but the good accounts of the renovation of General Canrobert's energies are completely swamped by the intelligence of the recall of the expedition to Kertch. If he had refused his consent to the embarkation of the troops, he might have been forgiven, but to recall an expedition *after* it has sailed, and to expose your game to the enemy, shows him to be utterly incapable of high command, or of weighing the results of so false a move as he has made.

On recall of
first expedition
against Kertch.

Well may the Army and Fleet be disgusted. I only wonder Bruat obeyed so degrading an order. I never will believe that the Emperor's instructions were such as to leave General C—— no discretion.

I hope you have got the Sardinian Contingent with you, at least so much of it as has arrived. I am glad that you have got your regiments, and when you get your detachments and your 1000 Guards you will present a better front.

Next Monday I am to propose the Consolidation of the Civil Department of the Army, and it will have the effect of relieving you of your duties and responsibilities of Master-General. The whole Board is to be abolished, the Military Command to be transferred to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Civil departments placed under the Minister for War.

On Consolidation of the Civil
Department of
the Army.

I fancy the change is not very palatable to the Ordnance, especially the Board, but it is a matter of necessity and must be done.

Now that your expedition to Kertch has been blown, I presume that we may turn our eyes to Sebastopol, unless General C—— considers his Master's orders to prepare for the field as imperative against retaking the Mamelon!!!

I cannot help being alarmed lest the indecision of the French should cause some serious outbreak here.

Hitherto our press has behaved better in that respect than we were warranted in expecting, but there is a limit to patience and we are approaching to it.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

May 7, 1855.

After criticising Canrobert and Niel, the writer adds :

Canrobert and
Niel a drag on
the British.

. . . I believe that Omar Pasha and Raglan together would do good things, and it is rather hard to see all glory given to the French and all blame to the British by *ourselves*.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

[G.C., May 7, 1855.

Suggests
sending a
British Com-
missioner to
Paris.

Don't you think it would be useful for us to have an intelligent General Officer at Paris, who should be the medium of communication of such information for Raglan as we wish the French Govt. to possess, and who should apprise us of the plans forming and orders sent by the Minister of War? If we had had such a man, the orders for spoiling the Kertch expedition would probably not have gone without our knowledge. I hear that Ashburnham¹ is come home, and he would, I should think, do well for the job if you have no one better qualified. I knew him very well ages ago. He is an agreeable man, and, I believe, a good officer.

It has answered uncommonly well to the French to send Admiral Chabannes here, and to us also, as he has smoothed away difficulties.

FROM ADMIRAL HOUSTON STEWART

Private.

'HANNIBAL,' OFF KAZATCH, *Monday, May 7, 1855.*

Old Laws have always some truth in them, and never was the 'slip 'twixt cup and lip' more strikingly illustrated

¹ General the Hon^{ble}. T. Ashburnham, who, two years later, commanded the British expedition against China.

than it has been with us, who started on Thursday last at sunset on one of the *most promising* expeditions imaginable. Long, long has Sir E. Lyons been urging and praying for 10,000 or 12,000 troops to be embarked for the purpose of taking possession of the Straits of Kertch, and opening the way for vessels of suitable draught of water into the Sea of Azof, by means of which the enemy derive so many of their supplies.

Abortive
expedition to
Kertch.

Lord Raglan's small Force did not admit of his detaching a number of English sufficient for the purpose, but, yielding his assent to the force of Sir E. Lyons' arguments, his Lordship did all he could to overcome General Canrobert's strong repugnance to spare even a regiment for this service, but without success, until, taking advantage of General Canrobert's irresolution in the matter of the Assault (which, I doubt not you are aware, it was on the 23rd ulto. agreed should be given on the 28th ulto. at 2 P.M., immediately after 60 hours of hard bombardment, but which the French General on the morning of the 25th declared must be postponed and reinforcements waited for), we urged the evident expediency of striking, *in the interval*, this important blow, by which possession of the Sea of Azof would be obtained. In the advocacy of this measure, Admiral Bruat cordially joined.

Reluctantly, Canrobert yielded, and promised to give triple the Force that we should do. Canrobert undertook to embark 8500 troops and *three* batteries of Artillery; but he only sent 7000 and *two* batteries—a fact which we were not aware of until on the point of sailing. The English Force, including the Marines of the squadron, was fully 3000. At sunset on Thursday last, and within 48 hours from the time the expedition was determined on, the squadrons started. Everything was propitious and the weather beautiful for steaming. We had 2500 French troops in four of our screw line-of-battle ships. *Hannibal* had Brigadier-General Duval and 620. One French battery, complete with horses, etc., and above 600 men on board the *Terrible*. At daylight on Saturday we were

The voyage.

within 12 miles of the entrance of the Straits of Kertch, and there Captain Spratt of *Spitfire* met us with the *most admirable* survey of the scene of our intended operations—a work which he had performed at very considerable risk to himself, as he was able to show the position and *range* of every one of the enemy's guns, in addition to the exact depth of water (ascertaining that there was 24 feet water within *less than* 500 yards of their strongest battery), heights of cliffs, etc.

Captain Moore, of *Highflyer*, who has been for some time stationed there, gave also excellent information, and there could not be one single reasonable doubt entertained of our *complete* success! Judge then of my amazement, on going on board *Royal Albert* by signal about 5 A.M., to find that Admiral Bruat had received, by an express steamer, the letter from General Canrobert of which I enclose a copy. No argument could prevail with him to go on. He took it as an order from the Emperor, and his resolution to obey it was, as he declared, '*inébranlable*.' I found him, and his *Chef d'État Major*, the French General commanding the troops, Sir G. Brown, and Sir. E. Lyons all in the cabin together. Sir E. Lyons gave me Canrobert's letter, and desired me to state my opinion. Without any hesitation I said that, 'Were I in Bruat's place, I would certainly go on. That an officer in command was bound to exercise his judgment and discretion, to place himself in the position of the Emperor or Authority sending the instruction from Paris, and consider what would be his desire did he know this expedition was within two hours' sail of the landing-place, with every prospect of complete success, and I felt *confident* the order would be to advance—impossible that it could be to retire, and exhibit such an instance of inconsistency and irresolution to our enemy and to the world. That I felt convinced the order from Paris related to the general determination which had been taken, when the Emperor was in England, to *concentrate* the Allied Forces; but this expedition could not in any way delay or interfere with that being done, as Kertch could be taken and the troops returned to Kamiesh *before* the reinforcements

The recall.

from the Bosphorus and Genoa could possibly reach the Crimea.' I found that Sir E. Lyons had made use of the very same arguments and taken the precise view which I did, and had, previous to my arrival, exhausted every possible effort of reason and persuasion to induce Admiral Bruat to go on. It was all in vain. I thought Lyons would have gone mad almost. Indeed it was heart-breaking to us all, but to him in particular, who had laboured night and day for many weeks past, as I well knew, to bring about this expedition, now arrested within sight of its object. The French squadron departed. We had no alternative. We had a large portion, nearly one-half, of their troops on board. The information we had received from French and English Engineer officers previously sent to examine, and from Captain Moore, advised that the Force should not be less than 10,000; and moreover, had we been able to do a little business on our own account, it would probably have made mischief between the Allied Forces. I trouble you with all this because without it my sad story is not complete, but I cannot doubt you are already aware of most of the details I have given.

Here we are again in perfect inaction, and mortified beyond expression in thus finding that, not only the French, but also the *English Fleet* is virtually under the control of a French General, whose dread of responsibility and indecision of conduct are the theme of complaint throughout the Allied Land and Sea Forces. Indeed it is becoming very serious. Canrobert seems *utterly unfit* to be a Commander-in-Chief, and all confidence in his abilities has faded away in this quarter of the world. Only one of two things could justify him in recalling the expedition to Kertch. Either that an armistice had been agreed to (in which case he should have notified it to the Admiral), or that the Emperor had been apprised of the expedition and expressly ordered it to be stopped or recalled. I write to you, as I know you like me to do, frankly and freely, but you are quite at liberty to 'show me up' wherever your doing so can afford the slightest aid towards procuring an immediate *telegraphic* order to take and *occupy*

Resulting mortification.

What might
have been.

the Straits of Kertch—or, at any rate, the recall of Canrobert! I put a score under ‘occupy,’ because I think the *occupation most desirable*. But Canrobert *insisted* that his troops were all to be brought back to Kamiesh on or before the 15th inst., and *therefore* ‘occupation’ was impracticable; but we should have destroyed all the fortifications, opened the passages which they are industriously labouring to block up with piles and vessels sunk laden with stones, taken or destroyed all their gun and steam vessels, passed a strong force of vessels of light draught into the Sea of Azof, and by vigilance and bold activity have kept the passage free, and a satisfactory blockade of all the coasts of the Sea of Azof. And this must be done sooner or later, if success in the Crimea is to be achieved. We have several vessels of light draught, and especially the *Miranda*, whose *legs* are short and her *arms* powerful, and is commanded by one of our most sagacious and determined young officers, Captain Lyons, whose conduct last year in the White Sea showed he was no *degenerate offshoot* from the parent stock; and who, I am certain, would do the work in the Sea of Azof most satisfactorily. I do not say this of him because he is my friend’s son. He was lieutenant with me in the *Benbow*, and I know pretty well what is in him.

I *blush* to think of what is likely to be thought of our consistency or firmness of purpose by the Russians after this *display*! Nor dare we indulge in the hope of a better state of matters whilst Canrobert directs. Lord Raglan’s position is most painful and difficult, and no man but himself could have kept things so well together; but ere long there *must* be a split in the Camp if Canrobert be not removed, for, if he displays the same incapacity and want of energy in the field which he undeniably has hitherto done on *all occasions* since St. Arnaud’s death, nothing will be well done, and the safety and character of the troops of both nations, but especially of England, compromised.

All our officers seem to agree in thinking that the service in Algeria has occasioned a deterioration in the

French troops, officers and men, and has not proved the source of military aptitude and experience which it was expected to afford. You hear from our lads on all sides this sort of sentiment, 'Well! whatever else comes of this war, of one thing we may assure ourselves, that old England is quite safe from any attempt at *invasion* for some generations to come.'

Suspected
deterioration
of French
troops.

And now fare thee well, my dear old friend. I have given you an unconscionable yarn, but I wished you to know what I really believe to be true and what is the conviction of my own mind. Take that for whatever you think it worth—put it into your pipe or your pocket—but never doubt the sincere esteem and regard of

HOUSTON STEWART.

I am quite well, never better. The Squadron powerful, healthy, united, and fit for anything *practicable*. I only wish the French Army were well commanded, and then let the *Rooshans* look out!

FROM LORD RAGLAN

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *May 8, 1855.*

I have nothing to send you to-day from Mr. Cattley. He accompanied the expedition to Kertch and returned on Sunday. No important intelligence was received during his absence; but some Tartars have come in this afternoon, the substance of whose information is to the effect that powder and ammunition are on their way to Sebastopol from Simpheropol, and a body of Cavalry are on the march from Perekop. They confirm the arrival of the two Divisions which I have already announced to you. He has not yet been able to examine these men in detail.

Reports by
Tartars.

The result of the expedition occasions much conversation, and to those who composed the expedition vast disappointment.

Abortive
expedition to
Kertch.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE.

May 8, 1855.

Removal of
unfit men.

I send you confidentially a letter from Granville, and I can assure you that the general feeling among our colleagues is that sufficient energy has not been shown in removing unfit men and in putting more capable and active men in their places.

Raglan's dislike
of changes.

It is not that victims are wanted; these changes are desired in order to prevent our officers and men from becoming victims to incompetence and incapacity. Raglan will never of his own accord make any change; he is a creature of habit, and is himself wanting in that energy which would be required for the making of changes.

Besides, it is hardly fair to throw the task upon him. We cannot expect him to turn round upon men who have been acting with him for eight months, and to find out all of a sudden that they are incapable. We must cut the knot for him, and make the requisite changes from hence, and he is too sensible a man not to acquiesce if the matter is properly and civilly explained to him.

LORD GRANVILLE TO LORD PALMERSTON

Private.

LONDON, May 7, 1855.

Lord
Ellenborough's
motion on the
mismanage-
ment of the
war.
Lord
Granville's
recommenda-
tion of further
removals.

I hear that Lord Ellenborough is to give notice of a motion for this day week on the mismanagement of the war. He will divide the House, which at all events will secure a great debate.

You have, I believe, decided that Airey, Estcourt, and Filder should be recalled. England¹ is another who ought to be brought away. The justification on paper of his conduct in India seemed complete, but there are no two opinions in the Crimean army as to his present insufficiency. He is over the head of Eyre, who is one of the younger men who have studied their profession, and seen

¹ General Sir Richard England.

some service. Evelyn Denison read, about two months ago, a letter from Eyre, in which he said that he had pointed out to Burgoyne a very dangerous piece of ground, and had suggested that they should make a dash for it, and connect it backwards with the English works.

Burgoyne thought the remark worthy of consideration, but decided it was better to approach it in the usual way. A fortnight after the date of Eyre's letter, the Russians did exactly what he had suggested, seized the ground, the now famous Mamelon, and connected it backwards with their own works. Eyre may not turn out to be a great General, but there is a fair chance of his being so, which he will have no occasion of showing while he is under the command of an incapable like England. I may be wrong in the particular case, but some of the changes ought to have been actually made before the matter is seriously discussed in Parliament. Dr. Smith was sent away four months after Newcastle had promised the Cabinet that the Doctor should go the next day. Such an example will not suffice for us, when the question comes to be debated as Ellenborough, Grey, and Derby can debate it. In the discussion, two or three dismissals, or changes effected, will be worth a dozen projected.

I hear from different quarters that General Markham (the best of all), General Ashburnham, Colonel Lindsay, and Colonel Mansfield are good officers.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *May 8, 1855.*

I see by the wording of Ellenborough's motion that his attack will probably turn upon your having continued a number of incapable men in important situations connected with the military service at home and abroad, and I clearly foresee that, unless you should be able to say that more efficient men than Andrew Smith, Filder, Airey, and Estcourt are appointed, or about immediately to be

Lord
Ellenborough's
motion.¹

¹ For this motion, see note to Lord Panmure's letter of May 14th.

Forecast of
debate on Lord
Ellenborough's
motion.

appointed, to the offices which they respectively hold, the debate will be as damaging to yourself and to the Government as the continuance of those men in their several places is detrimental to the welfare of the Army and the best interests of the Country.

It is in vain to say that Smith has resigned; the answer will be, why has not a better man been put at once into an office which every day requires efficient administration?

It will be in vain to say that M'Neill has made good arrangements for the commissariat; the answer will be, what business has a Scotch Poor-Law Commissioner to be buying bullocks and hay in Asia Minor for the use of an army in the Crimea? Let him come home and do his own business, and let a proper man be sent out to the Crimea to take charge of the business to be done there.

It will be in vain to say that Simpson has been put over Airey and Estcourt; the answer will be, that Simpson may any day be disabled, and the Army will then be left to [become] victims of the proved incapacity of Airey and Estcourt, and it will be said that, even if Simpson continues in life and health, it is inexpedient that he should have two incompetent men to act under him.

I have often urged these things upon you without effect; we shall now see what our opponents will make of them.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *May 9, 1855.*

Intended
Consolidation
of the Army.

The Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure that he has not yet sent her the printed copy of the Intended Consolidation of the Army which he promised her the other day.

She also wishes to know whether he thinks it would be possible for her to distribute the medals *any day* next week *except* the 19th, which being the Birthday Drawing-Room day, and the day devoted to her birthday, she could *not* naturally have the distribution.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

May 9, 1855.

Happening to have met General Knollys yesterday, I asked him whether any body of men of the Land Transport Corps would be given him for the Camp at Aldershot. His answer was, that he did not know. I take the liberty of expressing my opinion that it would be of the greatest importance to attach a complete troop, with horses, carts, etc., etc., to the Camp, not only in order to test its efficiency, but also in order to accustom our Army at home to the use of it. In point of expense it can be of no consideration, as the corps would do all the work which would otherwise have to be done with hired horse labour. If this should be your opinion also, I would only add that the Transport Corps ought to be on the spot from the beginning, else another system must be arranged at first, which has afterwards again to give way to the Transport Service.

Suggests attaching part of Land Transport Corps to Camp at Aldershot.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

May 10, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and in obedience to Your Majesty's wishes he has communicated with the Commander-in-Chief, and finds that he can have his men ready by Friday the 18th inst., on which day Lord Panmure would propose to Your Majesty to confer the Crimean medal on Your Majesty's brave soldiers.

Distribution of medals.

Lord Panmure would humbly suggest to Your Majesty the hour of 11 A.M., unless Your Majesty prefers to honour the parade at guard-mounting with your presence and afterwards to confer the medals.

Lord Panmure presumes that Your Majesty will issue your orders to the Commander-in-Chief upon these points.

It will be Lord Panmure's duty to attend Your Majesty

on the occasion and to hand to Your Majesty the medals for presentation.¹

Lord Panmure has the honour of transmitting for Your Majesty's use and information the printed papers connected with the changes in the Civil Departments of the Ordnance and Army, which would have been done earlier had not Lord Panmure expected some changes to be made by the suggestions of his colleagues.

TO LORD RAGLAN

May 11, 1855.

Lord
Ellenborough's
criticisms of
the Army.

I have been so pressed by business that I have written you no public or secret despatch by this mail, and even in my private letter I have little to communicate. Ellenborough is to give us a regular field-day on Monday, and you will see his resolutions in the papers. He will fall foul of you and all of *us* for certain, and we must try and meet him with an effective fire. We do not anticipate any defeat.

I am very glad to see you availing yourself of your power to call up fresh regiments, and I really hope ere long to hear of some blow.

Ellenborough, in a conversation with me, let out that he had letters from Sir C. Campbell describing the positions about M'Kenzie's Farm to be so fortified as to be impregnable, and every means used to fortify every road and track by which troops could advance into the Crimea.

These letters do the Army infinitely more harm than I can tell, and it is provoking to hear them read.

Injudicious
letters from the
seat of war.

Vivian¹ is full of them. I know it is a delicate matter to deal with, but it shall be checked if possible, for every complaint, no matter how paltry, as soon as it comes here, works itself out in public.

I am delighted to hear that Marmora is cordial. We do not make out all your telegraph, but are suspicious that you are still sweet on Kertch. So much the better.

¹ It was otherwise held that this was the duty of the Commander-in-Chief but the Secretary of State gained his point.

² Lord Vivian, who took a strong interest in Army matters, and frequently spoke on them in the House of Lords.

Lady Raglan has your bâton. The Queen delivers the first Crimean medals to the men and officers here on the 18th inst., in public. I'll send you a programme as soon as it is settled.

I must now go to the House of Lords.

TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 14, 1855.*

I have no time to write you to-day as I am just going down to face Lord Ellenborough, who opens his bombardment at a quarter past five.

I hear we are to have a strong support from the Bishops! So you see we are in odour with the Church.

All the military men are opposed, and, I hear, will either not vote, or, if they stay, will vote against—so I presume that the move will be defeated and that Ellenborough will not yet be Minister for War.

'Ellenborough will not yet be Minister for War.'

I am sure I would readily yield my post so far as I am personally concerned.¹

You must accept this as an apology for an empty bag so far as I am concerned.

¹ The result of Lord Ellenborough's motion was a considerable strengthening of the Government, which had by much the best of the debate, and finally won the division by a very large majority.

Of the succession of resolutions moved by the Earl of Ellenborough, the two offensive ones were as follows :—

- (1) 'To acquaint Her Majesty that, while we admit and lament the privations to which war necessarily subjects all classes of the people, we yet venture to assure Her Majesty that they would, in so just a cause, bear those privations without complaint if they could feel that the war had been well conducted, that the troops had not been exposed to any hardships which could have been avoided by forethought, and that everything had been done to enable them to achieve decisive success.
- (2) 'Humbly to represent to Her Majesty that her people, suffering privations on account of this war, have, as yet, had no such consolation; that, on the contrary, we cannot withhold from Her Majesty the avowal of our conviction that the conduct of the war has occasioned general dissatisfaction, and given rise to just complaints, and that we must humbly lay before Her Majesty our deliberate opinion that it is only through the selection of men for public employment without regard to anything but the public service that the country can hope to prosecute the war successfully and to attain its only legitimate object—a secure and honourable peace.'

TO LORD RAGLAN

[Undated.]

I have this moment received your telegraphic message announcing the resumption of the expedition to Kertch, and I sincerely hope it may be attended with success. This denotes more vigorous counsels in the new Chief of the French Army, and will, I think, lead to results at once creditable to you all and satisfactory to people at home. I have proclaimed in the House of Lords the resolution of the Government to abolish the Ordnance as a separate Department of the State,¹ and I shall send you an official letter announcing the fact to you as Master-General, and also thanking you for past services. I am quite sure that, if I am spared to bring the new proposals into smooth working order, much time will be saved and great simplicity obtained in the transaction of public business in the War Department. I suspect that little or no hopes now remain of peace until Russia is forced, by some decided success on our part, to listen to the proposals to bind her fleet in the Euxine to a small number, and give us some commercial accommodation not yet accorded. So your task is not yet accomplished. If you succeed in getting command of the Sea of Azof, that will be one blow. A victory in the Crimea will be another.

Your despatches of the 7th acknowledge my letter of the 20th April, and I am not surprised at your objection to the complicated operations of the Emperor in the direction of Aloushta. You must act with discretion now we have got over our first brush as to the old confusion, and start on a new campaign; you shall find me strictly honest in taking all my own responsibility, etc., backing you and your Army with all the *esprit* of a quondam soldado. Your telegraphic message expressing the difficulties of protecting

¹ It may be worth while to mention that Mr. Gladstone was favourable to this course, referring to which, in a letter of February 15, 1855, he writes: 'Lord Palmerston told me last week that he hoped to break up the Ordnance Department, a measure toward which my desires have long pointed.'

the siege-works is unpleasant. I confess that I thought 60,000 Turks and French could have been trusted, and that you would have been free ; but I admit at once the extreme importance of feeling perfectly secure as to both Balaclava and Kamiesh before any outward movement is made.

As to difficulty of protecting the siege-works in case of a new plan of campaign being adopted.

I do not like to write about it officially, but it appears to me that, if you are to assault, a reconnaissance on a quiet day, by means of a balloon let up a certain height and retained in position, would be a means of ascertaining the inner defences and the obstacles which you may have to encounter.¹ I shall have all ready, so that if you telegraph for one it shall instantly go to you. I am sending out some machines for making fresh water, as I think it of great importance to keep the Army secure of this essential necessary of life. I am getting a Foreign Legion for you, and hope soon to have some thousands at disposal of seasoned soldiers, not mere adventurers. Do not place any confidence of peace in what you may see in the debates in both Houses of Parliament during the week. The resolve of the country is for war or an honourable peace, not such an one as Lord Grey and Milner Gibson advocate,² and for which I regret to hear that James Graham and Mr. Gladstone are to speak and vote.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PALMERSTON

G.C., *May 15, 1855.*

While Walewski³ was at the F.O. this evening, he received his letters from Paris, and among them was a

On an important letter from General Niel.

¹ Perhaps the earliest proposal to employ a balloon for the purposes of warfare.

² Consequent upon the failure of the Vienna Conferences, Lord Grey had given notice of a resolution (moved in the House of Lords on May 25th), 'That an humble address be presented to Her Majesty to thank Her Majesty for having ordered the protocols of the recent negotiations at Vienna to be laid before us. To inform Her Majesty that this House deeply deplores the failure of the attempt to put an end, by these negotiations, to the calamities of the war in which the country is now engaged ; and to express our opinion that the proposals of Russia were such as to afford a fair prospect of concluding a peace by which all the original objects of the war might have been gained, and by which Her Majesty and her Allies might have obtained all the advantages which can reasonably be demanded from Russia.'

³ Count Walewski, French Ambassador to Great Britain.

remarkable letter from General Niel transmitted in one from the Emperor.

Walewski left it with me and I took a copy of it. The danger of an assault and the importance of *immediately* attacking the Russians in the field are shown with great clearness, and Walewski is anxious that we should send a telegraphic despatch to Raglan *ordering* immediate action. He says that, if we will tell him *what* we write and *when*, corresponding orders shall be sent to Canrobert, and that then there will be a chance of something being done. If you approve, perhaps you will tell Panmure what to write, and send him Niel's letter, as no time should be lost.

As to moving
rejection of
Grey's motion.

Shaftesbury in the most friendly manner this evening offered to move the rejection of Grey's *paix à tout prix* motion on Monday next, and I said I could give no answer without consulting you, but it appears to me that we ought not to delegate to any one the rejection of such a motion, and that, if we did so, Derby would not fail to say that we were afraid of doing it, and that we were hesitating in our policy.

I have promised Shaftesbury to let him have an answer soon.¹

The Emperor complained in his letter to Walewski that the English were so angry at the failure of the Kertch expedition that no concert with them could be expected unless positive orders were sent by the Government. For his satisfaction, therefore, as well as for the common cause, Raglan should be fully informed of our wishes and expectations.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *May 16, 1855.*

The Queen has received with much pleasure Lord Panmure's letter and the telegraphic message.

She thinks it quite right to wait till we hear from

¹ In the event, Lord Clarendon himself opposed the motion, which, after prolonged discussion, was withdrawn.

France ; is very sorry at the prospect of the English force being again divided, but hopes that, whatever may be done, the commands of the different troops will be left independent of each other, else their movements will be hampered as they were during the siege.

Importance of leaving command of different troops independent.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

May 16, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's note upon the subject of the two Warrants, one of which abolishes the Board of General Officers,¹ and the other confers upon the new Board the duties which the former one discharged.

Abolition of Board of General Officers.

Lord Panmure begs to transmit to Your Majesty the Order in Council in which the duties of the Director-General of Army Clothing are set forth.

The Board of General Officers discharged the greater part of these duties formerly. They were the custodians of the sealed patterns, and were responsible that the clothing was conformable to them.

The Director-General of Army Clothing will now come in the place of the Colonels as regards the provision of clothing, and [of the] Board of General Officers as regards the custody of the sealed patterns.

Lord Panmure begs to forward to Your Majesty a copy of the last clothing warrant, and to point out that that which is now submitted for Your Majesty's signature is simply a repetition, with the exception of the sentence underlined, for which is substituted the following :—

‘The clothing, accoutrements, and appointments of our Army will in future be provided in such manner and under such regulations as shall be determined upon by us, under our authority, signified by one of our Principal Secretaries of State.’

Not a word is said, either in the Order in Council or in

¹ See Note on next page.

the Warrant, about the origin of the patterns, and this has been purposely done.

The Commander-in-Chief will have the power of assembling Boards of Officers on all occasions when he may require their advice, but he cannot establish a permanent Board, which can only be done upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State.

Clothing and
arms of the
Army.

In regard to the origin of all patterns for the arms, clothing, and accoutrements and equipments of the Army, Lord Panmure recognises, and has carefully avoided infringing, Your Majesty's sole right to determine them.

The present patterns of clothing and accoutrements will be deposited with the Director-General as already sealed. Should any change be determined upon, the course to be pursued will be for the Commander-in-Chief to ascertain the expense and obtain the sanction of the Secretary of State to this being incurred, he will then submit any new patterns to Your Majesty, and having taken Your Majesty's pleasure upon their adoption, he will inform the Secretary of State of the same, who will submit for Your Majesty's signature an order to seal the patterns as adopted or altered.

In regard to arms, the Commander-in-Chief is responsible for the description of the arm which is put into the hands of the troops. He will at all times, as part of his duty, communicate any changes which are desirable to the Secretary of State for his concurrence, as it will frequently happen that a change from one kind of arm to another, as, for instance, from the smooth-barrel musket to the Minié rifle,¹ may be productive of great expense. With these explanations Lord Panmure humbly trusts that Your Majesty will have no difficulty in signing the Warrant.²

¹ It is interesting to recall that the Duke of Wellington stoutly opposed the introduction of the rifle, and it was not until Lord Harding became Commander-in-Chief that it was adopted.

² The Board of General Officers had been established by a Royal Warrant of George I., dated 29th November 1714. At that time there was no Commander-in-Chief, nor any headquarter administration of the Army in the sense in which it is now understood. Such matters as could not be dealt with by the colonels of regiments were disposed of by the King's order, conveyed through the Secretary-at-War or the Adjutant-General. The colonels clothed and

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 16, 1855.

I send you the accompanying papers from Clarendon.

I think we ought to do what the Emperor proposes, and that we should therefore by telegraph desire Raglan to make arrangements with Canrobert for carrying into execution the scheme of operations contemplated in the Memorandum signed by yourself and Vaillant,¹ as soon as the two armies have received the reinforcements necessary to make them strong enough for the purposes. And Raglan might be told that every day's delay beyond the time when the armies shall be fit for the purpose will be extremely injurious, and will render the operation more and more difficult; and yet such an operation is the only way to get the armies out of the embarrassing position in which they are now placed. Such an instruction might go to-day and be communicated at the same time to Clarendon. . . .

Recommends
doing what the
Emperor
proposes.

I am afraid, from all I hear, — is not a fit man to be placed at the head of the Commissariat in the Black Sea, and it would never do for us to recall one incapable man and to put another in his place who was not decidedly fit for it.

Everything we do about the Army in the Crimea will be narrowly scrutinised, and we must not risk our own reputations and the welfare of the Army for what may be represented as personal partialities.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, May 21, 1855.

The Queen sends to Lord Panmure the substance of such Minutes as she explained to him it was her wish

equipped their regiments, and matters of general importance to the Army were referred to the Board of General Officers by the King's command. After the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief in 1793, the functions of the Board gradually diminished, and in 1854 they were practically limited to matters relating to the clothing of the Army.

¹ Marshal Vaillant, the French Minister of War.

should be drawn up to place her intercourse with the War Department on a permanent footing. He will consider them and then submit them to her in the final shape in which they might receive her sanction.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *May 21, 1855.*

I received last night your letter, marked Private, of the 7th instant.

My telegraphic message of the 19th, which crossed yours of the 18th, will have informed you that I became acquainted on Saturday morning with the resignation of General Canrobert and the appointment of General Pélissier to the Chief Command of the French Army; and that which I despatched last night will communicate to you the fact that the expedition to Kertch has again been determined upon, and that it will consist of 3000 English, 7000 French, and 5500 Turks, the first and last being accompanied by one battery each, the French by three.

Canrobert
replaced by
Pélissier.

New expedition
to Kertch.

Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat hope to get the troops on board to-morrow morning, and to sail in the evening.

They attended the conference here yesterday, as did Admiral Stewart; and Omar, to whom I wrote the night before, arrived just before General Pélissier. The Pasha would have liked to have undertaken the job by himself, but this we felt would not satisfy either England or France. The chief object in having the Turks was that, if permanent occupation was considered necessary, the garrison might be furnished by them. It is desirable that the English detachment should be back here as soon as the service is accomplished.

General Pélissier talks a good deal and is very anxious to be doing; but all his troops are not yet arrived from Constantinople.

About half the Sardinians are here. I like what I

have seen of General La Marmora exceedingly. He is very anxious to be of use in the way I may think best, and if any effort be made towards Sebastopol, he will be quite ready to furnish his quota for the operation.

General La
Marmora.

Neither the 31st from Corfu nor the 72nd from Malta has arrived. I have been expecting them for several days. It may be some time before the regiment from Gibraltar gets here. I must endeavour to make a good brigade for Sir John Campbell when he is superseded by Bentinck in the command of the 4th Division. Sir John, with whose conduct I have every reason to be highly satisfied, would be glad to have a brigade of Highlanders, if a second brigade should be formed, which, however, is a matter of doubt.

I am much obliged to you for having mentioned that you had sent my *bâton de Maréchal* to Lady Raglan. I doubt, however, her having received it, for I have a letter from her of the 7th in which she makes no allusion to it. . . .

I am much concerned to hear that the Government have determined to propose the consolidation of the Military Departments, and to break up the Ordnance Office, at the head of which the Queen was graciously pleased to place me in 1852. I will not disguise from you the deep regret I feel at the prospect of being deprived of an appointment of which the duties were of a most interesting character, and where I may say without vanity my labours were advantageous to the service; but, putting aside all personal considerations, I conscientiously believe that the change will be the reverse of beneficial to the public.

Opinion on
Government
proposal to
consolidate
the Military
Departments.

From the number of hours I was obliged to devote daily to the public business of the department, I am quite satisfied that a Minister of War could not efficiently discharge it and at the same time perform the higher duties which devolve upon him as Secretary of State, and, if this be so, of which I entertain no doubt, much of the work will fall upon subordinates, and hence confusion and dissatisfaction may be expected to arise. The transfer of the Ordnance Military Corps to the Commander-in-

Chief must be an imperfect measure, and the officers will be in the disagreeable position of having two masters.

The General Commanding-in-Chief's power will be extremely limited, and the employment of the officers apart from their purely military duties will depend not upon him but upon the Minister of War. He may appear on parade at Woolwich, but the equipment of the batteries, the armament, etc., will rest with others, and he will have nothing to do but to ascertain that the drill has been attended to.

His command over the Engineers will be merely nominal, and the officers will not be able to look to him for anything. I could go into great detail on this question if I had time, but I should not have troubled you with any observations on the subject had you not yourself alluded to it.

Cholera.

The breaking out of the cholera is a sad grief to me. I would fain hope that its ravages will not be very extensive, but I cannot feel very confident. The loss of the French at Constantinople has been very great.

Balaclava.

I send you a sketch of Balaclava, which you will see is a small village instead of being, as seems to have been generally supposed, a considerable town. In the house in which I lived I had two rooms, one in which I slept and transacted my business, the other where I had my meals and the Military Secretary did his work. All my Aides-de-Camp were encamped outside. . . .

TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 21, 1855.*

I have to acknowledge your Lordship's secret and confidential despatch of the 4th inst.

I had learnt previously, by the electric telegraph, of the abortive character of the expedition to Kertch, which has caused as much disappointment to H.M.'s Government as it appears to have done in the Camp.

The circumstances under which General Canrobert

appears to have entirely consented to the expedition exhibit so much vacillation and indecision of character that I am not sorry he no longer fills a position to the responsibility of which he appears to have been quite unequal.

Possessing in the most eminent degree all the qualities of courage and zeal which constitute the brave soldier, he did not possess those comprehensive views, nor that moral courage in counsel, which mark the sagacious and resolute General.

Canrobert characterised.

I have perused the instructions issued by you to Sir George Brown, and I entirely approve of them.

They correspond in all respects with the views which H.M.'s Government have entertained of the object of the expedition, viz. : that it was not advisable to do more than to destroy all the enemy's means of preventing the free passage of our ships into the Sea of Azof, and, having accomplished that end, that the troops should again be reconveyed to the Camp.

I have read with great interest Major Gordon's¹ able report of the obstacles to be encountered as far as he could detect them, and the manner in which he and Colonel Desaint proposed to overcome them ; and when I find that the conduct of this expedition had been intrusted to an officer of the acknowledged skill, courage, and discretion which Sir George Brown is known to possess, I have no doubt that its success would have been complete. All this only aggravates the regret that General Canrobert should have deemed himself to be so entirely concussed by his Imperial Master's orders as to recall his portion of the force, and so, in spite of all your Lordship's remonstrances, to put an end to this promising project for defeating and weakening the enemy, not only on a most vulnerable, but most important point.

Abortive expedition to Kertch.

Since I received your Lordship's despatch, a telegraphic message has reached me this morning, informing me of the renewal of this expedition to Kertch, which gives me very great pleasure.

¹ Major Gordon, R.E., of Birkhill, Aberdeenshire.

I understand from the message that, for the original French force, there has been substituted 3000 French and 5000 Turks, but that the British contingent remains the same, and that the command is, as formerly, under Sir George Brown.

I trust that every success may attend the expedition, which I hail as a prelude to more active operations than have for some time past marked the progress of the war.

The presence of cholera has given me great uneasiness, but I fully rely on your Lordship's availing yourself of all human means to prevent its ravages in your Army.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Secret.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *May 22, 1855.*

Conference as
to a second
expedition to
Kertch.

In my secret despatch of the 19th instant, I mentioned to your Lordship that General Pélistier was desirous of having a conference upon the expediency of attacking Kertch.

Composition
of the force.

A meeting was in consequence held here on the following day, at which the two British Admirals, Admiral Bruat, General Pélistier, who had with him General Niel and General Martimprez, Omar Pasha, and myself were present, and after a discussion of some length it was decided that the enterprise should be resumed, and that the force to be sent to Kertch should consist of 3000 English, 7000 French, and 5000 Turks.

It was thought advisable that the Turks should be added, in order that they should form the garrison, if, after the capture of Kertch, it should be considered necessary to hold the place.

Nobody appeared opposed to the expedition except General Niel, who, upon the invitation of General Pélistier, stated the objections he entertained to it, but which produced no effect upon those to whom it was addressed.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown will command the force, as he did that previously sent.

Upon the breaking up of the conference, preparations were set on foot for the embarkation of the troops, and it is probable that they will sail this evening.

General Péliissier contemplates immediately approaching nearer the Tchernaya, but the object of this movement he has not yet explained to me.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *May 23, 1855.*

The Queen is anxious to have information on the following points:—

1. What has been done with respect to the monument in the churchyard where so many of our brave men lie buried at Scutari? The Queen inquires as to medals earned by her soldiers in the war, etc.

2. When will the medals for the Army in the Crimea be sent out?

3. What has been done with respect to the medals given on the 18th being engraved, and when will the clasps be added?

4. The Queen hopes that no time will be lost in sending the medals to all those officers and men who could not and did not appear on the 18th, but who are in this country. She knows that many such ones could not appear. Of course those who are in England will feel very anxious to get their medals when they see their companions wearing them. There are naturally many privates of the Line and Cavalry who have a right to the medals, but who did not attend, as only three of each regiment appeared.

Lastly, the Queen wishes to know what progress has been made with respect to the new Hospital, whether a site has been found, and whether it can be purchased?

The Queen is in the greatest anxiety (though very confident) to hear the result of the new Kertch expedition, and also very anxious and impatient to hear what active operations are decided on, as she feels that *everything* depends on that. She can really think of *nothing* else! Inquiry as to the second expedition to Kertch.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

May 24, 1855.

Minutes regard-
ing intercourse
of the Sovereign
with the War
Department.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge two communications with which Your Majesty has honoured him.

In reference to the first, in which Your Majesty refers to the Minutes which are to be recorded in the War Department upon the subject of Your Majesty's intercourse with that Department, Lord Panmure will lose no time in preparing and submitting such a memorandum for Your Majesty's approval.

With regard to Your Majesty's second note, Lord Panmure will reply more fully to it to-morrow. In the meantime, with respect to the monument at Scutari, in which Your Majesty takes so deep and natural an interest, Lord Panmure hopes at an early day to submit to Your Majesty a design for that object.

Lord Panmure has this morning seen Captain Laffan, the officer of Engineers sent down to look out for a site for the Military Hospital, and learns that he has discovered a most eligible site on Southampton Water, and Lord Panmure begs to enclose for Your Majesty's perusal a memorandum upon the subject.

Your Majesty's orders with reference to the Crimean medals shall be strictly attended to, and Lord Panmure will to-morrow report fully on the subject.

The Queen's
anxiety.

Lord Panmure feels deeply for Your Majesty's anxiety in reference to the movement of the Army in the East.

Lord Panmure earnestly hopes that Your Majesty's known calmness and courage may sustain you in this time of impending action, and Your Majesty may rest assured that the very earliest intelligence of any kind which reaches Lord Panmure shall be transmitted to Your Majesty.

The expedition to Kertch had not all embarked yesterday.

Lord Panmure does not expect any movement in the field before the end of June; it may be a little sooner,

but the preparations for transport will require some time to make.

Lord Panmure begs to apologise for the length of this note, but as it is written upon Your Majesty's nativity, he ventures to lay at Your Majesty's feet his humble, but most cordial congratulations upon so happy an occasion.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

May 24, 1855.

What answer shall I give to-day to Headlam about his proposal that the value of commissions shall be given to the families and representatives of officers dying on active service? I think the general feeling of the House of Commons is *for* such an arrangement, and *against* the general principle of sale and purchase of commissions, and I own that my opinions go very much in the same direction.

Might we not say that the regulated value of commissions which have been bought by officers killed in action, or dying of wounds in active service, will be given to their families and representatives, and that their commissions will be filled up without purchase, and that henceforth officers who have received commissions without purchase will not be allowed to sell those commissions so received? We may say that, in regard to death by disease, it would be difficult to draw a distinct line between deaths so happening in the Crimea and deaths so happening in other stations, and it would, moreover, be difficult to draw a satisfactory line between diseases directly brought on by climate and exposure and diseases which might have affected the officer even if he had been at home, and we should thus gradually slide into a regulation which would apply to almost all deaths of officers on full pay.

Suggests a move in the direction of 'abolition of purchase.'

Would it not be well to desire the Commissariat in the Crimea to make arrangements for a more frequent supply of fresh meat than that which was mentioned yesterday, and would it not be well to desire Raglan by telegraph to

Also suggests
hastening
Lord Raglan.

lose no time in concerting with Pélissier the arrangements necessary for the field operation, whether from Eupatoria, or from any other basis of operations which may be fixed upon between them?

Time is precious, and the hot weather and the Russian reinforcements are coming on.

TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *May 25, 1855.*

New spirit
infused into
French Army.

Your telegraphs for the last some days have been very satisfactory, and show that a new spirit has been infused into your French Allies. We all look forward to news from Kertch, and the second expedition is as yet a profound secret, so we hope to announce it and its results at once. I regret very much not having been able to send you more Cavalry remounts for want of shipping, but they will drop in by degrees, and the two additional Regiments, 1st and 6th, will swell your force.

I have nearly ready for you my corps of navvies, and I am sure they will spare your troops greatly, and save much time in all matters of earthworks and entrenchments. I propose also shortly to send you out a floating factory for repair of arms, and all kinds of material which you will find of great use to you.

I think the public mind is more calm than it was, and they are looking forward to some news. D'Israeli is trying an attack on Government, but he will not succeed, and has contrived, by patronising Mr. Layard, to alienate from him such men as Granby, who votes against him to-night.

I send you by this mail official notice of your ceasing to be M.-G.¹ We are proceeding with the amalgamation, and I am convinced it will lead to far more celerity of action in all matters touching the war. I am glad to see you have got your summer clothing. How do you like it?

I dare say Brown will abuse it as he does everything. I

¹ Master-General of the Ordnance Office.

had a long letter from him a few days since, most amusing and characteristic of him. I never knew a man who so cordially hated all change, whether good or bad. However, he is a fine old soldier, and may fire off his wrath against me if he like. You none of you know the difficulties I have to fight against, or how I fight, till you fall into Ellenborough's hands.

Character of
Sir G. Brown.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *May 25, 1855.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter with the telegraphic message just received. She is very glad to see that there is activity and energy to be seen amongst the French, which promises well.

Regret for
French losses.

We regret the loss they sustained on the night of the 21st.¹

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *May 26, 1855.*

. . . It seems to me that the best appropriation of Vivian's Turkish Contingent would be to send it to form an addition to the Turkish army at Kars in Asia Minor, getting the Porte to give the command of the whole to General Vivian. Vivian does not seem likely to get more than 10,000 Turks in Europe, unless by detaching men from Omar Pasha's army, and to take any men from him would surely be a great mistake, and would only be to gratify the personal hatred borne to Omar Pasha by the Siraskier. We should be taking troops away from an army going at once to commence important, and we hope, decisive operations, in order to transfer them to a reserve which will not be completely formed for some time to come. It would be as if we were to take regiments from Raglan and send them to Malta to be added to the dépôts in that island.

Suggests sending Vivian's Turkish Contingent to Kars.

Omar's force not to be diminished.

¹ This probably refers to loss sustained in the French capture of the Russian counter-approaches on the night of May 22nd.

Advantage of
recruiting
Vivian's force
from Christians
of Armenia.

But if Vivian were sent with 10,000 men, or even with a less number, to Erzeroum and Kars, he might complete his 20,000 from the Turkish force now in that quarter, or, what would be infinitely better, by voluntary enlistment from the Christian population of Armenia.

If there was an army of 30,000 men in that quarter, it would sweep the Russians out of Georgia, unite itself with the Circassians, and make a successful and brilliant campaign.

But the Georgians would look with fear at the advance of a purely Mussulman army in their country, as they are all Christians, and religious fanaticism combining with imperfect discipline might lead to excesses.

But if a good portion of the troops were Christians, and if the Mahometans were controlled by British Commanders, the Georgians would feel secure, would join us by thousands, for they hate the Russians, and our success would be assured.

Such an arrangement would, perhaps, be better than the sending European troops for a Georgian campaign, for I am informed that the climate of Georgia is unhealthy for Europeans during the heat of summer and in the autumn.

We might, perhaps, after we have taken Sebastopol, occupy Anapa, and some of the ports on the coast, if we did not think it best to destroy them, or hand them over to the Turks or to the natives.

I wish you would think over and consult with Clarendon about this disposal of Vivian's army, for if such an arrangement should seem advisable, no time should be lost in taking steps to carry it into effect.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

[In a letter dated May 27th, the Duke of Cambridge enters an energetic protest against allowing the 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers 'to drop down from their present Indian establishment to that of the other regi-

ments in the Crimea.' He also urges maintaining the four squadrons of the 1st Dragoon Guards, then under orders for the seat of war.] He goes on :

I add a line about our recruiting. It does not thrive, I fear, and you will find that the Army wants at least 40,000. This is an awful figure, and some means ought to be devised for increasing the voids without loss of time. Why not disembody those Militia regiments that have nothing but officers, and hardly any men? I fear there are but too many in this position. These men would no doubt join the Army, and might be asked to volunteer before being disembodied, so that we might keep our hands upon them. I fear there are but too many Militia regiments in which the officers are receiving full pay for doing nothing, they having 90, 100, or 150 men to command. Such corps only hamper us, and are worse than useless.

Suggests disembodiment of Militia regiments with a view to helping recruiting for the Army.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

May 28, 1855.

The Queen wishes me to express to you her great joy at the news of the taking possession of the Straits of Kertch, which you have communicated by telegraph.¹ That this success should have been obtained, and without loss, exactly on the Queen's birthday, enhances her satisfaction. The Queen hopes that immediate orders will be given to make the most of this advantage by seizing, or at least destroying, all stores and magazines which the Russians must doubtless have accumulated all along the Sea of Azof. For this it may be necessary to retain with the squadron employed in that sea a small force of troops, which may be landed on different points, and by their unexpected descents not only strike terror into the interior of the country, but oblige the Russians to divert large bodies of troops for the defence of their extended coast,

Suggestions as to following up British success at Kertch.

¹ General Sir George Brown's unopposed capture of Kertch and Yenikale, May 24th. For the guns, stores, etc., captured or destroyed, as a result of our success in the Kertchine Peninsula, see Kinglake, viii. pp. 58, 59.

and may further, by pushing into the country where it is possible for them to do so, obtain that information of which we have been hitherto entirely destitute.

I would detach at least a Brigade for this service (say 2500 men—English), which cannot be valued too highly. We must remember what annoyance our movable columns and small descents caused to Napoleon both in Italy and Spain during the former war.

Reasons for believing the Russian force to have been overestimated.

The fact of so small a force having been found at Kertch, after our expedition had become known, and we had been assured of the presence there of from 8 to 12,000 men, coupled with the other facts, that since the 5th of November the Russians have made no attempt to disturb our position before Sebastopol, nor that of the Turks at Eupatoria since the 17th of February, though they must have known that at one time a large portion of them had been removed to Sebastopol, must open the eyes of our Commanders to the delusions which have been practised upon them as to the enormous strength of the Russians, which even after Inkerman was put down as near 200,000 men! At least the Queen hopes that you will strongly impress upon them the probability of the Russians being only in strength where they know our troops to be immovably located, and of the accounts of their force in all parts of the Crimea having been purposely spread by themselves, and that there can be nothing more detrimental to enterprise and success than to overrate the enemy's forces.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *May 28, 1855.*

The Queen rejoices over success of second expedition to Kertch.

The Queen has just received Lord Panmure's two boxes. The account from the Crimea becomes better and better, and the Queen cannot express what a happy day this has been to us! She feels sure Anapa will fall speedily, but she doubts that the victory will be as bloodless. We never have known exactly how large the English force despatched was.

The Queen is truly thankful that the cholera is decreasing, and that that excellent and valuable person, Miss Nightingale, is safe.

We have just returned from visiting a transport with 70 horses on board (for the 17th Lancers), which has interested us much. They sail to-day.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *May 28, 1855.*

The Queen adds one line to the Prince's letter to Lord Panmure, to say that she would wish him to telegraph in her name to Lord Raglan to express her great delight at the news of the taking of Kertch, and of this happening on her birthday, and without any loss, and that she hopes this is the commencement of successes of a decisive character in the Crimea.

TO LORD RAGLAN

May 28, 1855.

This has been a very jolly Whit-Monday for us, owing to your welcome intelligence of the expedition to Kertch having reached us. I think that Canrobert must repent his having recalled the first expedition, seeing how great a work has been effected. They say it was from Kertch that Cæsar wrote his first despatch. Brown might have adopted his very word from the same place.

Success of
second expedi-
tion to Kertch.

I am glad to see that you have allowed the troops to go on to Anapa. These hornet nests had all better be extinguished at once. I have just received your despatch by messenger of the 15th inst. I am sorry that you have been obliged to keep the trenches, and I have no faith in only French and Turks in the field. I begin to incline to your opinion of the advance from Eupatoria; that from Aloushta I always held to be visionary.

I shall answer your secret and confidential despatch as soon as we have talked it over in Cabinet. You will see

that we beat Disraeli by 100, and so we shall be left to carry on the war.¹

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

May 28, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit for Your Majesty's use copies of despatches which arrived this forenoon from Lord Raglan.

Your Majesty will doubtless see with disappointment that it has not been found expedient so to carry out the plan of operations as hoped, in concert with the Emperor of the French, so as to leave Your Majesty's troops free to advance as instructed; but Lord Raglan still hopes, when the movement on the right and against the enemy's left is advanced, to be able to take part in the plan of operations, which is now evidently about to be put in execution. The large force of 90,000 men required to guard the trenches and depôts is far beyond our calculation.

Lord Panmure begs to draw Your Majesty's attention to the report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, which shows that no risk will again occur of Your Majesty's troops being destitute of supplies.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

May 28, 1855.

Second expedi-
tion to Kertch.

. . . I should like to have shaken hands with you today *in re* Kertch. Heaven grant it may be the forerunner of other successes; but if 90,000 men are required for the trenches, I can't feel very hopeful respecting Sebastopol, or beating the Russians in the field. . . .

¹ Mr. Disraeli had moved, on May 24th, in the House of Commons, 'That this House cannot adjourn for the recess without expressing its dissatisfaction with the ambiguous language and uncertain conduct of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the great question of peace or war; and that, under these circumstances, this House feels it a duty to declare that it will continue to give every support to Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war until Her Majesty shall, in conjunction with her Allies, obtain for this country a safe and honourable peace.'

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *May 29, 1855.*

I am extremely obliged to you for your kind note of yesterday's date, and am delighted to hear of your decision to keep up to the Indian establishment 10th¹ and 12th.² I hope, of course, in *horses* as well as in men. . . .

As regards Airey, I really think he is an anxious and willing fellow, and I doubt not you will find a marked improvement in him for this campaign, therefore I hope you will give him another chance, though I admit he has been much to blame in many respects, but it was from want of experience, which he has now fully acquired.

Of Filder I say nothing. I am enchanted at the success of our friend Brown at Kertch, and I do hope he will give us a further good report about Anapa, and I own I should like to see [them remain] (?) afterwards and settle themselves between Arabat and Kaffa. This would effectually bar that part of the Crimea, the Sea of Azof, and the communication with Circassia against the Russians, and I think we could spare a force for this detached position. It appears to me that the Russians are hardly in such force as before one thought they were in the Crimea. Another thing is very evident, and a great justification for Lord Raglan, that Canrobert was the man who always held back; for the very moment the command is taken out of his hands, the Allies are active and enterprising, a clear proof that it was he who would not take any responsibility of action upon himself. . . .

The expedition
against Kertch.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *May 30, 1855.*

The Queen has just received Lord Panmure's box, with the telegraphic account of Omar Pasha's resignation. She hopes that the Government will do all they can to

¹ Hussars.² Lancers.

prevent this being accepted, and to cause the removal of those who have led to this step being taken by Omar Pasha. His loss would be most serious at this moment.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

May 31, 1855.

As to Omar
Pasha's army.

Palmerston suggests that a message should go forth with by telegram to Raglan, desiring him to send word immediately to Omar Pasha that we not only do not want his 5000 men for Vivian's Contingent, but that we had refused them, thinking that his army, instead of being weakened, ought if possible to be reinforced. Raglan should add that we think Omar Pasha's resignation would be an irreparable calamity for the common cause.

I will write in the same sense to Stratford.¹

¹ Through Lord Stratford's personal intervention with the Sultan, this resignation was withdrawn.

CHAPTER VI

JUNE 1855

THE success of the Allied Armies upon the Sea of Azof had done much to restore confidence and stifle grumbling at home. Also, with Pélissier's accession to the chief command, a better understanding and more whole-hearted co-operation prevailed between the British and the French. Only the Emperor Napoleon remained obstinate in his policy of interference, and his advocacy of taking the field, with a view to investment, rather than continuing to press the siege as before. Lord Panmure speaks of Pélissier's 'stout and fierce' support of the Allied Commanders' contrary decisions. The Marshal's happy disregard of his master's orders also went far to minimise their mischievous tendency. But, if Kinglake's theory of his conduct on June 18th be the correct one, these orders were nevertheless responsible for disaster.

The Allies were now preparing to assault the suburb portion of the fortress. Before doing this, a necessary step was to capture the White Works, the Mamelon, and the 'Quarries,' as the work interposed between the British trenches and the Redan was named. After a fierce bombardment and sharp fighting, this was accomplished on the night of June 7th, the advanced position of the enemy being then converted into the front line of the siege-works. As always, the Queen was prompt to rejoice in the success of her troops and to sympathise in their losses. But Panmure, writing to Raglan on June 11th, suspects with

reason that successes gained in a manner opposed to his own wishes are far from pleasing Napoleon. Notwithstanding this, the Emperor accepts an agreement that no orders for active operations shall be communicated to either army save by both Governments acting in concert. At the same time the British Military Commissioner in Paris, General Torrens, is instructed to soothe the Emperor's anxiety. For the present, however, the limit of the Allies' success was reached. Whether adversely affected by his master's treatment or not, Pélissier was certainly responsible for the initial errors of the assault on the Malakoff and Redan. Save for a partial success gained by General Eyre, this proved a disastrous failure, the troops engaged in it being recalled after sustaining heavy losses. Indeed, the most important purpose served by it was to bring round the Emperor to the necessity of pushing the siege. The assault had taken place on June 18th. Ten days later occurred the death of Lord Raglan, on whose mind it had preyed heavily. He was succeeded in the chief command by General Simpson, whose despondence in the presence of the task before him brings the month's correspondence to a gloomy close.

Meantime cholera had again broken out in the army confronting Sebastopol, the newly arrived Sardinians in particular falling victims to it. Foreign Legions were at this time being mustered, and, in consequence of the difficulty of obtaining recruits in sufficient numbers at home, their assistance was eagerly looked forward to. Details of the constitution of the newly-established Clothing Board are discussed in letters of the Queen, Prince Albert, and the War Minister. The absence of letters from Lord Panmure to the Queen may be accounted for by the fact that the Queen was resident at Buckingham Palace during the month, and that Lord Panmure had the honour of seeing her several times a week.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 1, 1855.*

The Queen would wish Lord Panmure to come here at five o'clock this afternoon. The news is excellent from the Sea of Azof,¹ and causes us the greatest satisfaction.

TO LORD RAGLAN

June 1, 1855.

You cannot imagine how pleased every one is with the bloodless successes at Kertch and in the Sea of Azof, and already our foolish papers are beginning to impose insulting terms on Russia, unworthy of the solidity and calmness of England. I am longing for your despatch about the Bath, so that I may gazette the batch at once. But if it does not come soon, I shall act on your despatches and letters already received and ask the Queen to suspend the statute, and so set the red ribbons streaming at once. I am bored more than I can tell you about them, and I admit, justly so. I am getting disturbed about our recruiting, and cannot devise any means of getting men fast enough for our purposes. I have a great desire to propose to the Queen to have another regiment of Guards, to be called the Irish Fusilier Guards, and to put into them some of the most deserving officers of the Irish regiments now with you; it would fill in Ireland in a month, and, by giving service in the Irish Police to count for pension, we should get such a lot of fine fellows from that service that would make up for the diminished size of the other regiments.

Great difficulty
in getting
recruits fast
enough.

It has been suggested to send ticket-of-leave men to the Army, but I have set my face against that, though I dare say they would fight as well as honest men. I see that the *Times* says that drunkenness prevails in the Camp, which I believe to be a lie. It may be so at Balaclava. Let me know how you like the summer clothing which I have sent you, for I thought it an

Clothing of the
Army.

¹ Of the following up of the success at Kertch.

The corps of
navvies.

improvement on the smock, but, hot or cold, I hope you always *fight* in red. So you don't like my navvies! Believe me you are wrong, and you will do yourself and your Army great injustice to refuse them. They will not disgrace you, and will do all sorts of work in advance of the Army. They carry with them artificers of all kinds, and they will run you up an encampment and build you huts on a line of march in no time. They will fight if you let them, and, armed with pikes, will defend a trench as well as the best of them. I sincerely hope you will have them, or, if I send them on my own responsibility, that you will give them a fair trial. I shall not notice officially the Kertch affair until I receive official notice of it. I am doing all I can to get away your horses, but you have got all the horse-ships out with you. You shall hear no more from me as to your Staff; I have told my colleagues that I acquiesce in your reason for not submitting to a change, and that I will press it no further. I do sincerely trust that you may be spared a visitation of cholera; at present the cases seem to be few. You will be glad to learn that Scarlett returns in command of the Cavalry, and that Cardigan remains at home permanently. This is not known, so you may keep it to yourself. The Duke of Cambridge likewise remains at home. I am busy in keeping your reserves at Malta up to the mark, and in establishing a depôt of munitions of war there. I hope soon to hear of Anapa having fallen, and to get some exact intelligence, so far as you can procure it, of the extent to which the Russians have been supplied during the last nine months from the Sea of Azof. I dare say Cattlely could fish up this, if sent to do so.

Complaints
against
Raglan's Staff
to cease.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 4, 1855.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter received this evening, with the copies of despatches, etc.

She entirely approves the telegraphic orders which have been sent, in concert with the Emperor of the French, to the Allied Generals, and trusts that they will have the desired effect.

The Queen is grieved to see that the cholera continues to attack the troops, though she trusts that it is on the decrease.

She would wish to see a return of the Land Transport Corps, which seems never to be sent; Lord Panmure would perhaps inquire for it.

Desires to see a return of Land Transport Corps.

The Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure that he has not yet submitted the Minutes to her, which she wrote to him about some little time ago.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 4, 1855.*

The Queen wishes to mention two names to Lord Panmure of Officers—who, *when* the *Foreign* Officers are decorated with the Order of the Bath, should *not* be omitted, viz.: Brigadier-General Rose and Captain Claremont,¹ both distinguished officers attached to the French Army. The Queen wishes further to say that the Investiture of the Bath should be fixed for Saturday at 2 instead of Friday.

TO LORD RAGLAN

June 4, 1855.

A number of your private letters have come by this mail, and I rejoice to acknowledge the list for the Bath, which I shall now proceed with as fast as I can. The complete success in the Sea of Azof has given immense satisfaction, and I am glad to find that you do not intend occupation by French or British troops, which would have

As to success in the Sea of Azof.

¹ British Military Commissioner in Paris.

tended to weaken your force before Sebastopol. Your original force in this second expedition was greater than we had calculated from your telegraphic messages, and your additions, after Kertch was taken, makes Brown's army very formidable to any foe he may come across. It is well to have had Pélissier to deal with, for Canrobert never would have consented to detach so many men from his camp even for a temporary purpose. What a fine plum it would have been for Omar to have plucked! I fancy the inhabitants of Kertch would have found some difference between falling into their hands and ours. I am very glad you like Marmora and seem likely to get on well with him. Between ourselves, you must not rely entirely on his sincerity sometimes, as I once or twice found him holding one language to me and another to Clarendon. But this is a trifle! You will have got your Infantry regiments before this, and I will send your horses as fast as I can, but you *must* send me home some means of conveying them to you. . . . The change at the Ordnance is effected, and I am sorry to hear that you anticipate so much confusion from it. So far as the war is concerned, you will find all your supplies of material much easier managed, and your demands far more quickly complied with than before. I do not at all, nor does the Government, undervalue your labours in the department, but the change was inevitable, and it has been done. I may tell you in confidence that, from high to low, every man's tongue and hand was against the department. I am sure you will feel deeply grieved at the re-commencement of cholera. The only chance is to spare the men as much fatigue as possible, and to give them as much amusement to distract their minds from their own feelings as possible. The conferences at Vienna are, I hope, finished by this time, and now we must possess the Crimea and dictate our own terms. I must now be off to the House, to answer Ellenborough about some wrecked transport.

Advantages
arising from the
change in the
Ordnance
Department.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

June 4, 1855.

. . . Our numerical inferiority in the East is a constant source of alarm and annoyance. It enables the French (not the Emperor) to take a tone with us and about us that is painful now and may be serious hereafter. . . .

Numerical inferiority of British as compared with French.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

June 4, 1855.

I send Cowley's¹ letter, in which you will find the instruction that the Emperor proposes to send to Pélissier. Palmerston has marked the passage in it that he suggests should be sent to Raglan, adding to it the following words, 'You will consider with Genl. Pélissier and Omar Pasha whether the movement from Eupatoria would not be the best.'

As to instructions to Raglan.

Pray send me back the letter immediately, as I must inform Cowley what instruction you send.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 5, 1855.

The cholera is beginning in our Army in the Crimea. This disease is a scourge if it gains a head, but is easily mastered in its beginning, as was shown by the case of the troops at Newcastle during the violence of the epidemic in that town two years ago. Dr. Sutherland understands well the precautionary treatment, and it might be useful to desire Raglan to require the Military Medical Officers to consult him and to attend to his suggestions. Might it not also be useful to send out another man like Gavin to take Gavin's place in the Sanitary Commission?

Outbreak of cholera in the Crimea.

What ration of spirits is now issued to the troops? The use of alcohol in hot countries is poisonous, engenders fevers, and induces a bad habit of body which makes

Spirit ration issued to troops.

¹ Lord Cowley, British Ambassador in Paris.

wounds hard to heal. Would it not be advisable either to abolish the spirit ration, substituting beer or wine, or else greatly to diminish it?

TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 8, 1855.*

Reappearance
of cholera.

I have received just now your telegraph announcing the death of Admiral Boxer, and the scourge of cholera among the Sardinian troops. It gives me great pain to see this scourge reappearing in the Army, and I sincerely hope that vigilance combined with experience may enable you to contend against it. We are all lost in wonder at General Canrobert's not occupying the heights on the right of the Tchernaya, instead of coming back and establishing himself on the left again, but we shall expect some development of his motives in our next despatches. The Emperor is too much bent on commanding his Army from Paris, and has, I learn, ordered the recall of his troops from Anapa, but which I trust may not be listened to by his new Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea. The Foreign Legions are beginning to come from Germany and Switzerland, so you need not be surprised soon to have some German regiments for your outpost duties, but my hope is that you will have secured Sebastopol before we can send them.

Napoleon and
Pélissier.

As to proposed
movement from
Eupatoria.

We are generally of opinion here that you and Omar Pasha are right as to the movement from Eupatoria, but, to say the truth, I cannot see how it is to be made without more capacity for Land Transport than you at present possess. I have desired them to send as many mules as they can from all quarters. We have approved of a submarine line from Varna to Constantinople.

I am sorry to see the *Times* is at Colonel Gordon,¹ though I confess not surprised when it is a case (*sic*).

¹ Colonel the Honourable Alex. Gordon, Deputy-Quartermaster-General in the Crimea. He was rather severely animadverted upon by Sir J. M'Neill's Commission, yet was afterwards appointed Deputy-Quartermaster-General at home—one of those things, as Lord Dundreary would have remarked, which 'no fellow could understand.'

I have just given Colonel Sir T. Troubridge¹ the appointment of Director-General of Army Clothing, an office which I am sure he will fill with great advantage to the Service.

I may tell you in perfect confidence that I offered Gibraltar to De Lacy Evans, but he declined. I now mean to give it to Fergusson at Malta.² Would any of your Major-Generals wish to go to Malta? If so, send me a telegraphic message, and I will try and manage it for them.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

June 8, 1855.

Having, in conformity with your permission, anxiously considered the subject of your communication to me yesterday, and having further consulted two military friends in whose judgment I could confide, as also one or two members of my immediate family, I think I ought to lose no time in at once putting you in possession of the conclusions at which I have arrived as regards the offer you were so good as to make to me on the part of the Government. In the first place, however, I would beg to assure you that I am very sensible of your kind consideration of me, and am much flattered by the confidence that both yourself and your colleagues have placed in me on the present occasion. Having resided at Gibraltar in former years, and being therefore well acquainted with the place and with the duties of the Governor, I have come to the conclusion that, however honourable the post is that you have thought of for me, it is not exactly one that would suit my views and feelings. The fact is that the sphere of action is, if I may be permitted so to express myself, rather too confined for a person of active habits like myself. Indeed I may say that, unless under very peculiar circumstances, I should not like to be obliged to go abroad so soon again, after my recent return

Replying to an offer of the Governorship of Gibraltar.

¹ Of the 7th Fusiliers. He had lost both legs in the trenches.

² General Sir James Fergusson.

from foreign service. Of course, I am perfectly prepared to take my share of active duty in the field, if it should be thought desirable that I should again join the army in the East, but otherwise I should wish for some employment at home, where I think I might perhaps be useful at the present moment in superintending the levies of various descriptions that are preparing for active service. In such a capacity, even though more subordinate than the one now proposed to me, I should feel myself more at home and more comfortable than I ever should do in a place like Gibraltar, which, from experience, I know is terribly confined in every respect, and consequently more suited to a man of much less active habits than myself. The command in Ireland is the one that I should most wish for and desire, but I know full well that that has recently been disposed of, and is not therefore likely to become vacant for some time. This being the case, I should be very happy to make myself useful at Aldershot whenever that military station becomes more extended in numbers than it is at the present moment, or I should be very glad to occupy myself with the foreign levies, whenever these have arrived at that amount of numbers as to require military superintendence on an extended scale. Occupations such as these would exactly suit my habits, and would at the same time enable me to remain at home near my family, some of whom are of an age to make it very desirable for me to be near them. At the same time I am quite prepared to rejoin the army in the field, and in such case all personal feelings, such as those I have just named, must at once be put out of consideration.

There is a further feeling which I have on the subject, which is this, that a hot climate does not at all agree with me. I felt it much in Bulgaria last year, as I have done in former years both at Gibraltar and Corfu, and though perfectly well in health now, I do not wish to expose myself to this again so soon, unless called upon to do so with the army in the field. On the whole, therefore, I am induced to decline the offer that you have so considerably made to me, for the reasons above given, and I again beg

Other employ-
ments which
would be pre-
ferred by the
writer.

Reasons for
declining the
appointment
offered.

to express the hope that I may be deemed available for such duties at home as I have pointed out, and about which I certainly feel most anxious, as there is nothing so disagreeable to me as leading a life of idleness at a moment like the present, when it is the duty of everybody to put a shoulder to the wheel, and as I am moreover most desirous to prove myself worthy of the kindly feelings that have been shown to me from every quarter, and which lead me to the hope that I may further rise in a profession to which, as you are aware, I have ever been most sincerely attached.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 9, 1855.*

These news are glorious indeed.¹ Would Lord Panmure telegraph, either direct to him or through Lord Raglan, to compliment General Pélessier in her name on the brilliant success and gallantry of the French troops; and Admiral Boxer's death grieves us much, as well as the accounts of the cholera amongst the poor Sardinians.

When Lord Panmure is prepared to submit the list for the Bath, she wishes him to send Lord Raglan's original list also.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private and Confidential.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *June 9, 1855.*

The troops are in the highest spirits.² Their joy was excessive when the fire opened, and they are anxiously desirous of attacking Sebastopol.

¹ Assault and capture of the Quarries, the Mamelon, and the 'White Works,' June 7th.

² In consequence of the success of the third bombardment, which had opened on the 6th June, and of the various assaults which accompanied it. 'On even the first day,' says Kinglake, 'the batteries of the Allies obtained a decisive ascendancy; but from the morning of the following day, they hour by hour asserted their more and more thorough mastery of all the antagonist batteries' (vol. viii. p. 94). The 'White Works' and the Mamelon were then captured by the French, and the 'Quarries' by the English troops.

The success of the French is an immense advantage, though it is the more to be regretted that, when they failed in February, they did not renew the attempt on the Heights, which have since been fortified, the following night. I was afraid, when I saw them advance beyond the Mamelon, they would have to come back. This they were obliged to do; but their supporting columns set all right.

Poor General La Marmora feels deeply the loss of his brother, and the ravages the cholera is making in the Sardinian ranks. He has lost four hundred men, and the disease is not diminishing to any extent, though he told me this morning that he thought the admissions were somewhat fewer yesterday.

I sent an English medical officer to attend his brother. La Marmora was very much pleased with him, and he did all he could for the poor man.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 10, 1855.

Shaftesbury tells me that he has recommended you to send out immediately to the Crimea Drs. Glover and Milroy to assist Dr. Sutherland in making arrangements for the general health of the troops, and for organising a system of tent-to-tent visitation to check the cholera. This would be a very judicious step, and the sooner it was adopted the better; even days would be of importance.

You were saying yesterday that there is not room at Malta for more than 10,000 men. Do you mean that there is not roof accommodation for more, or that there is not encampment room for more? I suppose the surface of the island is nearly all appropriated and cultivated, and that there is not much space where an encampment could be made, but otherwise one should imagine that the island is big enough to hold much more than 10,000 men.

But if it is impossible to quarter more at Malta, could not room be found in the Ionian Islands or at Gibraltar;

Death of
General La
Marmora's
brother.

Recommends
steps to be
taken for check-
ing cholera.

or, if these places would not do, why could we not establish a dépôt for the formation of a foreign corps at Gallipoli, or at Constantinople, where the barracks lately occupied by the 23,000 French are now probably vacant?

Question as to quartering troops at Malta, or alternative stations.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

June 10, 1855.

This is capital news from the Sea of Azof, and the extensive destruction of magazines and supplies, in the towns attacked, must greatly cripple the Russian Army in the Crimea.¹ I am very sorry, however, to see so bad an account of the health of the Sardinians, and I strongly recommend you to urge Raglan by telegraph to-day to move the Sardinian Camp to some other and healthier situation.

News of the successful expedition to Kertch.

Such prevalence of disease as the telegraphic message mentions *must* be the effect of some local cause, and I am as sure as if I was on the spot that these Sardinians are put down in some unhealthy place, from which they ought without the loss of a day to be removed.

Prevalence of illness among Sardinian troops.

Our Quartermaster-Generals never bestow a thought about healthiness of situations, and indeed they in general are wholly ignorant of the sanitary principles upon which any given situation should be chosen or avoided; but if Raglan were to consult Dr. Sutherland on the subject, I am confident he would get a good opinion. At all events these men ought to be removed from where they are without loss of a day, and no excuse of military arrangements ought to be accepted as a pretence for delay.

As the cholera seems to be increasing among the troops, I should advise you to send for Dr. Waller Lewis, who lives at 3 Hinde Street, Manchester Square, and who would give you useful suggestions as to the treatments of the disease, and as to the best way of administering sulphuric acid, which seems now to be the most effectual

Sulphuric acid as a specific against cholera.

¹ Refers to a large number of vessels engaged in transporting supplies for Gortschakoff's army, as well as vast quantities of corn, flour, and stores, which had been captured or destroyed.

remedy, and which, if taken in time, seldom fails in stopping the attack.

Pray also see Hudson,¹ whose direction you will learn at the Foreign Office, and let us set to work to raise five or six thousand Italians according to his suggestion.

Forty thousand
men short of the
number voted
by Parliament.

We are forty thousand men short of the number voted by Parliament, and we shall be without the shadow of an excuse if we do not resort to every possible means and every possible quarter to complete our force to the number which Parliament has authorised; let us get as many Germans and Swiss as we can, let us get men from Halifax, let us enlist Italians, and let us forthwith increase our bounty at home without raising the standard.

This number
must be raised.

Do not let departmental or official or professional prejudices and habits stand in our way; we must override all such obstacles and difficulties. The only answer to give to objections on such grounds is, the thing *must* be done. We *must* have troops; war cannot be carried on without troops; we have asked Parliament for a certain amount of force, and have thereby pledged ourselves to the opinion that such a number is necessary, and we shall disgrace ourselves if we do not make every effort to raise that amount.

We are now getting on in the month of June, and no time is to be lost.

I wish you would send General Ashburnham to me before he goes to Paris, that I may talk over with him the matters he will from time to time have to discuss, according to his instructions, with the French Government.

Do not forget to suggest to our Commissariat people in the Black Sea (I do not say to Filder, because I fear no suggestion can be of much use to that most respectable incapacity, whom you are determined to keep on in a situation for which he is wholly unfit), but do not forget to suggest to some more active and intelligent agents that large supplies of oxen to be eat, and of horses to be ridden or to draw, may be derived from the country on the

¹ British Minister at Turin.

eastern shore of the Sea of Azof, from whence these animals might be brought down to the port of Taman, near the Straits of Kertch, and be from thence carried coastwise to Balaclava; and it would be well also to point their attention to the projecting neck of land, or island, called Krasnoi, in the Bay of Perekop, which is said to abound in sheep and hay. It lies north-west of the coast of the Crimea.

Resources of eastern shore of Sea of Azof to be turned to account.

TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 11, 1855.*

You spoil us by giving us a victory almost daily, and your last exploit in taking so many outer-works from the enemy is indeed most gratifying. I may, however, tell you privately that I suspect these actions of the French, attended as they are by so much serious loss, are far from giving the Emperor the satisfaction which they ought. He has set his mind on a great strategical movement which will drive away the Russian Army from the vicinity of Sebastopol and the north side of its harbour and enable the Allied Armies to make an easy prey of the fortress. For this reason he quarrels with the expedition to Anapa; he regrets the affair of the Quarantine bay, and he will view, I fear, with distaste the gallant recovery of the Mamelon and White Works.

The French Emperor believed to be dissatisfied with present success.

However, I have no doubt that you know better than he or we do how to take Sebastopol in the shortest time and by the least sacrifice of our precious men.

I have sent you some telegraphic messages on the subject of cholera, on which you can have no notion how I am pestered by every description of bore. Between ourselves, Palmerston is naturally nervous for the Army, and listens too much to the people. Then come those who think that they are entire controllers of cholera and every other disease under the sun. Then the homœopaths insist on their nostrum.

Palmerston nervous for the Army.

In fact, all are alarmed and insist on sending advice. I am sorry for Marmora's brother, and can sympathise

with the General. The German and Swiss Legion is beginning to appear, and I hope soon to ship you off some of these troops in addition to your own countrymen. Of course, all these foreign legions will be exclusively your own, though speaking another tongue. I must close this as I am called to the House.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

F.O., *June 11*, 1855.

The following is from Bloomfield's¹ letter received this morning.

Extract from a
letter as to
condition of
Russian Army.

Great sickness prevails in the Russian Army in the Crimea. There are 50,000 men in hospital. Few if any of them recover from severe wounds. The effective force does not exceed 130,000 men. Gortschakoff has reported to the Emperor that there is so great an amount of typhus fever in Sebastopol that it is scarcely possible to remain there, and that the men had better be killed in battle than be left to die there. Provisions, too, are said to be scarce.

Bloomfield believes that this is authentic, and Palmerston thinks it should be telegraphed to Raglan.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *June 12*, 1855.

My official communications of to-day contain all the news I have to communicate to you. Pélissier is much pleased with the notice taken of him by Her Majesty in your telegraphic despatch of the 9th.

Ravages of
cholera in the
Sardinian
Camp.

I am extremely sorry to say that the cholera continues to make sad havoc in the Sardinian Camp. There were ninety-nine fresh cases yesterday and between forty and fifty deaths. The troops, I am assured, are not dispirited, but this sad misfortune greatly affects General de la Marmora. His troops are encamped upon ground which looks all that can be desired.

¹ Lord Bloomfield, British Minister at Berlin.

The accompanying paper shows the state of the cholera with us. You will observe with regret that it is still progressing. . . .

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *June 12, 1855.*

From what I have seen in the newspapers and from what I have heard, I very much fear that the Foreign Legions in the course of formation will come to an untimely end unless you are very cautious indeed in your mode of proceeding. I am very much disposed to think that the system of bounty you have procured their men will never be understood by them, though it may do very well in England. I confess myself wholly averse to the system altogether. You promise a man a bounty of £6, at which he jumps with pleasure, but you tuck on a clause to the effect that out of this £6 he is to pay back nearly one-half for necessaries. The latter is not at all understood, certainly not on the Continent, and the men therefore imagine they have been deceived. Now these foreigners come to us for the money offered and promised, they being to all intents and purposes mercenaries, though that is a word I do not like to see used in public places, but still such is virtually the fact. The subject of this bounty, therefore, is the foundation upon which we work in getting men. It is therefore of immense importance that there should be no mistake in the matter, and that there should be no apparent breach of faith with the men in question, though I fully admit there is, according to the wording of the agreement, no *real* breach of faith. Still stupid fellows will not understand this, and you must make the question put before them more plain and simple, that the stupidest will understand it. The question then arises, are you in want of these foreigners, or do you not wish to have them? If you want them, you must pay for them, and surely it is better to give the additional few pounds of the bounty they have expected than to let the whole thing break down. My own idea is that you will find these corps very valuable,

Fears as to
Foreign
Legions now
in course of
formation.

As to bounty to
recruits for the
Foreign
Legions.

seeing what a want of men we have in our own Army, and cannot procure them even for the Guards. I do hope, therefore, that you will reconsider this most important subject, and will deal with these foreigners in the most liberal manner, either by letting them have the full bounty of £6 promised to them, or by making such other arrangements as you may deem desirable to meet the case. If you do not, you may take my word for it you may retain those you have got, though even this I doubt, but you will certainly get no more, for these men will warn their friends at home not to be taken in in a similar manner with themselves. The papers say that Major von — has resigned his post. This, I fear, will produce a very bad effect, and if the Swiss return home from Dover, that will be even worse. So, if you really want the force, pray be liberal in time. I beg you not to trouble yourself to answer this letter, but when I next see you I hope you will permit me to say a few more words upon this most important subject.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 14, 1855.*

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letter with the interesting despatches, which show how absolutely necessary it is to proceed as rapidly as possible with the siege. She wishes Lord Panmure to convey her entire and high approbation to Sir George Brown for his proceedings at Kertch and Yenikale.

The Queen has received with deep concern the long, sad list of killed and wounded officers, which shows the gallantry, the unequalled gallantry, of her noble Army. It must have been a bloody affair and no doubt very close quarters.¹

Would Lord Panmure express by telegraph our deep

¹ In the assault on the Quarries, Mamelon, and White Works, the French had lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 5440; the English, 693.—Hamley, p. 254.

sympathy with the wounded of all ranks, and her pride at their brilliant gallantry?

Did Lord Panmure convey her congratulations to General Péliissier?

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 15, 1855.*

The Queen has not signed the enclosed Warrants, doing away with the Board of General Officers and establishing the Clothing Department, as from the wording of it she is doubtful as to what is intended by it. Establishment
of Clothing
Department.

The Queen conceives that the new department, after the Clothing has been removed from the Colonels of regiments, will step into their place and provide the Clothing, and that the control over the patterns, shapes, and style will remain as heretofore under the military authorities. The Queen gives her directions with regard to them and her Adjutant-General, who is responsible for the discipline and the due observance of the regulations about dress thus laid down. Any changes or improvements found necessary by the experience gained on service ought to be brought before the Queen by the Commander-in-Chief, and it would never do for the Civil Heads of Departments, who are continually changing and must chiefly aim at giving satisfaction to this or that party in the House of Commons, to make suggestions upon the dress of the Army and become responsible for it to Parliament.

Although the inefficient old Board of General Officers will be very properly done away with, the patterns should, as heretofore, be laid before the Queen by the Adjutant-General, on consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, and be sealed and deposited at the Horse Guards, the Clothing Department superintending the execution of them.

The same rule ought clearly to apply in the case of accoutrements, horse furniture, etc., etc., and the Commander-in-Chief ought at all times to be able, as he is bound, to assemble a Board of Officers to give their opinion on the subject.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

June 15, 1855.

As to recruits
for Foreign
Legion.

I wish you would ask Stutterheim¹ in what manner he proposes that the recruits should be recognised on their arrival at the French frontier and on leaving France, in order that the French authorities may be sure that they are what they represent themselves to be. The necessity for precaution is great in France, or supposed to be so, and we cannot expect the French Government to give a general permission, which would certainly be abused.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

Buckingham Palace, June 16, 1855.

The Queen wishes Lord Panmure to inform Lord Raglan that she entirely approves and is much pleased at his intending to appoint Prince Edward one of his Aides-de-Camp. She wishes we could have some news of operations. There is nothing at all since the 7th.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

June 17, 1855.

I send a note from Persigny² which I cannot answer without your authority.

Exchange of
prisoners.

The Russian Government wants to give Turkish soldiers in exchange for Russian, as they apparently have not enough French and English to complete the exchange. This will not be very advantageous for us, but I suppose it would not be gracious to the Sultan to refuse, and it seems to be asked for exceptionally.

¹ Baron Stutterheim, commanding German Legion.

² Count Persigny, French Ambassador in London.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

June 17, 1855.

The Queen wishes me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter in explanation of the Clothing Warrants. ‘Clothing Warrants.’

She is glad to find that there exists a perfect accordance of opinion and views between you and herself. The second Warrant, however, cannot be considered in accordance with these views.

One of the chief duties of the Board of General Officers was to assist the Commander-in-Chief by their professional advice in determining the fittest patterns for uniforms, accoutrements, and equipments, to be by him submitted for the approval of the Sovereign. Now this is exactly what is NOT intended to be transferred to the Clothing Department; yet it is what the Warrant, as now drawn, would do by simply transferring the functions of the Board of General Officers to the Director-General.

Further, by expressing the Royal Commands that Boards of General Officers are in future to be summoned by the Secretary of State, the Warrant implies that the power of appointing Boards of Officers is for the future transferred from the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State, which according to your letter is the reverse of what you intend.

With regard to the custody of patterns, the custom hitherto prevailing was that the patterns were deposited with the Adjutant-General, and duplicates with each regiment, and it is essential that this should remain so, if he is to continue to be responsible for the strict maintenance of regulations as regards the dress of the Army; and it seems equally important, if we would avoid that greatest of all evils, having to serve two masters, that all correspondence with commanding officers of regiments, with respect to clothing, should go as heretofore through the Horse Guards,—as otherwise every officer would have a double correspondence, one with the Adjutant-General, the other with the Director-General of Clothing, who may give answers at variance with each other.

'Clothing
Warrants.'

The Order in Council states that all patterns, etc., etc., which have been approved of by Her Majesty shall be sealed by the Secretary of State.

If the Sovereign is to continue to settle the patterns, etc., etc., with the Adjutant-General, it will be necessary that a record of this having been done in each instance should precede the communication of the pattern to the Secretary of State, and this can only perfectly be done by the Adjutant-General affixing his seal as heretofore.

This need not prevent the Secretary of State affixing his seal also, nor can I see any difficulty in the Director-General having duplicate patterns deposited with him.

The Queen would wish, therefore, that a Warrant should be submitted to her which would fully meet the objects intended.

LORD PANMURE TO PRINCE ALBERT

June 18, 1855.

As it is essential that the New Clothing Board should get to work as soon as possible, and as it cannot do so till the necessary warrants are signed, I hasten to respond to Your Royal Highness' letter written by Her Majesty's wish.

Difference of
opinion with
Her Majesty.
as to the newly
constituted
Clothing
Board.

It is extremely painful for me to have any difference of opinion with Her Majesty, even on matters of detail. On questions of principle there can be none so long as I have the honour to serve Her Majesty.

I am happy to say that Her Majesty's views are mine upon the question of the authority of the Sovereign to originate, either by the expression of her own will, or on consultation with her Commander-in-Chief, all orders for the clothing, accoutrements, or equipments of her Army. It does not appear to me that the Warrant at all infringes that prerogative. It simply assigns to the Clothing Board the duties hitherto performed by the Board of General Officers and the Colonels of regiments, but, as the Board of General Officers was constituted by a Warrant from the Crown, so it requires a Warrant from the Crown to abolish

it and to desire its records to be transferred to the Director-General of Clothing.

The advice given by the Board of General Officers may be as well given by the Director-General of Clothing, who will be a military officer, as by the Board, and for any further aid the Commander-in-Chief may assemble small bodies of officers, but he cannot constitute a paid board, which requires the Sign Manual of the Sovereign. This can only be done by the Secretary of State, and being in fact a truism, the insertion in the Warrant may be unnecessary.

Constitution of
said Board.

The custody of the sealed patterns must be with the Director-General of Clothing, as it is his duty to see that all contracts are performed conformable to pattern.

1st. In cloth, by the contractors for cloth.

2nd. In clothing, by those who make it up.

3rd. In shoes.

4th. In accoutrements.

All these articles will have been approved by the Queen in consultation with her officers. The pleasure of the Queen that the patterns of which she approves shall be patterns for the Army must be signified by her Secretary of State, for the Commander-in-Chief can signify the Queen's pleasure to no one, nor invoke the Queen's name in any way.

After the patterns are sealed by the official seal of the Secretary of State, applied by the Queen's commands, no one can deviate in any respect from the pattern until altered by the highest authority.

A duplicate set of patterns can be sent to the Adjutant-General, and a certified set sent to each commanding officer of a corps for his guidance by the Director-General of Clothing.

By this means the Queen's control over these matters is preserved. Her Secretary of State is cognisant of all matters for which he is answerable to Parliament, and the Commander-in-Chief remains in his position as the Queen's adviser in the clothing and equipment of the Army without any responsibility except to herself.

Alteration in
mode of pro-
viding for the
clothing of the
Army.

Your Royal Highness must bear in mind the alteration that has taken place in the mode of providing for the clothing of the Army. Formerly the colonels of regiments were the persons who were looked to, to provide the clothing, who ran all risks of change, and carried out, without increased charge, any alterations made, unless they were of such a nature as to incur great outlay—in which case nothing could be done without the consent of the Secretary of War. Now it is wholly different; Parliament has resolved that colonels shall no longer clothe their regiments, but has given them a sum in lieu of the off-reckoning, and taken upon itself the business of clothing the troops.

In carrying out this, I wish to prevent Parliament, so long as I can, from dictating to the Queen according to what form she shall clothe and equip her troops, but on the other [hand] I must secure for Parliament that this is done in the most economical manner befitting the dignity of the country.

For the first Warrant, which I have numbered on the back, No. 1, I can see nothing which I cannot most conscientiously and safely advise the Queen to sign.

The second I will have altered so as to fall in with what I gather to be Her Majesty's wishes, and I will transmit fair copies of them early to-morrow morning for Her Majesty's signature.

TO LORD RAGLAN

BELGRAVE SQUARE, *June 18, 1855.*

I had no time to write to you a private letter by the last mail, and indeed I had little or nothing to say. The rapid tide of success which has poured in upon us has for the present put down grumbling, and I have enjoyed comparative peace in consequence so far as exterior operations are concerned. You seem to be getting on excellently with Pélissier, and I am happy to tell you, but in strict confidence, that his letters to the Emperor are stout and fiercely in support of the counsels at which you mutually

Pélissier and
Raglan in
accord.

arrive. The papers sent home by you in the last mail, and dating from 7th May, have given us an insight into your own proceedings, which you have done yourself injustice by withholding so long. I appreciate your good-natured motives, but I think you ought to consider yourself a little more and your associates a little less. Make your communications as secret as you like, but hide not your own light under a bushel. The course which you and Jones have urged so long was manly and wise, and, had it been adopted sooner, would in all probability have resulted as successfully and at less cost than we have paid.

I see by your secret letters of this morning that you and Pélissier both prefer the pressure of the siege to the exterior movement for investment. All our information goes to the conviction that the Russians are weaker than we are, and, if we stormed the Inkerman heights and gained and occupied the M'Kenzie Ridge, we should compel the enemy to withdraw a great part of his garrison, and either meet us on the field or retreat to the head of the Crimea. However, it is easy to wage war on paper, and I rely on your local information as being by far the best for action. Now it is not so in Paris, and you may shape your course on the information I give you, but you must betray me to no one. The Emperor has made up his mind that Sebastopol cannot be taken by any process of siege tending to regular approach and final assault. He will press Pélissier to insist, and may even issue such stringent orders as shall place Pélissier in the dilemma of having to choose between his master's orders and his own conviction. We shall do all we can to prevent this, and we have agreed with the Emperor that neither from Paris nor London shall any orders for operations be sent which are not *mutual* from our respective Governments. We have also sent to Paris General Torrens to act as the Military Commissioner of the Government, and to keep us advised of all that goes on there, as well as to smooth the anxiety of the Emperor, which seems to increase as our successes improve.

The Emperor's
views at
variance to
theirs.

I have thought it right to give you a full detail of what

could not otherwise be known to you, as it will be a guide to yourself, and enable you perhaps to comprehend more clearly many acts of Pélissier which he may not find himself at liberty to explain.

The expulsion of the Russians from Anapa will give joy in the Camp, and I fancy that the effect must be very prejudicial to the defence of Sebastopol. If it be true that so much pestilence reigns in Sebastopol, I trust, when you get it, you will not let your troops occupy it till thoroughly purged. I must now close this long private letter.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 18, 1855.*

Transfer of
patterns, etc.,
from Board of
General Officers
to Director-
General of
Clothing.

The Queen has signed the enclosed Warrants as altered, trusting to Lord Panmure's taking care, in carrying out the transfer of the Patterns, do. Indents, etc., from the Board of General Officers to the Director-General of Clothing, that the wants and requirements of the Adjutant-General's Department be fully satisfied. She does not enter into any further particulars in that respect, as the Prince has explained at length in his letter of yesterday all the Queen feels and wishes upon the subject.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *June 19, 1855.*

18th June: the
failure at the
Redan and
Malakoff;
Raglan's
explanation of
the same.

The telegraph yesterday conveyed to you the painful intelligence that the attack upon the Malakoff works and the Redan had ended in failure. I confess that I anticipated a very different result, and my feeling was participated in by both armies.

There were, however, several circumstances which combined to render success less probable. Some of these are related in General Rose's despatch to Lord Clarendon.

The determination of General Pélissier not to attack the Russian right, that is, the town of Sebastopol, whereby the enemy were enabled to concentrate a larger force in

the faubourg of Karabelnaya, was very unfortunate. The change of the hour of attack was also a great mistake. General Péliissier said here, on Sunday morning, that it was desirable that the Artillery should have a couple of hours after daylight the following morning to destroy any repairs the Russians might have made in the night, and that he should open the attack by the troops at five or half-past five, as his Commanding Officer of Artillery on the spot might determine. I was surprised, therefore, to learn from General Jones in the evening that, at a meeting at the French headquarters, it had been determined that the advance of the French should be at three A.M., and thus the objects for which it was proposed the attack should be delayed were defeated. Thus the mistake of General Mayran as to the signal, and the delay of General Brunet in supporting him, must have tended greatly to embarrassment, and to check the ardour of the French troops.

Alteration by
the French of
hour fixed for
their attack.

I am quite surprised at General Rose's statement that the French got into the Malakoff. General Péliissier did not mention the circumstance to me, although the opportunity was afforded him, for he was asked in my presence if his right column had succeeded in reaching the enemy's works, and he simply replied in the negative ; whereas, if his left column had been successful for a moment, he would not have failed to have said so. The greatest mistake is the partial attack of Sebastopol. If the attack had been general, the enemy's troops must have been scattered, and there could have been no great massacre there, and if confusion on their part had ensued, total defeat would have been the consequence ; whereas, had we succeeded yesterday, the town itself would have remained to have been assaulted. But General Péliissier continued firm in his decision, though it was opposed to the opinion and recommendation of General Niel and the other principal officers of Engineers. My impression is that he is in great apprehension lest his army should run riot in the event of the successful assault of the town, and should in consequence get into disorder and expose itself to defeat. This is not unlikely, but it is rather late in the operation to be

'The greatest
mistake is the
partial attack
of Sebastopol.

governed by such an objection. I always guarded myself from being tied down to attack at the same moment as the French, and I felt that I ought to have some hope of their success before I committed our troops; but when I saw how stoutly they were opposed, I considered it was my duty to assist them by attacking myself, and both Sir George Brown and General Jones, who were by my side, concurred with me in thinking that we should not delay to move forward. Of this I am quite certain, that, if the troops had remained in our trenches, the French would have attributed their non-success to our refusal to participate in the operation.

On the failure
at the Redan.

I never had a conception before of such showers of grape as they poured upon us from the Russian works. Some of the grape must have been thrown from very heavy guns. Our loss is very considerable. The heaviest is that sustained by General Eyre's Brigade. I have not yet got his report. It was proposed that the French should co-operate with him; but they did it to a very limited extent, though, at the request of General Pélissier, General Eyre went to General de Salis late in the evening of the 17th, to discuss proceedings with him. General de Salis commands the 1st Corps d'Armée, and has charge of all the French trenches between the sea and our left. The failure of yesterday is a great affliction to me and a sad disappointment to the Army, whose spirits are, however, I am happy to say, by no means broken or shaken by what has happened.

Army morally
unshaken by
the reverse.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 20, 1855.*

Appointment
of General
Torrens as
British Com-
missioner in
Paris.

Lord Clarendon has just brought General Torrens here, on his appointment to Paris; the Queen hears that he is to be considered as in Lord Panmure's department, and is to correspond with him. She therefore writes to Lord Panmure to express to him her wishes that General Torrens should—before he goes—be put in complete possession of the state of affairs in the Camp before

Sebastopol, and that he should therefore see all the despatches which have come from Lord Raglan latterly, in order that, when he is in communication with the French Government, he may be able to speak *de connaissance de cause*. Likewise that for the future Lord Raglan's despatches should be communicated to him; this is of the utmost importance, as the chief use of General Torrens's mission is to be able to prevent differences on military matters between the two Governments.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, June 21, 1855.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's note. Baron Marochetti might bring the model of the monument for Scutari at 3 to-morrow. She wishes Lord Panmure to come at the same time.

The Queen seizes this opportunity to remind Lord Panmure of the 'Minutes' which he promised to prepare in accordance with the memorandum she sent him about four weeks ago, which he has not yet sent to her.

The Queen wishes also to repeat (as she knows Lord Panmure has so many things to think of) once more her wish that, if possible, the medals should be distributed to the sick and wounded soldiers at Chatham.

Distribution of medals to sick and wounded soldiers at Chatham.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, June 21, 1855.

I am very sorry for the repulse and for the loss, which must have been severe.

The repulse from the Redan.

If the two armies had stormed the fortified heights between Mackenzie's Farm and the end of the harbour, they would certainly not have lost as many men as have fallen in these repeated assaults, and success there would have enabled them to cut off the communication between the town and the covering army. I wonder that they

should not have better known the nature of the works they were going to attack; a ditch and a wall require that a breach should be made, and that the guns should be silenced before an assault is given. This seems to have been similar to the mistake made by the Duke of Wellington in his first attempt on Badajos.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G.C., June 22, 4 A.M.

The assault on
the Redan.

This is indeed a monster calamity! Just as we thought ourselves on the way to final success, and the loss of the Russians has probably been insignificant.

The Queen will be in despair. If anything consolatory occurs to you, I hope you will send it to her, but I am utterly at a loss to devise any soothing message for the Emperor. Perhaps Cowley's despatch may afford some opening.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, June 22, 1855.

Failure of
assault on
Sebastopol.

Lord Panmure will easily believe with what pain and disappointment the Queen and Prince have received the news of the unsuccessful attack on the Redan and Malakoff Tower—though the Queen is by *no means* disheartened. Her heart bleeds at the thought of so much loss; for the loss of *every* individual man—whose worth is so great—is to *her* like that of a friend! *All* are *alike* dear to her! Still we must expect reverses. What will next be done?

The Queen grieves for poor Sir John Campbell, and dreads to see who else may have fallen.

Won't Lord Panmure inform Lord Raglan of her grief that so much gallantry should have been unrewarded with success, and that we should have to deplore so heavy a loss?

TO LORD RAGLAN

BELGRAVE SQUARE, *June 23, 1855.*

The reverse which has fallen on the troops in the attacks on the Redan is the subject of great regret, as you may suppose, but every one feels that no discredit has fallen on our Army, and all exclaim, 'Better luck next time.' The failure of the telegraph between Bucharest and Vienna since the 18th has been the occasion of a sad state of suspense to every one who has relations fighting under your command, and those vile newsmongers cry all sorts of exaggerated intelligence through the streets. After an affair of the kind you must send me a list of the officers killed as soon as you can, for I write to their friends before I make public mention of the names, and a most painful task it is to perform. The result of this failure on the part of the French will have very bad effects on the Emperor, and lead him, I fear, to issue some orders to Pélissier which may annoy him, and embarrass the future plans of both of you. He is singularly low at present, and as he has a tendency to a depression of spirits, you can make allowance for his communications when in that condition. I do not intend to criticise your operations, and especially as I learn from you that Pélissier and you are of one mind in preferring the siege to the attempt to invest. Still I cannot help thinking that if, while you were attacking the town, Bosquet had attacked the heights of Inkerman and M'Kenzie's Farm, we might have succeeded in carrying the position, and so cutting off access to Sebastopol. We are informed, from sources on which we can rely, that Gortschakoff has informed the Emperor of Russia that he has 130,000 men to occupy the whole Crimea, Sebastopol included, of whom 50,000 are in hospital; that the town is, from disease and failure of supplies, no longer tenable, and he has demanded permission to come out and fight you. How does this tally with your information? Moreover, we have learnt from the Intendant-General of the Russian Army that he is in

The reverse
sustained at
the Redan.

The enemy in
Sebastopol
reported suffer-
ing from illness
and want of
supplies.

deep anxiety as to his supplies. The capture of the Sea of Azof, and the destruction and interruption of all supplies from thence, must have a serious effect on the enemy's plans, and I look upon your occupation of Sebastopol ere long as certain. The affair at Hango,¹ where our flag of truce has been fired on and our people murdered, has created an immense sensation here. I cannot tell you how sorry we all are for poor Yea.² I wrote to his sister, and likewise to Lady Campbell and Mrs. Shadforth, as soon as your accounts came. The Sebastopol Committee have reported. I have not seen the blue-book, but I am told Layard had some flings at you, but they were rejected by the Committee. They have stuck in a sting in the tail of their report, and out of it Mr. Roebuck has educed venom. He names 2nd July for a Vote of Censure against the members of the late Government, including those of it who are in the present Government. I do not imagine it will come to anything. We are getting on with our Foreign Legion, and I hope soon to send you some German troops as well as a Swiss Corps. I have begun to prepare the warm clothing for another winter, in case you should be called on to spend it in the Crimea, so that I hope we shall not be found 'too late' again. You must be well pleased to have Scarlett as your Cavalry Chief. Cardigan remains at home permanently.

Wishing you every success, etc.

FROM LORD RAGLAN

Private.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, *June 23, 1855.*

Ravages of
cholera among
Sardinians and
our own troops.

I have received your letter of the 8th. I certainly have every reason to be satisfied with General La Marmora, but the cholera has committed sad ravages in the ranks of the Sardinian Contingent, which has lost above 800 men, and between 40 and 50 officers. Moving about has done

¹ In which a British boat's crew, bearing a flag of truce, had been fired upon and killed.

² Colonel Lacy Yea, a brilliant soldier.

it no good, and yesterday Colonel Cadogan¹ informed me that the cases of the day had increased. I don't think it increases materially in numbers with us, but we have lost two or three officers in the last two days, and General Estcourt is suffering under the disease at this moment. Yesterday we almost despaired of him. This morning there is some hope, though I fear a faint one, of his recovery.

Lieut.-General Pennefather is obliged to leave the Army, which I deeply regret. He is a fine, gallant spirit, and a man entirely to be depended upon. He is prostrate from diarrhœa. Brown is also unwell from the same complaint. But he, I hope, will be well in a day or two. The oppressive heat of the weather affects everybody more or less.

The 13th Regiment has not yet arrived from Gibraltar. The whole of the Infantry is now on this siege, and this makes the duty of the trenches lighter. The Marines only are near Balaclava. The establishment of a submarine telegraph to Constantinople is very important, and will be a great satisfaction to Lord Stratford. Miscellaneous items.

I am glad to hear that you have been able to provide satisfactorily for Sir Thomas Troubridge. . . .

I have always felt that the recruiting would be a difficulty, and I doubt your being able to get a sufficiency of men unless you enforce the ballot for the Militia, and then allow the Militia to volunteer as they did in the last war. However, you might try high bounty in the first instance. I would earnestly advise you not to raise another regiment of Foot Guards. I dare say the formation of an Irish regiment would take, but, if once established, its reduction at the peace would give great offence, and yet reduction must follow the close of the war, and it would be hard that the position of the regiments now existing should be injuriously affected by the creation of a new regiment for the war. And it would be difficult to find officers for a new regiment, where it would need to live in London, and Recruiting.
As to proposed formation of an Irish Regiment.

¹ Colonel the Hon. G. Cadogan, British Commissioner with the Sardinian Contingent.

without the advantage of barracks or lodging-money. Pray save us from ticket-of-leave men.

Drunkenness in camp, favoured by proximity of the French.

It is very difficult to control drunkenness, surrounded as our camps are by French camps, where there are canteens in which ardent spirits, often of the worst quality, are sold. At one time French canteens were established upon the different roads, and did a great deal of mischief. I got rid of these, and prevailed upon the French General to have the cantineers restricted to their own lines, but French soldiers roam about, often with bottles of spirits concealed under their coats. These when discovered are escorted to their own camps, but drunkenness is not treated as a crime in the French Army as it is in ours, and the officers do not notice it.

Very little crime in the Army.

Clothing of troops.

Besides the Assistant Provost-Marshal, attached to each Division, I have recently established a Deputy Provost-Marshal, who rides about the country with an escort of Dragoons, and puts a check upon any irregularity he falls in with. This arrangement will, I think, answer very well. There is, however, very little crime in the Army, and it is extraordinary how rarely I have to assemble a General Court-Martial. The summer clothing finds great favour, but for duty before the enemy the men appear in red. I ordered that they should be in uniform as soon as they were able to take leave of the warm clothing.

Disorders among the navvies.

Navvies should be made all possible use of, but they will be difficult to manage, and I shall send you to-day or by next mail a letter from Mr. Romaine on the necessity of having a special code for their government. The navvies here have lately been in a state of mutiny, and two days ago I was obliged to send Colonel Pakenham to them, to announce that he would appear next morning with the Provost-Marshal, supported by a Military Force, to punish any who should refuse to go to work, or to obey the orders they might receive. The sight of the Provost-Marshal had all due effect, and I have had no complaint of them to-day. Mr. Beattie is away, and the gentleman he has left in charge is not supposed to have any influence over the men.

Mr. Cattley will endeavour to ascertain the extent of the supplies conveyed to the Russian Army by the Sea of Azof.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 24, 1855.*

The Queen's patience, and, indeed, she might say *nerves*, begin to be most painfully tried by this incomprehensible silence of Lord Raglan's, and she suffers deeply for the agonising suspense of so many families. Would not Lord Panmure telegraph to Lord Raglan to ask what it means, and to tell him that nothing but those two telegraphs of yesterday (the one really quite absurd at such a moment) have reached us, and that we *must* have a few words to say what is going on, and, still more, the names of the brave men who have fallen or are wounded?

Silence of
Lord Raglan.

Perhaps Lord Panmure has already done this? The suspense is hardly, the Queen must own, to be borne any longer.

TO LORD RAGLAN

BELGRAVE SQUARE, *June 25, 1855.*

I wrote you on Saturday and therefore have very little to say to-day, except that our anxiety has been relieved by receiving the stray message which contained the sad list of casualties. Your notice of Sir George Grey's son¹ was a kind and considerate act, and relieved his mind exceedingly. I shall send another regiment or two to you as soon as possible, and I think that I may very likely have a demand from you to that effect as soon as the telegraph is in working order again. The destruction of the Museum at Kertch is a very wanton proceeding, and creates great regret among the savants here. It seems to have been the doing of the Turks.

I do not know whether I mentioned the intention of

¹ Noticing his conduct in the field.

erecting a monument at Scutari to those who have died there. It will be in memory likewise of all who have perished in the war. Baron Marochetti has designed a very fine model.

The Queen and
Lord Raglan's
letters.

By the bye, I think it right you should know what fell from the Queen the other day. We were talking of you, and she said: 'I wonder why Lord Raglan does not write me oftener; I told him to write, but I have only heard from him once or twice.' You should give Her Majesty a letter now and then, as it pleases her very much. I grieve to learn the ravages of cholera amongst the Sardinians.

TO LORD RAGLAN

WAR DEPARTMENT, *June 25, 1855.*

It affords me great pleasure to forward to you the Queen's licence to accept and wear the Order of the Medjidie of the First Class, which the Sultan has conferred upon you, and which you have so highly merited by the eminent services rendered by you to the Turkish Empire.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 26, 1855.*

The Queen much regrets the death of poor General Estcourt, who was a very worthy man; she feels much for his poor wife, who, she believes, was in the Crimea, and perhaps Lord Panmure would in that case send a kind message in her name to Mrs. Estcourt.

The Queen agrees in thinking that Lieutenant-Colonel Pakenham's appointment should only be temporary, and that General Markham would be the best for that post—if he would not be still more useful in command of a Brigade or Division. A Lieut.-Colonel seems almost too young for so important a post as that of Adjutant-General.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *June 27, 1855.*

Did you read the account in Saturday's *Times* of the plundering and other acts of violence at Kertch and Yenikale?¹ It is not unlikely that some questions may be asked, or some observations made, on these doings in Parliament. It would, I think, be a good thing that you should call on Sir G. Brown to explain what precautions he took to preserve the unoffending inhabitants from violence, and private property and the Museum from pillage.

Disorders following the successes in the Kertchine Peninsula.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 28, 1855.*²

The news contained in the telegraph Lord Panmure has sent the Queen has alarmed her a good deal, and she would wish to see Lord Panmure in order to talk to him upon various important points. Could he come at one o'clock to-day?

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 30, 1855.*

The Queen has written a few lines to General Simpson which she thinks may gratify and encourage him and the Army—which she wishes Lord Panmure to send by to-night's mail.

We think Lord Panmure's telegraphic message admirable.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *June 30, 1855.*

No words can describe to you the deep sorrow and affliction which I feel at the news which you were so con-

On receiving news of Lord Raglan's death.

¹ See Kinglake, vol. viii. p. 47 *et seq.*

² Lord Raglan died June 28th.

siderate as to send me this morning. You can easily imagine, my dear friend, all I suffer and feel at this dreadful intelligence, for I have known and valued Lord Raglan from a boy, and his loss, not only as a man but also as a valued and respected public servant, at the first moment is fearful to contemplate. God give us strength to bear up against all these sad afflictions that come upon us. What a lesson it is to all of us never to be elated with our success! I can conceive the anxiety this event has caused you and the Government. God grant that my dear, excellent friend Brown may recover sufficiently to take the command of the Army, but at all events we know it is in safe hands in those of our friend Simpson.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

CRIMEA, *June 30, 1855.*Gloom in
Camp.

I have kept you informed of the events of the last few days by telegraph. You may easily believe the gloom that pervades this Camp!

Sir George Brown goes away this morning, Pennefather is gone some days ago—both decided loss to the Army.

The weather is cool, and cholera therefore on the decline—I do not think the deaths from it just now exceed 20 a day. I dread the return of heat, however, for, if cholera becomes epidemic, our men are so worn out that they will possibly sink in great numbers.

The railroad.

I beg to call attention to the railroad. It is not answering its purpose, because engineers and navvies have in great numbers refused to work, and it is plain that they all wish to leave the country. If the Army winters here, it will just be the same as last year—there will be no road. Two days' rain renders it quite impassable for wheels. We have no hands to make roads, which ought now to be in progress. The French are fully employed in keeping up and re-forming their roads, but I see they just put a company or a regiment to the work. We

cannot do so. I mention this subject, because I foresee what will happen.

As regards the great object before us—the taking of Sebastopol—we continue working hard; but the enemy work harder. It will be found no easy task to enter the place.

The Sardinians are in position on the Tchernaya. They have been sadly used by the cholera.

Omar Pasha is in position further out at Baidar. Canrobert is also on the Tchernaya, and I consider these Forces safe from attack, and they are in close support should Omar be pressed from the outside.

I feel it very irksome and embarrassing to have to do with these Allies! No man can equal our lamented Chief in that respect. I sincerely trust, my Lord, that a General of distinction will be sent immediately to command this Army. Circumstances urgently demand that this Army should be commanded by the most eminent and best known soldier we have. With the Allies we have to deal with, this is of vital consequence. I have put myself in Orders to command until instructions from England shall come; but my health is sure to give way, as I have constant threatenings of gout in spite of all the care I take, and it may come some day too hard for me to bear! I cannot conceal this from my own conviction, and therefore hope soon to be relieved from work that is too much for me. All our Generals fall sick one after the other!

Simpson's
despondency.

I hope to be excused for entering into these details, but they cannot well be given in a public letter.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *June 1855.*

The Queen sends these very interesting despatches back. It is but too clear that the French are the sole cause of the failure. It is a satisfaction in one sense of the word, but very annoying for the future. The Queen fears poor Lord Raglan must have worried himself so

much that it hastened his death. As the Prince was unfortunately out, the Queen hopes Lord Panmure will let her have the copies soon.

Lord Panmure should take care that these despatches are communicated as speedily as possible to General Torrens.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *June 30, 1855.*

Recommends
pensions to
Lord Raglan's
widow and
eldest son.

I have taken the Queen's pleasure that a message shall be sent down to Parliament on Monday, recommending the grant of a pension of a thousand a-year to Lady Raglan during her life, and a pension of two thousand a-year to her son, Lord Raglan, with remainder to his next heir male on succeeding to the title, that is to say for two lives. The pension to Lady Raglan not to interfere with the established pension as an officer's widow.

Perhaps you will take steps to make Her Majesty's gracious intentions known to Lady Raglan.

ADMIRAL HOUSTON STEWART TO LORD PANMURE

Private and Confidential.

'HANNIBAL,' OFF SEBASTOPOL, *June 30, 1855.*

I have nothing very cheering to tell you, but I think you will rather like to have a few lines from me in the present circumstances, and, although I am unable to offer you any valuable opinion or suggestion, I can at all events tell you what *I think*, and, to a certain degree, what others think, of our present position, and this I do not to you as *Minister*, but to my old and dear friend of 30 years and upwards.

After Lord
Raglan's death.

Lord Raglan's death is so very recent (only 36 hours since) that we can scarcely yet realise it, and the gloom cast over Army and Navy is, as you may suppose, very great. Added to which our excellent Admiral is suffering the most poignant grief on account of the death of his brave and truly meritorious son, Captain Lyons, of the

Miranda, who died at Therapia Hospital on the 23rd inst., from a wound received on the night of the 17th from the batteries of Sebastopol. Nevertheless, on hearing of Lord Raglan's death, Sir Edmund made signal to me, and we proceeded yesterday morning to headquarters, where Sir Edmund and I had long interviews with General Jones, R.E., and with General Simpson, the Senior Officer succeeding to the command of the Forces, as Sir G. Brown is invalided, and goes home this afternoon, very ill, in the *Nubia*. General Simpson is evidently *oppressed* by the responsibility of the position he finds himself in, and makes no secret of his anxious desire to be relieved as soon as possible. He is a sensible old man, sees things in a pretty correct light, but at the same time is not sufficiently young, active, enterprising, and *elastic* for the Crimea. Indeed, dear Lord Panmure, we have a tangled web here, and great and puzzling difficulties to contend with, and it is *full time* to look ahead. We are here at the last day of *June*, and I do believe that no man can predict the issue with any justifiable degree of confidence. The *best man* here, in my humble opinion, is General Jones of the R.E.,¹ and one of the very best of the Generals is Codrington. He has been attacked severely with diarrhœa, and was obliged to take refuge on board ship. He is now greatly better, and I hope will be all right in a few days, when, as General Simpson told me yesterday, he is to take command of the *Light Division*.

'A tangled web.'

One great difficulty is the obstinacy and despotism of Pélissier, the French General-in-Chief. He will hear *not a word* from his own officers, gives a lecture, a *sic volo—sic jubeo* sort of thing, which, if his talents were *really superior*, would not be objectionable; but then he inclined to do the same thing with even Lord Raglan, and now, I fear, will be more difficult to deal with. It is true I have often thought Lord Raglan did not assume a sufficiently *positive* position. His patience and courtesy were inexhaustible, and he allowed the Frenchman to declaim, although conscious, as he must have felt, of his own

¹ C.E. in the Crimea.

superiority. Yet as Admiral Bruat more than once remarked to me after a conference, 'Do you know Lord Raglan's own opinion or plan? He gave none. I never heard him give any at any time I have met his Lordship. If he would state his opinion, I think his rank and experience and position would ensure respect and probable acquiescence from our Generals.' Yet the manner in which Lord Raglan has uniformly maintained the *entente cordiale* is worthy of all praise, and what few—very few—men so placed, and *so teased*, could have done. And this forms one of the chief difficulties of the position of the Commander of the English Forces—which, as compared with those of the French, are numerically so small that the Frenchman would appear to have some grounds for being the *Top sawyer*, but which I fear *none of them* are well qualified to be. Still, admitting all Lord Raglan's wonderful equanimity, courtesy, tact, and temper, I have sometimes doubted whether more *firmness* (and by that I mean decisive opinion) displayed on his Lordship's part might not have led to better results. It appears almost like *vile treason* on my part to *imagine a shade* to the disparagement of Lord Raglan, the most considerate, kind-hearted, generous, and *thoroughly brave* man that can be imagined, and that too so soon after he is laid low; but it is only *to you* I write, and you will understand, at least I hope you will understand, *my meaning*. I doubt if Lord Raglan's loss will be as deeply appreciated in England just now as it is here. *Here* it seems to be thought almost irreparable; but I trust not. They seem to imagine Lord Hardinge¹ will come out. I should think—I had almost said *I hope*, not. We want younger men—men of judgment and sufficient foresight, but of decision and prompt action, with conciliatory temper, and, if it be possible, also an ability to discuss matters *in French*.

Lord Raglan's
want of
firmness.

General Jones.

General Jones of the R.E. appears to me, and I know he does also to Sir E. Lyons, to take a wise and correct view of our position, and I am bound to tell you that it is not a very cheering one. His advice and plans hitherto

¹ Commander-in-Chief of the British Army.

have constantly been rejected or evaded by the French General. And so late as the 18th inst. he had gained Lord Raglan's assent to the assault being made *that same* evening—in the Bastion du Mât, where, it is strongly believed, the Allies might have gone into the town. The perplexing thing is that, after bombardment, the French always seem to desire to be quiet, and to *amend* and *extend* their batteries; but the moment the fire is relaxed, the Russians set to work and *renew* and make still stronger every point of their most formidable and well-designed defences.

The French are now constructing a new battery, with which they hope and believe they can destroy the ships, or force the Russians to sink them. I cannot offer any opinion worth having as to this, but I see it is much doubted. In fact, unless the Malakoff be taken, little or nothing can be done—the Redan cannot be taken, and, even if taken, cannot be held, unless the Malakoff be first of all secured. Pélissier spoiled the attack of the 18th by two mistakes. Pélissier's mistakes. Firstly, having settled that the assault should take place at half-past five or 6 A.M., and *after* two hours of good pounding by our batteries, yet at 9 P.M. on the 17th he changed his mind, and sent word to Lord Raglan that he meant to attack at 3 A.M., when all guards and garrisons and good officers are habitually on the *qui vive*, and meditating or expecting mischief. This of itself was unfair and discourteous to Lord Raglan, who had no time to protest or offer an opinion against the change. Secondly, the French columns blundered about the signal, and did not support each other, which caused Lord Raglan to order his attack on the Redan *before* the Malakoff was secured—he having the choice of being reproached for not having partaken of the attack at all, or of ordering the attack before the requisite success had been achieved by the French. And the French supports *were far too distant* and not available, otherwise the Malakoff would have been taken, for General Simpson assured me that one French battalion was actually cut to pieces *within* the Malakoff!!!'

The news received yesterday of Lüders' arrival at Bakshi Serai with upwards of 30,000 troops is not of a nature to raise our spirits, although there are plenty of troops here, if properly handled, to make our safety certain. But I confess I am very anxious, because I neither hear nor see *any plan* as being made and determined upon by the Generals, and Simpson acknowledged yesterday that he did not know what Pélissier's intentions were, although he had met him repeatedly in conference with Lord Raglan, and had seen him himself yesterday morning. Sir E. Lyons' advice and mine to Simpson was, to advise and consult seriously and carefully with General Jones, to form an opinion, and, if possible, a plan of proceeding, in accordance with Jones' advice and his own judgments, and then to see Pélissier and come to a distinct, but perfectly courteous and friendly, understanding (*if possible*) with him as to what is to be done. I fear Lüders' making an attack on the Tchernaya while the garrison makes a strong sortie at the same moment. But I fear still more that he will make a strong and desperate effort to recover possession of the Straits of Kertch, where the chief portion of the small garrison are *Turks*. I have told Sir Edmund I think the naval force there should be strengthened, and he is doing it—and meant to do it before I spoke. Now then comes the question. What will be the end of this? Certainly to take the South Side and destroy the dockyard and shipping would be of vast importance. But Sebastopol will *not then* be taken, and cannot be available as a harbour, nor, as most people think, could it be long retained, until the *North Side* be also captured, or, at all events, invested. *It* (the North Side) is *very strong*, and being made daily stronger wherever labour and skill can be applied. But, supposing Sebastopol is not taken within a few weeks hence, what prospect is there for the Army? To winter in the Crimea once more; and this should and must be held in view, and preparations made accordingly. If these be made, it will by no means be so severe or trying a business as was last year's. But I repeat the thing should be looked *timeously* in the face. I think the Commissary

Speculations as
to the future.

should even already be forming dépôts on the Camp Heights, and the road should be looked to, and branches formed to the railway, so as to reach different encampments. We *could not withdraw and re-embark* our Army without a Convention, and this last word is not to be mentioned or thought of. Pélissier and, in fact, all their Generals that we have seen here are in reality men of no experience, whose *raids* in Algeria have given them no practice in real warfare, who have been always accustomed to attack in overwhelming superiority of numbers, and never been accustomed to *face Artillery*, of which the French of the present Army appear to have considerable dread. Pélissier treats Omar Pasha with undisguised hauteur and almost contempt. And General La Marmora dislikes him, Pélissier, as an over-bearing, self-opinionated parvenu! I forgot to mention that Lyons' advice to Simpson yesterday, which I enforced as strongly as I could, was to get Omar Pasha's and Marmora's concurrence, by previous consultations, to any plan he and Jones might decide upon, and *thus* he would have *their* votes and support in conference with Pélissier. There is a General of Engineers—*Niel*, whom we all think meanly of as an Engineer, but who has hitherto countenanced Jones' plans and suggestions—to whom we are in a good measure indebted for the recall of the first expedition against Kertch, and who did all in his power to prevent the second from being arranged. In my presence, at the Conference, the first after Pélissier assumed the command, he declared in glowing and energetic terms that he would 'forfeit his right hand if Sebastopol were not ours in one month or six weeks at the latest from that date, *provided* we sent off no troops to Kertch, but, if we undertook the expedition to Kertch, we should fail in that object and fail in capturing Sebastopol.'

Inexperience
of French
Generals.

I presume you are well aware that the reasons against an advance into the field by the English are that they cannot leave their trenches and works unprotected, and that both French and Turks positively refuse to take charge of them—whilst, on the other hand, the French

Inability of the
British to
advance into
the field.

will not advance *without* the English. Meanwhile the Russians are fortifying every road and pass with the most unwearied energy and conspicuous skill. Certainly, if we get the South Side of Sebastopol, we shall thereby (if we can hold it) avoid the harassing work and fatal losses from shot and disease incurred from incessantly guarding the trenches. And that will be a *very great* advantage of itself. I cannot perceive myself the great value of the large force at Eupatoria, as they dare not venture out, and do not hitherto occupy the attention of any large force of the enemy in watching them. The English mustered yesterday morning 20,000 *effective bayonets*. Whoever is permanently to command the English Army should be appointed and appear *as speedily as possible*. . . . How true it is that the value of a thing is never rightly appreciated until it is lost. Even already old Boxer is regretted and his usefulness admitted. . . .

The Admiralty are eager for an attack upon *Odessa*; what possible advantage can spring from that, unless you are prepared with Land Force to a great extent by which to take possession of it, I am at a loss to perceive. Hard knocks on both sides, but *ultimate* withdrawal on the part of the fleet inevitable, and a consequent claim of having gotten the best of it asserted by the enemy. I speak, *of course*, against my own inclination in deprecating attack upon *anything* and *everything* rather than resting inactive. As to the fleet attacking Sebastopol, it would be sheer madness, and the very best thing which could happen to the Czar. In former wars, people never dreamt of our blockading fleets attacking the batteries of Brest, or Toulon, or Rochefort. Those of Sebastopol are much more formidable, and the general use of shells and hot shot make it far more destructive to shipping. In fact, unless ships can be brought within 500 yards of strong land batteries, I conceive they can have little chance of success. Algiers and Acre afford no criterions, for in both instances the ships were permitted to take up their positions, at Algiers completely unopposed, and at Acre very nearly so.

The fleet power-
less against
Sebastopol.

CHAPTER VII

JULY 1855

AT the seat of war the month of July was characterised by a lull, following the unsuccessful attempt on the Redan; whilst at home the nomination of a successor to Lord Raglan engrossed attention.

On the death of the latter, a telegraphic despatch from the Government had appointed Major-General Simpson, then serving as Chief of the Staff, to the command of the British Forces in the Crimea—an appointment in which he was confirmed on July 18th.

But, though a brave soldier, Simpson had not the qualities of a leader, and it soon became evident that the demands of the position were in excess of his abilities—a fact to which his own excessive modesty, not to say diffidence, was the chief means of attracting attention.

His position, indeed, was one which might well have daunted a stronger man.

Advanced in years and of infirm health, he found the mere correspondence which now devolved on him almost beyond his powers, for he had none of Raglan's aptitude for that branch of his duties.

But this was by no means the worst.

During his latter days, Lord Raglan had come in for much adverse criticism, but no sooner was he gone than his loss began to be severely felt, for there was none left who could compare with him—in the words of the Queen—in 'name, experience, position, rank, prestige.' And,

whatever might have been his shortcomings as a general in the field, his tact and the universal respect which he inspired had been of almost incalculable value in minimising friction and composing dissensions among the Allied Commanders.

Of authority of this kind Simpson possessed nothing, and the result was quickly seen.

From the outset there had been apparent at the Military Councils a disposition to treat Omar with scant ceremony, and the native bluntness of Pélissier's manners had not tended to lessen this.

Accordingly the Turkish Commander now proposed, or threatened, to withdraw his troops from the Crimea, where they could ill be spared, to the relief of Kars—a threat, which, though in the meantime averted, revealed the existence of a real danger.

Hence, in a private letter to Lord Panmure, Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart, an acute observer, expresses his fears of 'divided Councils'; whilst, as early as July 14th, Simpson himself writes as follows: 'The more I see and reflect upon the condition of things here, the more I am struck with the conviction that these four armies never can carry on any joint or united operation in their present condition. We want one great man to direct the whole.'

To add to the difficulties of the writer's position, the cholera at this juncture deprived him of two able coadjutors, whose places were by no means easy to fill—namely, of Mr. Calvert, *alias* Cattley, the Chief of the Intelligence Department, and Colonel Vico, French Commissioner with the British Army.

In these adverse circumstances, Lord Panmure did all that could be done to support his friend, the British Commander, by sympathy, exhortation, and advice; and it was only when he saw that these things had failed that he made up his mind to the inevitable.

Already on July 14th, the appointment of a successor to Simpson had been discussed in the Cabinet, with the result that, before the end of the month, a Dormant Commission had been made out in favour of General Codrington.

Meantime the British works had been advancing very close to the enemy's position, the number of casualties among the British troops increasing in proportion.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *July 1, 1855.*

The Queen is glad that Sir G. Brown is not likely to add to those who have fallen victims to the trying climate of the Crimea, and is coming home.

She feels much for General Simpson—though she confidently trusts that Lord Panmure's expectations of him will be realised.

As the Queen goes out of town at the beginning of next week, the Investiture of the Bath must be held *this* week; she therefore wishes Lord Panmure would at once send her the lists, in order that she may see the proposed names, which she can then talk over with him and Lord Hardinge.

The Queen is the more anxious to do this soon, as she thinks it will help to cheer the Army.

She sees that the mail with the details of the affair of the 18th will be here to-morrow.

MEMORANDUM AS TO CONDUCT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS IN
THE WAR DEPARTMENT, SUBMITTED BY LORD PANMURE
TO THE QUEEN, AND APPROVED BY HER MAJESTY

(Signed) V.R.

The enclosed Memorandum is most humbly submitted in duplicate to Your Majesty, as containing Lord Panmure's views as to the conduct of military affairs in the War Department, by Your Majesty's most devoted and most obedient servant,

(Signed) PANMURE.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 2, 1855.*

(Signed) V.R.

Appointments
and promo-
tions.

Memorandum for the guidance of the Secretary of State on the mode of dealing with certain military subjects in relation to the discipline, appointments, and promotion in the Army, the planning and construction of fortresses and barracks, and the arming, equipping, and clothing the troops.

A copy of this paper has been placed in Her Majesty's hands.

1. The Queen is the fountain of all appointments to, and promotions in, the Army, the list being submitted to Her Majesty by the Commander-in-Chief.

Appointments to military commands at home and abroad ought to be concurred in by the Secretary of State before they are formally submitted for Her Majesty's approval.

WORKS

Works.

2. The sum to be expended in works will be fixed by the Cabinet.

The localities and character of the works must be determined by the War Minister in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief and Inspector-General of Fortifications.

The result of their deliberations will in the first place, when properly put into shape, be submitted by the Secretary of State to his colleagues, and probably discussed with them and the professional authorities.

These plans, when agreed to by the Cabinet, will be formally submitted to the Queen for her approval, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum by the Secretary of State, who will certify therein that they have been adopted in concert with the Commander-in-Chief and Inspector-General of Fortifications.

When the Queen has affixed her signature to any such plans, they will be deposited in the War Department, after copies have been made of them for the execution of the works, and no deviation or alteration can be made without their being re-submitted to Her Majesty.

A Quarterly Return of the progress of all works will be made in duplicate from the Office of the Inspector-General of Fortifications for the information of Her Majesty and the Secretary of State.

BARRACKS

3. All plans of important barracks should be trans- Barracks.
mitted to Her Majesty for approval, and the same course observed in their construction as in fortifications.

ARMS

4. The Commander-in-Chief is responsible for the Arms.
description of arms used in the Service. He will communicate from time to time with the Secretary of State, and the patterns being fixed upon, they will be by him submitted for the Queen's approval, which being signified to the War Department, the Secretary of State will submit a Warrant for each pattern being sealed as the service pattern of that particular arm.

No alteration should be admitted on the sealed pattern without the Royal consent.

CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENTS

5. On all questions of clothing, equipments, and accoutre- Clothing, etc.
ments, the Commander-in-Chief will ascertain Her Majesty's pleasure, and inform the Secretary of State, when, should he see no reason to tender advice to Her Majesty upon the subject, Warrants under the Sign Manual will be obtained by him to seal the approved patterns, and no change can be made except by Her Majesty's sanction.

All questions, even of detail, in the dress of the Militia, Yeomanry, Foreign Corps, or any bodies in the service of the Crown, should be submitted to the Queen.

MILITARY LANDS

Military lands.

6. No land should be acquired or disposed of which is intended for military purposes without due information being given to Her Majesty in the first instance, in order that her pleasure may be known and recorded.

PENSIONS

Pensions.

7. All pensions emanate from the bounty of the Crown and the liberality of Parliament, and all Warrants will be proposed to Her Majesty on these subjects by the Secretary of State.

RETURNS

Returns.

8. When the Civil Departments are in working order, Quarterly Returns will be made to the Secretary of State in duplicate, one of which will be transmitted to Her Majesty from the following Departmental Officers :—
 - (1) The Director-General of Stores, showing the condition of the military stores.
 - (2) Director of Artillery, showing a brief summary of the proceedings of the Scientific Committee, and the armaments furnished during the preceding quarter.
 - (3) The Inspector of Artillery, showing the state of his department.
 - (4) Inspector of Small Arms, showing the state of his department.
 - (5) Inspector of Gunpowder, showing the state of his department.
 - (6) Inspector of Royal Carriage Department, showing the different carriages under construction.

9. Monthly Reports of all corps not at present under the Commander-in-Chief should be required when practicable, and transmitted to the Queen,

Viz. :—

The Ambulance Corps.
The Land Transport Corps.
The Medical Staff Corps.
The Army Works Corps.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *July 2, 1855.*

The Queen returns the Lists of the Officers who it is proposed should receive the Order of the Bath, which she entirely approves.

Her Majesty
desires daily
information
from the seat
of war.

She hopes all the necessary forms and preliminaries may be sufficiently hastened to enable the Queen to have the Investiture on Friday next.

The Queen wishes much that Lord Panmure would repeat the injunction to General Simpson to let us hear *every day regularly* how the military operations are proceeding. It is now three or four days since we have heard a word upon *that* subject from General Simpson.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 2, 1855.*

I find that I cannot send you by this mail the official despatch which I was anxious to write you, and I must therefore delay until next mail, when you may expect a large bag and your Letter of Service confirming you in command of the Army. You have come rapidly into a post of immense responsibility, and you will now be able to make yourself a name. Do, I implore you, use the best tools you have, and keep your people, I mean your officers, well in hand. I have assured the Government that you have talent and energy to do the thing, and I fix my faith on you without hesitation. I will support you in

Panmure's
advice and
directions to
Simpson.

your position, and you can render this an easy task by avoiding the rocks on which poor Raglan split, and applying to many an evil your own good sound Scotch common-sense. Routine is excellent, nay absolutely necessary, but there are times when you must set it aside and act for the moment as the moment requires. I say nothing to you as to Staff, but I think you will do wrong to cumber yourself with any of your predecessors out of feelings of mere kindness. If you are satisfied they are the best you can get, then employ them by all means ; if not, let them come home with all speed, or join their regiments if on the spot.

I hope you will study to maintain the cordial relations with the French which poor Raglan so eminently succeeded in doing, and although they seem to have gone wrong in the business of the 18th,¹ still we must not quarrel with them. I shall look for full despatches from you, and I wish you distinctly to understand that it is the Queen's wish, as well as that of the Government, that you should let us know every day by telegraph the *condition of the health of the Army*, the progress in siege-work, referring to the last plan sent by General Jones, and anything extraordinary. Before you receive this you will hear of the officer who is to be at the head of your Staff. I am not quite sure, but I think it will be General Knollys, whom you know. He is a good Frenchman,² and knows all the field operations well. You *must* and *may* place great confidence in General Rose, whom I look upon as a first-rate man. You will have received a message from me to complete your Divisions by selecting officers to their command, and your Brigades in same manner. It will afford you the opportunity of rewarding some meritorious young officers in command of Corps, and I entreat of you *use* none but good men. Let them complain if they will, I repeat I will support you. Another thing you must look to is the strictest attention to the health of your troops—compel it, and you will have the satisfaction of saving many a valuable life. Adieu, my dear friend, and believe me to watch with sincere anxiety the success of your career.

Attention to
health of troops
enjoined.

¹ First assault upon Sebastopol.

² *i.e.* French scholar.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *July 4, 1855.*

I met this evening at the Palace Colonel Reynardson of the Grenadier Guards, just come home from the Crimea ; he says the Army suffers greatly from heat, and that the kindest thing that could be done by them would be to send them out good-sized peaks to be put to their foraging-caps, white covers such as are worn in India for the caps of officers and men, small white parasols for the officers, and boots for the men big enough for the human foot, instead of things like the boot of torture formerly used in Scotland. He says that he was advised when he went out to take an umbrella with him to protect him from the sun ; that, though not believing much in its use, he took one, and that it has been worn to tatters by use by himself and his friends, to the great saving of their health.

Sufferings of
our troops
from heat ;
alleviations
proposed.

I don't see why the men should not be ordered to rig up a kind of gipsy-tent awning in the trenches, where he says they suffer awfully from the heat of the sun.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *July 4, 1855.*

. . . The Queen cannot comprehend our having heard nothing from Sebastopol. We have had no telegraph since Saturday night ! The French hear every day. Lord Panmure should really *insist* upon our hearing also daily. More than ever now we wish to know what is going on.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.**July 5, 1855.*

Though this will not go before Saturday, yet I may not be able to command so much time as to write so fully as I wish if I delay till nearer the departure of the mail. You will receive an official despatch from me in which I have addressed you as the Minister, in this I do so as your friend.

Reasons of the
repulse and
lessons from it.

It is in vain for me to attempt to conceal from myself that the failure of the 18th resulted from Pélissier having refused to adopt Raglan's advice to attack the whole town in the first place, and, in the next, in having made his attack without a preliminary bombardment to drive the enemy from the guns. Lord Raglan seems to me to have surrendered his opinion as to the general attack too easily. He should have informed Pélissier that unless his plan, approved as it was, not only by his own engineer but also by General Niel, was acted upon, he would not expose his men to slaughter and probable defeat. No one could have suspected him of over-caution, and he would have carried his point, and I'll be bound to say he would have succeeded in some point in getting into the town and turning the flank of the Redan and Malakoff; but unfortunately he yielded his opinion, and see the results. Then again Pélissier had agreed to the preliminary cannonade, which he most rashly abandoned, and left the enemy snug in his nest and able to give you such a reception as I do not suppose any troops ever met with since war was known and practised.

Character of
Pélissier.

These events would teach me, and I have no doubt will teach you, two lessons, the first of which is never to make an attack so as to permit the enemy to concentrate their whole force within a short space, and the next is to have your plan reduced to writing and signed by the Chiefs of both, or all, armies, if more than two are engaged, and then it will be for him who swerves from it to show good and substantial reason for the departure. Had this been done, I scarcely think Pélissier would have ventured to forego the bombardment, and to rush recklessly on, two hours before the time arranged. You will have an awkward game to play with him, as I hear he is a rough sort of fellow and very obstinate. I only hope you can be so too, when you feel assured that you are in the right.

The *Times* seems disposed to give you a good start, but the *Daily News* has discovered a fatal objection to you, that you are connected with me! I am not ashamed of the impeachment, are you? In a telegraphic despatch poor Raglan recommended Lieut.-Colonel Pakenham as successor

to Estcourt, and coupled your name with the recommendation. He will be accepted by the Government at once, and I trust you will find him active and sharp. He comes of a good stock. I am sending you the 56th, which will leave this 800 strong and in very good condition. I hope ere long to send you two fine German battalions, and a Swiss Corps which is composed of some fine men. Your Cavalry will soon be reinforced, and I have desired a reserve of 1000 Artillery to be sent to the Mediterranean as soon as possible. You will hear that I have made Fergusson¹ at Malta Governor at Gibraltar. Markham will have reached you before this or very soon after it, and I trust you will give him a Division, for he is a fine and zealous soldier, and knows something of siege-work, as witness Moulton. I shall have apprised you of my wish in this respect by telegraph. There is one thing I wish you to understand: that if I ever press anything against your serious conviction that I am in error, I shall never take it amiss that you differ from me, and defer action till you can telegraph to me. . . . [Here follow some questions as to the qualifications of General Sir Richard England² for succeeding to the chief command. Sir Richard's conduct in the first Afghan war had been adversely criticised, but Panmure had never given ear to his detractors.]

Reinforcements.

Sir R. England.

Look well to your sanitary condition, and keep your doctors on the *qui vive*, and indoctrinate your C.O. with the necessity of taking due care of the men in their quarters. The Bath comes out on Saturday, and is a long list. I hope soon to see G.C.B. attached to your name, though you do not appear in the present batch. I rejoice to see that Dowbiggin has been doing well in the front, and got *κῆδος* from General Barnard. Now I have only one word more. Give my Army Works Corps fair play when they arrive. They will come very complete and work well. I think Mr. Romaine³ is wrong in his law. You are the law-maker in your Army, and if these devils misbehave, set the Provost-Marshal at them without hesitation.

Army Works Corps.

¹ General Sir James Fergusson.² Commanding Third Division.³ Mr. Judge-Advocate Romaine.

Now farewell, send us frequent accounts of you, however brief.

PS.—The enemy¹ is nibbling me, but Gardiner is keeping him in check.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 6, 1855.*

Would Lord Panmure inquire by telegraph of General Simpson how the general state of health of the Army was, and whether the cholera was abating? The Queen sees no mention in the papers of poor Lord Raglan's remains having sailed; is it not to be mentioned?

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, *July 6, 1855.*

Recommends
appointment of
a General now
in the field as
Chief of the
Staff.

I feel so strongly on the subject of the appointment as Chief of the Staff for the Army in the East that I cannot help naming to you whether you would not make use of the *telegraph*, before coming to a decided opinion. My own feeling is that, both as regards the Service and the Army, as also as regards the personal comfort and advantage of the General commanding in the East, there can be no doubt that one of the Generals on the spot, and who has seen the working of the system out there and the numerous details of duties required, would be far preferable to any other man that would be sent out from home, however competent to fill one of the most important positions, if not the most important position, in the Army. I should, therefore, if I were you, telegraph to Simpson to ask him whether he had anybody to recommend for the post in question, and you might suggest an officer or not as you thought fit, but still let him have the option of naming a man of his own. Rest assured he will name one, for he will appreciate the advantage of having a man at hand thoroughly alive to what is now required to an army in the field. . . .

¹ Gout.

There follows a letter from the Duke of Cambridge, dated July 6th, in which the writer expresses his earnest desire for active employment, and suggests that this should be either with the Foreign Legion or in superintending the camps of Shorncliffe and Aldershot.

As to employment for the writer.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

F.O., July 7, 1855.

Persigny¹ is just gone from here, and he says the French Government are frightened out of their senses at the consequences that our *double pay* may produce in the French Army—spirit of discontent, insubordination, etc. I told him the pay was not going to be doubled, but that the soldier would have a small sum given to him for field allowance, as his officer had now, and that this act of justice was in lieu of an additional bounty, but that you intended to send proper military explanations of the measure to General Torrens for communication to General Vaillant.² He said, if it could only be stated that it was an extra allowance for campaigning, it would remove all their difficulties, because the French soldier has a *solde de guerre*, and he might then be told that the English soldier had only been put upon the same footing as himself.

Effect on the French of field allowance to British soldiers.

Nothing could be more friendly or reasonable than Persigny's communication. He disclaimed all right of inquiry, and still less of interference, but he said he was sure we would not wish to do them an injury that a little explanation, or possibly some change of form, might save them from.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

July 7, 1855.

Pray read this from Buchanan.³ It is written in a moderate tone, but it is rather a *poser*, on account of the

Difficulties as to foreign enlistment.

¹ Count Persigny, French Ambassador to Great Britain.

² French Minister of War.

³ United States Minister in Great Britain.

proclamation of the Governor of Nova Scotia, which really does amount to a violation of the Nova Scotia law of neutrality. We may say that all recruiting is put a stop to, but what shall we say about the past and about having disapproved our agents? The proclamation was imprudent, and not, I presume, in consequence of any instructions from home; but we can't throw over our Governors.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, July 7, 1855.

I understand it was Lord Raglan's custom to send Mr. Calvert's Reports to you with a 'private' note.

Attack by
Russians in the
open unlikely.

Enclosed is his last. I do not think there is anything new in it. Lüders¹ is certainly in Sebastopol. We saw a carriage with outriders, etc., arrive some ten days ago, which was probably him. He is a clever, enterprising man, not likely to remain long quiet; but I hardly expect he will attack us outside, as they know full well that it would be to their disadvantage to come out into the open plain. I send home to your Lordship this day several official letters. To those on the railway I beg your particular notice. Nothing managed by Civil workmen is likely to thrive here. I also dread those so-called military corps that are sent to this country with enormous pay—like the Mounted Staff Corps—as such a system is most displeasing to our regular troops, who are doing the same duties on a soldier's pay.

As to myself, my Lord, I await further orders, and have not made any change, or added to my Staff, until I know for certain what is to be ordered. . . .

Pressure of cor-
respondence.

The 'paper-work' and the correspondence that demand my time and attention here are beyond all belief, and interfere sadly with my military duties. In fact I am at my desk from four in the morning throughout the whole day, while I ought to be outside attending to more impor-

¹ Russian General.

tant matters. What with the two mails a-week, and the electric telegraph, the writing is incessant, and much interferes with more urgent duties. This I find is *my great difficulty*. The next to it is the difficulty I experience in dealing with my Allies—Pélissier, Omar Pasha, and Marmora. They are all equally with myself independent, and it is very embarrassing at times to get on as we ought in our great cause. I have no complaint of Pélissier. I find him frank and well disposed. I like Omar Pasha, who is very willing and soldier-like in all my dealings with him. I think Marmora, too, is very anxious to get on well with us, but he is not very easily satisfied. As yet, however, we are all going on well together.

Difficulty of dealing with Allies.

I know no man but Lord Raglan who was capable of managing these conflicting materials.

Cholera is much on the decline. I rather dread the return of hot weather. The air has been so cool lately that sickness of all sorts has diminished.

Telegraphic despatch from Lord Cowley¹ dated July 8, 1855, 11.30 A.M., received 1.30 P.M., enclosed in the letter which follows :—

The Emperor has just sent me without comment a telegraphic despatch from General Pélissier dated the 6th at 6 P.M. of which the following is a translation :—

Telegram from Pélissier.

‘Intelligence from Lord Panmure inspires General Simpson with apprehension for the safety of Balaclava, and makes him desirous of a concentration. I do not share these apprehensions, but you will appreciate the difference between these preoccupations of a purely defensive nature and the project of forcing the mountains and attacking the Russians on their summit.’

I presume that His Majesty means to convey the inference that we are opposed at home to a forward movement, and as I shall have an opportunity of seeing him to-morrow, I shall be obliged by your Lordship giving me such information in the matter as you deem proper.

¹ British Ambassador in Paris.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

July 8, 1855.

Against sup-
positions of
discord between
Allies.

I don't understand the despatch from Cowley of which a copy has been sent to you, as I don't know what are the apprehensions about Balaclava to which General Simpson alludes, but I should like, if you see no objection, to enable Cowley to give some explanation to the Emperor of Pélissier's despatch, and some assurance that we don't object to external operations, or to any other course which appears most expedient to the two Commanders-in-Chief. Also that no instructions have been sent of which the French Government has not cognisance.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *July 8, 1855.*

Lord Panmure has of course seen the telegraph just come from Lord Cowley, with a message from General Pélissier which is very strange. What news can there be which General Simpson is said to have received from Lord Panmure which would prevent any forward movement?¹

THE SAME TO THE SAME

*Private.*BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *July 8, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday. She approves of his proposition of Lord Stratford's being directed to invest all the officers in the Crimea who are to receive that distinction with the Order of the Bath, and of dispensations being opened to enable General J. Fergusson, Vice-Admiral M. Seymour, and Major-General Torrens to wear their decorations. At the same time, as the Queen knows that the dispensations are expensive to those who receive the distinction, she will be

¹ See Lord Panmure's letter of July 9th, and General Simpson's of July 24th.

ready to have another Investiture—should there be any here to invest who were unable to attend on Saturday on account of the short notice—when we come up to town for the Prorogation of Parliament, should it be advisable to do so, or at Windsor in October.

Has Lord Panmure received no letters whatever from General Torrens? The Queen wishes to see *whatever* he *does* receive, even if the letters do not convey much intelligence; but surely there must be something to report. The Queen sees that the mail is come, and despatches, she concludes, will be here to-night, and they would be up to the 26th or 27th.

Her Majesty desires news of the progress of the war.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

July 9, 1855.

The post-days are most inconveniently arranged; between Saturday and Monday I can have but little to communicate to you. I understand that the feeling between Pélissier and Omar Pasha is anything but friendly, and you will have to exert yourself in keeping the peace as far as you can for the general good. I hope you hold your head high among these dons, and maintain the position of your country, even though its land forces are weaker than those of the Allies. You will remember that the Sardinian Contingent is attached to *your* Army, and is not to be disposed of without *your* consent. . . .

'Hold your head high.'

I send out by next mail an order to Lord Stratford to repair to your Camp and invest the officers who have won the honours of the Bath. You will have to receive him with proper state, as the Queen's representative, and give the affair all the *éclat* you can.

I shall write you officially on the subject, but this will prepare you for it.

The Emperor of the French uses his telegraph too much; he gets answers from Pélissier which we do not comprehend. For instance, yesterday Cowley writes that the Emperor had sent him the enclosed.¹

Pélissier's game of cross-purposes with the Emperor.

¹ See Lord Cowley's letter of July 8th.

Will you let me know what intelligence you received from me that 'inspired you with apprehension for the safety of Balaclava'—surely not my allusion to Lüders' corps? My only reason for mentioning this is to show you how small matters excite our Allies, and to caution you against any demonstration of feeling which can create uneasiness where none ought to exist.

If possible, you and Pélissier should agree in all the telegraphs you send. *We* at home have agreed to send no orders to the Army which are not previously known to both Governments; we have left to you Generals full discretion, and I do not think either of you will have cause to complain that your hands are fettered.

I am lame in a foot just now, but quite able for business.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 1855.¹

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward to Your Majesty copies of despatches which have arrived by this mail. Lord Panmure cannot conceal from Your Majesty that in General Simpson's letter there are grounds for anxiety as to the present state of things with the Army. It is quite evident that General Simpson thinks himself unequal to the task of commanding the Army, and is anxious to be relieved from so weighty a responsibility. With this feeling so strongly expressed, Lord Panmure is of opinion that it would be unjust to the Army to leave it in trembling hands, and unfair to tax General Simpson's powers of mind and body beyond what he states himself able to endure. Under these circumstances Lord Panmure asked Lord Palmerston to hold a conference with Lord Hardinge at the War Department on this momentous crisis. They went over the list carefully and discussed the following selections as being possible.

1st. Lord Seaton. His age is seventy-six, and though

Qualifications
of suggested
successors to
Simpson,

¹ Day of month omitted in original.

his frame is robust for that period of life, he is unfit for exposure to such a climate as the Crimea, and to the anxieties incident to the command of the Army ; on these grounds he was set aside.

2nd. Lord Hardinge. He stated that, if ordered by Your Majesty, he would obey, but he represented that he was physically unfit for the task. That his legs swelled and that he could not walk, and that his riding was reduced to a very limited duration. He was therefore thought to be more useful to Your Majesty in the Government and Military Councils than in the field.

3rd. The Duke of Cambridge. Your Majesty will, I trust, forgive me when I state that, admitting all His Royal Highness's hereditary courage, he (*sic*) thought he might fail in self-control in situations where the safety of the Army might depend on coolness and self-possession.

4th. Passing our eyes down the list of Lieutenant-Generals and obtaining an opinion from Lord Hardinge on the respective merits of each, we discussed those of Sir Harry Smith, but set him aside from the circumstances of impaired health and liability to excitement.

5th. No other Lieutenant-General presented himself whom we could see the least chance of fixing on, except Lieutenant-General James Fergusson, now in Malta, and whose appointment to be Governor at Gibraltar Your Majesty lately sanctioned. We have reserved this officer's eligibility for discussion in Cabinet on Saturday.

6th. Failing him, we then proceeded to review the Major-Generals, both unemployed and employed. We agreed that, except Major-General Markham, the cream of these officers were already in the field, or incapacitated from further action by wounds or sickness. We then reviewed the list of those with the Army and have now resolved to place Major-General Codrington's claims first of all in point of merit, and of his possessing the qualifications necessary for the situation. Major-General Markham would ably support him.

Claims of
Codrington.

Lord Panmure has informed Your Majesty of all that has passed, and will be in a position to submit a definite

arrangement to Your Majesty after the Cabinet on Saturday. In the meanwhile he may probably be honoured by a communication of Your Majesty's views on the question.

The accounts of the health of the Army are favourable, but General Simpson's description of the reduced state of the men is far from satisfactory.

The railroad will ere long be in operation again, as the new Army Works Corps are all at sea, and the first division of six officers and four hundred and six men sailed on the 1st.

Lord Panmure has already taken measures for the Army wintering in the Crimea, though he hopes it may be unnecessary. Lord Panmure feels that he ought to apologise for writing at such length to Your Majesty.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, July 10, 1855.

Cholera broke in upon my family yesterday, and seized two valuable members of it—Colonel Vico, the French officer attached to our Army, and Mr. Calvert, the Chief of our Intelligence Department. Vico is still alive, but fast sinking; Calvert died this morning. Both are cases of decided spasmodic cholera.

The loss of Colonel Vico will be deeply felt, as he was singularly well adapted for the situation he held, liked and respected by all of us, and extremely useful in his position. I do not think the French will be able to give us *his equal*, but I know Pélissier will do his best.

As for Mr. Calvert—his loss is irreparable! I have not a chance or any hope of finding a successor, and the want of such an officer in our Army will produce many evils. I sincerely trust your Lordship may be able to send some trustworthy man in his place.

The sudden removal of two such men from the midst of the Household Staff is a severe blow. They were in perfect health when suddenly seized with this pestilence.

P.S.—Colonel Vico died at 3 P.M.

Deaths of
Colonel Vico
and Mr.
Calvert.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, July 10, 1855.

Things do not improve with us here! I send you the copy of a despatch from Lieut.-Colonel Simmons,¹ Her Majesty's Commissioner with Omar Pasha, addressed to Lord Clarendon, in which his Highness is stated to contemplate a withdrawal of his Army to Eupatoria. The result of this would probably be the loss of Balaclava, as the force left in the Tchernaya position and plain would not be sufficient for the security of that place. I need not point out to you its importance! The difficulty of those four armies going on successfully together without one great Chief has been manifest to me from the first. The French and ourselves have but one great object in the siege of Sebastopol; but the French detachment on the Tchernaya, with the Sardinian and Turkish forces, are not likely to be well handled in any combined movement where there is no Chief. The safety of Balaclava depends on this force, and if Omar Pasha withdraws I leave you to judge of the consequences!

Contemplated withdrawal of Omar Pasha's Army.

Want of 'one great Chief.'

I have only this forenoon received this copy of Colonel Simon's despatch, and deem it right to forward it without delay.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

July 11, 1855.

This is from General Cannon²; there is nothing in it very new, but all in it is very true. I think it would not be amiss to desire Simpson not to sacrifice lives in an assault until a practicable breach is made, and the fire of the enemy bearing upon the point to be assaulted has been duly silenced. Simpson may require such an instruction to protect him against the urgencies of Pélissier.

General Simpson to be recommended not to assault till a breach has been made.

¹ Afterwards Sir Lintorn Simmons.

² The letter here alluded to refers in somewhat scathing terms to the late Lord Raglan, on the ground of his having permitted an assault on Sebastopol before a practicable breach in the fortifications had been effected.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

July 11, 1855.

Palmerston's
opinion of
Raglan.

Thanks for this letter, which is very interesting. Raglan seldom gave opinion and never stated plans, because, with all his merits, he was not much of a hand at forming opinions or inventing plans. A man who has opinions cannot help bringing them out when he is consulting with others on the matters to which those opinions relate. I saw a good deal of Raglan at the military meetings we used to have at the Home Office, and I was well satisfied that Hardinge was a superior man to him.

If they want to have roads made, preparatory to winter, they should no doubt be able to get a thousand stout labourers from Constantinople, either Turks or Albanians, who would do the work.

If we take the town on the southern side of the harbour, we must bombard the northern fort from the southern side, and for that purpose the large mortars by the two Irish engineers would come into play, and 18-inch mortars would also be very useful. For a fort so strengthened, common shells would make little impression. It is probably casemated, and you want shells heavy enough to break through the casemates.

Prospect of
another winter
in the Crimea.

You are quite right in beginning already to take measures for another winter in the Crimea.

Whether we take Sebastopol or not, it is clear that our troops must winter there.

Advantage of
more powerful
mortars.

I have just been reading General Rose's despatches of the 23rd June, which strongly show the advantage that would be derived from a more powerful vertical fire than our present mortars are able to give.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, July 12, 1855.

Lord Panmure will have anticipated that his letter enclosing General Simpson's despatches must have caused

the Queen a good deal of uneasiness. General Simpson's own account leaves no doubt as to his inability to carry on the command, should his letter not be the result of the first feelings of depression, consequent on Lord Raglan's death, which manifested itself throughout the Army. It might be as well therefore, in the first instance, to ask him by telegraph whether he still holds to his opinion expressed in his letters of the 30th? Should this be so, it will have to be considered that the appointment of a Junior Major-General over General Simpson's head is not what he contemplates, but rather the appointment of a Commander of weight, both as a soldier and a gentleman of accepted position. Neither of which, the Queen is grieved to admit, have we available. Lord Panmure's opinion, given upon those who at first sight might appear so, entirely coincides with the Queen's own. She would accordingly give the preference to Lieut.-General Fergusson, and, in case of his failing, to one of the M.-G.s on the spot, of whom she also thinks General Codrington the most promising. He is junior, however, to England, Bentinck, Colin Campbell, and Barnard, and his elevation over their heads will be grievously felt, as his personal superiority is not so marked as to be generally admitted. But this is a difficulty which must give way to the necessities of the case.

General
Simpson's
depression.

The difficulty
of finding a
successor to
him.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 13, 1855.*

The Queen sees from the telegraph sent to her this morning that General Simpson appears ready to carry on the command for the present, and presumes that this is in answer to some question from home, and that for the moment he will be left undisturbed.

She wishes to bring under Lord Panmure's notice the singular coincidence that, while the cholera is generally diminishing to such an extent in the Camp that the last number of deaths was only 3 to 30,000 men, one victim after another falls at head-quarters: General Estcourt,

Victims claimed
by the cholera
at head-
quarters.

Lord Raglan, Mr. Calvert, and Colonel Vico. Should they have all lived at the same spot, which is more than probable, an immediate change of location for the headquarters should at once be recommended, as it is a peculiar characteristic of that malignant disease to attach itself to a particular spot, and kill all who inhabit it.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 14, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty five despatches from General Torrens, to the last of which Lord Panmure invites Your Majesty's attention.

Difference with
the French.

General Torrens very clearly describes what had passed, and in this despatch perfectly justifies the selection which has been made of him for his present position.¹ The Emperor's mode of dealing with the officers of his Army is much to be lamented, and must always engender jealousy and distrust among them.² Lord Panmure regrets to observe for the first time any charge on the part of our Allies against our Army.³ It will not be difficult to refute it, and this Lord Panmure will make a point of doing when he receives the despatch back from Your Majesty.

Question of the
command in
the Crimea.

The question of the command in the Crimea was fully discussed in the Cabinet to-day, and the general impression, in which Lord Panmure concurs, is not to confirm, at least for the present, General Simpson in command; but to make inquiries as to the condition of General Codrington's health, as he seems to be the man to whom universal opinion points as most likely to do justice to the Army and to preserve and to add to its renown.

Lord Panmure has been advised by Lord Hardinge not to sanction the Guards being formed either into a Division or an independent Brigade, even though Lord Rokeby take offence and resign.

¹ As Commissioner in Paris.

² Referring to the presence and functions of Marshal Niel at the seat of war.

³ A charge of dilatoriness brought by Niel.

Lord Panmure cannot but feel very anxious in these important changes, and is deeply grateful to Your Majesty for the patience and grace with which his communications are received.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

WAR OFFICE, *July 14, 1855.*

I have scarcely a moment to write you, so much has my time been occupied all day with public matters. Your despatch by the last mail has given me great uneasiness in many respects, and makes me fear that the Army is desponding upon the result of the 18th, and the subsequent loss of their brave and gallant Chief. Your private letter is as forcible as a public despatch, and I am turning over in my mind what is to be done. I had hoped to see you remain as Commander of the Army, but the grave doubts which you have expressed as to your health, and the pressing nature of your demand for some one to be appointed, leaves me no hope in that direction. I shall do nothing hastily, for it is a serious step which I am called on to take to determine in whose hands I will vest our Chief Command abroad.

Simpson desires to be relieved of his command.

I will write you fully on Monday.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CRIMEA, *July 14, 1855.*

There is nothing to report since my last letter. Cholera continues decreasing, and our general health is good. The two deaths in this house during the week, of Mr. Calvert (or Cattley)¹ and Colonel Vico, have been very melancholy events, coming so immediately after the great, irreparable loss of Lord Raglan. There has been unusual gloom in consequence.

More despondency.

Loss sustained by Raglan's death.

There is to be a Conference this evening of the Generals Commanding-in-Chief and the French and English

¹ Calvert had been selected by the Duke of Newcastle, on the outbreak of the war, on the strength of his knowledge of the country.

Admirals on a proposition of Omar Pasha, who wishes to withdraw his troops from the Crimea to endeavour to relieve Kars. The result shall be made known to you by next post. I do not see how we can sanction such a proceeding.

The more I see, and reflect upon, the condition of things here, my Lord, the more I am struck with the conviction that these four armies never can carry on any joint and united operations in their present condition. We want one great man to direct the whole.

My second reflection is my own position! for surely I am an unworthy successor to Lord Raglan, who not only guided the Army, but from his high rank, his great experience and talents, he really guided *the whole* combined armies, for all the Commanders had faith and confidence in him. I write these ideas without reserve to you, for they are worthy of serious consideration.

Illness of
Simpson and
others,

Of course I continue to do the work as well as I can until you decide what is to be done. I have been ill this last week with gout in my ankle and foot, as well as by the vexatious events that have occurred in the family of our Staff in this house. The correspondence here is sufficient to break down any man. I labour at it from four in the morning till six in the evening, and every mail seems to bring an increase of it. My outdoor military duties are therefore much neglected, and I feel that my work is unsatisfactory, because not properly done. Every one around me is sick more or less—Colonel Steele is on board ship for change of air; Colonel Stephenson, whom I appointed to succeed him, is also on board ship, seriously unwell. Mr. Filder will, I expect, have to call for a Medical Board. Under these circumstances I have the temporary aid of Colonel Brownrigg¹ and Major Claremont, who are of great service to me. The complaint which seems to visit every one is diarrhœa, which I apprehend is premonitory of cholera. Colonel Stephenson has been very ill from it.

¹ He had been A.A.G. to the Duke of Cambridge at Inkerman, and Chief of Sir G. Brown's Staff in the Kertch expeditions.

I have appointed no Staff until I see what will be determined upon, but I have taken over Lord Raglan's Establishment, so as to carry on the ordinary routine for the Head-quarters' Establishment, for the Staff, etc.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 15, 1855.*

The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure's letter received this morning. He need never fear to try the Queen's patience by writing to her too often or at too great length; on the contrary, it is an immense satisfaction and comfort to her that he keeps her so regularly and so constantly informed of everything that he hears of what is going on.

General Torrens's despatches are very interesting and very able; of two the Queen would wish to have copies.

The Queen agrees with Lord Hardinge with regard to Lord Rokeby. She has had the opportunity of knowing a good deal of General Codrington's own feelings, from having seen copies of many of his letters, or rather more of his journal, which his sisters have kindly allowed the Queen to see. They are admirably written, and show the greatest devotion to his service, as well as great energy and activity of mind and body. In his last, written after poor Lord Raglan's death, he says: 'His (Lord Raglan's) personal kindness and consideration towards me put me in the military position for which I was so anxious, but it probably never would have taken place without that personal consideration for which he had, and will always have, my most grateful feelings of remembrance. We shall indeed find it difficult to replace him, from his knowledge of the Army—so many of its officers personally and by character—his prestige of the great Duke, his cheerfulness and kindness of manner, his habits of business, his being a gentleman, and his having been our leader in victory during the early and spirit-stirring times of the campaign.'

Quotes from
private journal
of Sir W.
Codrington
referring to
Lord Raglan.

Further on he says, speaking of Sir G. Brown's illness and departure: 'It is possible, therefore, that I may be

named permanently to command the Light Division. It would be a high command for me to have!

‘Lord Raglan’s name and experience, his invariable good-humour with the French under many provocations, have been most valuable in keeping well with our Allies, who must be ticklish people to deal with. Who can be his successor, we all wonder?’

The Queen thinks that at this moment these extracts may be interesting to Lord Panmure, though she wishes them to be considered confidential. Speaking of his own health on the 30th, he says that two days more rest on board would quite restore him.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *July 15, 1855.*

There are two things which I very much wish you would do without further delay.

The one is to appoint an officer to undertake the formation of the Italian Levy; I asked Hudson¹ a few days ago what progress had been made in raising that Levy, and he said that no steps whatever had been taken, and that nothing could be done till you had appointed some officer to take charge. An officer who speaks Italian would no doubt be the best, but an acquaintance with French would be quite enough, and it is very important that no more time should be lost.

The other thing is the selection of a good man to take charge of the Commissariat in the Crimea instead of Filder, who, I am quite satisfied, is not fit to remain in command. He is narrow-minded, prejudiced, opposed to every new resource and improved practice, wedded to routine, and refusing every improved arrangement.

You cannot well have a worse man, and, if you were to spin a teetotum over a page full of names written down at random, and choose the one at which the teetotum fell, you would probably get a better. We are not justified in

¹ British Minister at Turin.

An officer to
superintend
formation of
Italian Legion.

Desirability of
appointing new
men to the
heads of the
Commissariat
and Medical
Departments.

sacrificing the interests of the Army and endangering the success of our operations out of delicacy for the feelings of individuals.

If anybody should moot this topic in the House of Commons, I should be quite unable to say one word in your defence.

Pray also put your new man into Andrew Smith's place without further delay.

The only way to meet the cry raised by these administrative reformers is to show to the country that we are bestirring ourselves to put the best men we can find into places, the duties of which have an important bearing upon the interests of the public service.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

July 16, 1855.

The Queen wishes me to thank you for your very interesting letter of yesterday. Omar Pasha's dislike to stay before Sebastopol is probably owing to Lord Raglan's death and General Pélissier's rudeness towards him. He is a proud man, who consented to act with Lord Raglan, but would not probably act a subordinate part to a new and untried English General, nor submit to being slightly treated by the French General; and considering his position, this is quite natural.

Will it not be right on every account to let General Vivian join the Crimean Army? This would bring the English force, independent of French interference, to 60,000 men, counting the English at 25,000, the Sardinians at 15,000, and the Turkish Contingent at 20,000—unless our General has an independent command, he will have as much difficulty as Omar Pasha finds to keep his ground. This would also be the best answer to the Emperor's exhortation that we should increase our Army.

The Queen wishes to know what is the final opinion about the command, as an early decision will be advantageous on every account. General Codrington seems to be quite well again.

Omar Pasha's unwillingness to remain longer before Sebastopol.

Suggests that General Vivian join the Crimean Army.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.*WAR OFFICE, *July 16, 1855.*

The mail of this morning with despatches up to the 2nd July brought no private letter from you. I am not much surprised at it amidst the many calls on your time and attention. I hope you ride about among the people and show yourself to the soldiers, as that was one of the points which they complained of Lord Raglan's leaving undone. I am sorry to see that Lord Rokeby is aggrieved in respect of juniors being named to Divisions over his head, but I cannot help it. We cannot have all our Generals Guardsmen, and out of five Divisions they have two, and a Chief of Staff besides.

'We cannot
have all our
Generals
Guardsmen.'
Commissary-
General Filder
recalled.

I have by an official letter recalled Commissary-General Filder . . . and as I do not wish to hurt the old man's feelings, perhaps you would have something done to break the announcement to him. I have long looked on him as an obstruction, but Raglan threw over him his shield to such an extent that, without a rupture with him, I could not reach Filder.

I am sorry to say that your private letter by last mail, in which you urged the absolute necessity of a successor to Raglan being appointed, and pressed your own weak health, has had a strong effect on my mind as well as those of my colleagues, and made us nervous as to your remaining in command. I have come to no decision yet, but you will hear from me as soon as I do, by telegraph.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*CRIMEA, *July 17, 1855.*

I enclose a letter to Her Majesty, which I will be very much obliged by your causing to reach her. I have given out Her Majesty's sentiments on the lamented loss we have sustained by Lord Raglan's death, in General Orders to the Army.

I send home to-day all the documents explanatory of Omar Pasha's desire to leave the Crimea. He is gone to see his Government at Constantinople, and I have sent copies of all these papers to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The departure of Omar Pasha's troops from the Crimea will have many bad effects. It will be a serious diminution of our force, and as the Turks are now in position on the Tchernaya, the enemy will see by their departure that not only is our guard over Balaclava weakened, but that we have no longer any intention of a forward movement on that side. What may be the result of this desire of Omar to leave us I cannot say. It is true the Russians' gaining possession of Kars, which seems not improbable, will be very dangerous for Constantinople; but the Crimea seems to me of greater moment still, as the battle must be fought here in preference to Kars.

Omar Pasha's
threatened
departure from
the Crimea.

The French progress towards the Malakoff is very steady, but Pélissier has made no communication to me of his intentions. He is very close, but I could wish a little less secrecy with me, as no doubt he will call upon me to help in his attack.

We are too weak to form any plans of our own, but may give valuable aid in a general attack. There must be a serious one soon, for our casualties are great from being so close to the enemy.

Early prospect
of a general
attack.

This is a serious business, the guns of the Naval Brigade being so worn out! Indeed all the heavy guns are nearly in the same condition, at least those which have had long continuous firing and have been hushed more than once.

I think, my Lord, that some telegraphic messages reach us that cannot be sent under due authority and are perhaps unknown to you, although under protection of your Lordship's name, and not in cipher. For instance, I was called up last night, a dragoon having come express from St. George's Monastery with a telegraphic message in these words, 'Lord Panmure to General Simpson—Captain Jarvis has been bitten by a centipede. How is he now?' This seems rather too trifling an affair to call for a dragoon

Troublesome
use made of the
telegraph.

to ride a couple of miles in the dark, that he may knock up the Commander of the Army out of the very small allowance of sleep permitted him! Then, upon sending in the morning another mounted dragoon to inquire after Captain Jarvis, four miles off, it is found that he never has been bitten at all, but has had a boil, from which he is fast recovering. I venture to mention this message because there have been two others equally trifling, causing inconvenience, and worse may come out of such practices with the wires.

Staff appointments.

Since writing the above, the mail of the 2nd has reached us. I await your Lordship's next despatches with much anxiety. I fill up no Staff appointments until further instructions. General Barnard is, however, in Orders as Head of the Staff, and is acting, and very useful to me as such. Lieut.-Colonel Stephenson, whom I had named as Military Secretary, has not been able to join me in consequence of illness, but I sincerely trust he is recovering. The sickness *among officers* certainly increases, while with the men it diminishes. . . .

There is far more writing for me for the mail than I can manage to-day, so I will conclude this private letter.

REAR-ADMIRAL HOUSTON STEWART TO LORD PANMURE

Private and Confidential.

'HANNIBAL,' OFF SEBASTOPOL, *Tuesday, July 17, 1855.*

Whilst attending a Conference at the *French* headquarters on Saturday last, your telegraphic message was delivered to me, and although very much gratified to find that my last letter was acceptable to you, and that you wished me to *repeat* the infliction upon yourself of another yarn, I feel that I have now very little to say which can be interesting or even worth your reading. The Conference to which the Admirals were summoned was to take into consideration Omar Pasha's proposal to go off himself immediately, with 25,000 Infantry and 3000 Cavalry, to the relief of the Turkish Army at *Kars*; and to make

up a portion of this force, he desired to withdraw the garrison at *Kertch*, or rather at Yenikale and St. Paul's, which I was glad to hear Pélissier declare was in his opinion *the last place* from which the Turkish troops should be taken. The fact is that Omar Pasha is strongly suspected of being tired of playing a subordinate part here, *as well as his friend Colonel Simmons*, who, I doubt not, is anxious to have freer and more independent action. And certainly the want of consideration and courtesy, or at least polite attention, evinced by Canrobert and Pélissier towards the Ottoman Generalissimo has been the subject of regret and remarked by us all. It is so foolish, too, because Lord Raglan and Sir E. Lyons have always found the Pasha very sensible to a little friendly attention, and *with that* not difficult to manage. He may or may not be honest, but many people look upon him as possessing more military talent and good sense than most of those do who affect to hold him cheap. However, I need not bother you on this point, as, of course, you will have all the necessary information from the Military Authorities, and by telegraph long before this reaches you. With respect to the *Military Authorities*, I ventured to tell you what General Simpson said himself of his own unfitness for the Command-in-Chief, and certainly the three or four times we have since met have in no degree tended to make me think he had estimated his own physical powers *too lowly*. On the contrary. He has already grown to look half-a-score years older, and to carry a more anxious, *chirpit*¹ countenance. Indeed it is evident to the most careless observer who sees and talks to him for five minutes that he is *completely* over-weighted and much oppressed. I have attended two conferences with him, and in neither of them has he addressed one single word or remark. In short, it appears to me, and I may add to Sir E[dmund] L[yons], that it is quite impossible the good General and worthy old soldier has enough in him to enable him to maintain either the interest, or the honour and credit, of the English Army under the present most trying circumstances, and I ardently hope that you

Omar proposes
to go to the
relief of Kars.

Simpson's
physical unfit-
ness to com-
mand.

¹ Otherwise shilped, Scots for feeble.

may have taken him at his word, and believing his own representation of inability, have appointed some younger, more accomplished, and energetic officer. An honester or more cautious, I do not think you could find. But this matter you will have determined on ere now, and so the telegraph forestalls all epistolary interest and information, and spoils correspondence, as Dundas M^cQueen said conversation did drinking.

Character of
Codrington.

There is a good deal of diarrhœa on shore, and in the Fleet too, but generally a few days of change of air on board our ships puts the soldiers to rights again. I am happy to say that General Codrington has completely recovered his health, although he left the *Hannibal* four or five days sooner than the doctors at all approved of—his anxiety to be at his post, after Lord Raglan's death, and the arrival of General Lüders' reinforcements to the enemy, not permitting him on any account to remain longer away from it. As I have already told you, I firmly believe Codrington to be one of the *very best and ablest* officers in the Army, and, if he is spared, I am confident will do good service. Fond of his profession, taking great pains about it, zealous yet cautious, decisive yet judicious, and not by any means over-impulsive, with excellent nerves and a courteous, soldier-like bearing, is the character that most of those who know him will concur in assigning to Codrington. Sir E. Lyons has recovered his spirits greatly. The Queen's most *beautiful* letter to himself acted *like magic*, and never, I think, has her most amiable and gracious consideration been more beneficially bestowed. You will not misunderstand me when I say that my gallant Chief and dear Friend, with some of the genius of Nelson, possesses also portions of the minor characteristics of our great Naval Hero, and his love of praise and notoriety is *very great*, although to his credit be it said that he bestows it on others with no niggard hand. *That* was the secret of Nelson's great popularity with his officers, and so it is with Lyons. On the other hand, Charlie Napier is most unpopular, because a *glutton* for himself, a *miser* to all his fellow-workmen!!!

Our works advance—slowly—but I hope pretty surely, and it is really nervous to observe the close proximity of the opposing parties, which we can see very well from the ships. I had General Jones down here the other evening to observe from the *Hannibal* with a powerful telescope, and he was much *edified*. Too much praise for indefatigable exertion and wonderful resources cannot be given to our enemy, neither is it possible to withhold admiration of the persevering, bold, and arduous labours of the Allies; but the adoption of *earthworks* makes repair so rapid that the damage of the day is often made good during the succeeding night. That we shall *fight our way into* the South Side I do believe, and certainly even an extensive cost of life doing so will be preferable to the nightly drain from sorties and the strenuous and incessant exertions of the Russians to harass and impede our operations.

Close proximity
of attackers and
attacked.

My chief anxiety is on account of the probability of *divided* councils and command. The moment for improving and following up anything like success has been repeatedly missed on this very account, and I really believe it is true that *one* indifferent commander is better than *two* good ones, a saying, I think, of Napoleon's. A Russian officer who was wounded and taken on the 7th June (Corporal Quin's of the 47th Manchester, I believe) has just arrived here from Constantinople, and goes to Odessa to be there exchanged with Captain Montagu, R.E. He is an intelligent young man, and apparently speaks fairly, although, *of course*, he is to be supposed as rather wishing to mislead than otherwise. Yet he says that 200,000 men cannot be fed in the Crimea, and that the whole force now in it does not exceed 150,000. That the Imperial Guards have been sent for, 50,000 strong, but that they will on arrival exchange with the weakest of the troops here, the latter retiring from the Crimea. He says that 28,000 *Minie rifles* were furnished by *Prussia*, and reached Sebastopol before he was taken prisoner. This is *handsome* conduct on the part of Frederick William, but, I presume, not unexpected. *He* says (of course) that we never can take Sebastopol now—

Statement of
a Russian
prisoner.

that we missed our chance after Alma, when '*none but sailors were left to fight the batteries.*'

He says the Redan is more difficult than the Malakoff, because the advance to it is much more exposed. That Osten-Sacken will fight to the last man, and that, even were the Malakoff taken, we could not take the lower town, and that, so long as the passage across the harbour is practicable, fresh troops can be thrown in; that the garrison is only 30,000, but that there are 60,000 on the North Side of Reserve. He says the fire of Russian ships sweeps the Malakoff. (However, the latter once ours, the tables could be turned.) He says they have plenty of *guns* in Sebastopol for *two years'* work, but acknowledges they are short of *shot* and *shell*, of which all they are now using is being brought up by land carriage. He says there is no absolute scarcity of the necessaries of life, but that everything is *very dear*, although shops are open and trading going on. The town has suffered much, he says, especially from shells. He talks *hugely* of the *interior* lines of defence, and, in truth, I fancy we shall have to fight for the ground; but once in the Malakoff, and the mines there exploded, or wires cut off, it seems generally believed that we should soon drive all out of the South Side. The North Side is *covered* with redoubts and batteries, and will be very difficult to take, except by *investment*. It is stronger than Brest or Toulon to the sea, and therefore impregnable to ships. It is very vexing to be obliged to acknowledge this, but in spite of Admiral Bruat's ingenious despatch of the 19th June, it is undeniably the case, and the fine fleets are, *comparatively* speaking, little better than spectators. Nor can Sir E. Lyons well absent himself just now, and especially since Lord Raglan's death. The Sea of Azof, the mouth of the Don, the factory of Lugar, and the stores of Rostof are, according to my view, the assailable points, where most serious damage might be effected; but neither there nor elsewhere can anything be effectively and safely done without a certain number of troops. I have long thought that, with even one good regiment and the marines of the Fleet—say 1500 men, commanded by an

The fleets little
better than
spectators.

intelligent, active soldier, embarked on board all the light draught vessels and supported by the gunboats and mortar-boats of light draught and launches, *much* might be effected; because I should never doubt the capability of such a force, aided by the vessel guns, maintaining itself on shore, against Cossacks or other assailants, for a sufficient space of time to enable the most complete destruction to be carried out. The factory of Luga supplies all the guns and ammunition for the Crimea. Were that destroyed, the Czar would be sorely puzzled—besides all the grain and other stores which would be found there and thereabout—and the blow which it would give to the Russian ascendancy and presumed invincibility would be *invaluable*.

What might be accomplished by a small force in the Sea of Azof.

I was *most anxious* that such an expedition should be undertaken *the moment* the Straits of Kertch were open; but it was altogether impossible to persuade the Generals to spare *even* one regiment—in fact, as you will know, we could with difficulty get the French to assent to go as far as Yenikale. Not one step beyond would they have budged. Still it is not too late—although I have little doubt but the garrisons of Anapa and Soujouk Kalé have gone thither to protect such valuable property. Pray keep this in mind, my dear Lord Panmure, and the moment you feel that 1000 men can be spared—in short, *a good smart English regiment*, let it be placed at the disposal of the Admiral and *quietly* despatched into the Sea of Azof. The nature of the country, the ubiquity of the Cossacks, render it hazardous to land seamen and marines only, unless retained completely within cover of the fire of the vessels; but 1200 or 1500 Englishmen would maintain themselves with confidence for the time necessary to destroy, and Luga would require a short land march. From all I have heard, and from all I can judge, no blow, short of the capture of the Crimea, would be more sorely felt by the Emperor of Russia than would the destruction of his very important works and stores and manufactories on the Don. And most emphatically would I recommend to the Government to cause it to be undertaken as speedily

Recommends action against works on the Don.

as circumstances will permit. On this side the Crimea I cannot think there is much to be done. Odessa *may be* bombarded, but *cui bono*? Unless you are prepared to land and destroy the town, the ships must at length *withdraw*, all the damage they may have suffered *quite apparent*, while that of the enemy will most probably be *very questionable*, and easily concealed or denied. I do not believe that, without a *large land force*, Nicolaieff could be effectively assailed. The Perekop is unapproachable by water on this side; and even if it were not, little or nothing could be done without that most useful and valuable being—a British red-coat! The bridge at the Chongar or Tchongar will prove also beyond our present means for destroying it.

You will wish me at Jericho for inflicting this long prose upon you, and imagine that I am indulging in some dreamy plan by which I may attain a laurel or two for myself. But such is not the case, and all that I can ever hope for, *in my present position*, is to be allowed to 'follow my Leader.' Besides, no large ship could get into the Sea of Azof, although the *Buntine* might, and probably would be easily shifted into a smaller craft. However, this is by the bye, and addressed only to *mine old and familiar friend*, not to Her Majesty's Minister for War!! There is some diarrhœa, but *very little* cholera, in the Camp—here and there a case, and even Balaclava is free. . . . And now farewell. These are unka kittle times, but I hope we may yet be spared to have a keen and merry bonspiel together on our ain side the Forth, or *Tweed* at all events. Let me just add that Sir E. Lyons felt much gratified by the *terms* of your despatch to General Simpson, and which has just been promulgated to the Fleet.

As to securing
peninsula of
Kertch for the
winter.

PS.—Should we have to winter again in the Crimea, the peninsula of Kertch, I presume, could be secured—the *whole* of it from Kaffa to Arabat—and thus afford room for our troops and safety for the *Straits* when frozen over. But, at the hazard of being thought impertinent, I would repeat, that the possibility of the troops remaining

in the Crimea for the winter should be manfully faced, and preparations made in good time. Last winter was not esteemed a *severe* one as to weather. . . . The Commissariat transports are, I hear, about to be put under naval control. The sooner the better. The Commissary officers cannot manage the masters, who humbug them and remain idle and doing as they please. Yet the Commissariat resents indignantly the smallest attempt on the part of a naval officer to make these masters do their duty. Any cock-and-bull story about hindrance of a *nautical* nature is sufficient to satisfy or silence a commissary, whilst the master of the contract steamer laughs in his sleeve. No vessels in Her Majesty's pay have *done so little* for the public service as those which have been assigned to the Commissariat, although I dare say Sir C. Trevelyan or Mr. Filder would strongly deny this. The French are erecting a battery on the east of the Careening Bay, from which they expect to destroy, or damage greatly, the Russian ships. I am not sanguine of its success—I fear it is too distant.

Difficulties with
Commissariat
transports.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *July 19, 1855.*

I am told there was a statement in the *Times* some days ago, which I did not happen to see, that on the 18th of June, when that unfortunate attack on the Redan was made, no proper preparations had been made by the Medical Department of the Army for the care of the officers and men who might be wounded, and that great and unnecessary suffering was the consequence. I think it would be well if you were to send a copy of that letter to General Simpson, desiring him to appoint a Court of Inquiry to investigate and report upon those allegations. If such statements are true, they imply great blame on the Medical Staff, and if they are false, it would be useful that their falsehood should be established and made known.

Inquiry as to a
report that no
proper medical
preparations
had been made
before the
assault on the
Redan.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 19, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's communication of yesterday.

The Queen approves confirmation of General Simpson in Command, with contingent commission to Codrington.

She approves the confirmation of General Simpson in the Command. His communications are clear and simple, and show much foresight. Every assistance ought to be given to him *at once* to diminish the labour at the desk of which he complains, and which is performed at the expense of time and mental energy which will be more useful to us in the field. General Codrington's contingent commission is also approved by the Queen, as well as the offer of Malta to Sir Rd. England. Care should be taken not to offend Sir Colin Campbell, who is a great favourite with the Army.

It will be quite essential to have the road between the Camp and Balaclava made, and no cost ought to be spared in that work, nor in the erection of a sufficient number of additional huts and barracks to house the new corps, the horses and animals. . . .

[The Queen] cannot conclude without congratulating Lord Panmure on the gallant conduct of his nephew—his '*son*.'

OSBORNE, *July 20, 1855.*

The Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure of the plans for the Aldershot Barracks, which have not yet been submitted to her. It does not the least signify if the original ones are dirty; to make a copy will cause great delay, and it is of the greatest importance that they should be begun as speedily as possible. She therefore hopes that Lord Panmure will direct them to be sent to her at once.

In a letter of Admiral H. Stewart's to Sir C. Wood, the Queen sees that General Simpson's want of rank is a serious inconvenience, and that General La Marmora, in consequence, is not *under* his orders (as he ought to be)—being a full General and rather tenacious of his rank—

while General Simpson is only a Major-General. Would Lord Panmure speak to Lord Hardinge on the subject—whether he could not be made a Lieutenant-General with the local rank of General? If this can be arranged, it should be done immediately, as the Queen thinks we ought to give General Simpson every assistance and support we can.

Every assistance and support possible to be given to General Simpson.

She is happy to see that Sir Ed. Lyons (and he says General Jones does also) takes a favourable and cheerful view of our prospects in the Crimea.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

July 20, 1855.

I am sure that you will forgive me if I make a suggestion to you which has occurred to me. You will treat it as will seem best to you.

General Pennefather¹ is returned, and I am told in very good health and spirits, except the stamina to stand 'campaign' work and exposure. It struck me that you could not get a better man for your Permanent Under-Secretary! He is said to be excellent at the desk, and has long been employed in the Adjutant-General's Department at home and abroad, and of most conciliatory manner, well versed in all our military affairs, and his experience of the Crimea, its Army, its wants and difficulties, ought to make his service in your office invaluable to you.

Suggests appointment of General Pennefather as Permanent Under-Secretary to the War Department.

I feel sure there could not be a more popular appointment, both with the Army and with the public.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR OFFICE, *July 20, 1855.*

As this mail will convey to you your formal recognition of Commander of the Army, I wish to write to you at some length upon the different points which occur to me as requiring attention on your part.

¹ He had commanded the Second Division at Inkerman.

Instructions to
Simpson.

I must observe, however, that you are to understand that when I touch on any particular topic, or urge any special point, I do not mean to assume that you have overlooked it, and I hope you will not view any remarks made in my private letters as offered in any but a kindly spirit. I confess I was much shaken in my resolution to confirm you from the desponding tone of your private letter written on the occurrence of Raglan's death, and it was not till I received your counteracting telegraphic message that I took courage and brought your name formally before my colleagues in the first instance, and subsequently before the Queen.

Grounds of
Simpson's
appointment.

You have been accepted by all, and we look to you to justify, as I have no doubt you will, the confidence we have reposed in you. The grounds on which I have selected you for this important command are your knowledge of your profession, your sense and discretion, and the determination which I believe you possess of making your subordinates work up to you. One more qualification is necessary, and it is firmness in maintaining your opinion and position and the prestige of the English Army.

You may find some trouble in this, but let your bearing be firm and your tone resolute and conciliatory, and you will make your way. Your first care must be to gain the confidence of your men. To accomplish this you must be much among them, see to their comforts in all situations, and especially when wounded or sick.

Instructions to
him, and
arrangements
for his
convenience.

You tell me you have no time to spare from your desk. Now let us see how I can give you more. Now that the telegraph is set up, why should there be two mails in one week? Suppose we make one only a short mail, and write fully only once a week! You have only to suggest to me any means of diminishing your desk labours, and behold I will do it forthwith. I see you have begun by selecting one of the most popular and efficient men in the Camp for your Military Secretary. Who are you to have instead of Colonel Vico? I hope some good man. You have had a great loss in Calvert, but I will send you

another man in a few days, a Mr. Jackson, who understands Russian and has been in the country before. I have been seeing about your warm clothing, and am forecasting for a winter residence for the Army. Now I have one or two things to say on that point as they occur to me. First, as to your Cavalry and all your great herds of animals.

They must be brought, in my opinion, as near to Balaclava, where the forage is landed, as possible, as it is easier to bring the horse to his food than to carry the food to the horse. You must have nose-bags for your horses, and an early supply of these should be demanded. With regard to your Infantry, you must calculate your hutting required, and let me know the materials you want.

Instructions in anticipation of winter, etc.

The Army Works Corps will erect you houses of any description—mud, or wood, as you require, and you will find a lot of very handy fellows among them. Your Army will be none the worse pleased by getting the extra field allowance of 6d. per day while fighting, and as it has been resolved on, you need make no secret of it, though of course you cannot officially publish it till it has been sanctioned in a warrant.

Your water has still some dangerous months to encounter, and I beseech you to see to your springs and wells. Store the former by means of tanks, and wall round and protect the latter from pollution as well as waste. Sir George Brown has arrived, in perfect health apparently, and I hear Pennefather is greatly better. . . . I have also seen M'Neill, who gives a poor account of —, and a cheering one of the supplies which are within the reach of the Army. You should set your Army Works Corps to make your roads, and make good drains by their side, and a lot of brush-wood as their substruction. I believe your rails will do you good service. Your waggons and drivers will appear soon. I wish you would send me home a sketch-plan of the whole attack, both English and French, distinctly marked and up to the latest moment.

Roads to be made, etc.

The Emperor talks of sending 15,000 more men. He also purposes an addition of 400 mortars, of which he is

to find half and we half. If all these get there and open, it will be a hail shower indeed. What would you say to try Dundonald's scheme¹ on the Malakoff? It might answer. Let me know by telegraphic message what Jones thinks of it.

I mean to make you a Lieutenant-General, and give you local rank of General-Commanding the forces in the Crimea. One word as to your health—if you find it beginning to fail, give up at once. You shall have instructions by Monday's mail how to do so. Hoping you will take in good part my freedom, etc.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, July 20, 1855.

Reverts to the *Times*' report as to lack of medical preparations for the assault on the Redan.

. . . It is very likely, as you say, that the statement in the *Times* may be untrue or much exaggerated; but it is always best not to neglect such things, and there is no knowing when they may be brought up as grounds of attack against a Government. I therefore strongly recommend you to send the *Times* letter out to Simpson (not to the head of the Medical Staff), and to call upon him for full inquiry and particular report.

The probability is that there was some foundation for what was asserted, and your inquiry will prevent any such omissions in future, if any took place at the time mentioned.

Considers the possibility of General Simpson's being compelled to resign his command.

The awkwardness of our arrangement about Simpson and Codrington is that, if Simpson should suddenly fall ill or be put *hors de combat*, Codrington would suddenly and without notice be put into chief command; and, in that case, the general officers who are senior to him would not have been prepared for their supersession. This inconvenience is to a certain degree inseparable from our determination to keep Simpson in command, but it makes it more necessary to set to work to remove obstacles beforehand, and as soon as we can, and I should doubt whether

¹ A scheme for smoking out the enemy.

it would not be best to appoint England to Malta instead of asking him whether he would like to go. If that was done, and if Colin Campbell were told that he would have a high command in India, matters would be prepared for the event of Simpson being forced by ill health to retire.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *July 21, 1855.*

We could not decipher your telegraphic despatch dated 18th July, 2.30 P.M. At least not the whole of it, but it is so far clear in it that it has been decided to confirm me in the chief command of this Army.

I only hope, my Lord, that my letter to you dated 30th ult. did not lead you to suppose that I was insensible to the high and splendid career that seemed open to me, or that I was devoid of that anxiety to seize the opportunity which you might have expected from me. The fact is that on the 30th, when that letter was written, we were all of us much cast down by Lord Raglan's sudden death, and by various cases of cholera that were raging at that time; and I much regret that the contents or tone of my letter may have given you any cause of embarrassment. The telegraphic despatch of the 18th seems to set matters all right, and I have given out an Order, of which a copy accompanies this letter, announcing to the Army my confirmation as its Commander. I have only to hope for *health*, and freedom from gout.

A personal explanation.

Pakenham is duly installed as Adjutant-General, and a better could not be found. Markham arrived two days ago, and is posted to the command of the 2nd Division.

I fully appreciate your kindness in authorising me to defer action on any of your orders, if any of them press against my serious convictions. I do not think this likely to happen. . . . You ask my opinion of Sir Richard England. It is good. He has gone on steadily and quietly in the honest execution of his duty ever since he joined this Army, and in spite of all the Cabal against him, I have

A good word for Sir Richard England.

perfect confidence in England, and should be content to trust him with any order to execute. He does not want sense nor talent, and I have no reason to think him otherwise than quite capable of command. He has had experience too—such as it is—but men learn from experience, be it what it may. England has been shamefully ill-used, and some injudicious friends have made matters worse.

'All is going
on favourably.'

It may be imagined that our siege operations are languid; but all is going on favourably, and if the French can succeed in taking the Malakoff, everything will assume a new shape.

Recommends
Canrobert for
G.C.B.

I venture to call your Lordship's attention to General Canrobert, should it happen that he is overlooked in the Honours of the Bath now awarded. I believe it was promised him, and it would be gratifying to our Army, and would enrapture the French, if Canrobert was made G.C.B. It should not be forgotten that he was by Lord Raglan's side whenever danger pressed, and he is a worthy fellow as can be, and much attached to the English troops.

I must not omit to mention that the *Times* newspaper reaches Sebastopol before we get it in our Camp; so what with the electric wires and the *Times*, our enemy has many advantages over us.

I will do my best endeavours to give a good start to the Corps of Army Works.

The *correspondence* here is beyond me! but I will endeavour to keep your Lordship *au courant* of everything going on.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 23, 1855.*

Brevity is commendable where there is nothing to say, and I am glad to find you do not extend your last private letters beyond a note sheet.

I think in a short time I shall be able to find you a head of your Intelligence Department, and if you like it I

could send you out a clerk from the Foreign Office, a gentleman and man of information, who could act as your private secretary, write and keep your foreign correspondence, and be of service to you in many ways in your transactions with the French. What say you to this?

Why don't you set to work and destroy the buildings in the town? Suggests destruction of buildings in Sebastopol.

Raglan spared them on some principle of mercy that I don't comprehend.

I am sorry to see Omar Pasha's desire to be off. If he would only hold on till I can send you General Vivian's force and some foreign levies, then he might go on his own hook where he could do most good. I send you out your official letter to-day, and your commission will come as soon as it is prepared. Meanwhile, as you will date from 29th ultimo, make all your arrangements. Omar Pasha desires to be off.

Why is Barnard at a Division? I thought you had made him Chief of the Staff? Use Markham actively in the field as a Divisional Officer.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *July 23, 1855.*

Beatson's Horse are of no use at the Dardanelles (not being sea-horses), and they might be of much use at Eupatoria, from whence, in conjunction with the Turkish Cavalry there, they might intercept or harass the Russian convoys from Perekop to Simpheropol. Suggests employment for Beatson's Horse.

Would it not be advisable to send them to Eupatoria without delay? Whatever forming they want would be given them there as well as at Dardanelles, and probably better. I wish you would confer with Charles Wood¹ about this. Some orders would be necessary to Lyons.

I conclude that Omar Pasha will go with some of his good troops to Trebizonde, to assist the Kars and Erzeroum Army; if that should be, it would seem to be best to send Vivian² and his men as soon as possible to the Crimea. Movements of Turkish troops at seat of war.

¹ Sir Chas. Wood, First Lord of the Admiralty.

² General commanding Turkish Contingent.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, July 24, 1855.

Your despatches up to the 9th arrived yesterday. I have before me your 'private' note of that date, to which these lines are my reply. I am not prepared to say that the feeling between Pélissier and Omar Pasha is of an unfriendly character, though it is evident there is not much mutual respect existing between them; and at these Conferences this is easy to be seen. I quite understand about the Sardinian Contingent—that it is attached to our Army. I shall be prepared for Lord Stratford de Redcliffe when he comes here. He has been here already, some few weeks ago, and knows his way amongst us quite well.

As to the inquiry your Lordship makes as to what intelligence I received that 'inspired me with apprehension for the safety of Balaclava,'¹ my explanation is that your mention of Lüders' Corps, agreeing with information from Simpheropol of his actual arrival, knowing him to be a man of enterprise, and seeing the troops on the Tchernaya Plain not properly posted (to my mind at least), I did feel it very probable that Lüders might force the line and get to Balaclava. I accordingly asked for a Conference as to the position of the troops, and a new and satisfactory arrangement was fixed upon, and I was satisfied.

Upon this, it appears that Pélissier sent the message to the Emperor which Lord Cowley sends to you, and which I really do not understand. At the consultation alluded to by Pélissier, both he and Omar Pasha agreed with me that the troops might be better disposed in case of an attack, and they were moved into better position, and I was satisfied.

I had no idea such a small matter was to become so important as to demand all this from me. The French use the telegraph all day; Biddulph says eight or ten messages come and go between this and Paris in a day! and it is therefore impossible for me to agree with Pélissier

¹ See *antea*, pp. 279, 280.

Relations between Pélissier and Omar.

Explains his apprehensions for safety of Balaclava.

in all the messages sent. Besides this, I think Pélissier 'Closeness' of the closest fellow I ever met with, though I do hope to Pélissier. succeed in inducing him to *trust me*.

There is a paragraph in the *Morning Post* giving the exact strength of our guards of the trenches, times of relief, etc. It is very disgusting to read these things, which are Indiscretion of the *Morning Post*. read in Sebastopol some days before they reach us here.

I enclose to your Lordship's care a letter to Her Majesty, who has commanded me to write direct to herself from time to time.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

July 26, 1855.

There is no doubt that Omar's proposal would be the best for the Contingent, but it will require to be seriously considered, because, if Vivian once goes to Shumla, there he must remain till next spring, and I cannot but think that you will want the force at Sebastopol long before the winter is over. In two or three months from this time surely the officers and men will be sufficiently acquainted with each other for all duties not *en rase campagne*. Movements of Turkish Contingent.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, July 27, 1855.

The Queen has observed with regret the very desponding tone of General Simpson's letter to Lord Panmure. She thinks he should do all he can to cheer General Simpson and to afford him assistance in his very laborious work; civil assistance—even if not usual—should, and surely could easily, be afforded him, so that the fatigues of writing might be lessened, for this is just what General Simpson's health never could bear. He was accustomed to walk nearly twenty miles a day to keep off gout, and a sedentary life always disagrees with him. The deaths of two very valuable men seem to have overset him very much. Major Claremont would be most useful to him, and Consideration for General Simpson.

the Queen hopes he will retain him. She is very sorry for Colonel Stephenson's indisposition, as she has heard such a very high character of him.

Suggests the adoption of a Chancellerie Civile at the seat of war.

We were much interested and gratified and comforted by all Sir J. M'Neill told us—whose enthusiasm for, and admiration of, her dear, brave Army is delightful to hear! Could not something like the Chancellerie Civile in foreign armies be usefully adopted in ours in the Crimea, and if so, would not a person like Sir John M'Neill be very eligible for the head of it? Neither the Chief of the Staff nor the Military Secretary can supply this want. Lord Raglan united it all in his own person.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 28, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letters of the 27th.

As to military appointments in the East.

With regard to the appointments in the East, the Queen would remark that Lord William Paulet is omitted from the list of Brigadiers, and that Colonel Storks can consequently not be moved to Scutari, a promotion he much deserves. The Duke of Newcastle speaks of him in the highest terms in a letter to Lord Clarendon, and this confirms all the Queen had heard of him.

Lord Panmure will since have seen a letter the Prince wrote to Lord Hardinge with reference to Lord Rokeby.

Proposal for forming a new Division.

The Queen would be very sorry if his case could not be considered. He is in no way inferior to any of the officers out there, and by many placed higher than some who have received commands. Should it still be intended to remove Sir R. England to Malta, that Division might be given him, or two or three battalions brigaded and added to the Guards, making a 6th Division? Some of the Divisions now count eleven and twelve regiments, whereas six was the original organisation, making two Brigades of three each. The regiments are now, it is true, much reduced in strength, and therefore more may be

brigaded together. Yet the disproportion has been allowed to become great.

The Queen is delighted to hear so good a report of the Swiss Foreign Legion, as well as of the Turkish Contingent, but laments that the accounts of Beatson's Horse are so very bad.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 28, 1855.*

The Queen writes a line to Lord Panmure to repeat the warning respecting head-quarters. From what Prince Edward¹ tells us, she feels sure that they ought to be shifted or we shall lose every one. He says the moment he left the Guards and went there he felt unwell, having always been well before, and has had fever hanging about him ever since. We feel so strongly impressed with this that we wish Lord Panmure would telegraph it again; the position may be healthy and yet the house have been infected.

Removal of
head-quarters
urged.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

July 28, 1855.

Would it not be well to put the following question by telegraph to General Simpson:—

‘Have you and the Admiral thought of the use of rafts or gunboats in the harbour of Sebastopol, to destroy the fleet or to take the batteries in flank?’

Suggests
employment
of rafts and
gunboats in
harbour of
Sebastopol.

I feel sure that this ought to be considered as one of the means of harassing the enemy. A raft is very difficult to hit from a battery and difficult to sink. It might remain under the protection of our new batteries on Mount Sapouné and still take up a flanking position with regard to the Malakoff, [and] the new Russian defences. I hope your order to shell the town and for the fleet to do the same every night will be attended to. The Russians ought not to be left a quiet moment in the place.

¹ Of Saxe-Weimar.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 28, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty's note of this morning.

Lord Panmure has observed the arrangements in the last to which Your Majesty refers, and has in his despatch to General Simpson to-day asked him to explain the grounds on which he has acted.

Lord Panmure is much gratified by Your Majesty's good opinion of General Storks.

In reference to Lord Rokeby's case, Lord Hardinge showed to Lord Panmure the two letters addressed by Lord Rokeby, one to H.R.H. the Prince, and the other to Colonel Phipps. Lord Panmure knows well the pain which it gives Your Majesty to do anything, even in matters of urgency, which can hurt the feelings of another, and has much satisfaction in meeting Your Majesty's views by creating a 6th Division, the command of which will be given to Lord Rokeby. A telegraphic message to this effect has gone to-day to General Simpson. Lord Panmure will communicate with Your Majesty by a special messenger to-morrow, respecting the future command of the Army. Lord Panmure begs to enclose for Your Majesty a Crimean medal.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.**BELGRAVE SQUARE, July 28, 1855.*

I have omitted to tell you that your private letters to me are seen by the Queen and my colleagues, whose thirst after everything coming from the seat of war is like that of the parched traveller in the desert.

I dare say that, not anticipating this, you have poured out your mind to me in all its gloom!

Your letters have certainly been most disheartening, and have in my opinion done yourself a great injustice.

It is impossible for a man feeling as you do to face the difficulties of any position, or to cheer on others in the arduous task before them. If you are so weighted down by a sense of your own inability to bear the burden of the command, you *must* write me so officially and request to be relieved. It is neither fair to me nor to yourself to do otherwise. I have already told you, with all the sincerity of an old friend, that I believe you to have many qualities for the command of that Army which I cannot seek in others, and I have been most anxious to advance you to the distinction which lies at the end of the road on which you have been placed. But, my good friend, you must *lead*. You must not be oppressed by care nor daunted by difficulty. If your correspondence overwhelms you, call in scribes to your aid. I shall be quite content with *one* bag a week instead of two, as you can telegraph to me for all your immediate wants. Nothing on my part shall be left undone to make your position as easy as I can, and to help you to reap its honours. So shake off the black dog, and make yourself respected by the Allies and obeyed by your own people. I think you may with great advantage retain Major Claremont's services about you.

In the event of your being ill and feeling yourself compelled to give up your duties suddenly, it has been determined at once to place General Codrington at the head of the Army, as being, in the opinion of every one, the best among the younger officers for that position. I shall send you an official letter on this subject by this mail, but you will retain it in your possession, not even acquainting General Codrington with the fact, until you see cause to act on it. I dare say that this resolution, when it becomes known, will create some surprise and perhaps cause discontent among the senior officers, but still, as it is in my opinion the best thing to be done under the circumstances for the Army itself, I am ready to bear the responsibility. I hope Lord Rokeby's mind is at ease by the arrangements made for a 6th Division.

I cannot understand why you did not give Lord W. Paulet a brigade. . . .

Exhortation
to Simpson.

In case of
Simpson's
having to retire,
Codrington to
succeed him.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.**July 29, 1855.*

Inquiries as to
progress of the
siege.

The Queen wishes me to let you know that she has not yet received General Jones' plan of the advances made since the 7th.¹

I wish also to remind you that the Report of the Barrack Commission has not yet reached us.

The telegraph which you have just sent to the Queen mentions for the first time that we took some works on the 18th.² I cannot find the named fort in the directory on any plan; the Mamelon at the gorge of the Port du Sud is marked on the Admiralty map, and seems an important point from its position.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, July 29, 1855.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday, and is much rejoiced at her wishes respecting Lord Rokeby having been carried out.

In the first place, six Divisions are a much better organisation, and often it is very important to prevent general dissatisfaction among the officers in the Crimea, which would do real mischief to the efficiency of the service there.

Hastening
despatch of
medals.

The medal was duly given to Prince Edward, who was much pleased to receive it from the Queen's own hands. He tells her, however, that not one Crimean medal for the Army had arrived when he left on the 5th!! How is this? Lord Panmure told the Queen two months ago that they were going out at the rate of two thousand a week! Will he inquire and take care that the medals go out as speedily as possible?

¹ 'All through July the defenders of Sebastopol beheld the works of the besiegers creeping steadily on.'—Hamley, p. 267.

² This probably refers to General Eyre's captures in the assault of the 18th June.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *July 30, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday evening, and has signed the Dormant Commission for Sir William Codrington. A similar course was pursued with regard to Sir George Cathcart. The Queen hopes that General Simpson may still rally. He must be in a state of great helplessness at this moment, knowing that he wants—as everybody out there—the advantages which Lord Raglan's name, experience, position, rank, prestige, etc., gave him, having his Military Secretary ill on board, the head of the Intelligence Department dead, and no means left him thereby to gather information, or keep up secret correspondence with the Tartars; Colonel Vico dead, who, as Prince Edward told the Queen, had become a most important element in the good understanding with the French Army and its new Commanders, and not possessing military rank enough to make the Sardinian General consider him as his Chief. If all these difficulties are added to those inherent to the task imposed upon him, one cannot be surprised at his low tone of hopefulness. As most of these will, however, meet every Commander whom we now can appoint, the Queen trusts that means will be devised to assist him as much as possible, in relieving him from too much writing and in the diplomatic correspondence he has to carry on. The Queen repeats her opinion that a 'Chef de Chancellerie Diplomatique,' such as is customary in the Russian Army, ought to be placed at his command, and she wishes Lord Panmure to show this letter to Lords Palmerston and Clarendon, and to consult with them on the subject.¹ Neither the Chief of the Staff nor the Military Secretary can supply that want, and the General himself must feel unequal to it without any experience on the subject, and so will his successor. . . .

Sympathy with
trying position
of Simpson.

Proposal to
appoint a
'Chef de
Chancellerie.'

¹ The suggestion was not adopted.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

CRIMEA, *July 31, 1855.*

There is nothing for me to write to you by this mail, everything being unchanged since my last. The last mail we have from London is that of the 16th, and I now reply to your private letter of that date. It tells me that no private letter from me reached you in our mail of the 3rd. It was the day of Lord Raglan's funeral procession, and we were all much occupied on that melancholy day. One or two other mails may have gone without a private letter, but I generally send one if there is anything worth communicating.

Lord Raglan's
rides in Camp.

I take my daily ride in Camp, as you desire, as soon as I get my day's work over at the writing-table. Ever since my arrival here, it was Lord Raglan's custom to ride about the Camp daily. I hardly ever knew him miss doing so, whatever the newspapers said to the contrary.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.**July 31, 1855.*

I send you out by this bag a packet marked 'most secret,' which you must keep in your own custody and not mention even to him who is most interested in it. When I sent you out to assume the position of Head of the Staff under the late Lord Raglan, I had in view not simply your standing between him and his Staff and controlling the depôts of the Army, but also that, in event of anything occurring to Lord Raglan, you should stand between the Army and Sir R. England. The contingency has unfortunately occurred, and you now occupy the chief command.

I imagine, however, that you will not do so long, and I have laid the ground for your retirement with the honours of war by having your commission executed, and yourself promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and the local rank of General. If you really feel unable to bear the

weight of responsibility, which I am aware is not small, I advise you to give it up, and every one will give you credit, and on your retirement a still further mark of the Queen's favour may be conferred; but I strongly recommend you not to hesitate in the matter. Either buckle up your reins vigorously for the work, or at once claim the consideration which your long and honourable services entitle you to receive. I have written to you plainly and as a friend, and you will, I know, accept what I write as such.

Whether you stay or come away, the same risk of letting the command of the Army fall into Sir R. England's hands stares me in the face, and as I am quite resolved to prevent this as far as I can, I send you the secret packet to which I have above referred. It contains a commission signed by the Queen, appointing Sir William Codrington (as I hope he will be ere you receive this) to the supreme command of the Army. It is not without much reflection and well weighing of every circumstance that I have made up my mind to put him over the heads of England, Bentinck, Campbell, and Rokeby. The only man among them whom I have any hesitation in superseding is Campbell; but I have been told that, though an excellent Brigadier, he is unfit for undivided responsibility. To England I have offered the solatium of Malta. Bentinck and Rokeby may, if they please, retire on their divisional honours. Campbell shall have the first profitable command I have to give, if he is unwilling to remain under Codrington.

In the event of your illness or absence, you will present the commission to Codrington and have him put in orders. In case of a bullet having your billet marked on it doing its work, you had better enclose the commission in a packet to be immediately delivered to General Codrington. I believe, and so do the Government, that we have made the best selection which circumstances will permit, and I should like to have your own unreserved opinion on the matter. I shall be anxious till I hear from you in answer to this and Saturday's mail, and in the interim I hope to see a blow struck which will signalise your tenure of the supreme command.

Simpson
enjoined to do
one thing or
the other.

Dormant
commission for
Codrington.

Instruction as
to dormant
commission.

Omar Pasha's
wish to with-
draw.

Let me now advert to your letters just received of the 17th. I have conveyed your letter to the Queen, who is at Osborne. Omar Pasha's desire to leave the Crimea lies not so much in his desire to relieve Kars as to get clear of Pélissier, whose conduct to him is uncivil, impolitic, therefore offensive and foolish. I cannot see how we can let him go until we can bring some other force to replace that which he would withdraw. I quite agree with you in opinion as to the effect which the withdrawal of his force, if unrelieved, would have on the enemy, and the discouragement it would give to ourselves. You are, I think, mistaken in giving in to his plan of sending the Contingent¹ to Shumla. He would lock them up there, an idle and useless force. My idea, and indeed I may say my intention, is to send it, so soon as capable of moving, much nearer to you. As soon as it is a little organised, and the officers and men are accustomed to one another, I will send it to the Crimea. The English Army is, as compared with the French, a mere handful of men, and in consequence of this its commander, wherever he may be, has not the influence due to the nation in the operations of the siege. The remedy for this may be found in the increase of the force. I was in hopes that the Sardinian Army would have been able for this, but as they are not fit for trench-work, and set up rather as a separate army than as a portion of the English force, my expectations in that direction are not fulfilled. To do any good in this way we must have troops under our own orders, and I look forward to strengthening you by reserves from Malta, and to make up your present battalions, and the 56th, of 800 strong, now on its passage to join you. I reckon that by this means you should have at your disposal 27,000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, and 5000 Artillery—all English troops. I expect to send you by the middle of August 3000 Foreign Legion men. If by the end of August I could move Vivian's Contingent to you, that would make an addition of 15,000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, and 2000 Artillery, all well appointed. This whole force, amalgamated and taking turn of duty alike, would

Simpson's force
to be
strengthened,

¹ Vivian's Contingent.

amount to 45,000 Infantry, 6000 Cavalry, 7000 Artillery—in all 58,000 men, to which if you add the Sardinians, you may say at 13,000, you would have a force on which to rely of 71,000, without a single one of Omar's Army present.

This would give the English Commander a moral influence which the Allies would be compelled to respect. The absence of any communication from General Pélissier to you exhibits a want of confidence which is most disagreeable. You should call on him in writing for his plans, and if he does not render them in hearty co-operation, let me know quickly, Naval guns are coming to you, and you shall have as many more of large calibre as you require.

Difficulties
with Pélissier.

No telegraphic messages reach you which I do not sanction. The inquiry after Captain Jervis was made at the earnest request of his father, the Chief-Justice. I have sent no message which ought to arouse you at night, and in future, that you may not be disturbed, give orders that no ciphered message shall be brought to you before the hour of rising, unless it commence with the number 500. This will protect you from having your rest broken, for it is rarely that I shall find it necessary to put on the secret work. . . .

I must conclude this as the post closes.

ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENT

Most Secret.

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 30, 1855.

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose to you under seal a commission nominating an officer to take command of the Army in the event of your being incapacitated from your duty by illness or absence. You will learn more particulars from my private letter of this date, and use your own discretion as to breaking the seal of this document and making its contents known to the individual therein named and the Army at large.—I have the honour to be, etc.,

The dormant
commission.

(Signed) PANMURE.

GENERAL SIMPSON.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

July 31, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to inform Your Majesty that in discussion with his colleagues to-day the following conclusions were arrived at :—

No withdrawal
from the
heights before
Sebastopol
consistent with
honour.

1st. With reference to General Simpson's despatch in which he takes measure for the future and refers to the preparations which the French have apparently made in the event of the winter still finding the Allies in the trenches and the Russians in Sebastopol,—Lord Panmure and his colleagues are unanimously of opinion that, under no circumstances whatever, will it be consistent with the honour of England and France to withdraw from the heights before Sebastopol unless driven from them, which ought to be impossible. Lord Panmure was authorised to convey this strong opinion to General Torrens, in order that it might be impressed upon his Imperial Majesty and Marshal Vaillant. This has been done in a despatch of which a copy is now transmitted to Your Majesty.

2nd. On the subject of Omar Pasha's proposal to repair in person to Kars, or such other part of Asia Minor as shall suit his purpose of relieving Kars, Lord Panmure and his colleagues are of opinion that the objections of the English and French Generals to that proposal were most proper, and more especially their resistance of the removal of the garrison of Kertch. After some consideration of the importance of not permitting Russia to gain a footing in the Turkish territory, and thereby giving her a *quid pro quo* wherewith to negotiate, it was agreed to offer by telegraph, should the Government of his Imperial Majesty concur, a scheme of the following nature :—

Omar Pasha states his Army in the Crimea to amount to 60,000 men.

He desires to go to Asia with

	25,000	Infantry.
	3,000	Cavalry.
say	2,000	Artillery.
	<hr/>	
	30,000	

To this we agree, provided he will leave

In the Crimea,	18,000
At Kertch,	6,000
At Eupatoria,	6,000
					<hr/>
					30,000

To reinforce Eupatoria we would send there immediately General Vivian's force, now estimated at 8000 Infantry and 2000 Cavalry, but which would be increased by degrees to 16,000 Infantry and Artillery and 4000 Cavalry. To these would be added Beatson's Horse, which may be calculated at 2000 at present.

Proposed
redistribution
of forces.

This would give quite a sufficient force of Infantry to defend Eupatoria from any attack, and furnish a body of Cavalry whose employment would consist in interrupting the Russian convoys at Sebastopol.

Lord Panmure conveys these views to Sir A. Torrens by the mail or messenger of this evening, and has requested a telegraphic answer.

Lord Panmure begs to inform Your Majesty that the private letter of which he has sent Sir. A Torrens a copy was addressed by Sir R. Airey to Lord Hardinge.

3rd. The change of siege tactics was carefully considered at the meeting, and approved as tending to an easier penetration into the place, at less cost of valuable lives.

Lord Panmure is happy to be able to inform Your Majesty that more favourable intelligence has arrived of the irregularities of Beatson's Horse. The next messenger will bring more particular details.

CHAPTER VIII

AUGUST 1855

WE have seen that Omar Pasha's desire to withdraw from the Crimea to the relief of Kars had at first been regarded with disfavour by the British authorities.

By degrees, however, the importance of checking the Russian advance in Asia Minor came to be recognised—on the grounds, to quote Lord Panmure, that the possession of the Asiatic territories of the Porte would 'give to Russia a material guarantee for peace—something which she had captured with her bow and spear, and which she would be able to offer as a *quid pro quo* when the period for negotiation came.'

Accordingly, on August 4th, after a Cabinet Council, Lord Stratford was empowered to consent to Omar's withdrawal, conditionally on his not reducing the number of Turkish troops before Sebastopol, or disturbing the garrison at Yenikale. At the same time General Vivian, commanding the Turkish Contingent, was ordered to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Eupatoria with the Contingent, which, however, still required much shaping. Meantime it was recognised that, should Vivian succeed to the command of any portion of Omar's troops, our position in the Councils of War would be thereby improved.

Nevertheless, General Simpson deplored the departure of Omar, whilst Louis Napoleon disapproved of it.

With the bitter memory of the past winter present to their minds, as summer declined, the British authorities at

home and at the seat of war began to look ahead and to form plans and take timely precautions.

Lord Raglan had distinctly declared that the hardships of a second winter in the trenches would be more than the Army could endure.

It was necessary, then, to face the distasteful prospect of abandoning the trenches, supposing that Sebastopol should remain, at no distant date, uncaptured, whether by sapping or bombardment.

And supposing that the trenches were abandoned, General Simpson emphatically declared that it would be impossible that the siege should be resumed (August 7th).

Signs were not wanting, however, that a crisis was at hand.

Throughout July the daily losses sustained by the Russians from the ordinary fire of the Allies had averaged 250; whilst in the bombardment of the preceding month the enemy had lost from 1500 to 2000 a day.

A desperate effort to raise the siege might therefore be expected.

Accordingly, on August 15th it became known to the Home Government that Prince Gortschakoff had received orders from St. Petersburg to take the offensive at all costs, and on the following morning was fought the battle of the Tchernaya, in which French and Sardinian forces brilliantly repulsed the attack of a powerful Russian field army.

Owing to the failure of this attack, the sortie which was to have accompanied it did not take place. Still the end was not yet, and on August 25th Simpson writes that a further attack is daily expected. In the meantime our advanced works before Sebastopol were being strengthened and improved under the greatest difficulties, and at a cost of on an average sixty casualties to the twenty-four hours. At the same time deaths from cholera in Camp

averaged from twenty to thirty a-day. Foreign levies and an Army Works Corps were on their way from England to the seat of the war.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 1, 1855.

I return herewith the plans of the new barracks, which the Queen has signed. All the alterations appear judicious, and I hope that the plans for Cavalry and Artillery will follow soon.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 1, 1855.

The Queen wishes me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing the mails of the 17th from the Crimea, and to answer that received this morning, which conveys an account of your last meeting with your colleagues, and transmits a copy of your letter to General Torrens written in consequence thereof.

Suggested
arrangements
in view of Omar
Pasha's with-
drawal from be-
fore Sebastopol.

It had also struck the Queen that, however inconvenient and even dangerous to our position in the Crimea Omar Pasha's proposed withdrawal might be, there is much weight in what he says with regard to Asia Minor. He is very likely the only person who could arrest the progress of the Russian Army in that quarter, and his landing in the rear of it with 25-30,000 men seems the most likely mode to succeed. The importance of checking the Russians in Asia Minor neither can be overrated, whether we contemplate the state of the war or future peace.

The Queen was therefore pleased with the result of your deliberations and the decision that General Vivian should relieve Omar Pasha. This will have the further advantage of diminishing the number of commanders, as General Vivian can be ordered to do what Omar Pasha had to be begged to consider.

The Queen wishes it to be considered, however, who is to command the 15,000 or 18,000 Turks to be left before Sebastopol? There is great reason to fear that they will fall under the French command or belong to nobody, and will perish like the former Turkish auxiliaries from the same cause. Now, if General Vivian joined our Army before Sebastopol, and the Turks under a distinct commander of their own were concentrated at Eupatoria, we should have a united Army of 50,000 men under one head, and with the Sardinians, 65,000. The position of our Commander, both towards the Sardinians and the French, would be much improved, as well as our military prospects. He need then not be afraid of being left in the lurch by anybody, and would be more considerately treated by General Péliissier.

The Queen considers this as of the greatest importance. The 6000 men (Turks) at Kertch would remain, of course, as suggested.

The second question of vital importance is that about the position of the siege. General Simpson's report comes after the ominous words of Lord Raglan: 'The Army cannot pass through a second winter in the trenches!'

That a certain military disgrace attaches to leaving the trenches cannot be denied, but this lies merely in the public acknowledgment of the fact that you cannot take the fortress; the fact itself will, however, not be altered by not being acknowledged, and probably the sacrifice of a whole army merely in order not to acknowledge the fact, that the trenches have become useless, would be both folly and wickedness. What is the state of the case?

Contemplates
the prospect of
having to
abandon the
trenches.

The French have sapped up to the Bastion du Mât and the Bastion Central, the two salients of the right line of defence, and are within 60 and 80 yards respectively of these two points since three months, therefore have got as far as trenches will carry them, but think it inexpedient (some say impossible) to storm! We have approached the Redan so near with our trenches that every night costs

us some twenty men killed and wounded, and Sir H. Jones declares that it will be unsafe to renew the assault on that work! The French must ere this have got as near to the Malakoff as sapping can be carried, and every day's delay in the assault will diminish the chance.

Urges costliness and futility of holding trenches through the winter.

When all this is done, which we may suppose is the case now, and the works are not taken, what possible hope of success can we attach to our holding the trenches? Will their being held weaken the place? Will it not get stronger rather every day, whilst we have got to the utmost limit of our means of attack. Suppose we held them the whole winter at the expense of another 20,000 lives, how would that better our position for war or peace next spring?

Bombardment considered as an alternative.

It is clear, then, that some other measure must be resorted to, to reduce the place. Possibly bombarding it may be the way. It is not likely (in my opinion) that it will do more than destroy houses and lives, which latter the Russians will replace as they have the means of doing, but we must consider it as a possible way to success.

Now, you say, the 200 mortars will leave England at the end of August. It is not probable therefore that the bombardment can begin before October, always supposing everything to go on smoothly with us in the meantime. If at the end of October we find the bombardment not to have answered, in what a helpless condition shall we be! Exactly where we were last year at the same period.

Anxiety for coming winter.

It must be argued therefore that the next few days will decide whether trenches will take Sebastopol, and if it be proved that they do not, immediate steps will have to be taken to change the plan of campaign, to place our troops in safety for the coming winter.

What plan next to be resorted to.

WHAT is to be done is another question, which cannot be solved until the first decision is come to, and the Queen thinks the Cabinet will do well not to come to the first decision without some professional advice.

Lord Hardinge ought to be heard, and together with

him Sir John Burgoyne, Sir George Brown, and Sir John Pennefather, all three perfectly conversant with every inch of the ground, and every military consideration.

The Queen wishes you to circulate this letter amongst those of your colleagues who assembled for the late discussion.¹

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *August 1, 1855.*

The Queen returns this most interesting letter with her best thanks.

Admiral H. Stewart² must be a most able man, with great good sense and sound judgment.

The neglect about the medals is very annoying. The Queen saw many, many sad cases in the Military Hospital at Portsmouth yesterday, almost all sufferers from that cruel trench-work—consumption, dysentery, rheumatism, paralysis, frost-bites of the most awful kind—many whose future lives will be those of cripples and wretched sufferers—some whose prospects must be those of another and a better world, where their devotion to their Queen and country will meet with its everlasting reward! It was a deeply affecting sight. The Queen was truly gratified to see them so comfortable, the wards, etc., airy and so well attended to, though the space is small.

The Queen would wish Lord Panmure to mention to Sir C. Wood that she heard with deep regret that the officers and men who came home in the *Hansa* transport on Saturday, several of whom she saw yesterday, say that they met with great discomfort and ill-usage on board, and she hears that this has been the case with several of the transports, the captains being so unfeeling and regardless of all comfort to the poor sick and wounded, to whom, under all circumstances, a long voyage must be very trying.

Medals.
Her Majesty's
impression of
her visit to the
Military
Hospital at
Portsmouth.

Discomforts of
transport
ships.

¹ See Note by Lord Palmerston on above letter, dated August 2nd.

² Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *August 2, 1855.*

The Queen finds that the unsigned letter was by mistake left out of the box in which Admiral H. Stewart's letter was sent.

She takes this opportunity of saying that she thinks Admiral Stewart's suggestion, of a regiment or two being made over to the Admiral for diversions, of the greatest importance, and hopes it will receive the attention of the Government.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

HOUSE OF COMMONS, *August 2, 1855.*

Suggests representations to the Emperor regarding proposed movements of Turkish troops at seat of war.

As Walewski¹ and the Emperor both object, we cannot well telegraph to Stratford and Simpson without further communication with the French Government. I think we might explain to them that the effect of our proposal would be to allow Omar to go to Asia, taking with him such portion of his force as would leave at Yenikale and at Balaclava the same amount of Turks as at present are there; for we might send Vivian to Balaclava, and his force and what Omar would leave there would, when put together, make up the same amount of Turkish force as that which is now there. We might press on the French Government the calamitous effect of a successful occupation of Asia Minor by the Russians, and the consideration that, after all, the Turkish Government have a full right to send their own General and their own troops to defend any part of their territory which may be in danger.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD PALMERSTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 2, 1855.*

I have sent my opinion to Clarendon with your paper on the Prince's letter—that we should immediately telegraph

¹ Count Walewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris.

to Constantinople to give Omar his head, on the terms of Stratford's despatch read to us yesterday. We cannot wait for the French, with whom the arrangement in no ways interferes as¹ [] from before Sebastopol.

You have on a separate sheet some notes as to the Army. A compliment to Peto² will do good.

LORD PANMURE TO LORD CLARENDON

Read the enclosed, and, if you agree with Palmerston, as I do, you will telegraph as he proposes.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

. . . We should be very careful how we give the French Government a ground for complaint that we give orders without their knowledge, or rather against their opinion, and particularly in a matter concerning Asia Minor, where they think we have an interest totally apart from theirs. . . .

As to desirability of working smoothly with the French Government in regard to Asia Minor.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *August 3, 1855.*

Your answer is excellent. You might perhaps add that when the two armies landed, their numbers being equal, the siege line was equally divided between them. That this equal division lasted during the severest part of the winter, although in the meantime the French numbers had greatly increased. That the effect of this disproportion was great distress and suffering among our troops, and thus, so far from our not having borne our share of the siege labour, we had for many of the worst months an undue proportion.

Remarks on the share of siege-labours borne by the Allies respectively.

¹ Passage illegible—'it will not withdraw a man' is the meaning.

² Sir S. M. Peto, one of the contractors for the steam-tramway between Balaclava and the Camp. The other was Mr. Betts. They stipulated that they should reap no pecuniary advantage from the contract.

Torrens might confidentially say to Vaillant that our Camp has, by the good regulations and great exertions of our Civil Sanitary Commissioners, been brought to an exemplary state of cleanliness, order, and health, that we are told the French Camp is in a very different condition, and that probably the great sickness in it arises in great degree for want of such arrangements.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *August 3, 1855.*

Secretarial
assistance for
Simpson.

The Queen has this morning received Lord Panmure's letter enclosing the copy of General Simpson's, which is much more cheerful. But *he must* have assistance in his correspondence; it is that which he complains of in every letter, and he will break down if he is not assisted. Lord Panmure has not answered the Queen with respect to the Chef de Chancellerie Diplomatique. She again strongly urges the expediency of adopting some such plan. It is not the military part of his office which seems to depress and oppress General Simpson, but the writing. The Queen hopes that Major Claremont will return to the Crimea as soon as possible. When is he expected here? The Queen would wish much to see him when he comes.

The Queen rejoices to hear that 12,000 medals have sailed. She wishes that those for the poor sick at Portsmouth should be sent soon, as she fears else many will never receive them, and she is certain many a death-bed would be cheered by this reward for all their sufferings!

If the Queen's visit to Shorncliffe is to take place at all, it must be next week, about Wednesday or Thursday.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *August 4, 1855.*

I now reply to your letter of the 20th ultimo. I must first thank your Lordship for the kind and frank manner in which you write to me, and I beg to assure you that to whatever points you require my attention, whether or not

they may have been overlooked by me, I shall always value your remarks upon them, and will receive them in the same kindly spirit as that by which they are dictated. I am glad that at length all doubts are ended as to my being confirmed in the command, because I have now only one fixed object before me—that of carrying it on to the best of my ability, and I cannot be otherwise but proud and gratified with the high position I hold, and with the confidence reposed in me. But I am equally sensible and deeply impressed at the difficulties surrounding me. They are of no small magnitude! I am also much grieved by the daily diminution of my best officers—this last week England has gone; Dacres and Warde of the Artillery also gone, both so shaken that I hardly expect them to return. In my own family, too, Stephenson will not be able to take up his appointment; Vico's successor, a very nice fellow, Colonel de Lusian, also gone to sea very ill; the Sardinian Attaché ditto—in short, I am much crippled, and my head servant, Keddie, whom your lordship must recollect, is ill with fever, and does not recover. These things are not agreeable around one who requires much aid in the daily business; and but for Colonel Steele,¹ who is come back quite well, I should break down altogether. He remains until I can judge whether Stephenson will ever be able to assume the duty. I have my doubts, for when a man becomes sick here, he rarely gets well without leaving the country.

Simpson on his own position and its difficulties.

You have sent a very useful man to me as Interpreter, Mr. Lauder; and I hope Mr. Jackson will prove equal to the chief management of that department.¹ The Russian system I believe to be very perfect, and that they have spies all through our Camp, and even in our regiments.

Russian spies in Camp.

I have considered the subject of our mails twice a-week and recommend no change, for if there should be only one a-week, it would be in my opinion worse than at present. Either the writing or the outdoor duty must be neglected, and I must just manage to act as is best.

¹ Military Secretary under Lord Raglan.

² The Intelligence Department.

Looking ahead
to next winter.

I am glad you are *forecasting* for our winter residence. I look on it with anxiety, because I foresee not only difficulty but *danger*, because the conformation of the ground we now occupy renders it difficult of defence when our trenches shall no longer be occupied. Our Cavalry is already close to Balaclava, our Artillery horses are with their Divisions all over the Camp. Three months only are now before us! The Army Works Corps has not yet been announced in our waters. I am well pleased to learn for certain that the extra sixpence is to be granted, though I fear it will not tend to diminish the prevalent drunkenness, which I am sorry to say is much on the increase. I am not afraid of our water failing, being persuaded that there is plenty of water under our feet in various localities not yet examined or tapped. There is also at intervals very heavy rain, which replenishes our springs. I am very glad to hear that Sir George Brown and Pennefather are better. Both are losses to us. . . .

Lord William Paulet does not return. I regret his leaving Scutari, where he has done so much. He goes home on leave. Sir George Maclean seems a clever Commissary, with more enlarged views than Filder. There is much to be attended to in that way. Our stores are far from what they ought to be. I have ordered General Jones and a Board to examine the railroad, because I have my own opinion about it, and am *certain* that much of it will in winter sink in the mud. No one who has not seen this country in the winter can form the smallest idea of it.

The Emperor's 15,000 men will fill up the enormous losses of our Allies, and his mortars, were they now here, would do good service. Our 13-inch shells are very low—a constant and large supply should be sent continually.

I am very much obliged to your Lordship for making me a General. . . . *Now*, I am amply paid, and have, in fact, more pay than I care about or deserve. A sketch-plan of the whole attack shall be sent to you without delay, or rather as changes occur, as the plans sent last Saturday contain everything up to the present moment.

Apprehensions
as to the rail-
road.

His own pay.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.**August 4, 1855.*

MY DEAR SIMPSON,—Since I last wrote you many important matters have presented themselves, and in them I have much pleasure in recognising your prudence and forethought for the Army and for the mutual character of its Commander and the Minister of War. Whether we winter in the lines or not, for such an event I have been making all due preparation, and I think I have got huts, stores, forage, and warm clothing well advanced. Your last telegraph for tents surprised me, and I have asked for an explanation, as you surely do not calculate upon the hutting you have already, or you have burnt it to boil your porridge! I shall notice officially your abandonment of the direct attack on the Redan, and Sir Harry Jones' proposal to enter by the valley. This is quite right even to an unmilitary eye, and I am glad you have boldly adopted it, and that the French engineers have come into the view of ours. The key to the outer town is Malakoff, and as soon as it falls things will go far smoother. You were all right in refusing to permit Omar Pasha to leave your lines with the forces, and to carry with him to Kars the garrison of Kertch. I cannot conceive how, with his soldier's eye, he could have expected for a moment that you and Pélissier could concur in such a proposition. My notion is that both he and his Commissioner, Colonel Simmons, are anxious for independent action somewhere, and perhaps somewhat impatient of the hauteur and marked indifference with which Pélissier treats him. This I have endeavoured to remedy by a private hint to Paris, as well as to secure more openness on Pélissier's part to yourself. Omar's visit to Constantinople has had good effect, because the Government there have proposed a plan by which Kars may be relieved, while no troops are taken from before Sebastopol or from Yenikale. They wish now to detach a force from Eupatoria, which we should replace by Vivian's Contingent, and perhaps Beatson's Horse, if they can be

Abandonment
of direct attack
on Redan.

Difficulties
brought about
by Pélissier's
treatment of
Omar.

Necessary to
preserve
Turkey's Asiatic
territory from
Russia.

Reinforcements
being sent out.

trusted. You seem to have the same pious horror of them as your predecessor, and as I entirely sympathise in your feelings, I will stand between you and them. It is absolutely necessary to preserve the Asiatic territories of the Porte from Russian hands, because their possession would give to Russia a material guarantee for peace—something which she had captured with her bow and spear, and which she would be able to offer as a *quid pro quo* when the period for negotiating returns. I am sending you a large bombarding establishment to sweep the town from the face of the earth. The Emperor's plan of a bombardment on a gigantic scale sounds well, and if we have only ammunition and cannoniers to work it, we may shell them out. You have done quite right in reconnoitring the heights of Balaclava in case of the worst. I am assured from Paris that no inducement will make the French raise the siege for a day! You will have a fine brigade of 2000 Germans under Brigadier-General Woolridge leave this in a fortnight. The Queen inspects them on Thursday. In ten days after, the Swiss regiment goes to you 1200 strong. The 56th, 800 strong, has sailed. You had better add the German Brigade to your Light Division, but keep them and the Swiss separate. The latter perhaps might fraternise with the Highlanders. . . . I hope the gout is keeping off. Our Session closes in a few days, and though I shall get no holiday, still I shall have more time to look about me and to see to your winter comforts.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 4, 1855.

Suggests hiring
German
drivers,

Hearing that the chief difficulty met with by the Land Transport Service is the want of good drivers, I cannot help suggesting that an attempt should be made to get them from Germany, where the pay you offer would give you an abundant supply, and of the best description. As these people would not be enlisted as soldiers, but merely hired for their labour, none of the laws against foreign enlistment would apply to them. They might be got by the

intervention of our Consuls, and ought not to be mixed up with the recruiting, in order to meet with no obstruction on the part of the Government.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *August 5, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of last night respecting Shorncliffe. She finds that it will be quite impossible for her to go both there and to Dover (as she returns the same evening to Osborne), and she thinks, therefore, that it would be best for her to go to Shorncliffe, and to arrange that the Swiss should march there for the Queen to inspect them there also. The Queen would go by railroad to Folkestone, and from thence drive to Shorncliffe. Thursday would do quite well.

Visit to
Shorncliffe.

The Swiss troops could be moved by railway easily, the Queen concludes.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *August 7, 1855.*

I have your private note of July 23rd. It is short, and so must mine be now, having nothing new to report.

We are to have a Council of Generals and Admirals to-morrow, and I fully expect some immediate measures will be determined upon, which I will report by telegraph to-morrow. . . .

We are by no means idle as regards the destruction of the buildings in the town, but I am nervous about our shells running short. There ought to be a continued supply ; and of 13-inch mortars, too, as far as 150 beyond the 50 now expected. This is most essential.

I regret to see by telegraphic message that Omar Pasha is to leave us. This may give cause of regret some day. Any troops of his that may remain with us will not be of much use, for I know no other Pasha worth his salt.

Regret at prospect of Omar's departure.

General Barnard has not been with a Division since I put him in Orders on the 2nd ultimo as Chief of the Staff.

This distribution into six Divisions has caused much vexation and trouble, and we have not men enough to form Divisions to satisfy the Generals, or the daily duty done by Divisions.

PS.—I wish it were possible to have a fourth battalion of the Guards here—one of the battalions of the Grenadier regiment. This would make a second Brigade to the Division of Guards, which I cannot at this moment make up from the Line, and it would put an end to all difficulty in making this new distribution with twelve Brigades.

I wish, my Lord, that you would consult Sir John Burgoyne, who knows our ground so well, as to his ideas of the best line if we fall back for the winter. I do not consider this Plateau defensible, and it will be for the two Governments at home to decide on the best mode of occupation for the winter. One thing must not be lost sight of, viz. if Sebastopol holds out, and we abandon our trenches, the siege never can be resumed, and our occupation *here* is gone.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

HOUSE OF COMMONS, *August 7, 1855.*

I agree with you that if Dundonald will go out himself to superintend and direct the execution of his scheme, we ought to accept his offer and try his plan. If it succeeds, it will, as you say, save a great number of English and French lives; if it fails *in his hands*, we shall be exempt from blame, and if we come in for a small share of the ridicule, we can bear it, and the greater part will fall on him. You had best, therefore, make arrangements with him without delay, and with as much secrecy as the nature of things will admit of.

[ENCLOSURE]

BRIEF PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

It was observed when viewing the Sulphur Kilns, in July in 1811, that the fumes which escaped in the rude

As to winter plans.

The writer's unreserved expression of his feelings.

Lord Dundonald's scheme.

process of extracting the material, though first elevated by heat, soon fell to the ground, destroying all vegetation, and endangering animal life to a great distance, as it was asserted that an ordinance existed prohibiting persons from sleeping within the distance of three miles during the melting season.

Scheme for
utilising the
properties of
sulphur in
warfare.

An application of these facts was immediately made to Military and Naval purposes, and after mature consideration, a Memorial was presented on the subject to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent on the 12th of April 1812, who was graciously pleased to lay it before a Commission, consisting of Lord Keith, Lord Exmouth, and General and Colonel Congrevé (afterwards Sir William), by whom a favourable report having been given, His Royal Highness was pleased to order that secrecy should be maintained by all parties.

(Signed) DUNDONALD.

August 7, 1855.

MEMORANDUM

Materials required for the expulsion of the Russians from Sebastopol:—

Materials
required for
putting said
scheme into
practice.

Experimental trials have shown that about five parts of coke effectually vaporise one part of sulphur.

Mixtures for land service, where weight is of importance, may, however, probably be suggested by Professor Faraday, as to operations on shore I have paid little attention.

Four or five hundred tons of sulphur and two thousand tons of coke would be sufficient.

Besides these materials, it would be necessary to have, say, as much bituminous coal, and a couple of thousand barrels of gas or other tar, for the purpose of masking fortifications to be attacked, or others that flank the assailing positions.

A quantity of dry firewood, chips, shavings, straw, hay, or other such combustible materials, would also be requisite

quickly to kindle the fires, which ought to be kept in readiness for the first favourable and steady breeze.

DUNDONALD.

August 7, 1855.

Note.—The objects to be accomplished being specially stated, the responsibility of their accomplishment ought to rest on those who direct their execution.

Smoking out
the Russians.

Suppose that the Malakoff and Redan are the objects to be assailed, it might be judicious merely to *obscure* the Redan (by the smoke of coal and tar kindled in 'The Quarries'), so that it could not annoy the Mamelon, where the sulphur fire would be placed to expel the garrison from the Malakoff, which ought to have all the cannon that can be turned towards its ramparts employed in overthrowing its *undefended* ramparts.

There is no doubt but that the fumes will envelop all the defences from the Malakoff to the Barracks, and even to the line-of-battleship, *The Twelve Apostles*, at anchor in the harbour.

The two outer batteries, on each side of the Port, ought to be smoked, sulphured, and blown down by explosion-vessels, and their destruction completed by a few ships of war anchored under *cover* of the smoke.¹

(Signed) DUNDONALD.

August 7, 1855.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, August 8, 1855.

Housing of
Cavalry horses.

The Queen is very anxious to know what measures have been taken for providing cover for our Cavalry horses in the Crimea?

It was the exposure to the wet and cold which caused us to lose them almost all, and immediate steps should be taken to provide against the recurrence of such a misfor-

¹ Lord Dundonald also contemplated floating naphtha on the water, and igniting it by means of a ball of potassium. The uncertainty of the wind condemned his plans.

tune—as the bad weather commences in October. Should we lose them again, we could not replace them.

The Queen is deeply grieved to see the increase of cholera.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD STRATFORD

(Telegraphic Despatch)

August 4, 1855.

Omar Pasha can go to relieve Kars, provided he does not diminish the Turkish troops before Sebastopol or disturb the garrison at Yenikale.

Desire Vivian to hold himself in readiness to go to Eupatoria with his Turkish Contingent.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, August 10, 1855.

In the report of siege proceedings which Lord Panmure gave the Queen yesterday morning, Sir H. Jones mentions a map which he says is the only one existing which shows the French attitude as well as ours—we should wish much to see this, but should take care to let no one else see it, or take any tracing of it. Secret map of military situation.

Our journey back yesterday was very rapid and prosperous, and we return much gratified with our visit to Shorncliffe and the fine troops we saw there.

Sir J. Pennefather is with us; the Queen is grieved to see him so infirm in health, but we are both struck with his sound and able views, and deeply regret his being lost to the Army in the Crimea. He will, however, the Queen is sure, be of great use to his country, though no longer in the field.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

August 10, 1855.

I send you a copy of a letter I wrote to-day to Lord Hardinge, relative to the promotion of officers on half-pay to be Generals, in conformity with our conversation yesterday. Promotion of half-pay officers of the Guards.

Copy of Letter to Lord Hardinge.

August 10, 1855.

I return you now the papers you were so good as to send to me. I think that, if the Guards promoted from half-pay are to be considered as entirely put upon the shelf by their promotion, your plan of promoting all who may stand in the way of a Colonel fit to become one of the 234, and this under Lord Panmure's condition, 'that they shall never receive General's pay,' quite right. Without such an understanding, however, we would expose the Service to two evils. First, to go beyond the 234 in employing these Generals, if they are to be properly paid when employed; or, secondly, to have General Officers employed, and this (possibly) only on Captain's or Major's half-pay, which would be disgraceful. A plan of employing them, giving them General's pay when employed, and throwing them back upon their old half-pay when their service is completed, would only combine both evils. I don't think they could have regiments even, as the 234 are calculated with reference to the number of regiments available. The arrangement would, in fact, be analogous to the Yellow Admirals in the Navy, with the difference that they would be promoted in a time to full Generals. The regulations of the Warrant would be acted upon, not taking into account at all the Generals with a X before their names. I have sent a copy of this letter also to Lord Panmure.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, August 11, 1855.

It certainly is possible that, not anticipating my private letters being seen by others than yourself, I may have expressed myself with less reserve than was proper, but I believe that every word I have written to you expressed my real and true feelings at the moment, and I assure you at times there has been sufficient cause of depression here during the last month. . . .

[The body of the letter deals with the circumstances under which certain officers hold their appointments.]

I have not been well lately, and am so weakened by diarrhœa this morning that the doctors have sent me on board ship, and I go to Sir Edmund Lyons in the *Royal Albert* for a few days' change of air, which it is hoped will put me all to rights again.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *August 11, 1855.*

Lord Hotham asks me whether you will have any objection to lay before Parliament the whole or part of the report and evidence received from M'Neill¹ and others as to the matters in the Crimea and at Constantinople which they were sent to inquire into. He thinks it probable that those documents would go to remove part of the bad impressions produced by the evidence and reports of the Sebastopol Committee.

Inquiry as to
M'Neill's
report on affairs
in the East.

Could you let me know to-day before one o'clock, when the House meets, whether you can do what he wishes?

If so, we might present what are called dummies to the two Houses, and have the papers printed and distributed after prorogation.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *August 12, 1855.*

I have just been reading Stratford's despatch of the 30th July, with its enclosures about Beatson's Horse,² copies of which have been sent to you.

Character of
Beatson's
Horse.

It seems evident from those papers that the great bulk of that Cavalry force is obedient and submissive, that arrests and punishments have been enforced by the officers and men upon delinquent comrades. Consequently it would be unwise to disband them, and to throw away a good Cavalry force which it has cost us much time, trouble,

¹ Sir John M'Neill, associated with Colonel Tulloch in Commission of Inquiry.

² Originally enrolled as a counterpoise to the Cossacks. For Simpson's character of them, see his letter to Lord Panmure, dated August 21st.

and money to get together. But they are useless at the Dardanelles, and it would be better to remove them from the scene of their partial disorder. The best thing to be done, therefore, would be to send them immediately to Eupatoria, to be attached to Vivian's Contingent, and to be there fully armed, equipped, formed, and drilled. They would soon become efficient there, and might at once be employed, in conjunction with the other Cavalry, in intercepting or harassing convoys. I am glad Stratford gave up the intention of disarming the Albanians. To have done so would have required a battle, and it would have been unwise to have attempted it, unless it had been intended to send the survivors to their homes.

Suggests
measures to be
adopted in
regard to
Beatson's
Horse.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

August 13, 1855.

I have not much to write you in a private note. I rejoice to say that our Session rises to-morrow, and we shall have time to look round us undistracted by the thought of what some busybody in the House of Commons will say. You will be inundated doubtless by many amateurs. Be civil to them, but give them no facilities for remaining, and if you could entice them within the reach of shot and shell you might do the State some service.

Amateurs at
the front.

We are working hard at your hutting, but with the immense quantity of scantling you seem to have at command, I expect you will cover most of your stores and some of your horses. I shall be a close prisoner here till you take the Malakoff! So I hope you will do so before the end of September, and let me away to kill a deer.

I have weathered gout very well, and so far I don't think official life has done me any harm. . . .

We sent the foreign levies on Thursday last, and I anticipate that you will get good service from them. The Jägers and 1st German Light Infantry will form a brigade under Colonel Woolridge, who I trust will be attached to the Light Division. You must not put the Germans and

Swiss and Ger-
man Legions.

Swiss together, but keep them separate. The Swiss are a queer set to handle, but they are true and faithful. They will probably dovetail in with your Highland troops.

Whenever they are ready to sail, which will I trust be soon, I will write you fully as to them and send you returns of their strength.

I am anxious to hear how your investiture came off, and I hope you received Lord Stratford with every honour.

You will rejoice, I have no doubt, that Omar is set at liberty to relieve Kars.

I think that Eupatoria is the best place for Vivian, and as soon as he is ready I will add him to your army, and so we shall be on a more equal footing with the French.

PS.—I find that I have not referred to yours of the 24th July. I am glad that you understand about the Sardinian Contingent, and will not let the French appropriate it in any way.

We are quite satisfied with the explanation of your movement to cover Balaclava, which showed judgment and foresight. How thankful you must be that I don't play on the wires of the telegraph as they do from Paris! You cannot be more disgusted than I with the *treasonable* breaches of discipline that come from Camp to this country, betraying to the enemy our numbers, position and power, and even sometimes our very purposes and intentions.

'Treasonable
breaches of
discipline.'

It is impossible to check it, I fear. I sent on your letter to the Queen.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, August 14, 1855.

Your letter of July 13th was left here by Mr. Doyne of the Army Work Corps, but I have not yet seen him, he having only come three days ago. Jones is attending to them, but I am sorry to see him unwell to-day. Airey too has fever—a dead loss to me at this moment—and M'Murdo and Napier are both very ill.

Simpson's
commission
received.

General attack
expected.

I received your letter of the 31st July this morning, with my commission, together with a secret packet, containing a commission for my successor should circumstances oblige me to give up the command, but which at present I do not anticipate. I could not go on board the *Royal Albert* last Saturday, as medically ordered, because we had reason to expect a general attack yesterday. It did not take place, but there seems every probability of the enemy attempting to force the Tchernaya, and he will probably make a sortie from Sebastopol at the same moment. Fresh troops have evidently arrived, and a large portion relieved the garrison, or a part of it, yesterday. The consequence is I cannot be absent on board ship, and fortunately my complaint has abated, for I have been comparatively in capital health these three days.

I considered Shumla the best and quietest place for the organisation of the Turkish Contingent, especially as the force was *there* to be augmented by 10,000 men. That force, go where it may, will be of no use this year, for it takes some time to make soldiers of Turks under our officers. If it comes here, nothing that can possibly be done shall be wanting to assist General Vivian. There is such a press of work by to-day's mail that I must close this letter.

THE SAME TO THE SAME

Confidential.

CRIMEA, *August 14, 1855.*

Simpson's
opinion of
Codrington,
and of the
results of his
succeeding him.

Since you mentioned that my private notes were read by the Queen and by your colleagues, I am very averse to offer *opinions* on men and things around me; but your Lordship positively desires my unreserved opinion on the matter of Codrington's selection as my successor. He is, in my belief, the best General here; but I am in full hopes not to be compelled by illness to act on your instructions at the present time of very imminent chance of our being attacked; for you must be aware of the very great disgust

that will be occasioned to Bentinck, Campbell, Barnard, and Rokeby, if Codrington is called to the chief command. They will, of course, take the most immediate measures to quit the Army. Codrington's commission is safe in my desk. No human being shall ever see it, so long as I am alive and well, and I promise you, my Lord, to do my work to the best of my ability. I have been very poorly with diarrhoea for these three weeks, and was nearly being condemned to go away last week, but I am all right again, and hope to keep so. . . .

I would like to add to this confidential note that I am truly sensible of the kind and frank manner in which you give me your sentiments on all points, more especially as regards myself. I think I perceive, however, that any opinion of mine that is not on the bright side is unfavourably looked upon? Now, with the greatest respect, I would merely wish to remark, that, however sanguine a Commander may be of the success of any operation, it is incumbent on him to take every precaution for the safety of his army in case of failure; and if I have to recur to the shifting of our ground from where we now are to a more defensible position for the winter, I really hope your Lordship will look fairly at the case, as myself and every old officer here views it, and not consider me to write despondingly. *If Sebastopol beats us*, depend upon it, my Lord, everything here must be well weighed and considered beforehand!

Defends himself against suspicion of despondency.

I only hope, if this expected general attack takes place, the garrison will make a strong sortie, and you may rely upon it we shall be very close on their tails in driving them in, and getting in with them. It was a great disappointment to us all yesterday morning, for we had intimation of an intended attack very worthy of belief. It will happen in my opinion.

A sortie desired.

I cannot close this without thanking you very sincerely for all your kindness to me, and assuring you of my determination to do justice to your expressions of good opinion of me.

Time is up! and this dreadful writing kills me!

LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS¹ TO LORD CLARENDONBERLIN, *August 15, 1855.*

Prince
Gortschakoff
reported to
have been
ordered to take
the offensive.

I am informed confidentially that a telegraph has been received this day from St. Petersburg stating that orders have been sent to Prince Gortschakoff to take the offensive against the Allies at all cost.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

August 16, 1855.

Enclosing Lord
Augustus
Loftus's
telegram.

I send this in case it has not been sent from F.O. You should telegraph it to Simpson, I think.

Old Vaillant² is very stout, and says the place *must* be taken, no matter how many armies are sent.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PY., *August 16, 1855.*

Recommends
sending out a
sanitary expert.

This letter from F. O. Ward³ is worth your reading. The practical conclusion is that it is very desirable that you should send out to the Crimea, in Rawlinson's place, some Civil Engineer who has turned his thoughts to sanitary considerations. Rawlinson himself would probably be able to find one for you.

I cannot but think that health arrangements are not enough attended to in the Camp, as every day's report brings us from twenty to thirty deaths by cholera. This ought not to be if twice a-day visitations of the men in huts, tents, and trenches were practised, and I should strongly recommend that you should write officially to Simpson, first telling him so by telegraph, to inquire whether such visitations are made, and to insist upon their being so. It is also very likely that some regiments are encamped or hutted upon ground known to be unhealthy,

¹ British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.² Marshal Vaillant.³ Lord High Commissioner in Ionian Islands.

and, if so, they ought to be removed without listening to the 'military considerations' which officers commanding brigades or divisions may urge.

The most important military consideration is to keep soldiers alive and in good health. As to two fires in each hut, I am afraid that would be carrying sound theory further into practice than means would be found for doing.

'The most important military consideration.'

It would be a good thing for us to have Pennefather on Tuesday morning and Sir G. Brown, one after the other.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Py., August 16, 1855.

I conclude you have telegraphed to Simpson the report from Petersburg, through Berlin, of an intended attack by the Russians on the Allies.

Report of an intended attack by the Russians.

Under the probability of such a move, it becomes of urgent importance to get to the Crimea all the transport animals you have in depôts in various quarters, and I wish you would take steps for having them sent forthwith to the Crimea, with drivers or without them. At least let the animals be there ready, and the drivers may be coming at the same time or even afterwards. The Commissariat should be told that they *must* provide adequate supplies of forage, and without delay.

Recommends vigorous measures to meet the occasion.

It would also be important to send immediately to Eupatoria Beatson's Cavalry, just as it is, together with all reinforcements coming to it, without waiting to ask and to know who likes or dislikes to have it there; if actions take place and the Russians are worsted, it may become a matter of first-rate importance to have a large Cavalry force at Eupatoria to harass and interrupt communications. Clarendon will send you a despatch from Colonel Neale,¹ showing that several hundred more Cavalry may be had at once from Bulgaria if the objection of the Pasha of the district is overruled, and it seems to me that this reinforcement ought to be insisted upon, and immediately. . . .

¹ British Consul at Varna.

Labourers
required for
the Crimea.

A fresh supply of labourers is urgently required for the Crimea, and orders to Simpson should be sent immediately to set to work to make the necessary roads while the weather is fine.

Suggestion
regarding
employment of
convict labour.

The Prince wrote to me to suggest the employment of convict labour. I have sent his letter to George Grey,¹ with a suggestion, which I also have made to the Prince, that the legal difficulty, arising from our having no lawful power of controlling them out of the Queen's dominions, might perhaps be got over by asking a number of those who have not committed serious offences to volunteer to serve as labourers with the Army, wherever it may be, for one or for two years, on the condition that at the end of that time, if their conduct shall have been good, they should have a free pardon, and a free passage home, with some gratuity to maintain them till they would find employment. Many would no doubt enlist into the Army rather than take their chance of getting employed at home.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

August 17, 1855.

Against grant-
ing any but
sick leave.

The Queen has read the letter and despatches from General Simpson with much interest. He is evidently in better spirits and heart, but the illness of those around him, and of so many of our best officers, is really very serious. The Queen sees in the papers that several officers—for instance, Lord William Paulet—have received leave to go home 'on urgent private affairs.' She must say she thinks that nothing but ill health ought to obtain permission to return home at a moment when every officer who is well is of such paramount importance. Lord Panmure would perhaps observe this to General Simpson.

The telegraphic despatch from Berlin which Lord Panmure will have seen yesterday evening¹ is very important. Nothing could be better than if the Russians took the offensive. They would get a nice reception.

¹ Sir George Grey, Home Secretary.

² Lord A. Loftus's despatch.

The Queen wishes Lord Panmure to thank General Simpson for his two letters to her. She will write to him shortly.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *August 18, 1855.*

I have heard nothing of Mr. Jackson¹ yet, and will attend to what you tell me on his arriving.

Omar Pasha has not yet returned. Lord Stratford will be here on Tuesday or Wednesday next, and Omar may perhaps come in the same steamer.

The attempt made by the Russians on the Tchernaya Battle of the Tchernaya. last Thursday² was a signal failure. Both French and Sardinians behaved admirably well. I do not think the Russian force could be much under 50,000 men, of which 7000 were Cavalry of very good appearance. Their loss must have been about 5000. The ground was covered with their killed and wounded, and their defeat and flight so rapid that they left their bridges lying by the river-side, as well as the tools, etc., with which they intended to have entrenched themselves.

We were prepared for a strong sortie, which would undoubtedly have taken place had matters gone on favourably with the enemy on the Tchernaya.

I fully expect, from the tenor of your telegraphic information, that another attempt will soon be made by the enemy, and have no doubt of the result.

The Army Works Corps has arrived, but I can give no opinion of them yet.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

August 18, 1855.

I have received yours of the 31st, and the same day brought us intelligence of your defeat of Liprandi.³ It seems to have been a vigorous effort on the part of the

¹ Successor to Mr. Calvert, as Head of Intelligence Department.

² August 16, 1855. ³ General Liprandi, at the battle of the Tchernaya.

enemy, and made evidently in consequence of the instructions, the rumour of which I sent you by telegraph.

I am amazingly pleased to find that both French and Sardinians have done so well, and you will find more confidence now in the safety of your rear while conducting your arduous duties in front. I hope my telegraph to Marmora and the French commander was distinctly passed, as I fear we are liable to blunders. You should make your A.D.C. prove every message before sent, by deciphering it after it is put in cipher, but you need not use the cipher except when you refer to supplies or measurements, as the enemy know facts as well as ourselves. I think you should have one of your Staff devoted to the telegraph, and make him look out for you, and in the night use a discretionary power of rousing you or not. It is better for an A.D.C. to lose a little sleep than that you should be unnecessarily disturbed. . . . Let me now refer to yours of the 4th. I very much appreciate the way in which you receive my letters, for the longer I live the more I feel convinced that half-confidences are detestable, and do more harm than perfect distrust. All I write to you is in a spirit of kindness, and you will never offend me in any way by your replies. Moreover, we are old friends, and have had the advantage of mutual intercourse for a long time now.

A kindly letter.

Whatever may ensue, it has given me the greatest pleasure to have confirmed you in your position. Our health and strength we none of us here command, and I implicitly rely on your letting your command pass from you whenever you feel incompetent to grapple with its responsibilities. These you do not underrate, and I sympathise with you in the pain which must daily harass you in seeing your officers put *hors de combat* by disease and worn out by constant toil. You have no idea how a sea-voyage and home revives many, and let me encourage you with the hope of yet seeing not a few of your old friends blooming in England. Brown and Pennefather are on their legs again. . . . I sincerely hope that Stephenson¹ will rally and join you ; though I never saw him, I have a

¹ Now General Sir Frederick Stephenson, Constable of the Tower.

high opinion of him. I will send you Claremont again in some capacity or other. I mean to give him a C.B. I am glad you like Mr. Lauder, and I hope Mr. Jackson will suit you. I have not mentioned it to you, but I may do so now, that you have my full authority for expending money for useful intelligence; it shall be reimbursed to you for 'secret service.'

Secret service
money.

Those infernal Russians are adepts at the system of espionage. I only wish you could lay hold of one of them and hang him up in sight of Sebastopol. I think you decide rightly as to the mail. I merely threw it out as a means of diminishing your work by bringing it to a one day point. I am getting on with huts and clothing, and shall have an official at you soon, detailing all preparations and their departure for the seat of war. I don't believe that one-half will be required, but that is not safe ground to work upon. The Army Works Corps has had a long passage, but I trust will soon appear.

Supplies being
sent out.

I am glad to hear that your supply of water is so secure. Nobody seems to grudge Pakenham his promotion, and his merits are fully admitted. You have no doubt grumblers in Camp, perhaps more than we have here. You are all right about Horn.¹ You need not regret Lord William Paulet leaving Scutari, as you have a much better man in his place. Sir G. M'Lean is a fine jolly fellow in appearance, and I hope you will not spare him till he puts your supplies beyond fear of failure. The railway must be looked to. I am sending you material for another line, and will try and keep it going as far as we can.

The Queen has desired me to thank you for your letters, to which Her Majesty will reply at her leisure. I expect every moment to hear of your bombardment.

MISS NIGHTINGALE TO LORD PANMURE

SCUTARI HOSPITAL, *August 19, 1855.*

I am very grateful for your kind letter. That you should think of me and my health in the midst of this

¹ Colonel Horn, who had commanded the 20th Regiment at Inkerman.

painful and pressing war must, indeed, surprise and please me.

I am well enough now, thank you a thousand times for your kind thought, to remain at my duties for another winter, if the war keep us here so long and my attentive medical adviser, Dr. Sutherland, sanctions my doing so. I have no one now to leave in my place, and could hardly therefore desert it, except I were compelled.

You will, I am sure, be glad to hear that these hospitals, in what regards *material* and all that depends on the War Office, are worthy of England. As to the *personnel*, I will not venture to intrude my opinion upon Lord Panmure, whom I know only from his kindness.

I may perhaps venture to say that I hope our Purveyor-in-Chief, Mr. Robertson, will be supported from home, and have his supply of *men* and things continued to him. Efficient clerks and plentiful stores. He has already done much for us. The physically deteriorating effect of Scutari air has been much discussed. The morally deteriorating influence exercised by the atmosphere is much more remarkable. The first may be doubted. The men sent down in the winter died because they were not sent down till half dead—the men sent down now live and recover, because they are sent in time. But the second, the mental exhaustion of our officials here, is beyond any doubt, nor does it appear to vary with the season of the year.

Would it be too much presuming on Lord Panmure's patience to mention the disproportionate number of patients, especially from pulmonary disease, which comes to us from the Artillery—inevitable perhaps during a siege, where practised men must be upon severe duty? But it has been said by officers who may be esteemed authority in the matter, that the duty is unnecessarily severe; that some inferior functions might be discharged by other men now less hardly worked; that men of the Horse Artillery might now assist, and that it is bad economy to kill men with hard duty, whom every day makes more valuable, because they cannot be replaced.

May I add that, had our troops had a dress for working in the trenches last winter, and had they been hutted, much of the destruction which we have witnessed would not have taken place? Doubtless ample preparations have already been made by Government for supplying both these wants next winter, should we remain the winter before Sebastopol. But I am told that, though there are huts at Balaclava, they take forty horses to take each up to Sebastopol, the railroad being preoccupied by the Commissariat necessities, and the huts therefore remain at Balaclava. A light waterproof dress would be desirable for the trenches. The men's boots, though waterproof, are heavy. And the hands should be guaranteed like the feet. It is not the cold but the wet which kills.

Again entreating Lord Panmure's pardon for taking up his attention with affairs not strictly belonging to the department of a Nurse, but upon which he can obtain information from those really competent to give it, and again thanking him for his kindness, etc.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

August 20, 1855.

I have not much to say to you, but will not let the mail go without a few lines.

The action on the Tchernaya has been most severe for the Russians, and I strongly suspect that they are hard up when they come out and fight at such disadvantage.

You are to have a Council of War, and I hope to hear some definite [plan] is adopted. I trust you assert your proper place in these Councils, and do not let Pélissier have all his own way. You cannot have better advice than from Lyons, and I advise you, between ourselves, Sir E. Lyons, to rely much on him. His knowledge of the French language, character, and feeling is undeniable, and his talent for diplomacy is such as to render him a safe counsellor. I am glad to hear that you have been destroying the buildings in the town, and will do my best to supply

Omar going
to Asia.

you with 'bonbons' to pelt them with. Omar is bent on going to Asia, and you cannot be surprised at it. It is of vital importance to Turkey to preserve that portion of her dominions from the enemy's clutches, and he could be of no use to you where his army is now, unless you contemplate a movement into the field. . . . You will have the 56th and 82nd to add to your force and some 3000 foreign levies immediately. I have sent for Hardinge, and I see no difficulty in giving you a fourth battalion of Guards. I will consult Sir J. Burgoyne, as you wish, tomorrow when we hold our Council of War.

|| I anticipate considerable changes in three weeks after this battle. Do not spare your 'Intelligence'¹ for lack of a little money.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, August 21, 1855.

Your note of the 4th inst. was delivered to me the other day by Mr. Jackson. . . .

Protest against
employing
Beatson's
Horse.

This morning I have your short note of the 6th inst. I am very sorry to learn that, in spite of what is stated in your letter of the 4th instant of your intention to stand between me and Beatson's Horse, they are actually to be sent to Eupatoria! It will be considered a disgrace to us to have such ruffians in our pay, and I can only protest against having anything to do with them. They will be found a set of marauders, setting all order and discipline at defiance, and Beatson will be an independent leader so long as his band will abstain from murdering him. I feel truly ashamed of our retaining such plunderers in British pay, and have already stated my decided wish to have nothing whatever to do with them, certain as I am that they will bring disgrace upon us. General Vivian's people will be good for little or nothing till next year, and if Eupatoria is to be left to theirs and the Bashi-bazouk's care, something unfortunate will assuredly be the consequence.

¹ Intelligence Department.

I begin to be very uneasy about thirteen-inch shells ; all we have left could be fired away to-night. The consequences of such a dearth may prove most serious.

Excuse such a hasty note, but I have been up all night, and on horseback since three in the morning, in hopes of a large sortie, the town being *crowded* with troops last night.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

ST. CLOUD, *August 22, 1855.*

The Queen has to thank for two letters of Lord Panmure's.

She quite coincides in the propriety of withholding a 4th battalion of the Guards from General Simpson. She does not think that a monument at home would at all be the same thing as one erected on the spot where those brave men lie interred.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *August 25, 1855.*

It was late when I received back the box with your answer about the Polish Corps, and I sent it at once to Hammond,¹ that he might forward our Memorandum to Paris ; but, on thinking the matter over, I would wish to suggest to you the following considerations.

Vivian's Contingent is not to be looked at as a separate army, but as a part of the British Army, intended to act in conjunction with the rest of the British forces, though for the moment placed separately at Eupatoria. Now the British Army, including in that term the purely British troops, the Turkish Contingent, the Germans, Swiss, and Italians, is and will be miserably deficient in Cavalry—an arm, be it remembered, in which the Russians are peculiarly strong, not only by means of their regular Cavalry, which is very numerous, but by means of their swarms of

British
inferiority to
Russians in
Cavalry.

¹ Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, afterwards Lord Hammond.

Cossacks, and the twenty or thirty Cavalry regiments in their military colonies in the south. If, after Sebastopol is taken, we have to act in the open country either in the Crimea or in Georgia, we shall sensibly feel our inferiority in Cavalry. Our British Horse do not exceed the wretchedly small number of about 2300, and we cannot greatly increase the number of that force without great expense and much time.

Considerations
in favour of
accepting
services of
Polish Cavalry.

The Cavalry of the Contingent and Beatson's Irregulars are so much gained, but of materials the value of which is yet to be tested. Surely if we have the offer of 2000 or 3000 good Polish Cavalry, it would be very unwise to refuse such an offer. To reinforce our Cavalry by an equal amount from home would hardly be done in any moderate time, and would cost us infinitely more money.

So strong, if you remember, was our sense of the importance of adding greatly and rapidly and locally to our Cavalry force that the people we have sent to Circassia were to try to get 10,000 of the Circassians as Cavalry; but these Poles are surely worth two or three times their number of Circassians whom we have not got, and may never get. I am therefore strongly for accepting the offer, and if, on thinking these considerations over, you should concur, I would telegraph to Clarendon to-morrow to authorise him to accept.

There can be no doubt that *politically* the taking of this corps into our service would be very advantageous.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *August 25, 1855.*

I have only a moment to write you a few lines and no more.

You will find ¹ a better man to organise anything than Paulet, but he may not be equally good to command. He is yet to be tried. I hope all your Brigadiers are to your mind now, and your machinery working sweetly. I hear that Sir C. Campbell has had some hot words with

Sir Colin
Campbell.

¹ Blank in MS.

Barnard. I have an idea that Sir C. is a fiery-tempered fellow. I wish you would sound him as to accepting the command at Malta. This will clear the way for Codrington. I have an idea that Barnard will by-and-by do better with a Division than as Head of the Staff. To show that I have no personal feeling whatever against Sir R. Airey, I would willingly see him Chief of the Staff if Barnard went to a Division. In such a case, you would require a new Q.M.-General, and you should have a young one. You would find such a one in Wetherall, now with Vivian's Contingent.

These are changes over which you can think. Take care of yourself, and only aid in reducing Malakoff and I shall put you in your place among the Cordons Rouges.

I will write you again on Monday.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *August 25, 1855.*

Your private letter of the 11th is now before me, but there is nothing calling for observation or reply in it.

We expect an attack every day, as our information all confirms the design of the enemy to attempt to raise the siege. It is rather embarrassing with our small force to determine how to employ it to the best account, having our trenches at one end of the line and Balaclava at the other, some five or six miles between. I felt so sure that the enemy would advance on the Balaclava side this morning that I sent Sir Colin Campbell and a Highland Brigade away from trench duty last night, in order to take up a position in second line to the Turks covering Balaclava. I am somewhat nervous as to the safety of that place! and it is not possible for me to take more from our trenches than these four regiments under Sir Colin. We may always expect a sortie, especially when attacked on the Balaclava side. The enemy has very nearly completed his bridge across the harbour—a splendid work—portending mischief.

Anticipates an attempt to raise the siege.

Apprehensions for safety of Balaclava.

The sickness of the officers is very annoying to me. Airey is on board ship, Jones has fever and is in bed, M'Murdo still ill and on board ship.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived at Kamiesh last night, and we shall have the Investiture ceremony on Monday. I much regret the French Generals not participating in our honours! It would have been most pleasing to them, and would have increased and cemented the friendship arising between me and them. There are some remarkably nice fellows among them, and I cannot say how much I regret their exclusion from all participation in the honours bestowed on our Generals on this public occasion.¹

Regrets non-participation of French Generals in English honours.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

August 27, 1855.

Many thanks for your two letters this morning. I am glad to hear that you are recovered and so much in heart as your writing betokens. Your opinion of Codrington coincides exactly with what we hear of him from all quarters, and I feel considerably at ease in the knowledge that you are empowered to place him in command. I regret very much to hear of General Jones being unwell, as also Airey, M'Murdo, and Napier. From your not mentioning them in your telegraph, I trust they are all better. I think the 'scent' of the battle has proved excellent medicine to yourself, and I regret as much as you can do that they did not come *out* on the 16th,² when they came *on* against the position on the Tchernaya. I hear that it was a deserter from the 23rd that stopped them.

How deserters are to be dealt with.

By the way, you should send me regular returns of such scoundrels, and I'll post them up in their parishes to be *execrated* by all loyal men.

I must earnestly draw your attention to the importance of storehouses for the cargoes arriving in Balaclava harbour.

¹ The preliminary negotiations had not at this time been completed, but the honours were in due time given.

² Make a sortie.

Your comfort depends on it. No matter how rough they are, if only weather-proof for perishable stores.

I shall not send your confidential notes to any one, so that, when you have any wish to write for my own eye alone, you can do so, as you have very properly done by this mail.

My object is to act with you as a friend as well as to direct you as a Minister.

I think, if we can get Sir C. Campbell to Malta, that it would not very much injure your army if Bentinck and Rokeby should leave you. I should be sorry to see Barnard do so foolish an act as to take huff at Codrington's promotion. . . .

You will be sorry to see that poor Torrens¹ is dead. He has not long enjoyed his honours, poor fellow!

I am quite at one with you as to the necessity of a General looking to the worst in whatever situation he may be placed, so pray don't alter your tone now that I have the key to it.

If these fellows do make a sortie in force, and you can be so prepared as to follow them in force, it will be a most gallant mode of carrying the place. You must keep a sharp look-out in dark nights, especially when the rain drives in your face from the town. I hope you have plenty of white lights to burn on emergencies.

In the event of a sortie.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

August 27, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and trusts that the enclosed despatches will reach Your Majesty after a safe and prosperous voyage from Boulogne.

General Simpson writes in better spirits as to himself, and Lord Panmure feels easy now that he has in his possession Your Majesty's commission to Major-General Sir W. Codrington.

¹ General Torrens, Military Commissioner at Paris.

Lord Panmure feels a strong conviction of General Simpson's conscientious integrity, and that he will retain the command of the Army no longer than he finds himself fully able for it.

Lord Panmure regrets to inform Your Majesty that cholera has invaded the camp at Shorncliffe. Immediate steps have been taken to arrest its progress, and with great success. Two thousand have been encamped about three miles distant, and exhibited on the occasion surprising aptitude in pitching their tents and in the duties of a camp.

Lord Panmure takes this opportunity of soliciting Your Majesty's permission to dispense with General Pennefather's attendance for investiture, his health being unequal to the task.

Lord Panmure has the honour likewise to inform Your Majesty that, subject to Your Majesty's gracious approval, the Cabinet have concurred with him in advising Your Majesty to permit an addition to the establishment of the Army of two new regiments, to be numbered 100 and 101 and designated 'The British North American.' Should Your Majesty approve of this proposal, Lord Panmure will intimate it to the Commander-in-Chief, who will submit to Your Majesty the details of organisation in the usual manner.

Recommends
enrolment of
two new
regiments.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *August 28, 1855.*

I reply to your note of the 13th instant. There is little going on since my last. We have had several disappointments of the enemy attacking us. I suspect they are waiting for the arrival of The Guard, the whole of it not yet having come down. The bridge was finished the night before last, and is now in full use. Our casualties are great, amounting now to an average of sixty every twenty-four hours.

I am glad to hear such good accounts of the Foreign Legion, and shall be glad to see them.

Completion of
bridge over the
harbour of
Sebastopol.

The Investiture came off yesterday, and I don't think anything could have been better done. I have every hope that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe is well satisfied with all the honours done him, and in my opinion he performed his own part very well and with great dignity. My only regret, and it is very great, is that the occasion was lost in conferring these honours on our Allies along with our own Generals. Pélistier, Bosquet, Bruat, Martimprez, La Salle, Thierry, Niel, and several others were present at the ceremony, in which I sincerely wish they had taken a part. The thought of Omar Pasha having been invested, with all possible *éclat*, and these French Generals who have fought along with ours *not* so honoured, must have occurred to every one present. Omar has not made his appearance yet.

The
Investiture.

I trust there will be no hesitation in permitting this railway to the Sardinian position? It will be a great point for them and for the Service generally.

I have only to add to this note that all my leading officers are one after the other falling sick, and it is not easy to supply the places of some of them. Sir Harry Jones is ill in bed and cannot carry on his duties. His loss is irreparable.

Illness of
leading officers.

CHAPTER IX

SEPTEMBER 1855

THE commencement of September found the Allies in daily expectation of seeing the Russian attempt of August 16th repeated. Meantime the sap continued to progress; whilst at home the shipment of stores, huts, shells, etc., in view of the forthcoming winter, was being pushed on. Lord Panmure urged the importance of the relief of Kars, on the ground that its fall would be likely to rouse the Kurds and Persians to support the Russian arms. But Simpson was not to be persuaded into withdrawing his objection to Omar's leaving the Crimea, or to the substitution at the present critical time of Vivian's raw levies for Omar's seasoned troops.

The 8th September, however, saw the situation in the Crimea transformed by the capture by the French of the Malakoff, the key of the Russian position, by assault following a three days' bombardment. The simultaneous British assault on the Redan—a harder task—failed in spite of some brilliant fighting. But if, as Hamley suggests, the main object of that attack was to serve as a distraction in aid of the French, then its purpose was fulfilled.

The same night the Russians evacuated the south side of Sebastopol, retreating to the northern side, and exploding their magazines as they went, whilst a day or two later they either burnt or sank those ships of their fleet which had so far escaped. Thus the victory of the allied

arms was complete, and the troops were at last released from trench duty.

Of this relief after long endurance, Simpson writes as 'something not to be described,' adding, 'It is to this perseverance that we owe the fall of the place, and I mean to send home a list of officers and men who have gone through these 339 nights in the trenches without a moment's reluctance or complaint. There are not many of them alive to see the result of their labours.'

The event was celebrated with due rejoicings at home, and by an exchange of military distinctions between the British and French Governments, Simpson receiving the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, in addition to substantive (in place of local) rank as a General.

The Queen also wrote to him in person, conferring on him a Grand Commandership of the Bath, and at the same time displayed her usual gracious eagerness to reward the services of her troops with medals.

The docks and barracks of Sebastopol, as well as the ammunition stored there, were found greatly to exceed expectation, and the destruction of the docks and sea-defences was eagerly desired by the soldiers at the front. But, for the present, the authorities at home opposed it, as a thing that could be done at any time.

Meantime there was a strong wish at home that success should be quickly followed up. Simpson was, therefore, distinctly informed that the Government had no present intention of negotiating, but was determined that the Russian Army should be expelled from the Crimea, the alternate plans suggested to this end being to cut its communications or to press its retreat.

Simpson and Pélissier were, however, agreed in favour of present inactivity; and Simpson, on being further pressed to act, telegraphed to Panmure resigning his command (September 29th), on the ground that he could not

continue to hold it whilst the Government considered that he and his Army were passing their time in absolute idleness.

As a matter of fact they had at this time ample occupation without fighting ; for, in addition to the making of roads, drains, and storehouses, the Army required to have military formation restored to it after its long disorganising labours.

And, despite the existence of the Dormant Commission, the situation created by Simpson's resignation was by no means free from difficulty. For Codrington's management of the reserves at the assault on the Redan had lately subjected him to much criticism.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *September 1, 1855.*

Your note of the 18th August is now before me. There is but little for me to say in this private answer to it, as all matters of moment have been either handled by the wires or in an official shape.

I am beginning to feel very anxious about this Land Transport, neither it nor the rail being at present equal to what we require from them.

The Russians have made no further attempts since the 16th, and our information describes them to be waiting for the arrival of the whole of the Grenadiers, some of whom only are yet come. I sincerely wish they were here, as an attack all round is the best thing that could happen. In the meanwhile we are progressing gradually with our sap, but it is close and dangerous, and the casualties very great.

The telegraphic messages to Marmora and the French were duly forwarded. I am satisfied that no mistakes occur in messages here. Major Curzon manages the deciphering. It would never do to give it to A.D.C.'s as

An attack
wished for.

Progress of
sap.

your Lordship proposes. *Secrecy* is everything here, and if anything is left to four or five A.D.C.'s, that object cannot be secured. The telegraph is an instrument for good or evil, and demands attention.

Sir George Maclean¹ has been ill since his arrival, but he is beginning his work, and will I hope recover, and will I trust put our supplies beyond risk of failure.

I am happy to think that Sir Harry Jones is getting well and that I shall not lose his services. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 1, 1855.*

The recess brings me no repose. I am living in a perfect whirl from morning till night, and now I have run myself to a minute to write to you. The result is that you will only get a dribble of a letter. I am satisfied that we are progressing in our winter arrangements, and I earnestly entreat you to have store-rooms for your bales of goods. Fill those furthest from the landing-place first, and make your officers at the port see that ships are properly discharged by room being given.

Recommends
store-rooms at
Balaclava.

I have communicated by telegraph on railway matters, so shall not refer to them.

I hope you will use Vivian's Contingent gently, and place them in a position where their organisation can go on and at the same time care can be taken of them.

You must give them supplies and attach Commissariat Officers to them. You will also have to arrange for taking the portion of Omar's army at Kertch under Vivian's command. Telegraphs have flown on the subject of this movement of the Contingent, and I must send by Monday's mail on the subject official despatches to you and Vivian.

The affair of the 16th² has been a crusher. You will have it repeated by-and-by—so look out.

They say that the Russians' Commissariat can find no supplies in the Crimea and must [*Blank in copy*]. Is there any truth in this?

¹ Commissary-General.

² Battle of the Tchernaya.

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

KEW, *September 1, 1855.*

As to winter-
quarters for
Cavalry now in
the Crimea.

I tried to see you the other day on my way through London, but found you had gone to Osborne. I wanted to have a little talk to you about our Cavalry in the Crimea. I presume that your thoughts are now fully directed towards making arrangements for the winter, and several of the letters I have had recently from there point out the advantage it would be to the Cavalry to be stabled somewhere on the Bosphorus or in Egypt. The latter country is, I fear, too far, but the Bosphorus I think would be very practicable, and I am certain most desirable. In the winter no movement can be made in the interior, consequently the Cavalry from Crimea [are] comparatively useless. The great object must be to ease both man and horse, and prepare them for the coming spring. This can best be done by putting all under really good men and stables, for the horses are indispensable. Now as to really putting up in the Crimea good stables for the Cavalry horses, in addition to those for the Artillery and Land Transport, [it] is in my humble opinion out of the question. The Artillery and Land Transport horses must to a great extent remain with the Army. Not so the Cavalry. These can be dispensed with, with the exception possibly of a few hundred, and there are plenty of large clean transports out there to take the remainder or bulk of the Cavalry to the Bosphorus. Then there is abundance of stabling in every direction by turning out some of the Turkish troops, that may as well be sent to Adrianople and the interior of the country, and thus men and horses will be well put up. There is an additional advantage in such an arrangement. Most of the men sent out for the Cavalry are mere recruits. These need riding and drill horribly, in fact they are useless without it. In the Crimea in the winter they could not get this, on the Bosphorus they could and would, and I do assure you that it will make the greatest possible difference to this most important branch of the Service.

Suggests shift-
ing Cavalry
from the
Crimea to the
Bosphorus for
the winter
months.

Another thing is that I very much doubt the horses of the two regiments from India standing the rigour of a Crimean winter, unless they are thoroughly well housed. At all events it is a matter well worthy your serious consideration, indeed so much so that I have thought it right to trouble you with this long letter upon the subject. I have reason to think that General Scarlett takes most completely my view of the case, as now explained to you. . . .

Another very important reason for sending the Cavalry to the Bosphorus is that you can get abundance of forage there, whereas in the Crimea all must be sent out from England.

COLONEL WILLIAMS¹ TO LORD CLARENDON

Private.

KARS, *September 1, 1855.*

I have requested Mr. Brant to write that which I am afraid to put to paper here. He will explain to your Lordship the *nature* of our medium of communication. A communication from Kars.

This 1st of September has been spent in skirmishing with the Russian Cavalry for our daily supply of forage. They press us up to the range of our long guns. Colonel Lake, Major Teesdale, and Captain Thompson are admirable officers, and stand their day and night work astonishingly well.

On September 2nd Lord Clarendon wrote to Lord Panmure asking that Major Claremont, Assistant-Commissioner with the French Army, might take the place of General Torrens, the British Military Commissioner in Paris lately deceased. The Emperor had asked that this appointment might be made, the Queen had signified her approval, and Clarendon himself considered it an excellent one. Appointment of Claremont to succeed Torrens.

¹ The defender of Kars.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *September 2, 1855.*

Inquiry as to
alleged blam-
able delay in
sending certain
stores for ship-
ment to Crimea.

Charles Grey¹ tells me that there was great, and apparently blamable, delay on the part of the Ordnance in sending down the various stores which were taken to the Crimea by the large transport which started from Southampton a day or two ago—the one, I believe, that Methuen commanded. She carried huts and shells and other things. The *Columbo*, I think, is her name. It might be worth your while to order an inquiry.

Grey's account is that ten days were occupied in doing what might have been completed in one.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

OSBORNE, *September 3, 1855.*

Naming the
German
Legion.

The Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure of the Foreign Legion being called the German Legion. There being now an Italian and a Swiss Legion, the Queen thinks that the other ought certainly to bear their native name as well. She is sure that this will have a good effect in Germany and help the recruiting; the German papers have been taunting them with not being allowed to bear their own names.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.*W.O., *September 3, 1855.*

Suspected
demoralisation
of Russians.

I have just received yours of the 21st. Your plea for brevity requires no excuse, and I only wish the Russians had made the sortie for which you are so anxious. But I fear that the lesson they received on the 16th has had too great an effect on them to encourage them to show their noses again in a hurry. The more I hear of them crowding the town with their soldiers the better I like it, as

¹ Private Secretary to Prince Albert.

disease is sure to do its work among them, as well as the projectiles from your batteries. . . .

I like Mr. Lauder's¹ reports much, and it is as well to remind you that, if you can aid Mr. Jackson² and him by the judicious application of money, you may do so, because intelligence is of such infinite value in every way that it ought to be had, and I suspect Lord Raglan did not pay for it.

I have received your protest against Beatson's Horse ^{Beatson's Horse.} with no surprise, as every one seems to be set against them. They are useless where they are, at the Dardanelles, and my opinion is that, if they once get to Eupatoria, they might be sent out against the Cossacks and enemy's convoys, and do some good in annoying them. I never can dream of attaching them to your forces without your full consent. You should receive with caution the French reports against them. Remember that they tried to organise them under Yusuff and failed. They will be jealous of the success of any other officer, and apt to cry down his efforts. The experiment is a doubtful one, but there is good policy in it, and if by punctual pay and strict discipline we can turn these fellows into a useful body, you may rely on it good will result. I am much perplexed by your telegraphic messages on the subject of the Contingent. I dare say I have not fully explained to you the policy which has led to the present order for the Contingent going to Balaclava. The condition of Asiatic Turkey ^{Asiatic Turkey.} is imminent. If the Russians succeed in wresting Kars from the Turks, Erzeroum will soon follow, and then the Kurds not too well disposed will join the enemy, and probably Persia, too, might recognise in this success a resurrection of Russian power. It is our duty to prevent this evil, and if possible to compel Russia to raise the siege of Kars. Can this be done except by a relieving movement? Certainly not. Can any other than that pointed out by Omar Pasha be effected? It does not appear to

¹ Employed under Calvert and his successor, in the Intelligence Department.

² Succeeding Mr. Calvert as Head of Intelligence Department.

me nor to Her Majesty's Government that it can. Is it fair to set Omar on this work with troops of whom he knows little, while we detain a large body of those with whom he is most familiar, and his comrades in all his victories, at our Camp? As a soldier you must say it is not. By whom then should they be relieved?

Importance of
relieving Kars.

We have named Vivian's force as that most likely to strengthen your hands and to prove useful to you hereafter. I see all the disadvantages as well as you do, but to effect the relief of Kars something must be risked. Something must be done immediately. The Committee of Cabinet meet here to-morrow and I will lay the whole matter before them, and you will receive the result by telegraph before this reaches you.

I trust some arrivals of 13-inch shells have relieved your mind on that head. In writing you my views as to both Beatson's Horse and Vivian's Contingent, do not suppose I find any fault with *your* views, or that I do not sympathise with your difficulties. I do so fully, and I will do my best to make things as smooth for you as I can.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

September 3, 1855.

Many thanks for your letter and first-fruits of the Return system. I have explained the Returns to the Queen and return them now to you as desired, with the exception of the duplicate from the small items' factory, which I presume is intended for the Queen to keep according to the memorandum. Of the gunpowder there was no duplicate. I suppose the Returns of the other four departments will also come in soon, and by-and-by printed forms will be adopted.

Desirability of
making roads
in Camp.

I am glad you mean to push on matters connected with the Camp; so I may as well add, that no authority has yet been given to make the roads in it which will become absolutely necessary before the wet season sets in, if the whole is not to turn into a Balaclava.

The Queen was very much surprised at General Simp-

son's protest about the Turkish Contingent. One can hardly understand his objection, when one remembers that an equal number of Turks are to leave with Omar Pasha as those who were to have come with General Vivian !

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private and confidential.

(The copy is undated.)

I have really nothing of any importance to say, except that your telegraphic messages have put us in great spirits, and I hope on Monday to congratulate you on a successful issue of your attack.¹

Capture of
Sebastopol.

You have been quite right in refusing Omar Pasha permission to remove his troops at this most critical moment. . . . You will have your own way as to the Contingent, and if Omar leaves his troops as they are at Eupatoria, then Vivian will go to Shumla for the winter. Here he will be able to collect and form his corps, and be ready to join the British Army in the spring for any movement that may be required.

Omar Pasha.

Vivian's
Contingent.

I am not sure whether all my propositions for you in the way of munitions may be wanted, but I shall not stop till you telegraph me so to do.

The Queen is in Scotland, and will not therefore receive the earliest news.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

G.C., *September 4, 1855.*

We must not quarrel with the Sardinian Government for not lending us Novara,¹ as you may be assured it will save us as well as them much trouble. It is too near the frontier. . . . I don't know the whereabouts of Chivasso, but I strongly advise that the offer of the barracks there should be accepted.

Recruiting-
station for
Foreign
Legion.

¹ Second assault on Sebastopol.

² As a recruiting-station for the Foreign Legion, as had been proposed by the British Minister at Turin.

I don't wonder at your being tired of the *foreigners*. I am so likewise, but we should have been spared most of the annoyance if the subordinate agents had been better selected, and if they had taken those measures of common precaution which they well knew were necessary.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *September 4, 1855.*

I have not much to say in answer to your private note of the 20th August. My official letters of this day are all that demand notice, and as regards the Turkish Contingent they are important. At this moment I naturally object to change tried troops for new levies!

Continued
expectation of
an attack.

We expect to be attacked every morning, and are disappointed day after day. There can be no doubt of the enemy's intention, however.

Omar Pasha has arrived at Kasatch, and I have sent an A.D.C. down to beg him to come up to his troops at once, and to come and see me in passing. I rejoice so far in his arrival, that, if we are attacked to-morrow, his troops will behave all the better for his presence. If this battle were once well over, he and his troops could be better spared.

I am most uneasy about our want of shells. It is a fatal circumstance at this particular time.

I am recovering from the difficulties of the Sixth Division, because the arrivals of the 56th and 82nd were most opportune, and all is now right. I fear the *fourth* battalion of Guards is an impossibility, and I was hard pressed when I made mention of it.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 10, 1855.*

The Queen writes to Lord Panmure to inquire whether Major Claremont is gone to Paris? If not, she thinks he should do so with as little delay as possible, as it is very

important to have some military man on the spot to be able to communicate freely with the French Government at this very critical moment.

The capture of the Malakoff¹ is most important, but our failure against the Redan, though the Queen feels certain that it can only be temporary, is very vexatious, and the absence of all detail makes the Queen tremble for the losses we may have sustained. It must not be forgotten that we have been told by the best authorities that the Redan could not be taken, and that the Malakoff must be first taken, which would be followed by the fall of the Redan.

Capture of the Malakoff, failure at the Redan.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

September 10, 1855.

I cordially congratulate you on the capture of Sebastopol.² I am much mistaken if it does not put the red ribbon across your shoulders. At least it will not be my fault if it does not.

I hope you have sent my bag home with the despatches about Sebastopol, for we do not recognise the telegraph as a warrant for firing guns, etc.

You will have heard from me by telegraph on the subject of wintering the troops. All our plans will be in some measure changed by this move, and I shall require to learn from you the position and supposed plans of the enemy on the North Side ere we can fix anything definitely. Meanwhile I shall continue to send you huts and labourers and all things necessary to make your troops comfortable.

Plans modified by capture of Sebastopol.

It is very difficult to foreshadow any plan of operations, but were I in command I would lose no time in organising a forward movement from Eupatoria, and so take in rear and cut off from its supplies the army on the North Side. This must be all left to your and Pélissier's determination. Another view is to occupy Kaffa and all the places along the coast, not excluding Woronzoff's Villa, as soon as you can with any safety separate your Army. Your Cavalry I

Suggests a movement from Eupatoria.

¹ Captured by the French, September 8th.

² 8th and 9th September.

have ordered to have provision made for at the Bosphorus, and you must consult Sir E. Lyons and arrange with him to get as many Horse Transports together as he can about the time you wish to move your force.

I hope M'Murdo is proceeding, as he said formerly, to house his mules by digging into the hillside and covering over the tops.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PR., *September 11, 1855.*

. . . We might say to the Emperor that the Russian Army must be so discouraged by its defeat and retreat from the town, with the burning of the ships, the setting fire to the town, the blowing up of all the works, that now is the moment to press them before they can recover.

It has been like the closing scene of a melodrama at the Surrey Theatre.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

SEBASTOPOL, *September 10, 1855.*

Fall of
Sebastopol.

The telegraph has kept you informed of the glorious events that have happened. The losses caused to the enemy in our attacks on Saturday no doubt determined him to be off before we should renew them. I regret beyond all measure our serious loss at the Redan, and the evacuation of that post saved me from further bloodshed yesterday. The town will probably burn for a day or two, and I do not permit our people to enter it until all danger from the mines shall be over; for every building is ruined. The Russian loss on Saturday must have been dreadful, the bodies were lying in heaps, one over the other. I do not think the French can have lost less than 5000. Our loss is upwards of 2000, but it is not yet quite ascertained.

Neither General Pélissier nor I can form any distinct opinion of the enemy's movements. They have not yet fired a gun from the North Side. . . .

All my brigades are to my mind, as far as they go; it requires a *Scotch* regiment to complete Sir Colin Campbell's 'Highland Division.'

You make mention of the situation of 'Chief of the Staff,' and I think it proper to give you my decided opinion, founded on my own experience of that duty, that in our Staff—consisting of Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Offices, and a Military Secretary immediately with the Commander-in-Chief—a 'Chief of the Staff' is an encumbrance and an embarrassment to the working of the duty. I give it as my distinct opinion that the office of Chief of the Staff in our Army is not required, and does more harm than good. I have considered *well* this subject, and since you allude to it I give my frank opinion.

A 'Chief of the Staff' an encumbrance.

I will in future take care that my public despatches are silent on Jones' report and the Intelligence Department.

I beg to mention that Brigadier-General Windham, C.B.,¹ who commands the Second Brigade of the Second Division, richly deserves his 'spurs' for his noble conduct in leading the attack on the Redan on Saturday. . . .

I am letting our worn-out men have a few days' quiet, and am going to look over all the Divisions in succession. There are many demands on me to-day. The 'Police' arrangements for Sebastopol are troubling me!

DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE TO LORD PANMURE

Writing to Lord Panmure, on September 11th, on the fall of Sebastopol, the Duke of Cambridge says: ' . . . Poor Lord Raglan! how I wish he could have seen this great work accomplished under his own eyes! I am in despair, as you can imagine, at not having been present; this is a most painful feeling, really at times quite unbearable, and, indeed, I feel daily more and more ashamed at leading an idle life when the Army and my gallant and dear friends and comrades are all in the field. If this war

¹ 'Especially recommended for his gallant conduct during the whole struggle in the Redan.'—Simpson's despatch of September 18th.

Writer's desire
of active
employment.

lasts, I do beg and pray of you to employ me *actively* in *the field*. That is what I do *ambitionate*, and I trust I should be able to do myself credit, at least I would do my best.' . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

September 11, 1855.

Fall of
Sebastopol.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and begs to say that the guns were fired early this morning at the Tower, and at 1 P.M. in St. James's Park, for this great success. The excitement is very great and will, Lord Panmure hopes, give a stimulus to recruiting.

Proposed
interchange of
decorations.

Lord Panmure begs to submit to Your Majesty that this would be a very suitable opportunity for the exchange of decorations between the English and French nations. If Your Majesty should concur in this view, lists might be interchanged before final approval. The officers whose services seem to Lord Panmure to entitle them to French honours are General Simpson, as Commander of Your Majesty's forces at the capture of the fortress, Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell, Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, as Commander of Your Majesty's fleet; and to these Lord Panmure would humbly submit that Lord Hardinge should be added on Your Majesty's part, in counterpoise to Marshal Vaillant, they being the respective heads of the two armies under their Sovereigns. This would make five grand crosses to be interchanged, and Lord Panmure would not extend it to any of the lower grades of the respective orders.

Lord Panmure would humbly propose to Your Majesty that he should be permitted to announce to General Simpson Your Majesty's pleasure to create him a G.C.B., an honour which might be extended to General de la Marmora.

Your Majesty's gracious intention of conferring the Crimean medal on the Allied Armies will suffice for any-

thing further in way of honours. Lord Panmure submits to Your Majesty that a clasp be given to the Army with the word 'Sebastopol' upon it, and that Your Majesty's gracious pleasure be intimated in a despatch.

Lord Panmure has not yet received any returns of the losses on the 8th inst., as no despatch of any kind has arrived to-day. Much anxiety necessarily prevails and many painful announcements will have to be made.

No doubt Your Majesty requires some explanation of our repulse on the Redan, and in absence of any documents Lord Panmure takes the liberty of submitting to Your Majesty his conjectures on the point. Your Majesty will observe from the plan that, within the Redan and the small Redan from which the French were beaten back, there were works recently erected, or at all events strengthened, the guns of which were laid to command the two points which were attacked. Both Your Majesty's forces and the Emperor's carried the works assaulted by them, but, the moment that they showed themselves, a murderous fire made their positions untenable, and they were compelled to retire. The same occurred at the Central Bastion. Whereas the French had sapped under the guns of Malakoff, which could not be depressed to injure their assailants, nor could those of the inner defences be elevated to fire on the occupants of Malakoff—hence the reverses below, and the comparatively easy possession taken of Malakoff.

Lord Panmure may be wrong in his views, but he gives them to Your Majesty as they occur to him.

The more Lord Panmure considers the important intelligence of yesterday, the more its immense value becomes apparent. The Army is delivered from the trenches. It can be spared to repair its roads and prepare for its winter repose. The sick and wounded can be conveyed to the hospitals on the Bosphorus, and all but useful people may be transferred to where they can be most conveniently fed and kept. The railway, relieved from its constant burden of shot and shell, can be applied to huts and provision to a far greater extent. With these and

Results of fall
of Sebastopol.

many other considerations, Lord Panmure cannot but again repeat his congratulations not only upon the past success, but upon the prospective safety of Your Majesty's most gallant Army.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 12, 1855.*

Fall of
Sebastopol.

The Queen wishes to mark the glorious event of the fall of Sebastopol by adding a clasp to the Crimean medal, with that name upon it. The clasp ought to be given to all her troops now before or in that place. This would not include those who had left the Crimea before the 8th inst., but would include the troops in position on the Tchernaya and at Balaclava.

The name of Sebastopol also to be added to the colours of the regiments in the same.

The Queen has written to Lord Clarendon about the exchange of decorations with the French, which she thinks ought to take place now.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

September 12, 1855.

Generals to be
instructed to
follow up their
advantage.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the melancholy duty to perform of transmitting to Your Majesty the list of killed and wounded in the last attack. The Guards and Highlanders do not appear to have been engaged, and among the list there are very few with whom Lord Panmure is acquainted. Now that the painful duty of sending these lists is over at the Camp, Lord Panmure trusts that General Simpson will forthwith consult with General Pélissier as to the best means of following up the blow. Lord Panmure will not fail immediately to convey to the Generals Your Majesty's gracious message, and will extend it in a despatch on Saturday; a copy of the telegraphic despatch is herewith enclosed.

Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty the despatches from General Simpson of the 31st August, which are of no great importance.

The Generals will be duly and immediately instructed to follow up the enemy, or to take such steps to improve their advantages as shall to them seem fit.

Lord Panmure has ordered 200 masons to be conveyed forthwith to Sebastopol, *viâ* Marseilles, to repair any portions of the town which may be made available for winter-quarters for the troops.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 13, 1855.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter of the 11th, which she has just received.

She thinks his explanation of the failure on the Redan very plausible and probably the correct one.

She approves the orders sent out by telegraph after the Cabinet. Perhaps she would have preferred that no mention had been made of a particular plan of operation against the Russian Army.

As to the exchange of decorations, Lord Panmure will have received the Queen's letter. She thinks it will be difficult not to carry out the arrangements originally agreed upon with the French Government, of giving the Lower Grades as well as the Grand Crosses. Exchange of decorations.

With respect to them, the Queen thinks it ought not to be asked for Sir C. Campbell, as it would certainly be refused—he not having held any independent command. He commanded only a Brigade at Alma, and has not been at Inkerman. Sir G. Brown's case is different; he was second in command all through the campaign, and Commander-in-Chief of the Kertch expedition, in fact Canrobert's colleague in the beginning. Whether Maréchal Baraguay d'Hilliers has not as good claim to the G.C.B., on account of Bomarsund, ought to be considered. Maréchal Vaillant ought clearly *not* to have it, not having been in the field, and Lord Hardinge could not accept the

Exchange of
decorations.

Légion d'Honneur under the Foreign Office regulations, which prescribe service before the enemy as an indispensable condition. It would be most inconvenient if decorations were exchanged between the Ministers; if Vaillant got one, the Minister of Marine would claim his also, and our first Lord of the Admiralty would come in for his share in return, etc., etc.

Should an immediate stop be necessary before further lists could be made out, perhaps Pélissier and Bosquet ought to have the Bath, and Simpson the Légion d'Honneur, at once; La Marmora might follow shortly after, as well as the Admirals Lyons and Bruat. But the three above mentioned stand alone with reference to the taking of Sebastopol.

The Queen wishes Lord Panmure to show this letter to Lord Clarendon. She will write herself to General Simpson and mention her conferring the G.C.B. on him. She thinks his rank of Full General ought to be confirmed.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *September 13, 1855.*

I send Cowley's¹ letter of this morning. Pray send it to Palmerston to-night, as he will be anxious to know the view taken by the Emperor of your communications. The Emperor has committed himself so strongly against the Eupatoria movement that he will not now retract, which is unlike his usual good sense.

The French
Emperor com-
mitted against
the Eupatoria
movement.

It may not be right to bother Pélissier with instructions, but the Imperial veto on Eupatoria, which he may think still holds good, should be removed.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

September 14, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and acknowledges the honour of Your Majesty's letter of the 13th inst.

¹ The Earl of Cowley, British Ambassador to France.

Lord Panmure is happy that Your Majesty approves of the message to General Simpson, but fears that he may have said something to induce Your Majesty to suppose that he had sent directions for any specific plan. Though of opinion, with his colleagues, that Eupatoria would be an effective base of operations under circumstances, Lord Panmure has not hampered the Generals with any plan, as Your Majesty will see by the enclosed copy of the message sent.

Lord Panmure has received Your Majesty's letter on the subject of decorations, and has communicated it to Lord Clarendon. Your Majesty's views, which you have condescended to support with reasons, are quite sufficient for not including Sir C. Campbell in the list of Grand Crosses to be asked for. He and Sir de Lacy Evans may be in the second class, thus leaving General Simpson, Brown, and Admiral Lyons as the only Grand Crosses for which we should ask. As to distribution of honours.

Lord Panmure entirely concurs with Your Majesty's opinion that Pélissier and Bosquet should have the Bath, and General Simpson the Légion d'Honneur immediately, and will arrange with Lord Clarendon to communicate your views to the Emperor of the French to-morrow.

Your Majesty's manner of conferring the Bath on General Simpson will add immeasurably to the honour, and deeply affect the worthy old soldier.

The Army will look upon it as an act done to them in the person of their Commander.

Lord Panmure will intimate to Lord Hardinge Your Majesty's commands to confirm General Simpson in the rank of General.

Lord Panmure is glad that Your Majesty has determined to confer the order of the Bath on General de la Marmora a little later.

Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers can still receive the consideration required by Your Majesty as soon as Sir Charles Wood comes to town.

In suggesting Marshal Vaillant and Lord Hardinge's names to Your Majesty, Lord Panmure wished to draw

a distinction between the Marshal's position as a Minister and his authority over the Army. The exchange of honours to Ministers would, as Your Majesty justly observes, be most inconvenient, and might lead to serious evils.

Question of destroying works at Sebastopol.

The only communication from Sebastopol is a question as to the destruction of the works. Lord Panmure has replied that no directions can be given on that point until it is known what the views of the Generals are as to future proceedings.

Major Curzon¹ is coming home with the despatches, and Lord Panmure will send him to receive Your Majesty's commands as soon as he arrives. As he comes in the *Telegraph* steamer to Marseilles, we shall know of his advent.

The loyalty displayed at Woolwich on Wednesday was most gratifying. Lord Panmure greatly regrets that Your Majesty cannot see the laboratory at work by night, as it gives a magnificent idea of the productive power of England.

The fireworks under Captain Boxer's preparation and direction were very fine, and the bonfire lighted up every face among the vast crowd, though 1200 yards distant from it.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

SEBASTOPOL CAMP, *September 15, 1855.*

The telegraph having kept you *au courant* of all that goes on here, I will confine myself to some replies to your two notes of 27th August and 1st September, which came nearly together.

I will be very happy to see Claremont again, but he is too great a trump not to get some better appointment than could be found him here. He is an excellent fellow. We were all very sorry to hear of Torrens's death.

¹ Afterwards Lord Howe, A.D.C. first to Lord Raglan, and afterwards to General Simpson.

I sincerely hope that we are progressing in our winter arrangements, as you are doing for us at home. The difficulty as to *Roads* and *Rails*, however, in such ground as this, is not easily understood by those who have not seen the ground in wet weather. I have every hope that store-houses will be erected in due time, so that cargoes may be discharged from the ships without delay.

Whatever may happen immediately (if anything does happen at all), I look upon it as pretty certain that we shall pass the winter on our present ground. But events are occurring from day to day which render arrangements difficult, and it is fruitless to trouble you with surmises, which the telegraph will have cleared up long before this note reaches you.

Sebastopol is a splendid town—much more so than any of us imagined! The Barracks and the Docks far surpass anything I have ever seen in my life. The newspaper reporters will [write] much better descriptions of all these things than I can.

NOTES ON THE ABOVE LETTER

This letter confirms the doubts we have had as to the sufficiency of store-houses at Balaclava. Ought not a distinct statement to be called for of the amount of store-houses actually provided and in course of construction?

(Signed) G. G. [GEORGE GREY].

I quite agree. I see by the Morning States that, between the 7th and 10th of September, the Infantry, rank and file, present and fit for duty, were reduced from 28,845 to 26,849; it would surely be desirable to reinforce; and the German and Swiss Legion, consisting of men more seasoned than our recruits, would be a valuable addition to the Crimean Army.

(Signed) P[ALMERSTON].

September 28, 1855.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

September 15, 1855.

Honours for
Simpson.Preparations
for wintering.Exhorting
Simpson to
further action.

I congratulate you with all my heart on the result of the assault, which, though momentarily unsuccessful, seems to have struck terror into our enemies' hearts. You have got rid of much of your prospective burden, and I anticipate that our arrangements for winter will be greatly facilitated. First of all let me inform you, *in confidence*, of the personal results to yourself. Your rank as General will be made substantive instead of *local*. The Queen herself will write to you conferring on you the G.C.B. The Legion of Honour will follow, as it is intended to confer on Pélissier our G.C.B. I may, therefore, wish you joy of your personal honours. You must now turn your attention to doing something for me. My credit depends on the wintering of our Army. I have sent out immense and costly supplies, and you owe me 'a day in the harvest' as we say in our country. I hope you have done as I told you and appointed Paulet Quartermaster-General of the Army, and given him exclusive responsibility, with some Deputy-Assistants under him, as to hutting the men and forming the roads in Camp. You will, of course, leave the railway to Beattie, and the maintenance and repairs to Doyne. Keep an eye on your *Commissariat*, and be sure that you have supplies in the heart of your Camp in case your communications are in any way interrupted.

I have given orders for fitting up quarters for our Cavalry at the Bosphorus, and I hope that will relieve you of considerable pressure. Soon after this reaches you, you will be in possession of two hundred artisans to repair any houses in Sebastopol available for winter, but if you take my advice you will stick to your huts as long as you can.

I see a report of Bakeries and Kitchens which affords me great pleasure, and I have ordered a regular supply of flour from America for you.

I am seedy to-day, and beginning to suffer from over-work, but I have passed through the doctor's hands and shall, I hope, be all right again in a day or two.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *September 17, 1855.*

I forgot to speak to you to-day *in re* Zamoyski, who I wish you could dismiss satisfied, for I dread the sight of his rueful countenance.¹ He sent me his eight points, some of which won't do, at least I conclude you won't undertake Polish recruiting agents, or a Polish dépôt here, or the payment of arrears of the Cossacks, all of which are bran-new and did not enter into the original scheme — which scheme, however, always seems to elude one's grasp and to shrink from practicable settlement. If you could let him and his men go to Shumla, and be called a Division, so as to keep Infantry and Cavalry together nationally, though of course subject to the orders of Vivian, and allow him to add to their numbers by prisoners, deserters, or any Slav subjects of the Porte, he will have got all you can give, or that he has a right to expect; but I think, if possible, he should not be rejected altogether, for we may want the *Polish element* hereafter, when this corps with Zamoyski at their head would do good service.

Zamoyski and
the Polish
Legion.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 17, 1855.*

We cannot tell here why you are resting on your oars. You neither fire nor lay plans for attack, nor tell us what you are doing with what you have got. The public will be on you to keep you alive, and while all the daily press are praising the Army, they are loudly crying out 'to run into the fox.'

I tell you this at more length on paper than I can by telegraph, for I dare say, before it reaches you, it will be stale and some deed will be done. I don't want to urge you to rashness, but mind, if you conceive a great scheme

¹ Count Zamoyski, the General commanding the Polish Legion, had been nicknamed 'Don Quixote.'

which can be executed by your own troops and those of Marmora with the aid of any Turks, I don't want you to play second fiddle to Pélissier. Only tell him plainly your plans, and don't make yourself a General of Division to him, Maréchal though he be.

We speculate here that you should try to turn the M'Kenzie Heights by Baidar, and to cut off his communication with his rear, but so much must depend on your own information that all we can really say is, 'Don't waste yourself in idleness.' I do not say that your best policy may not be to delay and to press on the enemy's rear when he retires; but you must be ready to do so, and always have some strong position behind you, to fall back upon should he turn to rend you!

'Don't waste
yourself in
idleness.'

Your telegraph about store-houses has made me easy. I shall keep sending all the huts I have ordered, as you will have use for them in any case.

I hope you have got us out of our dilemma with Lord W. Paulet by making him Deputy-Quartermaster-General. I expect to find that you have turned your working-parties on to the roads and drainage of your Camp.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD CLARENDON

[In an omitted passage, the writer of this letter asks that it may be shown to Lord Panmure, for whom it is written as much as for the addressee.]

September 17, 1855.

I am to return to you the Duke of Newcastle's¹ letter and Lord Panmure's letter upon it, which we read with much interest.

Duke of
Newcastle's
criticisms
criticised.

I am sorry that the Duke ever wrote this letter. It is at all times hazardous for a civilian going into a camp and picking up information from this or that person, and listening to the different stories flying about there, to give an opinion upon plans of operation, military system, the merit of the different men in command, but was particularly so for the Duke, who fell quite into the ways of our

¹ The Duke had visited the Camp before Sebastopol.

Correspondent, from very much the same causes. This siege has been an anomalous one in every way, and my astonishment is that the troops have borne 350 days' incessant hard fighting, with every possible discomfort, and deaths at the rate of from 18,000 to 19,000 men during that period, without grumbling at their Commanders and Government much more. When the Duke speaks of a want of plan (at time he wrote), it is nonsense, and the result has shown it; the only plan ever gone upon since May was to work up to the Malakoff and take it, which would cause the fall of the town, but could not be done without the Redan being equally attacked, and the batteries on the Sapouné being pushed sufficiently low down to reach the shipping. This was an operation of the greatest difficulty, costing the French 200 and us 60 men a night! Yet it was nobly persevered in. Now you may say that was done by the troops and is no merit of the Commanders; quite true, but it had to be done, and the Commanders could not get the town in any other way. If they committed a fault, it was that of allowing the French to besiege the West Side from October till March, whilst we could go on only with half the East Side, ending opposite the Malakoff—which our Engineers, however, all along pointed out as the key of the position.

That the Commanders seem now to be without a plan is lamentable, but even this must be judged upon with hesitation, as we know nothing of the condition of the two Armies since the assault, and their combined nature will make it exceedingly difficult to allot the parts and organise an army for the field. I hope to God it won't be a combined one again, but one (however organised) intrusted to one leader! But this will be full of difficulty, with Turks, Sardinians, French, and English. Péliissier cannot ride (from his size). Simpson is too old and also deficient as a horseman; Omar Pasha is not trusted by the French, and is certainly cautious; La Marmora has no claim to command the Army.

As to the plan of operation, I quite agree in that of the Duke, which in fact is the one we have advocated at home

Hopes that the Allied Army may in future be under one leader.

throughout, but it appears the Emperor puts his veto upon it even now!!

I think the Duke's judgment upon General Simpson hasty and harsh; yet I incline to the belief that now, the town being taken, and the break from Field-Marshal Lord Raglan to a General who went out as a Major of a battalion having been made, we would greatly benefit by Simpson's return home, and the appointment of a younger man. But since Pélissier has been made a Marshal, it will be more than ever necessary to separate the Armies. The experiment of joint command and action has been tried and we got through it with marvellous good luck and success, but we must not tempt Providence, and what may answer (as a *pis aller*) at 'sit down siege' will never do in the field. The English Army ought not to become a contingent of the French, and has the means of independent action. It is 36,000 men strong, with 92 field-guns; the Sardinians would give 15,000, Vivian's Contingent 20,000, the Foreign Legions at least 5000. This gives us 75,000 men. No larger army, if kept together, could conveniently move in the field, and it ought to be sufficient for any independent movement which does not exclude combination with that of the French Army. To effect this separation is peculiarly the duty of the Government at home, and I trust the Cabinet will spare no pains to obtain this result.

Advocates independence of British Army at the seat of war.

The contrast which the Duke establishes between the Sardinian Army and ours is most unfair, and Lord Panmure perfectly right in his criticism. It has not done a day's work in the trenches, and but for the 16th would not have heard a shot fired. Of course it used the three months' rest and leisure to organise itself as well as possible, and still fell a greater victim to the cholera than any other force out there. However, all accounts agree in representing the Sardinians as very fine troops. They have the inestimable advantage over the French that they are commanded (like ours) by gentlemen, but have the great advantage over us that these gentlemen put the soldier yet above the gentleman, whilst with us, where

from our constitutional history and national habits the soldier is disliked, the officer almost seeks to excuse himself for being an officer by assuming as unsoldierlike a garment or manner as he possibly can. The Sardinians would speak of a soldierlike gentleman (the impression La Marmora made upon the Duke), whilst we speak of a gentlemanlike officer, like General Estcourt, Lord Burghersh, etc., etc. All our civilian interference, now the increasing fashion, necessarily must lead to increase this evil, which may finally cause the ruin of our Army. The officers will try to appear less and less as soldiers, for that is at once proclaiming their stupidity, inefficiency, and incapability of understanding military questions, etc., etc., to the world—as that is the fashion of the Press, and the present politicians take [it] for granted, and the only remedy suggested by the Press or Parliament for any defect in our military organisation is to take the matter out of the hands of military men, who can know nothing about them, put it in those of some M.P. or civil clerk. At the same time, with us, there is not a question of discipline which comes before the public where the latter, with the feelings of freeborn Englishmen, does not side violently with the person who offended against discipline, and against the Authorities who are trying to enforce it (as brutes). All this is very serious, but will not be remedied by the abuse of military men in difficult and responsible situations, such as the Duke (who is a thorough John Bull upon that question) deals out.

I am glad the Duke leans to Sir W. Codrington as the most probable man to make a good Commander-in-Chief. . . .

Lord Hardinge has at last arranged with General Freath that he is to vacate the Quartermaster-General's office at the Horse Guards; Airey, with his Crimean experience, will be well qualified to fill that post, to which I understand Lord Panmure agrees, and the sooner this change takes place, the better. General Barnard's position could then be better defined, and a young active man be made Quartermaster-General to the Crimean Army, for which post everybody seems to point out Lieutenant-Colonel Wetherall, now with the Turkish Contingent.

'The gentleman above the soldier' in our Army.

Where we turn for the remedying of defects in our Army.

The public's instinct in questions of discipline.

Appointments for Generals.

Land Trans-
port and Army
Works Corps.

As to the Land Transport and Army Works Corps, they are both makeshifts required by the peculiarities of the case; the former will perhaps become a permanent corps, the latter will, I presume, some day merge into the Sappers and Miners (who at the siege of Gibraltar were an Army Works Corps similarly organised). They will never be really fit for much as long as they are not soldiers, receiving the same pay (instead of five times as much), and standing under the same discipline, regulations, etc., etc., as the rest of the Army—in fact, as long as they are not an integral part of the Army. Being a semi-civil corps, they are probably unjustly treated and certainly ill looked upon by the Regulars. They cost an enormous sum of money, but all that could not be helped; they were wanted, and Lord Panmure deserves great credit for the courage with which he grappled with the difficulties; he will not be disappointed if they should require total remodelling hereafter, when experience will have shown how this can best be done.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Py., *September 20, 1855.*

Criticises New-
castle's letter
from the seat
of war.

. . . I have seen Newcastle's¹ letter from the Crimea and your observations upon it, with which I very much agree. He saw things with the eyes of a disappointed politician, and he retailed the opinions picked up by a traveller from the idle gossipers of a camp. There is, however, no doubt some foundation for his description of Simpson, who, though he possesses many good useful qualities, is not quite up to the command of an army; but you will no doubt soon be able now to make the contemplated changes.

Failure of
Simpson to
send informa-
tion as to state
of Sebastopol.

It is remarkable that, though Pélissier has sent much interesting information as to the state of Sebastopol and the quantity and nature of the stores left by the Russians, Simpson has not that I have seen sent us any information whatever on those matters.

¹ Lord Panmure's predecessor in office.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*CAMP, SEBASTOPOL, *September 18, 1855.*

It is no doubt very easy for people in England to say — ‘Follow up your success,’ but Marshal Pélissier and I are responsible, and we are convinced that we are acting the wise part in pausing until we can see the plans of our enemies. It would be rash in us to attack the Russian position, as strong as any that can be imagined, fortified at every pass, and defended by an army stronger than our own! A little time will show, and as the telegraph will announce our movements before this reaches you, I will say no more.

Answer to
criticisms at
home.

I am making the best use of my time in preparing our Divisions to move, but Land Transport will not go beyond 15,000 men, and that imperfectly. How different from our Allies! Our Generals are busy with their Divisions, and the release from trench duty is something not to be described. A large party of the Guards are road-making.

If we don't mind, Balaclava will be *choked*, and then we are undone!

Jones is better this morning, and I do not think it will now be necessary for him to go home. Many of us are far from well, however. My complaint has become chronic and wears me out, as it is impossible for me to lay up, or attend to the doctor; and I am better one day and worse the next. I will hold on, however, as the cold weather may perhaps restore me. M'Murdo is recovering, at least he says so, but I doubt it.

Enclosed is to-day's account of the Russians.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

September 21, 1855.

. . . What a haul of ammunition they have had at Sebastopol! I have just heard of 200 tons of powder, and more than 100,000 projectiles. I am afraid the Generals

Ammunition
captured in
Sebastopol.

are more occupied in securing the plunder than in pursuing the enemy, but what a falsification of all the stories we have heard about ammunition being short! I hope it may not be the same with respect to provisions.

The journey of the Emperor to Nicolaieff does not look like evacuation of the Crimea. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 22, 1855.*

Your despatches have arrived and with them your private letter, which *painfully* account for the non-establishment of your banners on the Redan. Curzon gave me an account of the whole affair, and I confess I was a little humbled as I listened to his detail. I have told him to make his truths as palatable to the Queen as he can.

I trust you will now feel secure as to your troops in winter, and that I may congratulate you on your mind being relieved from anxiety to some extent, as mine is. Well! my good friend, it is not more than eight months since you left me in this room, and here you are now a full General in the Army, a G.C.B., and a Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour. I rejoice in this most sincerely, and I trust we may be spared to talk over these things when neither of us are troubled by official responsibilities. I hope you do not delude yourself with expectations of a second Vienna, because I can tell you that it is my opinion that, so long as we have a Russian soldier in Crimea, or a Russian army in Georgia, peace is as impossible as it was six months since. You have never mentioned Newcastle in any of your letters. Tell me how he and Airey met, and what His Grace did in the Camp, for I am rather anxious to know the opinions your soldiers entertained of him, knowing as I do what he has written of you.

Simpson not to
expect peace.

Request for
fuller news.

You must not be annoyed at my demands for information as to the details of events. Your officer who manages your messages is too costive, and does not half

satisfy either our Gracious Sovereign or her Cabinet. For instance, we have through Pélissier the amount of military stores found in Sebastopol. We can hear from neither of you what the enemy is doing in the northern batteries, and what you observe with your glasses. Have you made, or do you contemplate, any reconnaissance to see what he is about on the plateau? All these are interesting points and may be ciphered. As it is, your telegraphs are dry and laconic.

I presume I shall hear by next mail of what you are doing in regard to the munitions of war found in Sebastopol, and who are the Commissioners appointed to settle the amount and division of spoil. Sardinians and Turks must share in the spoil.

I suppose Pélissier and Bosquet will be pleased with the Bath.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PR., *September 22, 1855.*

I have received this morning copy of Simpson's telegram asking whether he is to destroy the docks and sea-defences, and recommending that it should be done. I think it would be well to tell him by telegraph to-day that we mean to preserve, fortify, and occupy, and not to destroy and evacuate, Sebastopol and the Crimea.

Government
intends to
preserve and
occupy, not
destroy
Sebastopol.

It would be well also to desire him to make more use of the telegraph.

It has cost us a large sum of money, and we ought to have value for it in daily communications. The Russians contrive, by means of telegraphic communication, to reprint in the evening at Petersburg the leading articles and most interesting foreign news of the *Times*, published here in the morning, and, on the other hand, Simpson's communications, at a moment of intense interest, have ever since the announcement of the capture of Sebastopol been of the most meagre kind—few and far between, and telling us nothing of what we wanted to know. All we have learnt of what has been done since has come to us from Pélissier.

Reprehensible
scantiness of
news furnished
by Simpson.

It would be well to give Simpson an admonition on this, and to desire him to let us know forthwith what the Russians are about, and what the plans of the Allies are, what he and Pélissier are doing about the two parts of the town east and west of the Dockyard Creek; and the Quartermaster-General's Department ought forthwith to make a good plan of the whole place and send it home to you.

Division of the
spoil.

Disposal of
captured guns.

Criticism of
Simpson.

I will suggest to Clarendon to propose to French Government that an agreement should be come to for a division of the stores of all kinds found at Sebastopol between the four allied Governments, English, French, Turkish, and Sardinian. The guns should be brought away, over and above those which may be wanted for the future defence of the place, and of any other positions in the Crimea which we may have to occupy against Russian attack; and might it not be worth while to desire Simpson to collect by-and-by, when he has leisure, the shot and shells that are lying about the ground like turnips in a field? But the points on which we ought to have information by return of telegraph are, what are the Russians doing, and what are the Allies about, or intending to do?

It is but justice to Simpson to say that his despatch of the 9th is admirably written. . . .

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Pr., *September 22, 1855.*

Your despatch of the 15th renders it sure that when it is received there can be 'no mistake'; it is quite conclusive.

As the Queen desired me in her letter to communicate with you and Hardinge, I thought it proper, in writing to her to-day, to say that you had both of you requested me to lay your grateful thanks at her feet, and I added that neither would say anything on the matter to anybody till you heard again on the subject. I said that you thought

the Grand Cross of the Bath the most appropriate token of H.M.'s approbation, and that both you and Hardinge had agreed with me in thinking that she had judged rightly in intending to make Combermere and Strafford¹ Field-M Marshals as well as Hardinge. . . .

Rewards for the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

SEBASTOPOL, *September 22, 1855.*

I have your private letter of the 8th inst. before me, having reference to the Turks and Bashi-bazouks. These are subjects of great difficulty, especially the disposal of the Contingent, and I must do the best I can. I have, since the letter of the 8th, received your telegraph about Omar Pasha's troops, and am endeavouring to let them away in concurrence with Marshal Pélissier. I fear that the season is now too far gone to enable Omar to do all he talked of.

From the nature of your telegraphs in allusion to 'following up our success,' I have only to say that the Marshal and I are quite of one opinion, that to attack Gortschakoff's superior force, posted along the Mackenzie Heights in the strongest imaginable position, would be unwise, to say the least of it. They are more able once more to *attack us* on the Plain, though I don't expect they will. To divide our Army would be equally unwise, and could not be undertaken in such weather as we have, with ground impassable from wet. You must also recollect that I cannot move about half my Army for want of transport.

Answer to critics at home.

It therefore remains to be seen what the enemy will do. I think he will remain in his strong position, fortify the North Side for a regular siege, and preserve the Harbour.

Course which will probably be taken by the enemy.

This is his evident game, and I think he will play it. At this season of the year how is it to be prevented?

The roads are now the main object. I hope, wherever

Road-making.

¹ Stapleton Cotton, first Viscount Combermere, and John Byng, first Earl of Strafford, both of whom had served brilliantly in the Peninsular War.

I can get a spade or pick, to put a soldier to it. I can do no more, but if I had spades for the whole Army, it will be as much as I can do to make a road from Balaclava to the Col!

The weather has completely broken into rain—the whole country is, as usual after wet, impassable.

French honour
for Simpson.

I must not omit to mention to your Lordship—and I will do so officially after I am more *officially* informed of the fact—that the Emperor of the French telegraphed to Marshal Pélissier that His Majesty has nominated me ‘Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour.’ This is indeed a high distinction, much higher than my deserts, and most unexpected. I suspect Pélissier has been saying kind things of me to the Emperor to induce him to confer on me so high an honour.

Cessation of
siege-duties.

We are still in ignorance how our news will be received in England. The cessation to the men of the siege-duties, after 339 days and nights of open trenches, is beyond all description. It is to this perseverance that we owe the fall of the place, and I mean to send home a list of officers and men who have gone through these 339 nights in the trenches without a moment’s reluctance or complaint! There are not many of them alive to see the glorious result of their labours.

We are withdrawing our guns, and dismantling the batteries.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 23, 1855.*

The Queen hastens to acknowledge Lord Panmure’s letter with the enclosures received this morning.

She thinks that General Simpson’s request respecting his A.D.C. Captain Colville should be complied with, and that Brigadier-General Windham should at once be made a Major-General for his distinguished services.

The Queen would wish Lord Panmure to send this letter on to Lord Hardinge.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

September 23, 1855.

I must make use of General Grey's hand, as a fit of rheumatism in my right shoulder prevents my holding the pen. I wish to return you Sir J. Burgoyne's letter, which you sent to the Queen. There may be a great deal of truth in what he says, but if our movements are to be made to depend on the intentions of the Russian Army, unless the Emperor of Russia will be so kind as to communicate his intentions in the same way as the *Times* communicates ours, our Generals will never ascertain these by merely watching them in front. The Russians will cheat them to any amount, as they have done the whole year through, by false demonstrations, and paid deserters. It is the back-door which must be watched, if you want to know whether your antagonist wishes to bolt or not. Unless, therefore, troops, and particularly Cavalry, are made to operate on the rear or flanks of the Russian Army, even the expectant policy of our Generals will lead to nothing. I think you should point this out to them. Whether the time is not now arrived for carrying out Admiral Stewart's suggestion¹—viz. to embark a movable column of British troops in a flying squadron, to threaten the Russian coasts on various points, so as to create doubt and confusion in their minds as to where the blow would fall, and thus perhaps to strike an important blow, even, it might be, by destroying Nicolaieff or Cherson by a *coup de main*, prepared and facilitated by a demonstration of the whole fleet against Odessa, seems to me to deserve serious consideration. Perhaps you will kindly show this letter to Lord Palmerston.

A hit at the *Times*.

'The back-door must be watched.'

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, September 24, 1855.

The Queen is desirous of conferring on Lord Panmure a mark of her high approbation of the services he has

¹ Referred to in Lord Palmerston's note of August 2nd appended to these letters.

rendered her and the country, and which she thinks can be bestowed at no better moment than the present, when we have to rejoice at the glorious event of the capture of Sebastopol.

Civil Grand
Cross of the
Bath for Lord
Panmure.

She, therefore, informs him that she intends to confer the Civil Grand Cross of the Bath on him, which she has reason to know will be agreeable to him.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PR., *September 24, 1855.*

The Prince is quite right, but the instructions we agreed two days ago to send to Simpson will meet the Prince's views. It is indeed inconceivable that we should have had a large force occupying Eupatoria the whole of this year without ever having been able to get from thence the slightest information as to what was doing upon the road from Perekop to Simpheropol.

Suggests a hint
to Simpson.

Might it not be worth while to send by telegraph to Simpson the extract which you sent me from your despatch of the 25th, telling him not to trouble himself about peace, but to try to make the best of the war?

That despatch will probably not reach him till the 30th, and it might be very useful that he should know our views earlier.

Considers the
question of our
ability to defend
Canada against
the United
States.

I have read the letter from Burgoyne of which you sent me copy. My impressions as to our ability to defend Canada against the United States entirely differ from his. But I am quite convinced that we ought not to put our tail between our legs, as he proposes we should do.¹ Besides, his proposal that we should make an agreement with the Yankees that war between them and us should not involve Canada in the quarrel is much the same as if Achilles had proposed to the Trojans that they should promise in battle never to hit him on his heel. Very likely is it that Jonathan would accept such a bargain!

¹ Over the Foreign Enlistment Act difficulty with the United States.

But Burgoyne looks at one part of the case only. If we are weak in Canada, as he assumes, the Americans are still more vulnerable by us in their Slave States, and a British Force landed in the southern part of the Union, proclaiming freedom to the Blacks, would shake many of the stars from their banner. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *September 24, 1855.*

I have positively nothing to say which I have not said by *telegram*, and I am so interrupted by a long Cabinet and people coming in on one that I can find very little time to run off a few lines to you. You have puzzled us very much by your eagerness to blow up the docks and sea-defences of Sebastopol, which to our limited comprehension may be done at any time. I am most anxious you should not think that you have done enough. I fear Pélissier will settle on his victory and ruminate on his success unless he is poked up. I trust to you and Lyons applying a hot poker to him. I again repeat to you that, as much depends on accurate information, you must apply money in any direction to obtain it. The Russians will use every dodge to chicane you, but you must try and outwit them. As soon as you have sifted a *deserter*, send him without loss of time to the rear at Constantinople, and press on Pélissier the same policy. I hope you are preparing for winter, and you must not think me importunate if I cry *roads, roads, roads* in every letter. As soon as I know your decision for the winter I will write you some suggestions.

Pélissier to be stirred to further action.

Had you not better send some senior Cavalry officer of *energy* and *head* to the Bosphorus to prepare for that arm going there for winter-quarters? I have desired preparations to be made for them.

Exhorts to preparation for winter.

You must let me know whether you require any more troops to the front. I will fill the Mediterranean with

seasoned men, so that you can get them to commence an early campaign with in spring.

Recommends
keeping clear
of Sebastopol.

You say the police of Sebastopol perplexes you. My answer is keep out of it if you can, for its sanitary condition must be dreadful, and I grudge every man that dies of disease more than ten who fall in fair fight. . . .

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 25, 1855.*

Zamoyski's
Polish
Contingent.

I congratulate you upon having solved the Polish difficulty and satisfied Zamoyski. I send Harrowby's¹ letter, and I have just seen Z., who should lose no time in going, but he is right in suggesting that the 2nd Regiment of Cossacks should not be sent off to Asia, from whence it will have to be brought back. We might telegraph to that effect if you think proper. He is very confident about getting over Poles from the Russian Army.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

SEBASTOPOL, *September 25, 1855.*

Yours of 10th is the last date I have. Since you wrote it, the despatch sent home by Major Curzon will have given more details.

Present
position of
British and of
enemy.

Our present position is just what was expected it would be if we acquired the South Side of Sebastopol. The Russians hold the North Side, which they are strengthening daily, and there cannot be less than 1000 or 1500 guns in the batteries. Their army extends along the Belbec from the sea, away towards Albut, and as far as Foti Sala, head-quarters at Kasales. I have no reason to think the enemy will leave. It is his duty to preserve the Harbour of Sebastopol, and he will winter in his present quarters as far as we can judge. In this state of things, neither the French nor ourselves can make a forward movement, nor divide our Army. The former would be to attack in front

¹ The Earl of Harrowby was strongly interested in the Poles.

the most powerful position that can be imagined, where defeat would be ruinous. The latter scheme, by removing our troops, might invite the enemy to strike at the Tchernaya once more. There are some two thousand Cavalry at Eupatoria, who will at all events feel the road between the enemy's present quarters and Perekop, and the French have extended their right into the Baidar plain, where, however, the nature of the country will not allow the enemy's left to be turned.

In this state of things I am working at the roads. It is fortunate our men are free from trench work, and can be put on the roads, or we should have been precisely in the same state as last year, for these Civil Corps are failures. Mr. Doyne and some of his officers are excellent, but the men give more annoyance and trouble than is agreeable. But you will have reports of this from other quarters. I can only add that I hope to see the road to Camp *securely* made within six weeks, but it will be as much as we can do. Wherever I can find *tools*, there is now no difficulty in *men*.

I regret Markham's departure more than I can say. He is very ill. Jones is very ill too, but he will not go away. It is most distressing to see the best men in the Army one after the other obliged to go away with broken health.

One of your Lordship's telegraphs alludes to 'idle delusions of peace.' Such are not entertained here, and the attitude of the enemy forbids them. I had some conversation with Marshal Pélissier yesterday, and we are decided that no separation of the Army, nor any forward movement, are advisable until the Russian plans are quite distinct.

No 'idle delusions of peace' entertained at seat of war.

The Cavalry shall be sent to the Bosphorus in due time.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *September 28, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's two letters of the 24th and 26th. She approves the draft of the

Dissatisfaction
with Simpson.

despatch to Marshal Vaillant. She cannot sufficiently express her disappointment at General Simpson's reports—showing a total want of energy of mind on his part. Lord Panmure's telegraphic despatch to him is by no means too severe, but the Queen is afraid that we shall require some more vigorous hand than General Simpson to restore the Army to what it was before the disorganising labours of twelve months' trenches. She would recommend this subject strongly to Lord Panmure's consideration.

With respect to the question whether the taking of Sebastopol should, like after Waterloo, count two years' service to the Army, the Queen would remind Lord Panmure that two years' service has already been given for Alma and Inkerman, and that it will become a serious question whether a repetition will not make it a matter of necessity after every future success.

Lord Panmure would perhaps consult with Lord Hardinge on the subject.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

SEBASTOPOL, *September 29, 1855.*

Your very kind letter of the 15th reached me last night. But the telegraphic message of a very different character reached me the evening before, and after a night's mature reflection and deliberate consideration, it seemed plain to me that I could not continue in command while the Government considers that I and my Army are passing our time in absolute idleness. I still continue in the same opinion.

Present inaction
justified.

It is plain to me, as it has been all along, that in England a very erroneous notion exists on matters here in general. The Press seems to guide every one at home. Were we to act as you seem to expect in attacking the Russians, in perhaps the strongest entrenched position that ever was seen, the odds are that the Allied Armies would be beaten. If, on the other hand, the force were divided by a large part of it going to Eupatoria, the Russians

would, as in duty bound, try to reach Balaclava. I am just as decided as that I am now writing, that Pélissier and I are acting wisely; and it is unfortunate for commanders when they lose the confidence of their Government.

I am quite alive to your kind expressions in your letter of the 15th, received last night. But these electric wires upset all calculations, and cause infinite confusion; and your telegraph of the 26th destroys all the effect of the kind things told me on the 15th. Nearly the whole Army is employed on the roads. It will be as much as we can do to make them passable before the wet weather. There is a conference of the Generals and Admirals this afternoon at the French head-quarters, so I must close my letter. I am glad to learn that flour is coming regularly from America; we are badly off for it at present. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

September 29, 1855.

I write you from my bed, to which a slight attack of gout has made it prudent that I should confine myself for a day. You will see by this mail what a hubbub has been created in the public mind by the failure of our success in the attack of the 8th inst. I am afraid you owe a good deal of this to your dry manner of narrating the occurrences, as compared with the voluminous and, I must say, ably composed despatches of Pélissier. Perhaps you may be averse to clothe failure in the language of victory, or you may be a novice in soothing the pride of the British Lion, who cannot tolerate failure in anything which he undertakes.

Be that as it may, I have felt compelled to write you a public despatch in order to elicit the information omitted hitherto, and to furnish me with full particulars to guide me hereafter. Shortly after assuming the command, you wrote me that it was resolved to give up the Redan as a

Simpson's
despatches.

Strong
language as to
the *Times*.

Simpson asked
to be more com-
municative.

point of attack, and I do not comprehend how I find you repeating the tragedy of the 18th June, and with the same unhappy results. You will see how the *Times* falls upon you, but I presume you do not let the lucubrations of a Mr. Delane, or a Mr. Higgins, or a Mr. Anybody else, under the shelter of a cowardly secrecy, trouble you much. . . . I expected to-day an answer to my telegram of the day before yesterday. I most seriously ask you to be more open with me—I should perhaps say more communicative, and a telegram at short intervals, even saying nothing of importance, and which I could give to the public, would keep them in good-humour and make both your position and mine more tolerable than they are. I have placed Beatson's Horse under Vivian, and accepted that officer's resignation, which in consequence he has tendered me. I believe that, as soon as Vivian and Shirley get hold of them, you will have a body of irregular Cavalry formed of them, which will be handy, active, and more than a match for any Cossacks, either of the Don or elsewhere, which the Russians can bring against you.

Docks and sea-
defences at
Sebastopol.

The Turkish Contingent is to winter at Shumla, and I hope in spring will be efficient to aid the British Army wherever it may be destined to act. I see you have occupied the Karabelnaia, and appointed Col. Wyndham commandant of the place. I learn this from newspaper paragraphs, and, if true, I ought to have heard it from yourself. I cannot comprehend why you are all so anxious to destroy the docks and sea-defences, which seem to me capable of being destroyed at any time. Rely on it we shall not give them up to any one in their present state. But there is no use destroying anything till the moment when you can safely do so with reference to your own necessities.

We have a great many reports from Continental sources, which seem to be circulated as false [illegible], to prepare the public for some further retrogression on the part of the Russians. I hear it is quite true that Osten-Sacken has put an end to himself. Hoping soon to hear of some activity,—I am, etc.

PS.—I have just received your telegraphic message, the concluding paragraph of which has surprised me. It would appear nowadays that nothing but honied words are to be accepted. I have no hesitation in looking for the cause of your resignation in other sources than my telegraphic message, which is approved by the Queen and concurred in by my colleagues. I trust your reasons for resignation will be set forth distinctly in your despatch, and I have no wish that you should spare my unfortunate telegram which has apparently led to it. And you must bear in mind that the papers will in all likelihood be moved for.

Simpson's
resignation.

Your business is to justify your resignation to the Army and the public, mine to make the best case for myself.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

Pv., September 1855.

Would it not be well to call upon Simpson to give us some detailed explanations as to causes of the failure of his attack on the Redan, with reference especially to the failure of a similar attempt on the 18th June—the experience of which seems to have been made no use of on the 8th September? For the assault in September appears to have been made almost identically in the same manner as that of June, and to have been attended, therefore, with the same kind of result, though in an aggravated degree.

Simpson to be
asked to ex-
plain the failure
of the second
attack on the
Redan.

The points, as it seems to me, on which Simpson should be called upon for clear and detailed explanation are as follows:—

Questions to be
asked.

- 1st. Why were not our trenches carried up like those of the French to the edge of the ditch, or at all events much nearer the Redan than they were; and why were they not made as wide as the French trenches, so as to be capable of holding the reserves?

- 2nd. Why, after the experience of the failure on the 18th June, was the Redan assaulted at all; and especially as the attack was to be made, not before or at the same time as the attack on the Malakoff, and in order to assist in the capture of the Malakoff, but after the Malakoff had been carried?
- 3rd. Why, if the Redan was to be assaulted, were no means provided for bridging over the ditch as was done by the French at the Malakoff, or, if it would have been difficult to carry materials for such a bridge across the great distance which our troops had to traverse between their trenches and the Redan, was not care taken to provide ladders that should be long enough, instead of ladders that were too short?
- 4th. Why was the storming-party not furnished with means for spiking the guns in the Russian works, so that by even a temporary occupation they might silence the fire?
- 5th. Why was not an adequate support sent forward in time to assist those who mounted and occupied the Russian works?
- 6th. What part of the Redan was it that was blown up afterwards by the Russians, and would the explosion of that part have destroyed any portion of our troops who might have driven the Russians out; and would not such a blowing up, if it had taken place as a defensive operation, have in the end defeated its own purpose, by making a breach in the works through which a subsequent assault might have been successful?

Questions re-
garding the
assault on the
Redan.

To some of these questions satisfactory answers can probably be given. In fact, I could almost give them by anticipation, but as this failure may be the subject of future discussion, it would be useful to have upon record all that can be said in explanation of it.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

September 30, 1855.

Our two armies seem disposed to rest under their laurels and to live in good brotherhood with the Russians on the North Side; but after a time their wind will come again. I am inclined to think that we cannot refuse to accept Simpson's resignation. But should his successor be Colin Campbell or Codrington? This we must consider.

Position of
matters at the
seat of war.

Who shall
succeed
Simpson?

As long as the Emperor remains bent, as he now is, on a campaign next year on a larger field of operations, I shall not much care for the peace propensities of the Parisians. But the Emperor ought not, for his own sake, to allow so many Russians, men and women, to live at Paris and artfully scatter the seeds of discontent and disunion.

Why should we not keep the Russians on the North Side alive by a shell-practice from time to time?

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

September 30, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty's note of the 28th.

Lord Panmure is not surprised that Your Majesty should express disappointment at the meagre character of General Simpson's reports, and Your Majesty's approval of the telegraphic message sent to him by Lord Panmure affords the latter much support in the present crisis of affairs. Your Majesty will perceive by the perusal of the reply to that message that the Generals of both armies have resolved to do nothing, and that, moreover, General Simpson will, if ordered to divide his force, make it an excuse for his inability to meet the winter and get roads and huts into proper condition. All that can be done in this country is to make and send whatever is necessary for securing the health and reasonable comfort of the troops. Those who command must be ready to receive and adapt what is sent.

Temporary
inaction of the
Allied Generals.

Lord Panmure cannot help being of opinion that General Simpson has pronounced harshly on the Army Works [Corps]. So far, none of his despatches have led to the belief that this opinion was entertained. The new huts will have begun to arrive by this time, and provided goodwill and good temper be exhibited, and the parties pull together for the one common object, Lord Panmure cannot doubt that the Army will be made secure against the rains of autumn and the cold of winter.

The last sentence of General Simpson's message solves all difficulty as to disposing of him. Lord Panmure is sorry to perceive that he has so eagerly availed himself of the first occasion of just remonstrance to divest himself of his responsibility. Lord Panmure begs to forward to Your Majesty the copy of his telegram in reply.

This event cannot but cause much anxiety to Your Majesty, as it does to Lord Panmure, and before discussing the matter with his colleagues he feels loth to express any opinion on it to Your Majesty. Lord Panmure, however, feels that, in questions of such deep importance, Your Majesty is entitled to the first thoughts of your servants, whether they ultimately resolve themselves into counsels or not. Your Majesty is aware that General Simpson holds a commission which appoints Sir W. Codrington to command the Army on General Simpson's resignation or death. By this arrangement he will supersede Sir C. Campbell, Sir H. Bentinck, Sir H. Barnard, and Lord Rokeby. The inconveniences likely to arise from this selection were fully canvassed, and Your Majesty's servants venture to incur the responsibility of them, even if they should lead to the resignation of these officers. Sir H. Bentinck has tendered his resignation. Sir H. Barnard and Lord Rokeby, especially the latter . . . may easily be spared, should they be so unwise as to throw up their commands. The only real difficulty is Sir C. Campbell. He has been offered Malta and refused it. Lord Panmure has reason to believe that, having made money sufficient for all his necessities, he will adhere to the path of professional ambition in preference to any that may lead to

Preparations
for winter.

Difficulties
attending
Codrington's
appointment.

pecuniary advantages. No one can blame him for this, although in the present case it has its inconveniences, which are more difficult to grapple with now than they were when Lord Panmure submitted to Your Majesty Sir W. Codrington's name as General Simpson's successor. The new phase of the question is this. Sir W. Codrington was charged with the command of the assault on the Redan. His arrangement of his reserves is said to have been so defective that General Windham appears to have been compelled, after sending thrice, to go at last himself, in order to obtain support. Lord Panmure, however, has heard of a letter from General Windham in which he refers to this story, nor does he attach any blame whatever to Sir W. Codrington, but rather throws it on Sir R. Airey. The tone of that letter would lead to the conclusion that General Windham was a bold and dashing soldier rather than a skilful and prudent tactician. Sir C. Campbell will have his supporters, and Sir W. Codrington's unsuccessful attempt on the 8th will somewhat strengthen their case, but on the whole Lord Panmure is still disposed to believe that Your Majesty's troops will be safer in Sir W. Codrington's hands than in those of any other officer.

As to Codrington's failure at the Redan.

The only other arrangement which presents itself is to send out Sir G. Brown. He has personally offered his services, and expressed himself perfectly able in point of health to undertake the duties. He will be so difficult a person to deal with, however—so wedded to everything established, so averse to anything novel, and, above all, so opposed to the system of promotion by selection—that Lord Panmure fears his appointment would create greater difficulties than it would succeed in preventing.

Character of Sir G. Brown.

Lord Panmure quite concurs in the views entertained by Your Majesty, and so well expressed by H.R.H. the Prince, that it will require a firm and vigorous hand to restore to the Army its drill and military formation after the disorganising labours and system of fighting in which it has been engaged, and however unpalatable regimental parade and drill on Brigade and Division field-days may be, they must be practised during the repose of the Army.

Necessity of restoring routine in the fighting force.

Lord Panmure will speak to Lord Hardinge on this subject, and likewise about the two years' service for Sebastopol. Lord Panmure was not aware that it had been granted for Alma, and thanks Your Majesty for setting him right on the point. The boon should not be repeated.

Your Majesty will be gratified to learn that your gracious kindness has made both Lord Strafford and Lord Hardinge very happy.¹ Lord Panmure presumes that Lord Combermere is not less so.

Lord Panmure begs to submit to Your Majesty that he should be permitted to take steps for constituting General Simpson a G.C.B., and that he should send dispensing orders as soon as they can go through the proper forms, and likewise that he should gazette the appointment.

Lord Panmure begs to apologise to Your Majesty for the length of this letter.

¹ They had been made Field-Marshal.

CHAPTER X

OCTOBER 1855

THOUGH the acceptance of his resignation had been agreed to in Committee of the Cabinet on October 3rd, General Simpson continued in command of the British Army in the Crimea until November 10th. For Codrington's failure on September 8th had not made it easier to promote a junior general over the heads of his seniors, Bentinck, Barnard, Campbell, and Rokeby; and the whole question as to Simpson's successor had to be reopened and discussed again in secret at home. In reality the choice still lay between Codrington and Campbell (see Lord Panmure's letter to the Queen, October 4th); but other names were also mentioned, among them that of Sir George Brown. Neither was Simpson himself as decided as might have been expected. Despite his modesty, he was by no means patient of censure, yet at the same time had patriotism enough to place his country's interests above private feeling. Not improbably his resolution fluctuated with variations in the state of his health. Considerate of his old friend's reputation, Lord Panmure persuaded him to assign his resignation to the latter cause.

Meantime abundant criticism continued to be brought to bear on him. For it had been assumed at home that, Sebastopol having fallen, nothing remained to be done by the Allied Arms but to drive the Russians at will from the field.

This, Simpson points out, was sheer fallacy.

For, not only did the Russians still cling to the North Side of their fallen fortress, thus making the South untenable and preventing access to the harbour, but their principal position also was unassailable by direct attack, whilst to have withdrawn troops in number from before it would have been to court disaster. So that, although released from the trenches, the British Army continued, as before, in a sense a beleaguered army. And hence the only military events which for the present diversified the *status quo* were operations at Eupatoria, and the despatch of an expedition to the mouth of the Dnieper to capture the fort and store-depôt of Kinburn. So far as they went, these were successful. Meanwhile the bulk of the Army was employed in the needful work of recovering its drill and organisation, whilst all available hands raced against the on-coming winter in erecting huts and in completing those roads on which, in Simpson's opinion, their safety depended.

But at home, where, as has been said, these things were not understood, impatience increased. The Emperor Napoleon, ever restless, was urgent with a new strategical scheme; and never, perhaps, since the commencement of the war, had the feeling of the Army against the Press been more acute than now.

'The general feeling here,' writes Simpson to Panmure on October 20th, 'is that the Press is our commander at home.' And again, 'The Press has proved the greatest enemy to this Army, by informing the Russians of all our intentions, publishing to them the exact state of our strength and of the number of our sick—acting, in short, as a friend and adviser to our enemy. And yet, in England, more credit is attached to the observations published in the papers than to the honest and unvarnished statements of your generals.'

Nor was this feeling confined to combatants, those at home who sympathised strongly with the Army in its

various trials alike participating in it. (See Prince Albert's letter of October 6th.)

For the rest, Army Works Corps had been got to work, and had already begun to be subjected to much criticism from those military authorities who objected to civilians in Camp. The raising of the Foreign Legions was receiving much attention, and their first regiments were being despatched to the seat of war.

By far the most inspiring incident of an otherwise rather uneventful month was the receipt of the 'glorious news of Kars.'

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 1, 1855.*

Your despatches of the 18th are just come in, but give little or no detail of anything that is going on. I am sorry to learn that your health is so far from strong, and that you cannot attend to your doctor's advice. I have given much thought to your resignation—more as to the suddenness of it than as to the fact. Simpson's
resignation.

I had an idea that you might like to slip out of your very responsible position, and was prepared to have aided you in any way I could; but you have upset all my views, and you must now make an official application for release, and put the ground of it as you think best for your own purpose. As far as I can, consistently with my own position, I am disposed as ever to support your exit from, as I aided your entry into the Crimea.

To the public your health is an ample ground for your desiring to be relieved, but if you wish to put other reasons forward, it is not for me to object. I hope you will think well on the mode of taking this step.

I have asked you in my last telegram to await the arrival of the mail of the 29th before you sent me an official communication, and I did so mainly that you might not be said to resign in the face of certain articles in the *Times*

and other papers, which have assumed to themselves the right of criticising and running down every one.

I have arranged so that you will be gazetted as 'General' to-morrow, and I have asked the Queen to allow me to hurry your appointment as G.C.B., so that you may have your ribbon before you leave the Crimea, and therefore, as your desire to resign is a secret and will not be divulged here, I strongly advise you to do nothing in a hurry. I hope you will recover your health before you get home again. I expect to hear to-morrow who is to command your brigade in the expedition to Kinburn.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 2, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of the 30th ult., and fully shares the sensations which the correspondence with General Simpson seems to have excited in him.

General Simpson goes on with the mistake of Lord Raglan, never to give his Government his reasons for the course he adopts. There may be good reasons why the Army should not move, but we hear only *one*, now *wrung* from him. . . . When he telegraphed before, that he must wait to know the intentions and plans of the Russians, the Queen was tempted to advise a reference to St. Petersburg for them!

A successor
to Simpson.

Sir Colin
Campbell
proposed.

But now as to a successor. The Queen does not think that it will do to place Sir William Codrington over the heads of all his seniors upon a patent failure. Public opinion at home and in the Army would never support this, as, in fact, it would not be just. Under all the circumstances the Queen thinks Sir Colin Campbell (with his known good qualities and defects), the senior General after Sir H. Bentinck's return, also the fittest to take the command and to inspire our Army and our Allies with confidence. The Queen thinks, however, that Lord Hardinge ought to be consulted before the Cabinet come to any determination amongst themselves.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 2, 1855.*

The Queen would wish Lord Panmure to order a correct plan now to be made of Sebastopol, of the approaches of the English and French Armies, with all the batteries in, and this seems to be a good time for having it done.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

CAMP, SEBASTOPOL, *October 2, 1855.*

I have your private note of the 17th ultimo this morning. By it I perceive it quite in vain to satisfy the public cry in England, while the Press keeps loudly demanding us to 'run with the fox.'

All this will not induce us, who are responsible, to risk the ruin of the Army. I never read the papers, and only regret that they seem to lead the opinions of so many sensible men, not even excepting the Government of our country. The Press has proved the greatest enemy to this Army, by informing the Russians of all our intentions, publishing to them the exact state of our strength and of the numbers of our sick, acting, in short, as the friend and adviser of our enemy. And yet in England more credit is attached to the observations published in the papers than to the honest and unvarnished statements of your Generals.

Now, as to the speculations you propose, the French have extended their right by Baidar to endeavour to turn the Russian position on its left, but, from the nature of the country, I do not think they can do it. If now they make a strong attempt, the Sardinians and part of our Army are ready to try to force the Mackenzie Heights, which at this moment would be madness to attempt.

Contemplated
movements of
the Armies.

The Turks, aided by General D'Allonville and three regiments of French Cavalry, are acting from Eupatoria, and doing very well too, and were our force sufficient to land 50,000 men at Eupatoria, some good might be done, but to divide the Army here would be the height of imprudence.

As to Sebastopol, I would by this time have destroyed the docks and all public buildings. The telegraph said, 'No.' The place cannot now be occupied, the fire being too heavy.

Ten thousand of our men are on the road daily. I much fear finishing it, and the safety of the Army much depends on our own military exertions for the winter. It will be all settled as regards my retirement before this reaches you. I could not reconcile it to my sense of what is right to remain in command of this Army when the Government consider me to be wasting my time in idleness. I firmly adhere to my well-considered opinion, and I wish to be released. I am most desirous to create as little inconvenience as it is possible, and will take any hints on that point that you may be so kind as give me. Your telegraph of the 26th ult. decided the point—I have frequently reconsidered it, and cannot change my opinion.

Simpson's
determination
to retire.

Enclosed is Mr. Lauder's Report of this day. It is not easy to tell how much of such information is to be depended upon ; but, as far as my belief goes, the Russians are still in full force on the Heights before us, whatever may be their intentions for the winter.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 3, 1855.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter received this morning with General Simpson's despatches. It is indeed a great comfort to see no 'casualties.'

What can be done for those officers mutually recommended by Maréchal Pélissier and General Simpson ?

Distinctions.

The Queen also wishes to remind Lord Panmure of the K.C.B. for General Rose, and the C.B. for Major Claremont and perhaps also Captain Foley.¹ The two first named had been decided on, she thought.

She approves that the other Baths should be promul-

¹ Lieut.-Colonel the Honourable St. George Foley, attached, with General Rose, to the head-quarters of the French Army.

gated as he proposed in his letter which she received yesterday.

The Queen wishes also to observe that, in this Morning's State and in the one preceding it, the Artillery has been left out, as well as all the horses. This ought to be observed upon.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

October 3, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to inform Your Majesty that the Committee of Cabinet met to-day and discussed the question of General Simpson's resignation and the appointment of a successor, both as to the individual who should be selected and the time at which it should be done. The opinion as to the acceptance at once of the resignation was clear, but the question of the selection of a successor was not quite so much so. The cloud which has to some extent, whether justly or otherwise, enveloped General Codrington since the affair of the Redan had to some degree shaken the faith of the Committee in their former opinion as to his fitness to direct great and combined operations, and it is only after well examining all the circumstances of the case, and carefully considering the fitness of others, that the Committee came to the conclusion that Sir W. Codrington is on the whole the best man for the important position which has to be filled up. The next point to be considered was the time at which the change should take place. To some it seemed desirable that General Simpson should be directed by telegram to give over his command at once to Sir W. Codrington, placing in his hands the commission which Your Majesty had been pleased already to sign. Lord Panmure observed that this would do very well if Sir W. Codrington had been next senior officer to General Simpson, or even had those three above him been all of merely ordinary calibre. But this is not so, for among them is Sir C. Campbell, an officer of high reputation and merit, who, though not judged fit to command the Army,

Cabinet discussion as to Codrington's appointment, and when it should be made.

must have every respect showed to his feelings, and ought not to be passed over by a telegraphic appointment. This argument prevailed, and it was resolved that Lord Panmure should forthwith draft a letter to be submitted to Your Majesty : first, accepting officially General Simpson's resignation, and desiring him to place the commission which he holds in Sir William Codrington's hands ; second, appointing Sir W. Codrington, in an official letter to be delivered with Your Majesty's commission ; third, a letter to Sir C. Campbell, of a conciliatory character, and advising him to serve under Sir W. Codrington ; fourth, similar letters to the other senior officers.

Steps to be taken in connection with the above.

These Lord Panmure hopes to be able to send to Your Majesty by next messenger, so as to get them back in time to be despatched by Monday's mail, [with] the subsequent letter confirming the arrangements, which Lord Panmure trusts may be in accordance with Your Majesty's sentiments.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *October 3, 1855.*

Napoleon III. on the proposed distribution of British decorations to French troops.

The Emperor has written privately to Cowley, saying, 'J'ai à vous adresser une demande à laquelle j'attache une grande importance. Le Maréchal Vaillant a dit que la Reine avait la bonté de donner à tous mes soldats la même médaille qu'elle donnera aux siens pour la campagne de Crimée. Si cela est exact, je désirerais bien que cette distribution pût avoir lieu le plus tôt possible, car elle fera un très-bon effet, et avec l'échange des autres décorations calmera bien de petites susceptibilités.'

Of course this is impossible, and I have told Cowley that some months must elapse before the medals are ready, but I think that the wishes of the Emperor would be partly met if the Queen's intentions were at once announced to the French Army. If you see no objection, will you have the goodness to inform Cowley so by the messenger this evening. . . .

Cowley asks whether, upon the whole (if his insufficient standing could be got over), Rose would not be the best Commander-in-Chief of the English officers out in the East. We might have a worse man, but, of two such lottery tickets, I think we should be more likely to draw a prize in Windham. . . .

Rose suggested
as Commander-
in-Chief in the
East.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

October 4, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to reply to Your Majesty's letter of yesterday.

Your Majesty would receive Lord Panmure's which left by messenger this morning. Immediately on receipt of Your Majesty's letter, Lord Panmure conferred with Lord Palmerston, and he had already twice conferred with Lord Hardinge, so as to be able to state his opinion to the Cabinet. The case is one of the most embarrassing which has ever occurred to Lord Panmure, but fortunately Your Majesty, your servants, and the Commander-in-Chief are all actuated by the same anxious desire to secure for the Army the best Chief. To both Lords Palmerston and Panmure the point has resolved itself to a choice between Sir C. Campbell and Sir W. Codrington. Lord Hardinge has pronounced a decided opinion against Sir C. Campbell. . . . He states, moreover, that he does not think Sir C. Campbell fitted to command an army, though well calculated to lead a body of men, his own countrymen, anywhere. He, moreover, has had lately some correspondence in which Sir C. Campbell has not shown that acquiescence in superior authority which he ought to have done. The same objections would arise against Sir C. Campbell as exist against General Simpson, of not being able to carry on familiar communication with Marshal Pélissier. This, however, would be of less conse-

Hardinge's
objections
to Sir C.
Campbell.

quence now than it was, unless a combined movement took place, of which there is no probability. Your Majesty now knows all that Lord Panmure knows against the policy of appointing Sir C. Campbell.

The next consideration is whether these objections are sufficiently strong to justify his being superseded by a junior officer labouring under the disadvantage which at present surrounds Sir W. Codrington. To this officer's fitness for the chief command, as compared with his comrades, no doubt existed previous to the fatal assault of the Redan. Has this failure been traced to Sir W. Codrington? In a letter of the 15th, Sir H. Stewart writes, referring to the assault: 'I have not seen Codrington since, but hear he is low and out of spirits, which I can easily understand, although no blame whatever has been attributed to him, or accounted against him, as far as I have ever heard.'

Lord Panmure has seen no communications reflecting on either Sir W. Codrington or General Markham. It is fair to tell Your Majesty that Lord Hardinge possesses no more knowledge of Sir W. Codrington's eligibilities to the command of the Army than what we all know. He believes him to be a steady, good officer, attentive to his men, vigilant in position, calm in action, discreet in council. His manner will secure courtesy. Such are Sir W. Codrington's recommendations.

Character and
present position
of Sir W.
Codrington.

Opinions
unfavourable
to Codrington
afterwards
reversed.

Except for this failure, Lord Panmure and his colleagues would have had no difficulty in advising Your Majesty to name him as General Simpson's successor. Is the failure sufficient to exclude him? On the whole, Lord Palmerston and Lord Panmure and Sir C. Wood think so, and Lord Panmure interprets Lord Hardinge's opinion to the same effect. The case is, however, reverted for the moment, and as the Cabinet meets again on Monday, the point will be again discussed, and the result shall be telegraphed to Your Majesty. . . .

Before the Cabinet meets again, Lord Panmure may, perhaps, be favoured with a further expression of Your Majesty's sentiments.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR, *October 4, 1855.*

The Queen and the Prince expressed to me an opinion that it would have been better not to have published the paragraph in Simpson's despatch which I have marked, and that some of the details in M'Murdo's despatch would have been better left out. Editing of war despatches.

They observed that, as the Russians would find that a false report of their intention to attack us had stopped Colin Campbell's intended expedition, they would be encouraged to spread more false reports, and to send in deserters with prearranged inventions, and they also thought that M'Murdo's despatch gives the Russians detailed information about our Army which we should be too glad to be able to get about theirs. There is some force in their remarks. Remarks by the Queen and Prince Albert.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 5, 1855.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for the portfolio with all the plans and accounts of the siege. They are beautifully done and most interesting. Plans of siege.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

BROADLANDS, *October 5, 1855.*

I saw Zamoyski yesterday before I left town, and I recommended to him to write you a letter containing a definite proposition to bring pending matters to a conclusion.

I conceive that we have agreed that he should have a Division of yeoman Cossacks attached to and forming part of Vivian's Contingent, and that this Division, which is to be under Zamoyski's command, subject of course to the superior command of Vivian, may consist of 5000 men, Cavalry and Infantry. . . . Zamoyski has already one regiment in Turkey, consisting nominally of 1000 men, Cavalry; these require to be clothed and armed, and the

Turkish Government should be urged to pay them the arrears due to them up to the time when we took them into our service as part of the Contingent.

The Polish
Contingent.

I told Zamoyski to propose that he should be authorised to raise immediately a second regiment of 1000 men to be Infantry. This regiment he might raise partly here, and by men and officers who would come hither from France, reporting themselves at Shorncliffe, or at any other place fixed upon by you, where the officers and men might be inspected by some officer appointed for that purpose by you, but who must, of course, on account of difference of language, be assisted by some Polish officer to be appointed by Zamoyski.

The officers and men thus to be formed into a regiment would be sent out by you to the Contingent whenever they were ready, clothed and equipped, and they might be completed to their establishment when in Turkey, if a sufficient number could not be got together here.

It might be necessary to make some small allowance to cover the travelling expenses of some of these officers and men from France to England.

Advantages of
the Polish
troops.

There can be little doubt that these Poles will, number for number, be better troops than the Turks, because both officers and men will be more intelligent, more accustomed to European habits and tactics, and, as all the officers will speak French and many of them English, for the Poles are good linguists, they will be much more easily communicated with and handled than the Turks can be.

In a mere military point of view the Poles would probably be more useful troops than the Turks; and they would carry with them the further advantage that, when put in front of a Russian Army in which many Poles would be found, even if none of those Poles came over from the Russian Army (which, however, a great many no doubt would do), the mere apprehension of their so deserting would greatly embarrass the operations and arrangements of the Russian General, and much cripple his means of attack or defence.

Will you send this to Clarendon to see if he concurs in what regards his matters?

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *October 5, 1855.*

. . . You are very hard upon Newcastle;¹ if he was making political capital, would he have written to me that if he wanted to be called a patriot he would publish all he knew; that if he wanted to avoid being thought hostile to the Government he should hold his tongue; but that, having the public service sincerely at heart, he had determined to write to me, in order that I might use his letters as I thought best, without committing him. Of course I did as I would be done by, and sent them to you. You may think him all wrong in his observations, but depend upon it that he has stated nothing but what he believes to be true.

Defends the
conduct of the
Duke of
Newcastle.

I have not heard a syllable about the Italian Legion since Percy² arrived, and I can't make out why he has resigned.

I rejoice at the Cavalry success on the Eupatoria side, but I can't help wishing that it was not always the French alone who succeed. Why should not our Cavalry have gone there too? Not an envoy ought to be allowed to pass from Perekop.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 5, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of the 3rd October. She did not answer his first on the subject of the Crimean Command, as her own on the same subject had crossed it. The decision to be arrived at does not become the least easier on longer reflection. It appears clear, however, that one of three courses will have to be followed, either Sir C. Campbell or Sir W. Codrington will have to be selected, or a General must be sent from home.

Successor to
Simpson.

¹ The Duke of Newcastle, during his visit to the Crimea, had kept a journal, which he submitted to members of the Cabinet.

² Lately commanding Italian Legion.

Claims of Sir
W. Codrington.

If Sir G. Brown and the Duke of Cambridge are out of the question, and Sir Colin is found, on a knowledge of his character, to be an impracticable man, there would only remain Sir William Codrington. His arrangements on the 8th have, however, certainly been defective, and he has shown no military talent (as distinct from merely soldierlike qualities) as yet. It is curious that his report on the attack of the 8th (a rough draft of which the Queen has had a private opportunity of seeing) mentions every detail but not the name of General Windham. We are really wholly uninformed on the nature of this affair. The Queen sends an extract from a letter of Lord Rokeby, which displays creditably the feelings of Sir C. Campbell and himself. Should it turn out that gross mistakes were committed on the 8th, Sir W. Codrington's elevation will be sure to provoke the most violent criticism and deprive him of all influence as a Commander.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *October 6, 1855.*

I have your 'private' letter of the 22nd September—four days before you sent the telegraph which induced me to ask to resign.

I value your kind expressions in that letter extremely. Everything that has been done for me personally is much beyond my merit or expectation. In fact I take no credit, and deserve no praise for all our success, which is owing entirely to the constancy of the Allied troops in their trenches.

Departure of
expedition to
Kinburn.

I have only to notice the departure of the Allied expedition to the mouth of the Dnieper to take the fort of Kinburn, in which I hope for success.

Also to say that I have sent a Brigade of Cavalry and a Troop of Horse Artillery round to Eupatoria, to aid General D'Allonville in his operations.

These seem the only changes since my last letter. The

position of the enemy remains unchanged. The ground they hold is much too formidable for any direct attack, but to divide or withdraw troops from its front would be most imprudent.

I can therefore only continue to regret that the English press condemns us as wasting our time.

I begin to be nervous as to our roads—ten or twelve thousand men employed daily are making less progress than I expected. Mr. Doyne directs.

You do not seem to be aware in England that Sebastopol is untenable, because of the fire from the opposite side. We keep guards on the skirts to prevent plunder, and the Commission has managed to make an inventory of all the booty found in the place. But to turn the buildings to any account in winter is impossible.

The trouble caused by Mr. Doyne's Corps, and his disputes with Mr. Beattie, annoy me much. The Army Work Corps are by far the worst lot of men ever yet sent here. It is ruin to our soldiers to be placed in contact with such a set of people, receiving higher pay than themselves.

Criticism of the
Army Works
Corps.

I know you will be annoyed to read this, my Lord, but it must come to your ears some day that the whole composition of the Army Works Corps has not answered here, and the vexation they have caused me is beyond all belief.

There is but little time for me to write more. You tell me we are dry in our communications, but we are overworked in our correspondence, and *this* is one of the points on which most men will break down in commanding this Army. You quote General Rose, but he has nothing else to do from morning till night than to compose his despatches, while I, at my desk from daylight in the morning until near sunset, do not answer all demands on me, and am prevented giving my mind to my military duty. . . . The doctors have again warned me of the necessity of giving up my work before it is too late. I am much worn out and anxious to receive the despatch in which you tell me that my wishes will be complied with.

Pressure of
correspondence.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

October 6, 1855.

I return the enclosed papers with my best thanks, and am much pleased by the good accounts they give.

Criticism of
the *Times*.

The Queen has written to Lord Palmerston about the *Times*, who will perhaps show you the letter. The pen and ink of one miserable scribbler is despoiling the country of all the advantages which the heart's blood of 20,000 of its noblest sons should have earned!!! The public opinion on the Continent as to our military strength and capacity gets lower and lower every day, which cannot take place without ruin to our political position.

Our inaction at
the seat of war
contrasted with
French activity.

Now the French Cavalry is gaining a Cavalry action off Eupatoria, adding fresh renown to their arms, whilst ours remains inactive and useless, preparing to go to Scutari! Why is this, when we have been writing volumes on the advantages of operating from Eupatoria, and the French against it? Again, why are the French erecting mortar batteries on the south shore of the harbour of Sebastopol, and successfully bombarding the Russian works and magazines on the North Side, and we are doing nothing? You ought to ask these and many similar questions to General Simpson by telegraph.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private and Confidential.

WAR DEPARTMENT, October 6, 1855.

Difficulty as
to Simpson's
successor.

The difficulty of naming your successor has not yet been got over, and it becomes more than ever necessary for you to maintain the profoundest secrecy as to the commission you hold for Sir W. Codrington. He has damaged his reputation by the want of success in the attack on the Redan, and it seems to me to be out of our power to place him over the heads of senior officers. We have to make up our minds on Monday, and you will of course know by telegraph what we intend to do.

We heard yesterday of the success of General D'Allonville, and this must prove to you how useful it will be to

keep a considerable body of flying Cavalry out on the flanks of the Russians, for I am convinced they can keep no troops of that arm in the Crimea during the winter.

The papers have been discussing your affair of the Redan, and pulling you all to pieces. I think that, if you had sent a more verbose and well-digested despatch, without so many rough edges on it, you could have allayed the storm better and smoothed down the grumblers. You cannot conceive how I have been pestered by critics and tormented by fools with long faces. I am glad to see the huts arriving, and hope you will soon have your people under comfortable cover, and your drill and organisation and correct tellings off once more set straight. The end of trench-work must be a burthen off your mind.

Simpson's
despatch
criticised.

We have just heard that the Russians contemplate abandoning the North Side. I trust it may be so, because you can then get possession of the harbours. I must conclude this, as I have been greatly interrupted, and write more by Monday's mail.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 7, 1855.*

The Queen wishes to know if there has been any official announcement of her intention to confer a clasp for Sebastopol on the Army in the Crimea? She has nowhere seen this announcement, and it will lose all its value if it be not conferred as soon as possible after the fall of Sebastopol; moreover, the newspapers may possibly think fit to suggest what has been agreed upon and intended by the Queen herself.

Clasp for
Sebastopol.

It is possible that it has been done, but as the Queen has nowhere seen it, she has thought it right to call Lord Panmure's attention to the circumstance.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

October 8, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the Cabinet, after mature deliberation, are still of opinion

that Sir W. Codrington is the most eligible officer for the command of the Army. They have, however, suspended a final decision until a further lapse of a week, that they may have the benefit of further accounts of the feeling of the Army in regard to him.

It was stated in the Cabinet that Lord Raglan, in letters to the Duke of Newcastle, had given a most decided opinion against Sir Colin Campbell's fitness for isolated command. In General Simpson's private letter of 14th August to Lord Panmure, he states that 'Your Lordship positively desires my unreserved opinion on the matter of Codrington's selection as my successor. He is, in my belief, the best General here, but I am in full hopes not to be compelled by illness to act upon your instructions at the present time of any imminent chance of our being attacked, for you must be aware of the very great disgust that will be occasioned to Bentinck, Campbell, Barnard, and Rokeby, if Codrington is called to the chief command. They will, of course, take the most immediate measures to quit the Army.'

Simpson's
opinion as to
a successor to
himself.

Lord Panmure has given Your Majesty this full extract, which he had in the pressure of business forgotten. This testimony, however, does not neutralise the occurrences of the 8th, provided the consequent events can be fairly traced to Sir W. Codrington's door. To afford a greater chance for ascertaining this, the Cabinet have agreed to pause for a week in their decision.

In regard to the clasp for Sebastopol, Lord Panmure, having received Your Majesty's commands on the subject, wrote an official letter to that effect to General Simpson on the 15th September; on the 22nd he intimated the commands of Your Majesty to Field-Marshal Lord Hardinge, and he has just privately seen the draft of a General Order on the subject. The Army are, however, aware of Your Majesty's intentions long ere this.

Lord Panmure has communicated officially to Lord Clarendon Your Majesty's desire to give the French Army the Crimean medal, and has likewise communicated that generous intention to General Simpson.

The Cabinet discussed the question of the destruction of the docks, which arose on a despatch of General Rose's, which Your Majesty will no doubt see. The impression was decidedly in favour of destruction, but not without the concurrence of the Emperor.

Cabinet
favourable to
destruction of
Sebastopol
docks.

Lord Panmure forwards to Your Majesty the contents of this mail. Your Majesty will perceive the difference which the absence of trench-work makes on the men.

The correspondents say that goose-step and primary drills are going on with soldiers with medals on their breasts. Lord Panmure is glad to find so many medals to be in the soldiers' possession, and not less so that drill and organisation is being steadily attended to.

Resumption
of drill.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 8, 1855.*

I have been at a Cabinet so long that I have scarcely any time to write to you, though much to write about. In the first place we have carefully considered the question of blowing up the docks, and when we see the great anxiety which appears to pervade both you and the admirals, we are much disposed to let you have your way.

As to blowing
up the docks
at Sebastopol.

The docks can be of no use to us, and may be troublesome if allowed to exist until by further successes we have forced Russia to come to terms. We cannot, however, proceed actually to destroy them without the consent of the Emperor, who seemed to have an aversion to do so. In the meanwhile I see no reason why you should not immediately consult Sir E. Lyons, and proceed to make preparations for their destruction by employing your sappers to mine them. We hear that the Russians are in great fear of their destruction, which is all the more a reason for our at once setting their minds at rest on the point. I learn by telegraph that you have ordered the Turkish Contingent, irregulars and all, to Kertch, and I find that you have restricted Vivian to simple community of action with our force there. This is a mistake. Vivian

will be the senior officer there, and must be looked upon as if he was a Queen's officer, as he is to all intents and purposes.

I have no objection to the 10th Hussars and 71st Regiment reporting directly to you, but they must also report to Vivian, and take orders from him, so long as they are under his command. You can, of course, command him, but you must observe all the etiquette of the Army, or we shall have the C.O.'s of the detachments turning up their noses at Vivian and acting on their own hook. Your caution to him to keep well with the French is very good, but as he is an excellent Frenchman I have no fear on that head.

The Irregulars.

As to the Irregulars, I suspect, like a certain gentleman, they are not so black as they are painted. I believe much may be made of them when we get them together and can turn them on the roads against the enemy. My notion is to send them to Eupatoria, but I am not sufficiently informed at present to decide.

You must tell Sir G. M'Lean that he will have to make their commissariat be active for supplies, and you should get Sir E. Lyons to give some vessels for the Kertch station, to go to and fro for the Contingent.

The Foreign
Legion.

I have determined to send you my first regiments of the Foreign Legion. You will see their strength from the official despatch. They are fine-looking men, and will do more work than your youngsters, and be more handy. You must keep the Germans under the Brigadier I send with them, and put them in any Division which has a good linguist or two in superior commands. Keep them away from the Swiss. . . . The Swiss and Germans are not good friends, and in camp should be placed in different quarters; but they will fight well, and you may rely upon them.

Health of the
troops.

I think you should, as you find room, recruit your ranks from Malta, and I expect great benefit to your men's health who are in the Kinburn expedition, and indeed, when we get settled down, and the ships are at leisure and you feel secure in your positions, I do not see why you should not send a regiment afloat now and then to give them sea air.

I have the Queen's commands to G.C.B. you, and I hope next Saturday or by Monday to have the necessary preliminaries gone through. I shall order your insignia and send all out in the bag, that you may wear them before you leave the Army.

The Queen in the most flattering manner has conferred the G.C.B. (civil) on me. This is only valuable as associating me with the management of the Army.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

BALMORAL, *October 9, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of yesterday.

She approves of Brigadier-General Williams being made a K.C.B.

She regrets much that General Simpson, having once sent Cavalry and Artillery to Eupatoria, did not send more.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CAMP, SEBASTOPOL, *October 9, 1855.*

I have just been sending off an answer to your telegraphic cipher received this morning, beginning with No. 500. I much regret being deemed so wanting in communicating all that passes; still more do I regret the different views I hold from yours at home. I send an official to-day, in which I endeavour to explain my reasons for wishing to destroy the docks, sea-defences, etc., of Sebastopol. I considered our siege had mainly in view the destruction of these works. It could have been at once accomplished, but not now under fire. As to the French bombardment of the North Forts, I entirely differ with our Allies, who have changed their minds since it was unanimously determined at Conference that no such fire was to be opened. We have every possible information of the enemy, though of his intentions I can say nothing.

As to destruction of docks and sea-defences of Sebastopol.

As to our *roads*, I begin to dread their completion before winter. Our safety depends on them, and I have every man employed.

Disadvantages
attending
'private' cor-
respondence.

I am now answering your private note of 24th September. Your official telegrams upset all that your private notes convey in kindness, and make me most desirous of release from such a state of things, as it is plain that Government place no reliance on me.

The only trophy I can think of sending you home would be a pair of Russian field-guns. Let me know if you would like them. I have not myself one single trophy. All is under Commissioners, but I could get a couple of guns.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

October 10, 1855.

As to recruiting
Poles.

I cannot but admit that a depôt in England to which Polish recruits were to come might cause some embarrassment if it implied agency abroad. We have suffered so much from the imprudence and misconduct of agents that I would not trust them with any regular Polish recruiting, and the utmost I would do would be to allow Stütterheim¹ to inform them that, if they met with Poles willing to enlist, they might accept them as well as Germans and Swiss, and defray their expenses in the ordinary way to this country. When they arrive here, they might, if in sufficient numbers, be kept separate from the others, and always be sent off to Zamoyski by the first opportunity, leaving it to him to drill and organise them. . . .

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *October 10, 1855.*

As to Italian
Legion.

. . . I would not abandon the scheme,² but, if the antecedents of Colonel Reade inspire you with confidence,

¹ Baron Stütterheim, commanding German Legion.

² Of raising an Italian Legion, after an abortive attempt by General Henry Percy, who had now resigned.

I would put him at the head of it. I should, however, associate Hudson with him for the management of all civil concerns, and for communication with the Sardinian Government, who like him, and are desirous to oblige him personally and the British Government politically. I should inform him and Colonel Reade of the manner in which you propose to proceed, but I should call upon them in the first instance for a joint report as to the practicability of raising 5000 men—the means of housing, clothing, and feeding them, the quality and amount of further assistance that may be required, the time it would take to collect and to organise such a corps, and all other information they can furnish, and which will enable you to judge whether the experiment should be vigorously proceeded with or abandoned altogether.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *October 10, 1855.*

The arrangement which, in the mislaid letter, I recommended, as the one which it would be best to adopt, was that the Ottoman Cossack regiment of Cavalry now in Turkey should be at once taken into our service as part of the Turkish Contingent, and that the Porte should be urged to pay them up the arrears due. That Zamoyski should be authorised to add three battalions of Infantry (still to be portions of the Contingent), to be raised gradually one after the other. That some place here, Shorncliffe or other, should be appointed for officers and men to go to, to be inspected and approved by some officer of yours, assisted by a Pole to be named by Zamoyski, and that some moderate allowance should be made to cover expenses of coming here.

These troops might make an excess over the 20,000;¹ but a number of Turks equal to the excess might be given back to Omar Pasha, or the excess might be allowed to be absorbed by casualties among the Turks.

¹ Agreed on with Turkey.

Arrangements
affecting the
Turkish Con-
tingent and
Polish Legion.

The Poles would be better troops and more manageable than the Turks.

It would be a good thing to settle this with Zamoyski at once.

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

October 11, 1855.

I have received your long letter of the 9th. The Turkish Contingent has been so much ordered about and counter-ordered, that I was astonished to see from your letter that it is to go now to Kertch, or perhaps already there; I was looking for it at Varna. I am glad of your determination not to rest till you have got the 20,000 men in full.

The German Legion and other foreign troops.

Your account of the German Legion is very satisfactory, as well as that of the Swiss. That the Italian should have failed at the outset, I am very glad of, as it would have been certain to prove a failure in the end. With the Poles the greatest care is required, as with them the Legion is merely a means to an end. If they are joined to General Vivian's corps, much objection will be obviated.

Comparative estimate of Army of Allies and that of the enemy.

General Simpson's last despatches are really too lamentable! He has got 26,000 British bayonets, with 6000 Artillery, and 3000 Cavalry—together some 35,000 to 38,000 fighting men; the French have about 60,000 out of 110,000, say only 55,000 without Cavalry and Artillery, the Sardinians perhaps 12,000 out of 17,000, and the Turks still from 20,000 to 30,000 between Sebastopol and Eupatoria. This makes together a victorious army of not less than 150,000 men, opposed to an enemy estimated by our timid Generals at the same number before the last bombardment, during which Prince Gortschakoff writes that he lost from 600 to 1000 men per diem during thirty days, the last three days costing him 18,000 men! Now General Simpson writes: 'The enemy is doing what I always thought he would, strengthening himself on the North Side, with a view to holding it as well as the west of the Crimea. We cannot attack his impregnable position in front; the

reconnaissance by Baidar has proved that, as we always thought, his left cannot be turned on account of the ground, and we dare not divide our Army! for we might be attacked, so we are making roads!!'

How can a Commander-in-Chief believe that 200,000 men are sent to Sebastopol to make roads? If his account of our position be correct, how is the war to be carried on? Are we to remain checkmated upon our road-making position? What is to alter the position in our favour till next spring? Will the Russians then not be in twice their present strength? Will Bakshi Serai and Simpheropol not be impregnable fortresses then? When we wanted to move last spring, it was declared impossible because 90,000 men were wanted for the siege, the guarding the position. The siege is gone, the enemy defeated and dispirited, and now 200,000 men are said to be wanted to hold our precarious (?) position and make roads!

Really we must not allow such opinions to be uttered even by an English General! . . .

According to General Rose's account, General Bosquet was wounded in the Mamelon, and not in the Malakoff; he seems as commanding officer of the assault, therefore, to have taken his position in rear of his columns, just like Sir W. Codrington, and the fifth parallel seems not to have been a safer berth than the Mamelon.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

October 11, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit the despatch this day received from General Simpson.

Your Majesty will perceive among these despatches one containing General Simpson's resignation, which Lord Panmure proposes in due time, and with Your Majesty's permission, to accept. Lord Panmure, however, regrets to perceive that the General founds his official resignation upon an implied censure in a telegraphic message, which is

Supineness of
General
Simpson
criticised.

Simpson's
resignation—
the grounds on
which it shall
be put.

not calculated to give his retirement the character which Lord Panmure would wish to attach to the close of the career of an old and worthy soldier, of undoubted bravery, but of no extensive scope of mind.

In that message there is not a word which Lord Panmure was not fully justified in using, not a word which the public will not stamp with its approval, and Lord Panmure thinks that General Simpson might have accepted the reproof without thinking it necessary to resign. The General has decided otherwise, and must be the best judge of his own feelings; but he is not the best judge of his own position, and in kindness to him as an old soldier, and likewise an old friend, Lord Panmure has offered by a telegram to place the resignation to the score of ill-health. If General Simpson refuses to accept of this offer, then he will leave himself entirely without defence in the unpleasant business.

Your Majesty will observe that the unusually long telegram of last night gives reasons for the non-erection of mortar batteries in our portion of the South Side. Lord Panmure does not concur, but is unwilling to urge their erection, in the face of Sir H. Jones' opinion, until he has consulted professional opinions. Lord Panmure has intimated officially to Lord Clarendon Your Majesty's intention to confer the Crimean medal on the troops of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, and likewise upon those of His Majesty the Sultan.

In the telegram which arrived last night, General Simpson still holds out the prospect of a general advance, should the French and English be able to turn the left of the Russians. Lord Panmure has no great expectations of any result from this piece of strategy now.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, October 13, 1855.

I have your Lordship's despatch on the 'Redan,' the answer to which I must postpone till next mail, as I labour

under the disadvantage of Sir Harry Jones' absence, who, instead of returning from the Bosphorus, where he went for a few days' change of air, has been invalided to England.

I will endeavour, as you desire, to be more communicative by telegraph. It is not so easy, however, in 'private' correspondence to be otherwise than guarded and dry, when I know it to be read by others, or perhaps given to the British Lion himself.

General Windham occupied the Karabelnaia only a few days, when he was obliged to quit, leaving a guard in the back premises, which are safe, with sentries at night to watch the harbour. The buildings afford much useful timber for our winter purposes.

I much regret to read in the postscript of your Lordship's letter that you 'have no hesitation in looking for the cause of my resignation in other sources than your telegraphic message.' I am at a loss to guess your meaning.

It has not been easy for me to bear the treatment I have lately met with. I have been by every mail taunted with downright inactivity before the enemy, while I am at the same moment told to devote myself entirely to the roads and hutting of the troops for the winter, and as if to complete the censure heaped upon me, I am reproached with passing my time in absolute idleness. Simpson's
grievances.

I just ask you, my Lord, can it be wondered at that I am mortified and disgusted with such a state of things, and anxious to be released from it? I never for a moment dreamt of resigning the high position I hold, until these communications, continued by mail and telegraph, made me feel that I had no other alternative—inferring from them, as I do, that the Government deem me idling away my time, and that no confidence is placed in me.

Such is the true state of my feelings. I have, however, the strongest desire to cause no inconvenience to the Service, and will do my best until your orders reach me.

I much regret that Balaclava is overworked! Admiral Fremantle tells me that there is more work there than can be managed, and great delay takes place in consequence. Fitting out expeditions, sending away Turkish

Inadequacy
of Balaclava
harbour.

troops, vessels arriving filled with supplies, also mules, drafts of men—all this at once cannot be done. Forty ships are outside and cause great anxiety. The Admiral has no hesitation in stating the port is not large enough for the demands made on it, particularly when called upon to embark troops. It will barely meet the demands of the winter, and will probably break down in many ways, and ships will be kept outside at the greatest risk. . . .

PRINCE ALBERT TO LORD PANMURE

October 13, 1855.

I return the medical report with my best thanks. General Simpson's argument for inaction is really condemning our 200,000 men to end their days on the Chersonese. 'We cannot attack the strong position in front, nor turn it. We must not divide our Army, else the enemy might reach Balaclava.'!!

I have to-day written a long letter to Lord Palmerston about the chief command, suggesting a new mode of grappling with the difficulty: he will communicate it to you.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

October 13, 1855.

The Sebastopol
clasp.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and requests permission to submit to Your Majesty some observations in regard to the clasp for Sebastopol which Your Majesty has commanded to be given to the Army. Lord Panmure makes these remarks after conferring with Lord Hardinge, and reading the enclosed General Order which has been sent to him.

Your Majesty intends, Lord Panmure presumes, to grant this clasp as a reward for that long and severe duty which led to the fall of Sebastopol. If the clasp is confined to those who were present from the opening of the fire on the 5th September to the 9th, when the place fell, then many officers and men who have served in the trenches,

and were from wounds or sickness entailed by such service compelled to be absent, will be deprived of the reward which their more fortunate or more hardy comrades have reaped. The consequence will be a cry for a clasp for the trenches, which it will be difficult to refuse.

Lord Panmure humbly suggests to Your Majesty that the General Order should be so worded as to extend, not simply to the officers and men present from the 5th to the 9th September, but that it should include all officers and men who were absent on leave in consequence of wounds received in the trenches, or disease contracted on duty, and admitted by a Medical Board subsequent to the 1st March. All officers absent on leave for their own affairs should be excluded.

Proposes an extension of those eligible for the Sebastian-topol clasp.

Such an arrangement will render any other clasp unnecessary, and the claim, if made, can be easily met.

Lord Panmure has the honour to enclose for Your Majesty's perusal the embarkation-return of the 1st Regiment of the German Legion, with Colonel Kinloch's report, which are most satisfactory.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *October 13, 1855.*

The country will not much care what the ground is on which Simpson places his resignation. They will be too glad to get a younger and more active commander, and will not stop to inquire why.

Simpson's resignation.

It struck me on reflection that, if the proposed draft should go to Simpson, instead of praising him for his care of the Army, it might be well to say 'his attention to its wants or condition,' or something of the kind.

Hypercritics might say that he did not take much care of the Army when he ordered such a forlorn and desperate attack as that on the Redan. . . .

PS.—A general who was conscious of being fit for his command would have shown (if he could) that he was not passing his time in idleness, instead of resigning in a pet.

The Turkish
Contingent.

Recent despatches show that the Porte will have some difficulty in keeping up the Contingent to its proper amount of Turks ; and, in truth, the arrangements made for organising it do not add a man to the aggregate force of the Allies, though those arrangements render a portion of that aggregate force more efficient by placing it under the command of British officers, and are a relief to the Porte by throwing upon England the charge of paying, clothing, and feeding a number of troops who would otherwise have to be paid, clothed, and fed by the Turkish Government. But the Polish regiments will be a clear addition to our aggregate force.

I hope that Beatson's Horse, now amounting to 3000 Cavalry, may go to Eupatoria, where they could, as it seems to me, be the most usefully employed, whether under Beatson or Smyth, but under the superior command of Allonville.¹

They might, as suggested from Constantinople, have some other name than that of irregulars. They might be called Light Horse, or anything else.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 14, 1855.*

Simpson's
resignation.

Since I wrote you last I have received your formal resignation, on the terms of which I have for your own sake thought it right to send you a telegram. I hope you may take the friendly advice I have given you and let me accept your resignation on the plea of health. To me personally it is of no importance, but to yourself of the very last. Let me lay the case before you as showing rather the reasons of my message than with a view of pressing it on you, for long before this reaches you the die will have been cast, and you will have closed your career in the East, either with such an acceptance of your resignation as it would give me pleasure to write, or with a bald acknowledgment of it, and such a cold intimation

¹ D'Allonville, General commanding French Cavalry at Eupatoria.

of the Queen's pleasure as I shall be very sorry to have to transmit to you.

Moreover you will forgive me for saying you will not stand well when the correspondence sees the light, as it most probably will do. Think of it as you will, people will say that your resignation was hasty and my message did not warrant it, while you ought to have waited some *despatch* of censure and not hastily seized on an expression in a telegram to throw up your command. Remember that you never gave me any reasons for your inaction, but simply stated the fact, and the Government was as ignorant of what was doing in Sebastopol as they were of what was doing in St. Petersburg. I have not, I can assure you, taken any feeling from the Press. Nobody condemns it more than I do, or is more willing to support you against it than I am, but I could not invent information, and unfortunately you furnished me with none. My rebuke, if you will so interpret it, in my telegram will not be considered sufficient ground therefore for your hasty resignation, and all the answer I can give to it is a simple acknowledgment and a notification of its acceptance by the Queen. If I do more, I must enter into a justification of my message, which I am quite prepared to do, though nothing would give me so much pain. Now if you take my advice, and whatever may be your real motive, make health the ground of your retirement, I can let you go with all the honours of your position recognised, and with such expression of approval as every officer must delight to receive at the close of his military career. I give you this information more in explanation than for any other purpose, and to show you that friendship alone has dictated my advice to you.

His failure to supply due information.

Reasons with Simpson as to grounds of his resignation.

Your last telegram, on the subject of the movement of the French in Baidar valley, encourages me to hope for some movement in advance still.

I perfectly admit that it is a critical thing to storm strong positions, but, on the other hand, it is dangerous to allow your enemy repose and to let him fortify the towns in his rear, so that to clear the Crimea you may have two

Danger of inaction.

of as pertinacious sieges to encounter almost as Sebastopol itself. I am glad you have sent Cavalry to the aid of the French at Eupatoria, and I hope that we may see some regular scheme laid out for interrupting the enemy's supplies to the North Side. . . . Adieu. I hope nothing in our official correspondence will interrupt our private friendship.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *October 14, 1855.*

After receiving
news of fall
of Kars.

The news from Kars is an indescribable relief, for the notion of Williams and Co., with 16,000 Turks, being starved into surrender with 100 guns has gone between me and my rest for a long time past. If Omar Pasha was worth his salt, he would have a word to say to those demoralised Russians before they sneak back to Tiflis.

I am glad I told Williams he was a K.C.B. before we heard this news, as it will show him that we didn't wait for victory to appreciate his efforts.

This Kars affair is as great a blow to the military prestige of Russia as anything that has happened during the war. Mouraviev is their best General. He had 46,000 men, Cavalry in swarms, and some very heavy Artillery, and he has been routed by Turks and half-a-dozen English officers.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 15, 1855.*

Those that will to Cupar maun to Cupar, and I say no more on the subject of your resignation, which will be duly laid before the Queen when she comes up, and probably be accepted next mail.

We have decided on our arrangements, but as we have not yet submitted the decision to the Queen, I say no more about it. I have just signed your dispensation for G.C.B.

'The glorious
news of Kars.'

We have just heard the glorious news of Kars, and your telegram of the expedition to Eupatoria under

Campbell has given great satisfaction. We expect you will force the Russians to break up; but if you do so now, how much easier it would have been had you done it after the 8th, while their army was disheartened and its organisation broken!

I have nothing worthy of interest to communicate; but I cannot help observing that you do us wrong to suppose that we are led by the Press in asking for explanations of your inactivity. As far as myself, I am quite ready to justify my message before the public, or to argue it out with you over a bottle of claret when you come home.

Repudiates the idea of being influenced by the Press.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *October 16, 1855.*

I quite agree with you that it is impossible to allow an officer or a corps in the Queen's Service to decide—the officer, whether he shall or shall not continue to command the corps; the corps, whether it shall continue to be commanded by the officer. Beatson therefore must be removed; and if the men refuse to serve under his successor,¹ the only question will be one of discretion, namely, whether they shall be subdued by force, or whether, in consideration of the peculiar character of the men, those who do not choose to continue to serve shall be dismissed, giving up whatever has been furnished to them in the way of arms, horses, clothing, etc., and be sent to find their way home. The objection in the first case would be that we might be obliged to kill some of our own troops, the objection in the second case would be that the disbanded men would rob and murder the inhabitants in their way home.

A difficult question which has arisen in connection with Beatson's Horse.

Perhaps by good management they might all be persuaded to remain, and notwithstanding the general prejudice against them, my belief is that, if sent to Eupatoria, or even to Kertch, but especially to Eupatoria, they would do us good service.

¹ Owing to their attachment to Beatson.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*CRIMEA, *October 16, 1855.*

I thank your Lordship very much for the kind letter I yesterday received from you.

Fallacy of sup-
posing that
the fall of
Sebastopol
implies the end
of the war.

I confess that, on reading your telegraphic message dated 26th ultimo, I was so surprised and hurt with the tone of it, especially as it followed some other intimations not very agreeable to me, that I really thought there was a desire at home to get rid of me, as not possessing the requisite qualities to meet the crisis which every one in England seems to have assumed to have arrived; viz., that we have only to run in upon a beaten enemy and hunt him out of the Crimea! There never was a greater fallacy.

The letter received yesterday does much to dispel this feeling, and if nothing has yet been done respecting my resignation, I beg you to act just as you may see fit; for, as you formerly mentioned, it is far from my wish to cause inconvenience or embarrassment to the Service by quitting it so suddenly, before the business of the campaign, or whatever is to happen, is decidedly put an end to by the season.

Anticipated
action of the
enemy.

I do not think, however, that the enemy will be so unwise as to hazard a battle. It is not their game. It is their duty to retain the North Side, so as to prevent our entering the harbour. They will do so, if by any means they can bring supplies to their army.

I assure you, my Lord, I am truly sensible of all the personal kindness you have shown me. All that you have done for me is far beyond my deserts or expectations, and I really feel ashamed at the honours lavished upon me when I reflect on the hard work of officers and men who have gained them.

But the turmoils of a command like this are too much for my age and health. Diarrhœa, which attacked me three months ago, has never left me, and wears me out.

The doctors say that gout has to do with it, and that I cannot winter in this climate. But if not worse than I am now, I will endeavour to remain.

The roads are getting on, but they are a serious task—
as much as the whole of the Infantry will be able to complete by the end of this month. Had we not been released from the trenches, the calamities of last winter would have been exceeded this year.

Progress of
roads and their
importance.

The huts we must now take as we find them, but fresh complaints come to me every day of huts arriving which, when unpacked, are found incomplete. I hope by degrees the missing pieces will cast up in other ships. The Camps are getting a very comfortable set of kitchens, private roads of communication, and are in many other respects advancing favourably. . . .

Improvement
in Camps.

We have up to this moment heard nothing of the expedition to Kinburn, which surprises me. The weather, which has been windy, may have proved against it.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *October 17, 1855.*

Your drafts are excellent. . . .

PS.— . . . Perhaps it might be well to tell Simpson by telegraph that the account we had about the Council of War at Nicolaieff did not imply that the Russians meant to attack the Allies, but rather that the Russians will not leave the Crimea till driven out by defeat in pitched battle. The allied commanders will therefore have to consider whether, by threatening the rear of the Russians by a strong force from Eupatoria, they will not compel them to detach from the camp on the north of Sebastopol a force larger than that which the Allies may send to Eupatoria, and whether such an operation would not therefore be advantageous to the Allied Armies to the south of the harbour.

A question of
strategy.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

PICCADILLY, *October 18, 1855.*

How to deal
with General
Simpson's
resignation.

I do not think that this telegram affords any reason for delay. We have all come to the conviction that Simpson ought to be relieved, and the only point on which we are liable to attack is our not having relieved him sooner. If his next by post is to be waited for, we lose ten days or a fortnight, and when his next arrives, if it should contain a withdrawal of his resignation, it would only oblige us to remove him against his will instead of accepting his resignation.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *October 18, 1855.*

... I think your arrangement about the medals will do....

Cowley has secured 50 officers' and 500 Chevalier Crosses of the Legion of Honour.

Dissatisfaction
of the French
Emperor.

The Emperor is much annoyed with Pélissier's despatches.

He says it is impossible to advance, that to attack the Russian position on Mackenzie is more difficult than taking Sebastopol, that every valley and approach is impregnably fortified, and that from Simpheropol to the sea is one great fortress.

His new plans.

The Emperor, accordingly, now talks of the Allies being compelled to retire on the lines of Kamiesch, and then completely destroying Sebastopol and re-embarking a great part of the Army, to come home or go elsewhere, holding Kamiesch, Kertch, and Eupatoria, and waging a defensive war till peace is made.

What do you think of that? It is not pleasant, and I fear that short harvest and financial crisis are at the bottom of it.

Will you look at a Sardinian despatch I send herewith, and which I have received from Azeglio?¹ It is now more than three months since we proposed to the Sardinians

¹ Sardinian Minister in London.

and Turks to join the Anglo-French Convention for the distribution of prizes. The former gladly accepted and sent full powers to Azeglio; the latter agreed, but (just like them) have done nothing more in the matter, so no Convention has been signed, and the Sardinians, not unfairly, I think, appeal to our good faith not to let them be injured by Turkish delay, and they ask to share in prizes as if the Convention had been concluded. We must consult the French Government, but I am disposed, if you don't object, to recommend compliance. Turkish delay.

The Emperor agrees to the destruction of the docks at Sebastopol.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *October 18, 1855.*

The Queen returns the enclosed drafts, which she Drafts. approves. In that to Sir W. Codrington she has made a slight alteration in the concluding passage.

With regard to the drafts to Lord Rokeby and General Barnard, she wishes merely to observe that no notice is taken of the second supersession to which they are to be subjected, by the promotion of Sir W. Eyre to the command of the corps. They might serve under Sir C. Campbell, but would hardly do so under Sir W. Eyre.

The Queen wishes to have copies of the drafts as finally worded.

She has asked Sir George Grey to explain to Lord Panmure her views relative to the clasps of the Crimean medal, which she hopes he will agree in.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WINDSOR, *October 19, 1855.*

I am sorry to say that we cannot wait for your despatch, but as I anticipate it will say something on the score of health, I have determined to say something also in the letter announcing the acceptance of your resignation. By Monday we shall have decided on the whole arrangements,

Expedition to
Kinburn.

and you maybe preparing to make your exit from the Crimea, and hand over to your successor the cares and anxieties as well as the honours of your position. . . . I am not very sanguine myself of any great results from this [expedition to Kinburn], but it will be something for the Navy to do, and they have been in sad want of it for some time back.

Having been ordered down here, I have not much in the way of bag to bother you with. There are some letters to be acknowledged and some movements to be approved, but they will keep till Monday. Among them is your transference of the Turkish Contingent to Kertch. I like this very well, and I hope before long Vivian will leave his card on Wrangel¹ at Amhet, and perhaps drop in on Kaffa. As soon as he gets himself shaken into his place, he will not rest long without making a sign.

Condemnation
of the *Times*.

I am at my wits' end about these irregulars. I hope Beatson is half-way to England by this time, to pour his grievances into Ellenborough's ear, who will doubtless fight his battle next session with elephantine vigour. The *Times* is worse than ever. You can have no idea what damage it has done our prestige abroad, and how it is daily injuring the fair name of England. . . .

I am sorry to see what you say about the road, but I trust your doubts will be dispersed and all yet be well. We shall keep sending you things to make you comfortable, and you must kick everybody and make them look alive to lodge themselves.

Whatever you may be by others, *here* you will be received cordially, and I trust you will be long spared to wander on my hills, and we'll fight our battles over a social tumbler in the evening. . . .

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private and Confidential.

CRIMEA, October 20, 1855.

In answer to your Lordship's 'private and confidential' letter of the 6th instant, I have to assure you

¹ Baron Wrangel, Russian General.

that no human being here knows of the commission I hold for Sir W. Codrington. . . . I can any day send your packet home to you just as I received it, unopened.

Now, my Lord, without reference to my good opinion of Sir W. Codrington, which remains unchanged, I cannot but remind your Lordship that Lieut.-General Sir Colin Campbell is next senior to me in this Army, and I most respectfully beg leave to point out to you that it will have very serious consequences if Codrington, or any other junior to him, is placed over his head. Sir Colin has been forty-eight years in the Army, has seen a very large share of active service before the enemy, and is certainly an officer of great distinction and character.

Claims of Sir
Colin Campbell
as successor to
Simpson.

You tell me, my Lord, to keep a considerable body of flying Cavalry on the Russian flanks! On *their* left flank it has been proved that no troops of any sort can operate; on their right I have already a Brigade of Light Cavalry, leaving me little enough *here* if the moment arrives to follow and harass the enemy.

Cavalry on
enemy's flanks.

I care not for the newspapers. I am not trying to please the Mob, but am endeavouring to do my duty. But it is the general opinion here that the Press is our 'Commander' at home, and by degrees your Lordship will discover the difficulty of finding an English gentleman to command an English Army.

General opinion
held in Camp as
to the Press.

Huts are arriving, but sad complaints still come to me how difficult it is to find, *in one ship*, one complete hut. The cargoes must have been meddled with at Malta or in the Bosphorus?

I am working for our winter existence! The whole Infantry is road-making, and it is a lottery if we can do as much as I desire before the weather breaks. It continues delightful at present.

The Russians appear to me firm in their position. Our Intelligence People state that they have ample supplies. This, I doubt; but no one can deny that it is their duty to keep us out of the harbour, and to winter in their lines as we do.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 22, 1855.*

I send you your release by this mail, and I hope the arrangements which we have made will not make a severe ferment in the Camp. We have chosen for the best, and I hope the despatches which I have sent to Rokeby, Campbell, and Barnard will reconcile them to the changes and the promotion of their juniors.

You may now give me your free opinion on our selection, which I have forborne to ask hitherto, as not desiring to place you in the invidious position of commenting on your brother officers.

All that has been done has been cordially approved by the highest authority.

Drunkenness
in Camp.

I have just received yours of the 9th. I am sorry that drunkenness prevails so much in Camp. I will write to Codrington on the subject of finding amusements during the winter for the men, as well as putting a check on the sale of spirits.

I shall be glad to get a pair of Russian field-guns as a trophy, and you can send them home in any ship bringing invalids or stores.

Command to be
given over to
Codrington.

You may send for Codrington and consult as to when you will give him over the command, but don't tell him or any one else that you held a commission appointing him to command in event of your removal suddenly.

Send me that commission in the next bag.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL CODRINGTON¹*Confidential.*WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 22, 1855.*

Sir,—The Queen having been pleased, at his own request, to relieve General Sir James Simpson from the

¹ Extracted, as essential to the full understanding of the situation, from *Further Correspondence relative to the Military Expedition to the East*, printed solely for the use of the Cabinet, January 28, 1856.

command of the Army in the East, the question of his successor has been a subject of most anxious deliberation with Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government have well weighed the responsibility of their selection, and have been guided to it solely by the desire to place the command of the Army in the hands of that officer whom they consider best qualified for the various duties required of him. They are quite alive to the difficulties which may arise from adopting the principle of selection, in preference to acting upon that of succession by seniority, and to the risk of giving offence to those officers who are necessarily passed over; nevertheless, they feel bound to encounter these difficulties, thinking, as they do, that you are on the whole best fitted for the command of the Army.

The principle
of selection.

The qualities required in a commander, beyond those of a merely professional character, are decision, firmness, temper, and well-regulated prudence. In addition to these qualities, the officer in command of the British troops at present serving in the Crimea must so conduct himself as to maintain inviolate the good understanding between the two countries, and to uphold the dignity and due weight of the British name in the councils of war.

Believing that they find a greater combination of these qualities in you than in others, but without the slightest disparagement of the courage, zeal, or ability of your companions-in-arms, Her Majesty's Government have thought it right to recommend you to the Queen as General Sir James Simpson's successor; and I have the satisfaction, by Her Majesty's command, to intimate to you the high position to which she has been pleased to call you.

It will be your duty, as I am sure it will be your wish, to endeavour to reconcile, as far as possible, the senior officers of the Army to your promotion, and to secure the continuance of their valuable services to their country, in the different posts which have been assigned to them in the arrangements which I shall now proceed to explain to you.

The British Army is rapidly increasing in numbers,

Division of the
Army into two
Corps.

and its organisation is not at present such as to render its movement in the field an easy matter. It appears to me, therefore, after due consultation with Lord Hardinge, desirable to divide the Army into two distinct Corps, consisting of three Divisions each, and with such proportions of Cavalry, Artillery, and Land-Transport Corps, as shall be determined upon.

While you retain the supreme command, it is proposed to place two officers at the head of these Corps, the one being Sir Colin Campbell, and the other General Markham, and during his absence¹ Sir William Eyre.

The only suggestion which I will make is, that the Highland Division should form a portion of the Corps placed under Sir Colin Campbell.

I have written to that effect to Sir Colin Campbell, and I have also written to Lord Rokeby, and to Lieutenant-General Barnard, asking them to waive for the good of the Service their claims founded upon the principle of seniority, from which, on the present occasion, Her Majesty's Government have thought it right to depart; and appealing to their patriotism to acquiesce in the arrangements which have been confirmed by Her Majesty's approval.

Should these appeals fail in their object, I shall deeply regret it; as, the more I reflect on the best means of securing the success of the Army, and of maintaining its high character and reputation, the more I am convinced that the principle of selection for all posts of command must be followed out, notwithstanding the occasions which will arise of imputed acts of injustice—imputations which nothing but imperious consideration for the good of the Service, the high name of the Army, and the best interests of the country, would induce me to encounter.

With regard to yourself, I cannot impress upon you too strongly the delicate and responsible position in which a General in command of our troops is in these days placed.

Acting, as we are, in concert with an ally of high military

¹ He had been recalled from India.

renown, the greatest circumspection and caution are necessary on our part to maintain that cordiality of feeling and that unity of action which can alone lead to prosperous results, and cement that friendship between the two great nations of Europe on which the liberties and future peace of the world essentially depend. The eyes of your countrymen, likewise, will be fixed on you; naturally generous and forbearing, they are nevertheless impatient of inaction and irritated by reverses; but they are ever open to reason, and, when sufficient explanation as to disappointed expectations can be given consistently with the public interests, it ought always to be furnished.

Of the information to be laid before the country, you are not to be the judge; such responsibility it would be improper to place upon you, and it is your duty to give to Her Majesty's Government the fullest details of every transaction: it will be for them to determine how far it may be expedient to give publicity to your reports.

By following this course, you will avoid one of the great mistakes into which your predecessors have unintentionally fallen, and you will beget a mutual confidence between yourself, as Commander of the Army, and the Ministers of the Crown, which cannot fail to secure you from much anxiety, and which will enable them to repel many of those imputations and reproaches, the injuriousness of which to the Army they have frequently felt, but which, in the absence of sufficiently minute explanations, they have found it difficult, if not impossible, to meet.

I will not add to the length of this despatch by further remarks, but conclude by assuring you of the warm support of the Queen and Her Majesty's Government, and that they feel entire confidence that you will spare no means of rendering your promotion acceptable to the Army at large, by an earnest attention to its organisation and comfort, as well as by an exhibition of professional skill and boldness of enterprise which may enable the Army under your command to add to its already well-earned reputation, and that you will thus justify your selection by Her Majesty for this high and important post.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR W. CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *October 22, 1855.*

I must introduce myself to you before I commence my private correspondence, and congratulate you, as a friend of your father's, on the high situation to which it has been my great satisfaction to recommend you to the Queen. I have written you a public despatch with your commission, and likewise a confidential official despatch explanatory of the motives which have led to your appointment and the duties for which we shall look to you. I now proceed to dwell on some points which I can alone touch upon in the privacy of private correspondence. I have been in the habit of doing this with your two predecessors, and I shall, with your permission, continue it with you. It is no use concealing from you that since General Simpson resigned we have been seriously puzzled to find out the best man to command the Army, and finally we have fixed upon you as combining more qualifications in your own person than any one else. I will not flatter you by saying that we are without misapprehension in these new arrangements, but I feel confidence in your trying to do all in your power to justify your own appointment and reconcile your late seniors to your elevation. Much may be done in this way by a kind tone and gentle handling of the aggrieved parties, and this I shall look for from you. Sir C. Campbell will be the worst to conciliate, but I hope the letter I have written to him will have considerable weight, and moreover the division of the Army into two Corps, at the head of one of which he will be placed, may be some consolation to his offended dignity.

Character of
correspond-
ence.

Advice and
suggestions.

In regard to yourself, you will have to justify the selection of you by Government by the greatest earnestness, activity, and zeal in your new position, in which, I fear, you will find many an improvement to be made. It reaches me from all quarters that our Army has fallen into a laxity of discipline which is serious—that men pass officers of other corps than their own without proper

respect, and pay insufficient respect to the orders they receive even from their own. I can trace much of this to the siege, but it must be expurgated by strict attention. I learn, too, from General Simpson's despatches just received, that intoxication is prominent as a vice among our men; in soldiers drunkenness is a crime, and I sincerely hope you will find some means of eradicating this degrading habit. You will have to invent amusements for your men during winter, and, if you will get up a place, I will send you out some popular lecturers, conjurers, and different sorts of fellows, to distend the cheeks and empty the pockets of the overburdened with money. I would much prefer, however, to see them having the sense to send their money home. I sincerely trust that you will devote your attention to roads, huts, and running up stables for horses in charge of M'Murdo for winter, and on all these points I should like to hear from you two or three times a-week by telegraph. The Queen having asked Lords Palmerston, Hardinge, and myself to Windsor, we there recast the different commands, and to some extent changed the organisation of the Army. I mention to you in my despatch the constitution of two Corps, and I hope Sir Colin will take the one, and, in Markham's absence, that Eyre will have the other. I enclose you a programme of the divisional brigade commands, and those you should fix by General Orders as soon as you can. It will, I hope, be acceptable to you to have General Windham as Chief of the Staff, and, as he is your junior, naturally you will get on easily with him. I have no doubt, with a little management, you will be able to overcome your difficulties in your own Camp very soon. The French and Sardinians are next to be considered. I much fear, from Simpson's paucity of French and mildness, he gave way a good deal to Pélissier, at all events the impression has got abroad that he did not stand up for his Army sufficiently in the Councils of War. You must watch this, and, of course avoiding anything which can be misrepresented as arrogance, you will firmly maintain the respect due to the British name. I am told of late that La Marmora has been more in the habit of taking orders

Changes in
commands and
organisation of
the Army.

Necessity of
maintaining the
respect due to
the British
name.

from the French than us. You must check this. The Sardinians are essentially under British control, and should act under you, receiving orders from you and consulting you in their dispositions, etc. Of course you will duly recognise their nationality, and treat them with the respect due to their gallantry. You must tell General Simpson to give you the despatches to read up, and next mail I will see if I can furnish you with a brief of any importance recently sent. I beg your full confidence at all times, and you will find me quite open with you.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *October 23, 1855.*

I have yesterday your letter and despatches of the 8th instant.

Inadvisability
of bringing un-
seasoned troops
to the Crimea
at this time of
year.

I did not think at this advanced season, and in our altered circumstances, that your Lordship would have sent the Swiss and Germans to winter here. When they come, I will do my best; but the winter cannot fail to be severe upon them under canvas, and without the comforts which our troops have been busy providing themselves with. These new-comers will arrive to pitch their tents either in snow or eight inches of mud. For the same reasons I have abstained from calling more troops from Malta. You tell me to do so, but I will await further instructions, as I think it will save many lives to suffer them to winter in Malta, where they are.

I saw Marshal Pélissier yesterday respecting the docks. They are now under the hands of the Engineers of both Armies, but I fear the Russians may make the locality too hot for them. The Admirals being all away in the Dnieper, we must act for ourselves.

With respect to the Turkish Contingent, I send a copy of my instructions to General Vivian, who, of course, I consider the senior officer in the Queen's Service, and as such I look upon him. I am glad you think him well calculated to get on with the French; for it is on these

mixed detachments, at Kertch, Eupatoria, or anywhere else, that the danger of squabbles with our Allies is greater than here at head-quarters.

Danger of squabbles with Allies is mainly on detachment.

There is no change in our position. The enemy remains steady in his position, and we are under arms every morning in case of attack. But I do not think *that* his game. We cannot turn his flanks; I have always deemed it impossible, unless by a far larger force than we can spare to Eupatoria. It is the enemy's duty to remain all winter where he is, and I see no reason to think that he will quit the Crimea, but on this point opinions differ.

Future movements of the enemy.

I must still claim a few days' delay in sending my reply to your Redan despatch. There is much writing in it, and I am anxious to have it as full and complete as you could desire. How you became possessed of Codrington's letter I know not; but I did not send it, because it was never the practice of Lord Raglan to send anything more than his own despatch, which was framed on the various reports made to him by the officers employed. Copies of all these documents will now be sent home, and I much regret being called upon to transmit them. . . . One hundred and fifty-three officers fell there [at the Redan], in their noble endeavours to lead their men! . . .

Redan despatch.

After giving it as his opinion that the 'best General for this Army would be Sir George Brown,' the writer concludes :—

I sincerely congratulate Your Lordship on being made G.C.B. The hard work you must undergo deserves to be rewarded, and the Queen has a very judicious and flattering way of expressing her acknowledgment, which must be very gratifying to you in this instance.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *October 25, 1855.*

Williams's despatch will go to you officially, but I send this one privately, as I am sure you will agree with me that it should be in the *Gazette* to-morrow.

The defenders
of Kars.

I enclose also his private letters (you will be pleased with the one of the 30th), which show what tough materials he is made of, and what gallant fellows he and his officers are. Pray consider what should be done for them; they ought to be rewarded and it ought not to be delayed. If you could write me a letter of approbation, it would please them more than a letter from the F.O.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *October 25, 1855.*

The Emperor's
desire for
British medals
for his troops.

I have another letter from Cowley, saying that the Emperor¹ . . . attaches the greatest political importance to the distribution of the medals (without clasps, in the first instance) to the 9000 men on their arrival in France.

This is a large order, and of course cannot be executed if that slow-going mint is alone to be relied upon; but I feel sure that, if you would distribute the medals among two or three of the principal houses at Birmingham, you would soon get them both for the French and British Armies—there are the Sardinians and Turks besides. I don't see why the workmanship should be inferior at Birmingham, as it is only a question of dies; but if it was, it would signify less than indefinite delay. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

October 25, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to enclose the despatches from General Simpson which arrived this morning.

Your Majesty will perceive that the General accounts for his reserve by the knowledge that his letters are read by others besides Lord Panmure. The Morning State is still improving, and no medical report has arrived by this mail.

Lord Panmure has received with much regret the

¹ The war was unpopular in France, and Napoleon had become anxious for peace.

account of an explosion in Woolwich laboratory, and forwards to Your Majesty the telegraphic notices of it. It was extremely fortunate that it occurred at the dinner-hour of the workmen, and therefore no one has been injured. The damage is not considerable. . . .

Lord Panmure has received from Paris copies of some Russian plans found in Sebastopol, and evidently those made in the defence of the place. They are being traced for Your Majesty's use, as likewise some old plans of the mouths of the Dnieper and the Crimea—more curious than useful at the present day.

General Simpson having informed Lord Panmure by telegraph that he had great fears that he could not hut the foreign corps, and that they might be exposed to hardships in the Crimea, Lord Panmure sent an immediate telegram to General Storks,¹ and he has undertaken to winter 3000 at Scutari or in the vicinity. Orders for the 1st corps embarked, to stop them, have been sent.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

CRIMEA, *October 27, 1855.*

I yesterday received your letter of the 13th, in which you very kindly give me your advice touching the ground of my resignation. I am truly obliged to your Lordship, but as you tell me that long before your letter can reach me the die will be cast, I have only to leave everything in your hands, as my fate must ere this time have been decided, and it is too late for me to make health the ground of my retirement. There can be no doubt I might have done so, because I am far from well, and the doctor has often told me that I shall not be able to go on long without change of climate. . . .

I am prepared to stay on as long as I can, or until such time as your Lordship shall have fixed on my successor. I am very anxious to cause no inconvenience either to the Government or to the Service. I sincerely trust that,

¹ Commanding British troops at Constantinople.

whosoever is chosen to succeed to the command, it may cause no resignations of senior officers. I still think Sir George Brown the best man, and no one can take offence.

I must plead guilty to the scantiness of the information sent home by me; but, I confess, I am quite at a loss to find anything new for daily transmission.

The British
Army still a
besieged army.

We continue to be, as we have been ever since I came to the Crimea, a *besieged* Army, the enemy extending in a semi-circle round us, from the mouth of the Belbec along that river up as far as Foti Sala, from whence to the sea the country is too mountainous for military operations. The Russians have thirteen or fourteen Divisions of Infantry, with numerous Artillery, and Cossacks without end. To turn their left flank has been found impossible owing to the nature of the country; and from Eupatoria I have no hopes of any *great* success, unless we could send some 50,000 or 60,000 men, which we never could do. This was the state of affairs on the 9th September, on the evacuation of the South Side of Sebastopol, and so it will continue throughout the winter, for the Russians will remain as they are if they have supplies. I see no reason to think they will move; if they do, it will be after the rains begin, when neither Artillery nor Cavalry can follow them.

What new information is to be found in such sameness to transmit by daily telegraph?

The enemy may still hazard an attack upon us, but I do not think he will.

Proper tactics
for the British
—a waiting
game.

A forward movement on our part would be to risk every advantage we have gained by the fall of Sebastopol. Our game is to make no false move, to risk nothing, to appear to the enemy (whom we cannot reach) quite at our ease, preparing our winter quarters and making our roads. He would like nothing better than for us to attack his heights. His winter, if he stops, will be a much more disastrous one to him than for us.

This furnishes
no news for
transmission.

This being our daily and unchanging state, how I am to cater for John Bull and his Press I know not. . . .

In reference to the last paragraph of your letter, you may rely upon it, my Lord, that nothing that has happened in any way alters my feelings towards yourself.

I feel extremely grateful to you for all you have done for me. But I confess I have the strongest conviction that no officer can serve his country while the reign of the Press is paramount in England.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *October 27, 1855.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letters. She is sorry to hear of the explosion at Woolwich. . . . Explosion at Woolwich.

Poor General Simpson seems very much hurt and annoyed, which is vexatious, but we must, when he comes home, try to pour oil into his wounds and soften what may have appeared harsh, but was unfortunately true.

The Queen regrets to see that the hutting seems to go on so slowly—when the materials have arrived so late. She would hope that the disposition to drunkenness, which all the officers assure her was not the case during the siege, will cease when the Army is more actively employed.

Lord Panmure will see a very interesting and promising (as regards his future position) letter, or rather more journal, from Sir William Codrington, which shows how anxious he is for something to be done. Journals of Codrington.

The Queen has also been reading one of older date, in which he does nothing but lament and wonder at the inactivity of the Army. His spirit seems excellent. When does Lord Panmure expect to receive the telegraphic answer to the despatches conferring the new appointment in the Army? When would the despatch arrive? New appointments in the Army.

Are the appointments known here, or are they to remain secret till we hear of their being accepted? Possibly this would be the better course.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

*Private.*BELGRAVE SQUARE, *October 27, 1855.*

I have heard that our message of Monday was too late for the boat, by reason of an accident on the railway, and therefore the despatches conveying the changes in the Army will arrive with this.

Explanations
addressed to
Simpson.

These changes have leaked out to some extent, but not with any certainty, and my anxiety is that the truth should be known in Camp first, and the officers passed over get the letters which I have addressed to them. I hope you will feel yourself loosed from your command in a satisfactory manner. You have complained of the harshness of my telegraph superseding the kind expressions of my private notes. I think you do not make sufficient allowances for the curtness of a telegram. It goes to the point at once, and there is no room for anything but the 'raw' question or observation, as the case may be, which is of course sometimes unpalatable to sensitive minds. This I cannot help. But I may tell you confidentially that similar messages have been sent to Pélissier, and even more brusque, and have been quietly pocketed and rejoined to without any extreme step on either side.

You are the best judge of your own feelings, and I find no fault with you for your course, only don't suppose that I had any intention of driving you from command by a side or underhand proceeding. That is not my way, and I was surprised to see you take the message as you did.

I certainly thought that you had seized it as a peg to hang up your resolution to quit the command, which was trying your health and physical powers more than you could long endure. It seems now that you have no other reason than sheer disgust at my unfortunate telegram. Well, so be it! I cannot think that it justified your act, but what is done cannot be undone, and we must make the best of it.

I shall be curious to learn the result of the announcement in Camp. I hear, in a letter from A. Stafford,¹ that my Army Works Corps have been employing a lot of men in erecting for themselves splendid accommodation, and making terraces, etc. If this is so, I strongly advise you, or whoever commands, to occupy them whenever finished, or put the superior officers of the Army into them. These men have no business to employ the Army Works Corps to make elegancies for themselves till the whole Camp is drained, housed, and in some comfort.

We have heard from the Emperor a proposal to circumscribe our line of defences at Sebastopol. He sends a despatch from Pélissier, in which he suggests the abandonment and destruction of Sebastopol, including works, docks, etc. Proposals of the Emperor.

He further suggests that we should occupy lines from Kamiesch round to Balaclava, to be kept by about 70,000 men, and that the remainder, which he estimates at 100,000, should be withdrawn, but he does not say where to!!

The first thing that struck me in this proposal was the contradiction it gave at once to all his and your opinions as to the impossibility of dividing your force. If 70,000 men are sufficient to defend your dépôts at Kamiesch and Balaclava, why have not 10,000 men been in movement for Eupatoria, or elsewhere, in operation on the flank or rear of the enemy? We hear that the Russians will evacuate the Crimea: if they do this 'mero motu' and unmolested, it will be a triumph, and if Gortschakoff can effect an orderly retreat, saving his guns and conducting his battalions in decent organisation and safety to Perekop, he will rob you of your laurels and be the real General of the day. Objections to the same.

I hope this may not be the case. The more they fire from the North Side, the stronger may be your presumption that they mean to decamp, and you and Pélissier will, I hope, be in a condition to pursue on the instant. I have got winter cantonments for my foreign troops in the

¹ Augustus Stafford, at one time Secretary to the Admiralty. He visited the Crimean hospitals and wrote about them. Prospect of a Russian retreat.

Bosphorus, and will not overlay the Camp with them. I am glad to see that Beatson has not proved a true prophet as to his wild horsemen. Something may be made of these fellows yet.

Markham has got home, but they say he is quite broken. Stephenson dined at Windsor on Sunday, and I like his appearance very much. I believe he sails from Marseilles with this messenger.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

F.O., *October 29, 1855.*

Puzzling
conduct of the
Emperor.

I enclose a letter from Cowley which arrived last night, and which will surprise and annoy you as much as it does me. I cannot understand the Emperor, but there must be something behind the curtain—either he is afraid of trusting Pélissier at the head of such a large army, or he thinks that, by withdrawing a portion of it, he shall economise and render another loan unnecessary; but whatever his reason may be, it will turn out the greatest miscalculation of his life if he carries out his present intention.

Pray return Cowley's letter, which nobody has yet seen, but I send the Queen's upon the former letter of Cowley, and it shows that H.M. as usual takes a right view. There are some matters in the letter which concern you, and require immediate attention. . . .

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

F.O., *October 29, 1855.*

Report as to
British Cavalry
going into
winter quarters.

I think there must be some mistake about our Cavalry going immediately into winter quarters; but if it is true, I don't wonder at the bad impression which it has produced at Paris, where we are urging more active operations.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

October 29, 1855.

The arrangements for your relief were all settled before your telegram asking me to pause arrived, and of course long before your letter reached me this morning.

On your own account I am glad you are coming home, as I am quite certain you would have stayed too long for the chance of recovery from the diarrhœa which is fastening on you. You will receive from the highest personage in the land the greatest kindness you can anticipate, and from me a hearty welcome, whenever you come.

I have seen Markham to-day, and was shocked to find what a wreck hard work has made of him. . . .

I hope Lyons will place the *Caradoc* at your disposal at least to Marseilles, and indeed I would advise you not to risk the Bay of Biscay at this season.

I have nothing to say on public affairs. I have not sent the Foreign Corps to the Camp, in consequence of your telegram, but shall place them in quarters at Scutari and Smyrna by arrangements which I have despatched Colonel Lefroy to see carried out.

The Foreign Corps to be quartered at Scutari and Smyrna.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, October 30, 1855.

Your letter of 15th only reached me this morning.

I sincerely hope the plan you allude to as being settled regarding my successor may be a satisfactory one.

There is absolutely nothing to put into a military despatch to-day, and none is sent. Nothing whatever can be done about Kaffa and Arabat until the return of the Admirals from Kinburn, when I will instantly call a Conference as to what is to be done there. As regards Eupatoria, the transport by sea is not to be had in the absence of the Fleet at Kinburn.

The whole of our share of the field-guns taken in

Sebastopol will be sent home ; they will be delivered to the Ordnance Storekeeper wherever they are landed, and you have only to claim two of them. I have never interfered with the Prize Commission, and have not a single Russian trophy.

The Russians are again making bridges to cross the Tchernaya ! And our spies again announce that they intend at all hazards to try another battle. I can hardly believe they will be so rash.

Our whole attention is given to the roads. They are in great progress, but far from finished. The weather still holds out as fine as can be wished.

There is nothing for me to communicate, and I am so poorly to-day that I can hardly see to write at all.

CHAPTER XI

NOVEMBER 1855

IN addition to the transference of the chief command from Simpson to Codrington, certain changes in the organisation of the British force in the Crimea were at about this time decided on.

Thus the entire Army was divided into two Army Corps—to be under the command, respectively, of Generals Sir Colin Campbell and Markham, or, in the absence of the latter, who had been summoned from India, of General Sir William Eyre.

At the same time the existing relations of the offices of Chief of the Staff, Quartermaster-General, and Adjutant-General were modified, by the recognition of the two last-named officials as heads of departments under the former; whilst the Military Secretary became, in a sense, the chief of a Chancellerie, designed to lighten the pressure of correspondence upon the General commanding.

In the appointment of Codrington, the principle of selection for high command (as against succession by seniority) had been put in practice—his comparative youth having probably quite as much to do with his preferment as had his distinguished services at Inkerman and the Alma; and, at this juncture, Generals Barnard and Lord Rokeby supplied a valuable precedent by the readiness with which they agreed to subordinate *amour propre* to higher considerations by serving under a junior.

On the rumour of Codrington's promotion, Sir Colin

Campbell had returned impulsively to England ; and his consent, at the personal request of his Sovereign, at once to resume his duties at the seat of war is certainly not the least chivalrous episode in the career of that gallant veteran.

‘I leave this with every kind feeling towards yourself . . .,’ writes Simpson to Lord Panmure on November 10th, ‘but I have found many matters too much for me. This is not at all like the command of an Army! It is a huge chaos of civil government, of extreme difficulty of management.’

These words, together with the dislike of newspapers and the electric telegraph which the writer shared with Pélissier, may be considered as summing up the sentiments of a General who, though gallant and distinguished, and not yet old as age is now reckoned—he had been born in 1792—had certainly failed to keep pace with the times in which he lived.

Meantime, whilst adapting itself to these new arrangements, the Army was resigning itself to the enforced truce of winter, though it maintained its state of preparation against offensive movements by the enemy.

‘We no longer look for daring deeds and successful enterprises, which covered any little omissions,’ writes Panmure to Codrington on November 16th, ‘and we must therefore be circumspect in our acts, and ready, as far as we can, to anticipate the public in everything conducive to the comfort of the Army.’

So, for the present, active operations in the field ceased to be contemplated, a proposed expedition to Kaffa and Arabat being abandoned, and the interior economy of the Camp engrossed attention.

Until near the end of the month this was favoured by fine weather, and the health of the Army continued good. But, besides the care and labour devoted to the moving up of supplies by the railway and Land Transport Corps, and

to the proper clothing, feeding, and drilling of the troops, it also became necessary to cope with an outbreak of drunkenness which had followed relaxation of strain and comparative abundance of pocket-money.

Short of more drastic measures, Lord Panmure suggests social entertainment as the best means of curing this evil.

The leave of absence granted to officers was regulated, and an exchange of prisoners carried out.

On November 15th there occurred a disastrous explosion in a windmill which had been utilised as a magazine.

At home, regiments of the Foreign Legion were being handed over to the Commander-in-Chief as soon as they were fit for service; whilst a new Military Hospital on Southampton Water was being planned, the Queen showing special interest in its progress.

Both Lord Clarendon and Colonel Claremont note a diminution of cordiality in the relations of the Allies.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

November 1, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward to Your Majesty the despatches which he found on his return from Windsor. Your Majesty will perceive with pleasure the satisfactory reports of the provision for the Army, and likewise the statements of Colonel M'Murdo.¹ The Floating Factory which Lord Panmure sent out seems to be highly prized. The reason why whips, harness, etc., were not sent with the railway horses was simply because no demand was made for them. The only part of the despatches which gives Lord Panmure any annoyance is what General Simpson says in reference to Sir Colin Campbell. It shows a clinging to seniority, not unnatural, but still not in accordance with the views held here.

Satisfactory
reports of pro-
vision for Army.

¹ Who had been appointed, as will be remembered, to organise the Land Transport service.

The General has hit upon the true reason for the confusion of the huts, as Admiral Stafford at Malta and Grey at Constantinople took upon themselves to trans-ship some cargoes, because in their wisdom they thought it useless to send on to the Crimea the shot and shell in the holds of the vessels, as if these could not have easily been returned. The moment Lord Panmure heard of this he complained to Sir C. Wood, and warned him of what might be the results. Orders were instantly sent to stop their proceedings, but mischief has evidently been done, though, Lord Panmure trusts, of no serious consequence.

Lord Panmure has sent to the papers—

1. General Simpson's despatch relative to the capture of Kinburn.
2. Brigadier-General Spencer's report to General Simpson.
3. Return of wounded men on the 8th September—a curious and satisfactory document.
4. Dr. Hall's report, omitting the passage on brain-fever arising from drunkenness.
5. Colonel M'Murdo's report.

Lord Panmure has just heard of the arrival of Sir Harry Jones at Farrance's Hotel. He sent his A.D.C. to report his arrival and his inability to come in person. Lord Panmure will call on Sir Harry this evening, and inform Your Majesty of his condition.

Lord Panmure begs to apologise to Your Majesty for the haste of this letter.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

Private.

CRIMEA, *November 3, 1855.*

There has been no mail since my last note to your Lordship, dated 30th ultimo.

Nothing whatever has occurred since that note, nor can I see any good reason to believe the enemy intend leaving the Crimea. It is so decidedly their duty to remain that they will do so if supplies are possible.

In urging me to carry on operations from Eupatoria, I have only to say that General D'Allonville has represented the propriety, or rather the necessity, of withdrawing the troops as soon as possible. No operations can be undertaken there for want of water. We have lost some horses from that reason, and I am going to withdraw the Cavalry Brigade as soon as the Admiral can manage the transport. Sir Edmund Lyons will be here to-day, but too late for post. I confess I was surprised with the message of an expected movement from Eupatoria at this season of the year! As to Kaffa and Arabat, I can say nothing till Sir Edmund Lyons comes here. The Kinburn Brigade is still on board ship. . . .

Impracticability of operations from Eupatoria.

I regret the departure of Sir Colin Campbell, whom I have given leave to go home on urgent business. He is a great loss to this Army. . . .

The enemy is said to hold his intention of attacking our whole line some day next week. I do not expect he will so commit himself.

Enemy reported to be contemplating an attack.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

[Writing on November 3rd, and referring to despatches received from General Rose and Colonel Claremont, Lord Clarendon says :—]

I think Rose shows clearly that, with a little more dash, good things might be done, and I cannot agree with Claremont that Pélissier is disposed to advance if he could. No one in the Crimea now thinks that the inactivity of the last two months has been necessary or justifiable, and yet nothing has been done but the Kinburn affair, the orders for which were sent from Paris and London.

I must say that I have the same instinct as Claremont about diminished cordiality, and I am not easy about all the intrigues that are at work against us, and that come in aid of the altered views of the Emperor, caused by the multiplying embarrassments of his own position at home.

Writer's instinct as to 'diminished cordiality' between Allies.

I enclose a memorandum upon the officers serving with Williams, who ought to be rewarded without loss of time.

There are not two better men in the Queen's service than W. Churchill and Dr. Sandwith,¹ but unless they get a civil C.B. I don't know what can be done for them.

I am glad Zamoyski has got the command. A word to Harvey² to expedite matters might be useful, for they ought not to take much time.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 3, 1855.*

Long ere this reaches you, you will have had the official letters arranging the future command of the Army, and those consequent on it.

I see by your last note that you are wedded to the principle of seniority, and I am quite prepared for your disagreeing to the course we have pursued.

Possible effects
of disregard of
seniority in
Codrington's
appointment.

I have endeavoured to soften it as much as I can to Sir Colin and the others senior to Codrington, but it may be that my persuasion may be vain and the Army may lose the value of their services. None will regret this more than I shall, and I live in hopes of a better turn to our affairs. I find that the *Caradoc* has been returned to the Black Sea, and is refitting to carry Canning to Alexandria, but I have asked Sir Charles Wood to telegraph to Lyons to give you a boat to yourself, and I again advise you, 'consentus doctoris Gairdner,' to land at Marseilles. I shall write you on Monday, but not after that; or, if I do, I shall write privately to Codrington. As to his former commission, I wish you to send it home to me on receipt of this, unless you prefer taking it with you. You are quite right about the huts! Those infernal Admirals at Malta and Bosphorus have been meddling with them and bedeviling them; and not content with that, they have been unpacking a general cargo vessel into the bargain. I have set up my back at this, and I hope they will catch it. I will not be responsible for their delinquencies, and I only wish you would ascertain the fact and write a smart official

¹ Medical officer at Kars during the investment.

² Probably the official charged with financial arrangements connected with the Polish Legion.

on the subject. I don't like difficulties made, but such irregularities as these, even though at my own door, ought to be officially stated.

Irregularities
of Admirals at
Malta.

When I was at Windsor the Queen asked particularly for you.

I have seen Sir Harry Jones, who is much better since he came home.

LORD PANMURE TO GENERAL SIMPSON

Private.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 5, 1855.*

This is the last private letter which I shall probably address you as Commander of the Eastern Army, and as I see you have let Sir Colin Campbell come home on private affairs, I presume either that some words have passed between you, and a rupture occurred, or that the old Highlander has smelt a rat and determined to be off before any change takes place. Be that as it may, his absence will make the change easier, and I have every hope it will do well.

Sir Colin
Campbell.

I wish you could have finished off with Kaffa and Arabat. I have got into hot water by publishing your despatch in which you say that Sir C. Campbell was recalled from [the] Eupatorian expedition on account of the chance of an attack from the Russians intimated by me.

Result of pub-
lication of one
of Simpson's
despatches.

You did quite right to word your despatch as you did, and it was because it was so worded, and that the public should see that Government, and not you, was responsible for the recall, that I published it. The Court doubted the prudence, as it would tempt Russia to mislead us by false information. As if she had not warred with the weapon too long to require any lessons in the use.

Hardinge has been ill and is now much better. The Duke of Cambridge and Brown are very angry, or pretend to be so, with the promotions in the Army, but the plunge is taken, and the wave must be breasted however high it may rise.

I am run very short by a Cabinet, and have some more letters to write.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

THE GROVE, *November 7, 1855.*Criticism of
Pélissier.

I send you the despatch of Rose and Claremont which arrived this morning. I suppose Pélissier knows what he is about, but he seems to have scattered his army a good deal for winter quarters, and [so] that the Russians, if they don't keep winter, might make an attack upon some of his points. I hope his arrangements have some reference to ours and the Sardinians'. Pélissier determined from the first to make no great operation, and he has had his way, and we can't help ourselves. Cowley suggests that, when the winter is set in, the Generals and Admirals should return for ten days and hold a Grand Council of War for spring operations. What do you say to that?

Exchange of
prisoners of
war.

As to the prisoners, I think our course should be to set aside the Paris Commission, and to get our own people as we can and as soon as we can. We should know exactly from the Admiralty how many Russian prisoners have been sent to Liebau, and require through the Danish Minister at St. Petersburg that a similar number (they have not so many) should be handed over to us at Odessa—the lists of both Russian prisoners sent away and English remaining in Russia should be transmitted to Lyons, and he should communicate about them with the Governor of Odessa. . . .

We have got nine thousand medals sent exactly at the time you said they should. One thousand more will be wanted, Cowley says, for the Imperial Guard, which is coming home. . . .

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 8, 1855.*Suppression of
drunkenness
in Crimea.

The Queen returns the enclosed draft to Sir William Codrington, and quite approves his special attention being drawn to the suppression of the vice of drunkenness; she doubts, however, the propriety of the introduction of Mr.

—'s name, whose position as reporter to the — would thus be officially recognised, and his reports be acknowledged as public ground for the Government to act upon. The injury this would inflict in the discipline and government of the Army need not be pointed out.

The Queen has also made some corrections, which are intended to maintain the proper position of the Crown in the official documents emanating from her Secretary of State.

It is very inconvenient that General Simpson should have given leave to Sir Colin Campbell to come home.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 9, 1855.*

It has been my custom to write every mail a private letter on different subjects as they occur, and though I have not the pleasure of your acquaintance, you must permit me to continue with you the practice which I have pursued with your predecessors.

You know so fully my views on your appointment that I conceive it to be unnecessary to revert to them in this letter. I confess that I am not without anxiety as to the course which may be followed by your seniors, and I only trust that, if they are so foolish as to resist your appointment by refusal to serve under you, you will not permit such an event to disturb your mind. We have the information by telegraph that Sir Colin Campbell's home affairs have assumed an urgency at this peculiar juncture which is much to be regretted. I cannot gather from Simpson's message whether Sir C. has had any reason to suspect the arrangements going on at home or not, but I cannot help thinking that his return before he had ascertained the decision of Government was premature, and had I been in Simpson's place I would not have allowed it. However, it is scarcely fair my speculating on the course of this brave old officer in ignorance of the motives which dictated it. While referring to the leave on private affairs granted to him, I take the opportunity of drawing your attention to

As to
Codrington's
possible diffi-
culties with his
seniors.

Suggests
arrangements
for regulating
leave of
absence.

the impression which exists that many officers are leaving the Crimea, who have neither the excuse of illness, promotion, or long service, and as we may now suppose that active operations are at an end for the winter, some regular system of leave should be arranged. You might let so many go home, so many to Constantinople, so many to Malta, according to your ability to spare them, and I would give them free passages to and from their destination. These leaves should be given equitably between Staff and regiments, and the longest out should have prior claim to return. I am very sorry to have had to write you an official letter on the intemperance of the soldier. There is no remedy for this, in reality, but by amusement and work closely interwoven. You must have some bad ones, but a little energy and inventive genius in the regimental officers will do much to turn men's minds from the canteen. I will meet any outlay which you may sanction for getting up theatres. I will send you lecturers or conjurers for nightly exhibitions if you desire me. Football for the day; in short, anything to drive away ennui. I have telegraphed to Simpson as to a library, and, if none can be found, it shall be sent. I hope you put down all grog-shops within the lines, and allow no interlopers to supply the men with spirits when they wander into Balaclava. I hope your huts are arriving in better order than at first. I cannot say how extremely provoked I was to learn that they had been so wantonly meddled with by the Admirals at Malta and the Bosphorus. I had it put a stop to as soon as I could, but I am not sorry to learn that Simpson has addressed me officially on the subject, though the despatch has not reached me. I think that, as soon as the first difficulties of your new position wear off, you will find it more easy than your predecessor, whose diffidence and modesty, which may be carried to a fault in a public man, interfered with his authority and rigour of command. Again I repeat to you that I have every reason to believe that you will justify the choice of the Government, and repay, by a successful discharge of your duty, the trust reposed in you.

Intemperance
in Camp.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 9, 1855.*

The Queen returns this despatch of Sir J. Simpson's, which is quite satisfactory. This ought to have been written the day after the event took place, and then it would have been unnecessary for him to have sent the enclosures¹—which it seems is unusual.

The telegraphic message is again most unsatisfactory.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

CRIMEA, *November 10, 1855.*

Yours of 22nd and 27th have arrived together by the same mail.

This note replies to the first of these letters. I herewith return the letter to Sir Colin Campbell, who sailed for England a week ago, and will not in all probability return to this Army.

I likewise transmit to you the cover containing Codrington's commission, which has been in my writing-desk these three months; and your Lordship may rely upon it that neither Codrington nor any other soul has the smallest idea that such a document is in existence.

Appointment
of Codrington
to command.

The Russian field-pieces will be found in the *Bucephalus*—marked with my name; they are the only trophies that I appropriated, in order to send them to you. Codrington is much gratified by his appointment. There is no choice—he is the best man here—and as I have just told him, no one can wish him more success than I do. I shall at once give over charge to him.

GENERAL SIMPSON TO LORD PANMURE

*Private.*CRIMEA, *November 10, 1855.*

As I may possibly have the pleasure to see you before this letter reaches you, I shall not write many lines. Two

¹ Refers to the reports by officers on the affair of September 8th.

mails, 22nd and 27th, arrived together yesterday. I have your private letter of the latter date, and am much gratified by its contents.

I could say a good deal on the new distribution of the Army,¹ but will wait till I can talk the matter over with you, which the welfare of the Army may induce me to wish to do, if you will allow me.

I am perfectly well pleased with the manner you have taken to release me. The doctors would have soon stepped in to do it in their way. I will not now trouble you with *opinions* on telegrams, nor attempt any further justification of my views of them. But Pélissier and myself are both of one opinion that the electric telegraph is our greatest enemy! worse even than the newspapers, which publish to the enemy everything we are doing.

Two great
enemies: the
telegraph and
newspapers.

The message that hurt me so much came after a succession of very taunting remarks both in the public prints and in your own private letters; and I confess I was very much hurt with it. But it is of no use dwelling on this just now, when time presses for the mail. I leave this with every kind feeling towards yourself. You took me from my *retraite* with the kindest intentions; but I have found many matters too much for me. This is not at all like the command of an Army! It is a huge chaos of Civil Government, of extreme difficulty of management. I saw much of this in Lord Raglan's lifetime, and it has increased tenfold.

A huge chaos
of Civil
Government.

I see no reason to think the Russians will evacuate the Crimea. Their duty is to prevent our occupation of the harbour. Some great man reviewed some 10,000 of them, two days ago, in full-dress, opposite Inkerman. Our spies give us all manner of reports, while the enemy never spends a farthing for information. He gets it all for 5d. from a London paper. If they retire, it will be after a few days' rain. The weather has been very fine as yet. . . .

I must close this rambling letter, written under many interruptions.

¹ Into Corps d'Armée.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 10, 1855.

I trust you will find me willing to give you all information, and, as I say in my public despatch, to let you be present in mind with the Army as much as possible. I thank you most truly for the kind expressions and feelings towards myself. I had no thought of being selected for command of such a high and honourable nature, but I have no hesitation in saying that I do not mean to be frightened by all its responsibilities, its delicate situations or difficulties, for I have put myself in the path with, I trust, a soldier's feeling, and I do not mean to hesitate on the hill on which that path is now cut.

Sir Colin Campbell having left the Army removes what I think would have been an impossibility on his part—
Codrington's relations with Sir Colin Campbell.
 serving under me. I can know nothing of the causes; but I thought you would not object to my public reference to his character of service and distinction. I have seen General Barnard, who, with kindly feelings towards myself, though with some hesitation as to his being put in a lower position perhaps by leaving the Chief of the Staff for a Division, accepts the proposed arrangement. But he would not have objected to his own continuance as Chief of the Staff had your arrangements, which I consider settled, admitted of it. I have seen General Windham, an old and intimate friend of mine. I have no hesitation in saying that he will carry on the duties of Chief of the Staff with the utmost efficiency; but there must be a total change in the duties, as at present carried on, of that situation.

When the changes take place, it will be necessary that, New arrangements consequent upon a new command.
 instead of the Adjutant-General [s] and the Quartermaster-General [s] being two separate and independent departments and offices, they must be merged into one, of subordination to, and dependence on the Chief of the Staff. The situation has had no fair trial as yet; if it is the intention of Government to continue the appointment, it must have it, and be made the head, the union of the other two and of the communications of the Army.

Recommends
correspondence
of the Army to
be addressed
henceforth to
the Chief of
the Staff.

In the correspondence of the Army, I should therefore say that all is to be addressed to the Chief of the Staff—as the organ of the public service between the Commander-in-Chief and the English Army—with the department named in the corner to which the question refers. The Chief of the Staff will thus be made aware of everything, divide everything to the proper departments, and receive the decision of the Commander-in-Chief on any one of them. He may require the assistance of another officer for this purpose.

Duties of Mili-
tary Secretary.

In case of this being thus carried out, I should look upon the situation of Military Secretary as one to receive all the despatches addressed to the Commander of the Forces from home or elsewhere, and transfer to the Chief of the Staff what concerns the English Army, exclusive of the finance and promotions, peculiarly his own.

I cannot at present say more, except thanking you and any members of the Government for their kindness towards me.

Quartermaster-
General.

I must add that, in the arrangement of the Quartermaster-General's Department in future, both General Windham and myself are strongly of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Wetherall is the officer most fitted for it.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 11, 1855.*

Appeal to
Sir Colin
Campbell.

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter and the telegram with much satisfaction. It shows the true loyalty and devotion of her gallant officers, but is no more than she hoped for from them. Should Sir Colin Campbell have left, she trusts that, on being acquainted with what has occurred, and with the Queen's wishes and confidence in his known devotion to her service, he will consent to take the command of one of the Corps d'Armée.

The Queen entirely approves of Lord Panmure's signifying her great satisfaction at the conduct of the Senior Officers.

LORD CLARENDON TO LORD PANMURE

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 12, 1855.*

I send Claremont's despatch just arrived.

While it is on my mind, pray let me suggest great caution in publishing anything that comes from this office. I regretted, as you know, that that part of Simpson's despatch should have been in the *Gazette*, which referred to news from *Berlin* of an intended general attack by the Russians, and this has got Loftus into a scrape—people have been arrested who were supposed to give him information, etc.¹

Urges caution in publishing information derived from the F.O.

I have a letter from Cowley from which I extract the following:—

'Vaillant has accounts that everything is ready for blowing up the docks at Sebastopol, but, in addition to this, Niel wishes to destroy the aqueducts from the Tchernaya and Fort Nicholas. The Emperor is against both, as also against another project of the same officer for destroying Kinburn.'

Differences of opinion as to destroying enemy's works.

Let me know the opinion of the Government. I think these are not questions to be answered in a hurry. . . .

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 12, 1855.*

I have nothing to say to you in the shape of a public despatch on the subject of the general administration or the conduct of the Army. I have noticed the disinterested conduct of Rokeby and Barnard, in waiving all scruples and accepting your appointment so readily. It has given great satisfaction to the Queen, and has been hailed by the Government as an example to the Army at large of infinite value. To yourself it must be very gratifying.

Disinterested conduct of certain Generals.

I see that Simpson, in his private letter, is complaining very much of his health, and I begin to be uneasy lest the

¹ A good deal of trouble arose owing to the publication of a despatch containing information stated to have been obtained from Berlin. See the correspondence for August 1855.

excitement of departure should prey too heavily upon him. Your difficulty seems to lie with the interior economy of your Camp, and my belief is that you will have to look for the cure of drunkenness, and the preservation of health, more in the personal exertion of officers in command of regiments than in anything else.

I am sorry to learn by your telegram that the weather is broken, and I succumb at once to your decision as to Kaffa and Arabat, though I confess that with a little enterprise *earlier* you might have had the former as excellent wintering for your troops.

If Vivian gets his force well in hand at Kertch, he may do something by-and-by. I shall send you no more troops to the Crimea, and I think you will do well to leave the dépôt at Malta undrawn upon till the spring, and I will desire Lord Hardinge to impress on Pennefather the necessity of strict attention to drill. The same will be done here in our dépôts, and I will send some 6000 or 7000 foreign troops to Smyrna and Scutari, which will be of good service to you in the next campaign.

You might probably run down and look at the Germans at Scutari when you can leave your own Camp with satisfaction. . . .

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 13, 1855.

‘Information’ mentions that the Emperor was expected about the 13th or 14th inst. at Korales, to review the troops stationed in that neighbourhood: the Staff of Prince Gortschakoff to be removed from Bakshi Serai to Korales, where a Council of War is to be held.

A rumour that troops are to be concentrated at Korales, whence an offensive movement will take place against the Allied positions; and, in case of non-success, that the Russians will evacuate the Crimea.

There are other details given, and the account is that of a ‘correspondent.’

Such an attack is scarcely probable after what has happened ; but I think it would be welcomed on the part of all the Allied troops, and would bring matters to a more decisive issue with regard to the winter occupation of the Crimea.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 13, 1855.

I have written to you an official letter on the subject of the abandonment of the expedition to Kaffa and Arabat.

Abandonment of expedition to Kaffa and Arabat.

I was suddenly called upon to inquire and decide ; and I had no hesitation that, unless with a much larger force—even up to two-thirds of this Army—such an operation, requiring siege artillery, should not be risked at this season of the year, nor indeed at any season of the year. With a large force, sufficient to maintain itself, I quite feel its value.

You will have been aware, before my entering on command, that the French had no intention of sharing it ; and there could be no doubt that such a diminution of our force on this plateau as I should have considered commonly prudent for the purpose of increasing that to Kaffa would have required fair communication with, and the liability of adverse opinion from, the French.

I do not think that less than ten days would have been requisite for the arrangement and embarkation of additional force ; and it was then the 10th of November.

Justification of its abandonment.

My part of it was a military question, about which I had no doubt ; and I believe that, after the time that had elapsed since the return from Kinburn, the opinion of Sir Edmund Lyons was in accordance with mine. . . .

I shall have to enter on other subjects in your private letter to me. The drunkenness was serious, particularly at the first issue of the accumulation of the field allowance, which, with working pay, gave the men a quantity of money ; but I think that the deprivation of that field allowance when a court-martial convicts for habitual drunkenness has already checked it.

Drunkenness.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 16, 1855.*

The Queen wishes to bring the following points under Lord Panmure's notice :—

War Office
Departmental
Reports.

1. She has never yet received any of the Quarterly Reports from the different departments under the new War Office which were to be sent to her. She can fully believe that this may be difficult with some of them, but there can be no reason why the Barrack and Fortification Departments should not report; and as to the others, the Queen would prefer incomplete reports to none at all, feeling convinced that the impossibility to report is caused by present confusion, and that the necessity for drawing up a report showing system and order is the surest way to produce it.

Hospital.

2. The Queen hopes that Lord Panmure will soon take steps to have the plans for the new Military Hospital on the Southampton River considered. It will take time to prepare them, and we have none to lose. The appointment of a Commission of competent persons to advise on the subject appears to the Queen as the best step.

Foreign troops.

3. The regiments of the Foreign Legions, when their organisation is sufficiently advanced, ought to be transferred to the Horse Guards.

The Queen understands that there are Swiss troops doing garrison duty at Dover, of whom the Commander-in-Chief has no official knowledge, and over whom he has no command!

Militia.

4. A new regulation about the Militia, reducing the officers where the number of men has not reached a certain amount, has the tendency of stopping volunteering from the Militia, as it in fact punishes with reduction of officers those regiments which give their men to the Line. Such a regulation ought not by rights to have been introduced without the Queen's pleasure having been previously taken.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 16, 1855.*

Since the Army have apparently ceased from contemplating active operations in the field, the interest has considerably subsided and turns into a different channel. We now no longer look for daring deeds and successful enterprises, which covered any little omissions, and we must therefore be circumspect in our acts, and ready, as far as we can, to anticipate the public in everything conducive to the comfort of the Army. To secure vigilant care of the troops, we must keep their commander in sound health, and therefore I must entreat of you to allow nothing to induce you to treat health as a trifle. I know how much our officers are apt from the best of motives to do so, and they refuse to go for a few days to sea, which might set them right, and like the stitch in time save nine. Now I mean to give you no excuse for this by telling you that I expect you, at your own leisure, to visit your Army at Kertch, Scutari, and even Smyrna, should you think it advisable. You will have a vessel at your service, and you must judge for yourself when you can most comfortably leave your charge on the plateau.

Urges attention
to health on
Codrington.

Having noticed your health, I now pass to the wintering of the troops. So long as the enemy is so near, you know him too well to leave anything to chance, and I presume you have already arranged with Pélissier to hold a proper occupation of a line of defence from the former French right to Balaclava, so as to secure yourselves from any surprise by the Russians during the winter. Having looked to your security, I suppose the quartering of the Army is engaging your attention. It was an egregious error in the Navy people meddling with our hut vessels, and I fear much confusion has arisen from their so doing, but I trust this has ceased, and that huts are arriving daily and going up speedily to their positions. I have various accounts of the Land Transport Corps, but all concur in saying that it is not as it should be. I fear

Wintering
of troops.

Colonel M'Murdo undertook a work too heavy for him, and that he has broken down under it, but I am glad to see that danger was past. The officers who come home tell me that his animals are ill cared for, ill-treated, and allowed to stray everywhere. There can be no excuse that money has not been spent on that force. I am now sending out a large number of drivers, and I hope with these Colonel M'Murdo will be able to do better.

To him and the railway I look for the welfare of your people in the winter, and I trust supplies will always be moving to the front as fast as weather and roads will allow, and that every precaution will be taken to give the men fresh meat and onions, or potatoes, four times a-week, and good salt provisions and split peas the other three. The ration of spirits seems to me to admit of consideration, and if it could be stopped I am sure it would tend to good, at all events it might be reduced. I have already written you an official letter on this point, and I will give you another to-day, as I wish to relieve you from personal responsibility in this matter.

Clothing, feeding,
amusement
of soldiers.

After the quarters of the men, I consider their clothing to stand next in order. I believe that you have ample supplies of under warm clothing, but unless you make punishments for neglect in putting it on, and cause inspections to be made to secure its being worn, you will be surprised to find how it is shirked. You must impress on every grade of officer that much, nay everything, depends on warmth, and on their resorting to all expedients to keep the men's spirits in activity. No man should be allowed to leave his hut for work or duty without something warm to start with, such as soup, and the same waiting him on return.

I dare say many will say all this is coddling the soldier; my answer is, unless you care for the men, they will not care for themselves, and neglected soldiers will neither march so well, work so well, or fight so well as men thoroughly well fed and housed, and kept in condition and wind, free from constant and vexatious drills.

Don't suppose, however, by this that I look down on drill. Far from it. Now is your time for drill, re-organ-

ising drill. Officers and men require it, and it comes more palatably to the men when they see officers at it as well as themselves. You must let me know by telegraph your wants and wishes, and I will meet them as far as I am able. Excuse this long letter, but I feel so anxious on our troops being well wintered that I think of it every hour.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

November 17, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's letter of yesterday, which he regrets that Your Majesty should have had the trouble of writing.

1. Lord Panmure transmits such of the reports as he has received, in original, and has the honour to request that Your Majesty will return them when convenient.

In the schedule accompanying them, Lord Panmure has written in red ink those which are not yet made, but he has ordered them to be furnished forthwith.

2. The purchase of the ground for the new Military Hospital on Southampton Water is not yet completed, as a question has arisen as to the supply of water, and the engineer officers are examining the ground, and boring to ascertain whether a sufficient supply can be obtained. Lord Panmure will immediately appoint a committee of competent persons to consider plans. In talking upon the subject with Captain Laffan,¹ it appears to him and Lord Panmure advisable to build the hospital by degrees, so that it may be occupied as each wing or ward is finished.

3. The regiments of the Foreign Legion which have embarked for foreign service have been given over to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Swiss regiment, which embarked this morning in the *Great Britain*, has been under the Commander-in-Chief for six weeks.

Lord Panmure would be too glad to hand over the different regiments much sooner, but experience has proved

¹ R.E., and for some time M.P.

Giving over of
foreign regi-
ments to the
Commander-in-
Chief.

that there are many things which require correction and conforming to British practice, which a Secretary of State can do at once and quietly, but which the Commander-in-Chief would find great trouble in carrying out, as he can only act within Your Majesty's regulations and by following established etiquette. Lord Panmure fully admits to Your Majesty that the system of organisation has been in many respects loose, but the necessity of the case required it, and the results will not disappoint Your Majesty's expectations.

The foreign
regiments.

Lord Panmure has desired the Inspector-General of Foreign Legions to hand over two more regiments of Germans to the Commander-in-Chief in a few days.

The extreme difficulty of finding accommodation for troops has caused Dover to be given up to the Swiss, but Lord Panmure hopes soon to be able to give over more of the Legion to Lord Hardinge.

While upon this point, Lord Panmure has the satisfaction to inform Your Majesty that the 1st Regiment of Germans has disembarked at Scutari in perfect order, and is admired by all the officers out there.

Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit to your Majesty a letter which he has just received from Colonel Kinloch,¹ notifying the embarkation of the Swiss in a manner which must be gratifying to Your Majesty.

4. With reference to this paragraph of Your Majesty's letter, Lord Panmure has, in dealing with the Militia, not departed from former practice. In none of the circulars issued to its commanding officers is the name of the 'Queen' invoked, though Lord Panmure is not prepared to doubt the propriety of submitting to Your Majesty such changes as those to which Your Majesty has drawn attention.

Reduction of
officers of
Militia.

The reduction of officers was loudly called for, as in many regiments they vastly exceeded reasonable bounds. In one regiment the saving to the public amounted to £2000 a-year.

There can be no doubt that the circular intended to meet the difficulty of too many officers was objectionable

¹ Inspector-General of Foreign Legions.

on the grounds stated by Your Majesty, but as soon as this was made known to Lord Panmure, he issued the circular of which he has the honour to enclose a copy for Your Majesty's use, which he hopes will meet the difficulty that has arisen.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 17, 1855.

The explosion¹ on the 15th was indeed heavy ; it must have been terrific in its immediate neighbourhood—a sort of triangular or circular *bouleversement* of everything flat within about fifty yards of its centre, and all huts and roofs exposed to its first blast within three hundred yards damaged by, either falling, or the sides and planks of roofs being blown in. And beyond this, in a large circle, shells and splinters of burst shells were sent half a mile in some places, and in the quantities to cause many of the casualties I have recorded in an official letter to yourself. A terrific explosion.

You will get officially the summary sheet of information about the Russian Army opposite : there seems but little change in their dispositions ; they crowded all the batteries on the North Side in the explosion (I was told), and they opened a considerable fire from them, which caused loss to the French in the town and their batteries.

I suspended for the next morning all duties, except that of preparation before daylight to meet any possible attack which the enemy might be disposed to make. On seeing that all was quiet, the Divisions were dismissed ; and, though later than usual, resumed the now smaller parties on the roads.

The main road to the Camp is nearly completed—the Division roads from it to their own and to regimental camps are progressing, some being complete. I wish more huts were up and established, but all exertion is being made to remedy our misfortune in the Light Division huts, as well as to distribute the cargoes to others as they arrive. The new roads.

¹ See *infra*. The explosion occurred in a windmill which had been converted to a magazine for ammunition.

Chief of the
Staff.

I do not know how the system of Chief of the Staff will work. I think it will do—it must do—we must make it do. But the men are new to it, and it is also new to us and the Army; we must therefore trust to our attention and energy to overcome any difficulties.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, *November 19, 1855.*

I really only write for the sake of not interrupting the usual course, for I have nothing of moment to say.

Sir Colin
Campbell.

Sir Colin Campbell arrived on Saturday and called on me. I put into his hands a copy of the letter which I addressed to him by the bag which conveyed your appointment. He seemed then to be in very good tone, and though I asked him no questions, he appeared to me to be not indisposed to resume his duties as commander of one of your Corps d'Armée.

I have since seen Lord Hardinge, who reports Sir Colin to have changed his key, and he thinks that some of the old officers at the club have been tampering with his sensitiveness.

However, he is going to visit the Queen, and if Her Majesty, as I doubt not, expresses a hope that he will return, I am convinced he will do so. Both I and Lord Hardinge think it is desirable he should do so, as such an example will quell the grumbling at home and be of much support to you in your arduous duties.

I feel you are right as to Kaffa and Arabat, but it is to be regretted that winter should find them in the enemy's possession.

The account of the terrible explosion in the Artillery quarter reached me yesterday and has occasioned me much pain.

I am glad to find we had no powder there. I suppose we shall have a full account of the accident officially. I long for your sentiments on the means of stopping drunkenness. Sir Colin was clean for putting down all the booths at both old and new Kadikoi.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 19, 1855.*

The Queen is glad to hear of Sir Colin Campbell's arrival in good health and spirits. It is the opinion of those that know him that, on reflection, he would be ready to return to the Crimea and take command of one of the Corps d'Armée. As the Queen has asked him down to Windsor for two nights to-morrow, she is anxious to know how matters stand in this respect, in order that she may be prepared how to broach the subject towards him.

The Queen to
speak to Sir
Colin Campbell.

We deeply deplore the sad explosion in the Camp in the Crimea, and the melancholy loss of life, as well as injury, sustained.

How is Sir Harry Jones? Does Lord Panmure think that he would shortly be able to come down to Windsor—perhaps only of a morning, to enable us to see him—or would he be unequal even to that for some time to come? Perhaps Lord Panmure will ascertain this for the Queen.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 19, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of the 17th, and thanks him for the immediate attendance to her questions.

1. She returns the reports as Lord Panmure desired, but hopes that she will receive her copy to keep, when it can be got ready.

The mass of old 'flint-lock' muskets in store is very extraordinary. The amount of new muskets (1853 pattern) would enable the Army in the Crimea to be supplied entirely with that weapon—of which the Queen understands several Divisions are still armed with the Minié of 1851. This subject is important.

Obsolete arms.

The Queen sees from the reports that the new fort at

Harwich has been armed with 24-pounders!! The experience of this war has shown that nothing but the heaviest armaments can withstand the fire of modern shipping; 24-pounders would therefore prove quite useless. The Queen would ask Lord Panmure to draw Lord Hardinge's and Sir John Burgoyne's attention to the subject, in order to arrive, in concurrence with them, at a decision upon the proposed armament of our sea-defences in general, in order that no useless expense may be incurred, nor a delusive security be established with regard to the strength of them.

2. The Queen is glad to hear that Lord Panmure will take immediate steps for the appointment of a Committee to advise on the construction of the new Military Hospital.

3. The report of Colonel Kinloch about the two regiments of Swiss just embarked is very satisfactory, and the Queen is glad to observe that Lord Panmure concurs with her in the propriety of turning the foreign regiments over to the Horse Guards as soon as practicable.

4. The new regulation about the Militia, of which Lord Panmure has sent a copy, will to a certain degree remedy the evil apprehended from the former one, but still holds out punishment if, after three months, the deficiencies caused by volunteering are not filled up.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

November 19, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward to Your Majesty the despatches which have just arrived. There is no private letter from General Simpson, which arises from the fact of the General having embarked in person.

Your Majesty cannot fail to perceive with satisfaction the good health of the Army.

Lord Panmure has spoken to Lord Hardinge on the subjects of the temporary appointment to the Land Transport Corps referred to in the enclosed telegram, subject to

Your Majesty's approval, for which Lord Hardinge will apply. Colonel Wetherall is well fitted for the important position.

Lord Panmure has had the honour to receive the two boxes from Your Majesty. He has had a conversation this morning with Lord Hardinge on the subject of Sir Colin Campbell's return. Lord Hardinge did not find Sir Colin in such good-humour as Lord Panmure found him, and it was evident that he had visited the 'United Service Club.'¹ Sir Colin very candidly informed Lord Hardinge that he had resolved to come home some time ago, in consequence of the combined effect of a rumour which reached him of the selection of General Markham for command of the Army, and the offer of the command at Malta to himself. He considered this as indicating a wish for his absence from the Army, and resolved to leave as soon as the fighting was over and he saw his Division with prospects of comfort for the winter. Sir Colin will probably decline to return at Lord Hardinge's suggestion, but he used the following expression which denotes his devotion to Your Majesty, and his readiness to obey any wish or advice or hope expressed by Your Majesty. He said, 'I do not return in pique at being passed over, for had the Queen appointed a corporal to command the Army and intimated to me her desire that my services should be continued, I would never have come away.' Both Lord Hardinge and Lord Panmure concur in opinion that Sir Colin's return will be attended with good effect to Your Majesty's Army both at home and abroad, and should Your Majesty in conversation with Sir Colin Campbell be graciously pleased to intimate that it would afford satisfaction to Your Majesty were he to return to assume command of the 1st Corps d'Armée, your Majesty would establish the authority of your Royal Warrant and save a fine old soldier from lapsing into a retired grumbler.

Sir Colin Campbell's reasons for his return.

Sir Colin's loyalty.

Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty a report from 'The Royal Gun Foundry,' and to

¹ The members of which were considered to be critically inclined.

state that he has given orders for the others to be immediately copied for Your Majesty's use.

In obedience to Your Majesty's commands, Lord Panmure will present himself at Windsor early on Wednesday morning, so as to be in readiness to attend Your Majesty before the Council. Lord Panmure will confer with Lord Hardinge and Sir John Burgoyne as to the points in Your Majesty's note and be prepared to explain them on Wednesday to Your Majesty.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 19, 1855.

Re-adjustment
of Staff
appointments.

. . . You may imagine that the complete commencement of a new system of offices and correspondence would of itself require much attention and occupation by details; still more so when there is the additional circumstance of change of men.

But I think it will work: even starting in the midst of all the different and somewhat independent departments—Army Works Corps, Land Transport Corps, and the many departments, Commissariat, Medical and Military—we have not yet got into scrape or difficulty.

[November] 20.

Arrival of
Cavalry of
Turkish
Contingents.

General Shirley¹ arrived just now, having with him, in three steamers and some sailing-vessels, the Cavalry of the Turkish Contingents, which had, at General Vivian's request, been ordered from the Bosphorus to Kertch. . . .

Some felt and some tow arrived in a vessel yesterday; but I understand that these essential things just now are at the lower part, and many water-carts at the upper part of the vessel.

We have last night and this morning the first rain—not in violence at all; on the contrary, it is fine and not cold. . . .

¹ He had the reputation of being a first-rate Cavalry officer.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 20, 1855.*

The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter received to-day, and will gladly express to the brave and chivalrous old Highlander, Sir Colin Campbell, her earnest hope that he will again devote himself to her service as he has hitherto so nobly done. His loyalty towards herself is very gratifying to her.

If it suited Lord Panmure, we should be very glad if he would dine and sleep here to-morrow; we have a performance in the evening in honour of the Princess Royal's fifteenth birthday.

Will Lord Panmure be so good as to make the inquiries relative to the health of Sir Harry Jones which she begged him to do in her letter of yesterday.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 22, 1855.*

The Queen has this day written to Lord Hardinge, informing him of Sir Colin Campbell's very handsome conduct in consenting instantly to return to the Crimea to take command of the 1st Corps d'Armée.

Sir Colin
Campbell con-
sents to return
to the Crimea.

She has at the same time, however, stated what she wishes now to repeat to Lord Panmure (though she knows he feels it as strongly as herself), that, as by his and Lord Hardinge's advice she has obtained from Sir Colin the sacrifice of his own feelings to her wishes, she feels herself personally bound not to permit him to be passed over a second time, should the command again fall vacant. Lord Panmure will be so good as to communicate this to Lord Palmerston.

We deeply regret the death of General Markham, who is a serious loss. The 2nd Corps d'Armée will thus become vacant. The Queen would wish, before he appoints his successor, to consider with Lord Hardinge whether Sir

William Eyre should be permanently confirmed in the position he now holds temporarily. . . .

Sir C. Campbell spoke in the very highest terms of General Mansfield,¹ as one of the most promising officers in the Army; useful as he may be where he is, it strikes the Queen that he would be far more useful in the field.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 24, 1855.

General Vivian
at Kertch.

There is nothing of consequence to refer to in a private letter; the Cavalry being returned in such a hurry from Kertch, after having been at General Vivian's express wish sent up in such a hurry, was provoking.² I have written, of course, to General Vivian with my mention of it in that tone: he had treated the idea of a want of forage there (expressed by the Admiral) as 'fallacious.' And thus a waste of transport has ensued at a time when it was wanted for our own people. There are no movements of the enemy to indicate an attack, or advance in force towards Kertch. General Vivian is entrenching the heights above the town, and I have desired him to ask for Artillery from the Turkish Government, for we have not what he demands for the armament of various redoubts, viz. thirty guns—32-pounders—and some large howitzers.

Suggestion as
to best defence
of Kertch.

I have also said that he, having a considerable force, viz. 13,000 or 14,000 Infantry and forty-two field-guns—the whole good troops as I am assured—might make the best defence of Kertch by an attack upon a force that should venture on so long a line of communication as one from Kara Su; it does not seem likely that such an attempt would be made.

The cold at Kinburn has been severe—ice on the

¹ Military Commissioner in Turkey, afterwards Lord Sandhurst.

² The Cavalry of the Turkish Contingent had been ordered from the Bosphorus to Kertch, where, from want of forage, they were unable to remain.

boats and on the shores; but all well defensible. I hear this from a Naval officer just arrived.

The hutting is going on fairly, as you will have learnt by my telegraph, and the damages of so many huts by the explosion¹ are being quickly remedied. Progress of hutting.

I have put on men night and day for the destruction of the docks; perhaps it will be worth while taking the gates away, as they are all in pieces riveted together; they might either be useful or as 'trophies.' In this varying climate here we are again in fine, clear, dry weather—a great advantage to our transport of huts and commissariat.

LORD PANMURE TO THE QUEEN

November 24, 1855.

Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty's note of the 22nd inst., which he would have done sooner, but a visit to the Speaker prevented his reception of it.

Lord Panmure is happy to inform Your Majesty that his telegram reached the Crimea in time to stop the sale of Sir Colin Campbell's horses and chattels, so that he will very shortly depart to resume his duties. It will be impossible to pass over Sir Colin again, unless, indeed, he exhibits, in command of the 1st Corps, such apparent incapacity as to render his appointment to the command of the Army dangerous to its safety. This Lord Panmure does not anticipate. Lord Palmerston shall immediately be informed of Your Majesty's views. Sir Colin's return to the Crimea settled.

Lord Panmure has the honour of forwarding to Your Majesty the despatches which arrived yesterday and contain most satisfactory intelligence of the changes in the Army. Sir William Codrington assumes his duties with a very proper spirit, which bids fair for the future. Lord Panmure agrees in every word he says about the Press, and would publish the despatch,² but he thinks it more Codrington's criticism of the Press endorsed.

¹ By which thirty-one huts were destroyed and sixty-one damaged.

² The draft of this despatch was drawn up by Prince Albert.

prudent not to bring a hornet's nest about Sir William's ears at first starting. Lord Panmure has fully made up his mind that, if the Army takes the field, the Press shall form no portion of the line of march.

New appointment consequent on death of General Markham.

Lord Panmure unites with Your Majesty in deeply deploring the death of General Markham. Sir William Eyre, being appointed to command the 2nd Corps pending General Markham's illness, should, with all deference to Your Majesty's decision, in the opinion of Lord Panmure be allowed to retain the command.

General Mansfield's services in the front will be required, but he is too junior an officer to aspire to so high a command with no Crimean service to record.

Lord Panmure ventures to address Your Majesty on a different subject on another sheet.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 25, 1855.*

The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter with the very satisfactory and excellent despatches from Sir William Codrington.

The Queen will write to him herself to-morrow, and send her letter to the War Office.

The return of Sir Colin Campbell will be very gratifying to Sir William.

The Queen most readily grants Lord Panmure an absence for the pious and melancholy duty of consigning to their last resting-place the remains of his gallant and much-lamented brother;¹ she trusts the rapid journey will not be too much for Lord Panmure.

He will be so good as to leave directions that the telegrams and despatches are transmitted to her during his absence from the War Office.

Upon the whole, the Queen thinks that it would be well that Sir William Eyre should be confirmed in the command of the 2nd Corps d'Armée.

Sir William Eyre.

¹ Colonel the Hon. Lauderdale Maule, who died of cholera at Varna.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 25, 1855.

. . . Here is a letter from Stratford which Clarendon sends me, as he does all from Stratford. The statements made at the latter part of it, as to the way in which our Commissariat supplies are purchased, is rather startling, and seems to need inquiry. Such assertions, if brought out in the House of Commons, would produce an impression.

Startling statements as to purchase of Commissariat supplies.

Zamoyski came to me two days ago, saying that you had settled all his affairs except some small details. It would be a good thing to finish him off before you go to Scotland, and to be liberal with him in details. He can scarcely get on unless you give him here an advance of part of the money which he is authorised to draw at Constantinople.

As Austria is bent upon drawing us into negotiations, the formation of a good Polish Corps would be a powerful instrument of negotiation, and be as good, as a demonstration coercitive upon Russia, as the occupation of Kinburn.

Bearing upon Russia and Austria of the formation of a Polish Corps.

It would have a good effect also upon Austria. It would be a hint to all of those Eastern Powers that peace ought to be made soon, while at the same time it commits us to nothing and gives none of them the slightest ground for saying a word of remonstrance.

PS.—I doubt the expediency of having asked the Queen to request Campbell to go back. Sovereigns are best kept out of such matters.

Let us have the gates of Sebastopol sent home, as proposed by Codrington; they will be better than the gates of Somnauth.¹

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

WAR DEPARTMENT, November 26, 1855.

. . . I have received your public and private communications with great pleasure, and they have given equal satisfaction to the Queen and my colleagues. The manly yet

¹ Memorable through a famous piece of bombast of Lord Ellenborough's.

modest tone inspires me with confidence for the future, and the ready acquiescence of the senior officers tells as much in your favour as it does in theirs. I only wish my old friend the Admiral had lived to see the day when his son was called to lead the Army of England, as *he* was to lead its Fleet.

I think you are right to make your changes by degrees, but an event which you did not and could not contemplate has occurred, which will of course expedite the formation of your two Corps d'Armée, I mean the resolution of Sir Colin Campbell to return immediately to the Crimea. He does this from perceiving the anxiety felt by the Queen and the Government that he should do so, and we have pressed it on him, as tending to give firmness to your position and prove to the Army that the principle of selection for high command, and not succession by seniority, is no farce but a present and future reality.

I do not mean to say, *cæteris paribus*, seniority ought not to have its fair weight, nor do I mean to say that selection is to be wantonly made, but I wish the Army to feel that professional merit is the true road to preferment, and that fools and idlers are no longer to look to it as a lounging refuge in which to kill time for a few years. I must do Sir Colin the justice to say that he has behaved with great discretion as far as I can learn, and no expressions of disappointment have escaped him. He has been very close in all professional questions, and nobody seems to have been able to screw an opinion out of him; indeed I am told that when cross-questioned by the Prince on past events, H.R.H. failed in extracting any criticisms from him. From the moment he resolved to return, his shrewdness showed him that the least said soonest mended. You have done well to refer, as you have done, to his public character. You must judge for yourself as to Barnard and Windham. If you think one more fitted than the other for the Chief of the Staff, I do not mean to fetter you in any way; but with Lord Hardinge's concurrence we fixed upon Windham for the Chief of the Staff, because, being in such close and intimate contact with you, we thought Barnard would prefer the change.

Sir Colin
Campbell to
return to the
Crimea.

Judicious
reticence of
Sir Colin.

I entirely give in to your views as to the change of administration which must take place to give a fair trial to the Chief of the Staff. I intended what you propose to carry out, but neither Lord Raglan nor Simpson entered *con amore* into the changes, and they tolerated the individual out of deference to authority, but never attempted to place him in his proper position. The Quartermaster and Adjutant General are merely heads of branches under the Chief of the Staff. I perfectly enter into your views of having all the correspondence of the Army addressed to the Chief of the Staff, marked for what department it is meant, and to be by him separated, transmitted, and acted on, if he thinks right, on the instant. Whatever aid he may require, you have only to ask it for me to sanction the expense of it. Your Military Secretary by this means, as you say, is divested of much work which now encumbers him, and of course deprives you of the benefit of his full services. He will thus become what he ought to be, the chief of your Chancellerie, and you will be left to give your directions as to public correspondence, to write as much or as little as you please, and devote your physical exertions to the Army, unoppressed by labours of the desk which have, we think, weighed so heavily on your predecessors. You have by telegram since the date of your letter suggested Colonel Wetherall to succeed M'Murdo, and I therefore presume that you have selected Herbert for your Quartermaster-General.

Duties of Chief
of the Staff.

Only one word more and I will release you from this long detail. The telegrams I send you are intentionally *curt*, not one word more than sufficient for the clear comprehension of their meaning. Simpson has, foolishly in my opinion, mistaken curtness for censure. Now, no censure will ever be meant in a telegram, and I hope you will not imagine for an instant that any such is even intended.

Sir James¹ has called to-day, and I learn he is looking well, though I have not seen him. I forward you a letter from the Queen. . . .

¹ Simpson.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 26, 1855.*

Change of
intention as
to Eyre.

Upon further consideration, the Queen wishes to express her belief that there would be great advantage in *not confirming* Sir William Eyre in the command of the 2nd Corps at *present*, but leaving him merely in acting command. The confirmation can at any time be given. . . . His holding the acting command at first will also soothe the feelings of Lord Rokeby and General Barnard, who must feel the additional elevation of another junior officer very much.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 27, 1855.

I received yesterday your official letter about drunkenness in the Army, and your private letter at the same time of the 9th.

I have your telegraphic message of the death of General Markham,¹ the account received with interest and regret by all.

Formation of
the Army into
Corps.

I have also the telegraph of Sir Colin Campbell returning to the Army to command a Corps. I have written to you by last mail, with my opinion on the formation of the Army into Corps; I cannot say I think it a good plan, I see many disadvantages in it, and serious ones; and I do not see the object aimed at, beyond a personal one towards the officers who are put in command of them.

I hope you will settle with Lord Hardinge clearly the authority which they are to have. One of the foundations of the best military arrangement of all armies seems to be 'the Division'—that it would be a small army in itself, with Commissariat, Artillery, and Transport complete, and under the control of the General Officer commanding. I do not know if it is intended to continue that independent

¹ General Markham had distinguished himself in India, and his premature death was felt as a great loss to the Army.

power with him, or whether you intend that the General Officer commanding the Corps is to enter into the arrangements, discipline, establishment, and full control of the detail. If so, we may have two totally different systems going on in the Army at the same time; and, if the Generals of Division are to retain that authority in their own hands, it leaves but little to the care of the General of the Corps.

Corps *versus*
Divisions.

I apprehend that the general principle of an officer commanding a Corps is that an army is large enough to detach almost an army in itself, say 20,000 or 25,000 men; and that it requires in such case a General Officer of unquestionably higher rank than those of his subordinate Divisions.

This is scarcely the case with the English Army, of which it will scarcely be the wish to separate half of it in any future operations. However, you will find me ready, and very willing, notwithstanding my opinion, to carry out in its spirit any directions for such a change.

As soon as I came into command, I laid down for myself and General Windham a general understanding—I will not say a positive rule, for that is impossible—that I would grant leave, where the state of the regiment permitted it, to officers who had been a long time out here and engaged in active work. And this independent of what is called ‘urgent private affairs.’ That term is a sort of acknowledged officiality, and is too much used. . . .

As to leave
granted for
‘urgent private
affairs.’

I think your suggestion of giving free passages will be a great boon, and will enable indulgence for short periods to be granted to many by keeping those periods short.

Nobody in this Army, from the General to the Subaltern, and I think I may add to the drummer, was surprised at the drunkenness during the month of October.

As to recent
drunkenness in
Camp.

There had been given to the soldier, not merely a prospective increase in his pay of sixpence a-day, but the accumulation of back pay to that amount for about three months; for the order to issue that allowance was the 21st September for the back period from the 1st July.

Indeed it was to be expected—would it have been

otherwise in England, even amongst older soldiers, or even among many other classes?

Added to this, the work of the siege was over—the real bodily work and occupation—as well as the consequent mental excitement of service.

It was bad, no doubt; for I, and every one who looked about him at that time, saw people lying about as if after a skirmish with an enemy—that is, towards the evening.

Then, remember, there was pay for the roads to about 9000 or 10,000 men of the Army, at an additional eight-pence a-day to all this!

It is all very well to suppose about savings-banks and transfers to England; nobody doubts its being a very good thing; but the man who may be shot, or dead by disease, to-morrow or a week hence must be excused if he looks to himself more than to his very distant heirs and successors.

After all, your Lordship must remember one thing, that the evil of drunkenness when it happens *saute aux yeux*: the drunken man lying about is seen and remarked; the much greater proportion in their tents or huts is not remarked.

Drunkenness
of the soldiers
accounted for
and to some
extent palliated.

The majority of the Army, as I always found in a regiment, is good, are not drunkards; and this national vice, a misfortune, is not confined to soldiers. Then look at the recruits sent out to the Crimea: are they a 'better' class, an older class, a steadier class than recruits which formed the first army sent to Turkey? Certainly not, and they were as apt to learn the vices as I hope they will learn many virtues of a soldier's profession.

The sale of spirits is not permitted in the regimental canteens, that is, in canteens of natives, or Maltese, or Greeks, or Germans, which commissioned officers of regiments have in their own lines and under their own regulations; but as to spirits not finding their way to Balaclava, to camp, to huts, to tents, as long as there is a quantity of money in a soldier's pocket, and that Balaclava and Kamiesh are ports free to land for French, Sardinians, and all the heterogeneous supplying merchants and traders of the Levant—it is not likely to be.

SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON TO LORD PANMURE

November 27, 1855.

The mail just in brings me another private letter from you. The kind feeling [of] both General Barnard and Lord Rokeby I was sure of, when once they thought it right to remain ; but I cannot say what their feelings may be if, by another junior officer being placed over them, they find themselves excluded from any position which they may look for from their seniority and service.

There is no doubt every military man must feel that the care and discipline of troops must depend on the attention to detail and interest shown by Regimental Commanding Officers. As the line-of-battle ship—so the battalion. The duty of General Officers must of necessity be more external, though those external efforts are necessary to keep Commanding Officers up to the mark. However, it has, I think, always been found in our Army that the exception is singular of Commanding Officers *not* taking an interest and doing their best for their men ; and even if one, personally, does not, it generally is accompanied by an indolence that enables a junior to be of use ; it is seldom that a man is actively obstinate for the neglect of men ; and you will find, as Lord Hardinge must well know, that all those multifarious details for a Commanding Officer obtain generally attention and secure the comfort and efficiency for the men. Like drunkenness, referred to in my letter of to-day, we must not take the exception as the rule.

A report—I think a mere report—of the Russians advancing on Kertch ; it was signalled as a report from the shore to a vessel just come in.

It is snowing, and is winter ; we have had rain three days ago, making the roads on hillsides like glass ; we had cold yesterday blowing through one, we had frost and ice on windows last night, we have snow to-day. And remember—and I remember with a conviction I did right—that this would have been just the time probably of

Duties of
Generals and of
Regimental
Officers.

Wintry
weather.

What might
have been done.

disembarkation of troops, stoves, artillery, for siege at Kaffa and marching to Arabat! I do not enter on the question—oh! such an important one at the time—of whether an army, a real army, could not have been put on the then most vulnerable flank of the Russians by pretending for Odessa and landing at the Alma, or even at Old Fort again; not marching from Eupatoria over a country wanting water, but coming on the march of high recollections and crossing up to the Belbec plateau: such an expedition, however, must have been an army, not a detachment. It must have been strong enough to fight the Russian army of Mackenzie;¹ and why not, and what more to be wished?

It has been found out that the ridge of the Russians is too strong a position to be touched from our, the French, right; but it took time and means to do so.

Strength of
British and of
Russian
positions.

The merit of Russian position at Simpheropol, etc., is its being central, and that you cannot safely put a detachment on one flank, and a detachment on another to hem in, without exposing each to a superior central force. So the merit of our plateau here is great—the attacking-party of such mutually strong positions is put at the disadvantage; and so the Russians found at the Tchernaya battle.

Looking ahead.

It will be a great point for the English and French Governments to come to some understanding as to the continuance of the war here (I mean including all Crimea), or elsewhere. The Russian object, I presume, will be to leave a force on the heights sufficient to be tolerably safe from winter and early spring direct attack, and yet not too large for their power of supply; and, if they mean to dispute the Crimea next year, to send so strong a force as to put us in the same difficulty there has been of a direct attack upon this¹ front, without our exposing Balaclava and the plateau.

Importance to
the Russians
of holding the
harbour.

To say they have political and military hold of the harbour is a great point for them: possibly worth great efforts and sacrifice now and next year.

¹ The Mackenzie Heights.

² *i.e.* the Russian.

The Government must consider if it is their purpose, their determined purpose, to drive them from the South of the Crimea, and deprive Russia of that political and military advantage, as a preferable point to attacking elsewhere. . . .

The huts are not the least watertight, very bad roofs, leak at joints, thin wood, and defective.

THE QUEEN TO LORD PANMURE

WINDSOR CASTLE, *November 29, 1855.*

The Queen has seen Sir William Codrington's letters and despatches of the 13th. She would wish no decision to be made with regard to the list for the distribution of the Crosses of the Légion d'Honneur till she has seen and spoken to Lord Panmure on the subject.

As to list of names to be recommended for the Légion d'Honneur.

It seems to her that Sir William has, in this list, only named those officers and men who are now in the Crimea, and has not included any of those who have come home, many of whom are amongst the most distinguished of the Army.

MAJOR STUART¹ TO MAJOR GRAHAM

(Forwarded by Major Graham to Lord Panmure)

ERZEROU, *November 29, 1855.*

For some time past it has been in my thoughts to write to you, but I have put it off from post to post in the hope of being able to announce something definite with respect to the war in this country, and perhaps to send you favourable tidings of Kars. This hope, I am sorry to say, is now at an end. Within the last few days an event has occurred which for the present gives the Russians the upper hand, and which, so far as I can yet foresee, will enable them to carry on a long and obstinate war in these parts—in a word, Williams, with his brave garrison, has had to sur-

Particulars of the fall of Kars and its results.

¹ Of the 7th Fusiliers. He had been selected, with Captains Garden and Cathcart, to assist General Williams, who had attached him to the force under Selim Pasha at Erzeroum.

render. The intelligence was brought in here on the afternoon of the 27th by General Kimety, who, you may remember, took such a conspicuous part in the affair of the 29th September. He is a Hungarian refugee, and being afraid to fall into the hands of the Russians, lest they should deliver him up to the Austrian Government, he left Kars at sunset on the 24th, with General Williams' permission, and, in company with General Kolman, another refugee, and a few Kurds, succeeded in getting through the Russian lines and making his escape. The account he has given me is to the following effect. On the 23rd inst., General Williams received a letter, dated the 12th inst., from our Consul here, informing him that no assistance could be afforded him from this quarter. I should tell you that for some time he had been anxiously looking in this direction, misled by a vaunting promise made to him by Selim Pasha, immediately after his arrival here, towards the end of last month. This promise was to the effect that he would march without delay to his relief, as he had brought with him strong and well-appointed reinforcements from Constantinople. Williams naturally believed him, and consequently was holding out from day to day, looking in vain for the aid that was not to come. I understand that he had been deceived at first in the same way by Omar Pasha, but latterly he saw that nothing was to be expected from him. Now, as regards Selim Pasha's reinforcements, 1000 men arrived here about a week after himself, 1000 more are expected in eight or ten days, and I have learned that a third instalment has landed at Trebizond. Had Williams known how matters really stood, he might have marched out a fortnight ago, when his men were still in fighting condition. The fall of Kars must therefore be charged to the *falsehood of Turkish Generals and to the dilatoriness of the Turkish Government*. But to proceed. On the receipt of the letter above referred to, Williams saw at once his position, and early on the following morning he called together all the Pashas in Kars, explained to them how matters stood, and asked them severally if their men were equal to the attempt of cutting their way out. The answer

The Turks to
blame for the
fall of Kars.

of all was that it would be impossible owing to the state of the men, debilitated and emaciated as they were by long privations and severe work. Add to these the general demoralisation that had succeeded to their previous good discipline. Under these circumstances it was the unanimous opinion that no alternative remained but to surrender. Accordingly Teesdale was sent to Muravieff in the course of the day. He had not returned when Kimety left, so that here for the present I must stop. No intelligence has since arrived.

You can judge of the extremity to which they were reduced when I tell you that, on the 24th, there were in store but six days' rations, at the rate of half a pound of bread a-day per man. The hospitals were crowded. 70 and 80 a-day were dying of starvation. Many had gone raving mad, and all looked like living skeletons. With the townspeople it fared if possible still worse. They all looked to Williams, and his quarters were constantly beset with frantic women who flung their starving children on his steps to die.

Now, I maintain that all this might have been averted had there been here a man of common pluck and ability. *Selim Pasha has not a spark of either. In the return he has furnished to me of the men at his disposal, he has put down the number at somewhat more than 7000. I know from good authority, and from my own eyes, that they are nearly double that. I have been incessantly at him. I have suggested to him what to do. I have offered to take the command of a body of Cavalry and make a dash into Kars with a convoy of provisions, but no—Turkish apathy is not so easily acted upon.*

The truth is, if we are to make war successfully in this country, we must have BRITISH Commanders.

The Turkish soldiers are splendid fellows and might be made anything of, but, from some inherent evil in the national system, it is necessary for a Turk, as he rises in life, to become an adept in falsehood, dissimulation, and selfishness, so that the higher you look in the grades of society, the more accomplished villains will you find. This

Privations
during siege
of Kars.

Supineness of
Selim Pasha,
and moral
deduced
therefrom.

Character of
Turkish
soldiers and
officers.

is the cause of the striking difference that exists between the respective merits of Turkish officers and soldiers. . . .

We must now prepare for the Russians' fire. The season is unusually mild, and they may come on, but I think we shall be able, if they do, to give them a warm reception.

LORD PALMERSTON TO LORD PANMURE

BROADLANDS, *January 1*, 1856.¹

How Kars
might have
been saved.

This letter from Major Stuart is important, as you say, by showing that there were means at Erzeroum sufficient to have saved Kars, if they had been directed by a man of courage and capacity. This letter, moreover, gives one hopes that Erzeroum may not fall like Kars. Reinforcements can more easily arrive, and provisions be more easily conveyed.

The wanderings of the Turkish Contingent and the Turkish Light Horse seem to rival those of Ulysses after the fall of Troy.

LORD PANMURE TO SIR WILLIAM CODRINGTON

November 30, 1855.

Decrease in
intemperance.

. . . You seem to have set your shoulder to the wheel in earnest to repair damages,² and I sincerely hope that, with huts and double tents, the men will carry through this winter in sound health. I am very glad to see in one of your letters that you consider intemperance to some extent to be corrected. I hope your stringent measures may effectually put an end to it. I had a suspicion myself as to libraries in situations with extended radii, and I am much obliged to you for sending me so much information on the subject. You shall have plenty of books, and I will not fail to follow up this source of amusement.

I quite enter into your views as to the Chief of the Staff, and with your determination to work it to good pur-


¹ Inserted here on account of its reference to the preceding letter.

² Done by the recent explosion.

pose, I am sure it will become a popular appointment in our Army, and one that will save a general's time.

I can say nothing on your arguments against the Corps d'Armée until I talk the matter over with Lord Hardinge, but I dare say Sir Colin Campbell's return to the Army may change your views on this point. . . .

END OF VOL. I.



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